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THE PLURALITY OF FORMS. NOW AND THEN

JOHN O'CALLAGHAN

HOW MANY ESSENCES does a natural kind have, one or many? In this paper I address an argument of Hilary Putnam to the effect that the plurality of modern sciences shows us that any natural kind has a plurality of essences Putnam argues for this claim in the context of objecting to what he takes to be the Thomistic assumption of a single essential or substantial form for any particular natural kind [1] Putnam's objection to the Thomist is prompted by his longstanding worries about how language or the mind "hooks onto the world "[2] He has argued that no system of representations, mental or linguistic, could have an intrinsic relationship to the world He has long used "Aristotelian" as a descriptive term applied to representationalist accounts of mind and language that appear to suggest such a built-in relationship

However, Putnam now grants that the Thomistic notion of form and its application to the identity of concepts may avoid the earlier objections he directed at what he called Aristotelianism In this concession, he has in mind the Thomist thesis that the mind's concepts are formally identical to and determined by the objects in the world that fall under those concepts, what I will call the concept identity thesis (CIT) When we use a term like "dog," it succeeds in referring to dogs because the concept we have in mind is in some fashion formally identical to dogs This looks like a powerful candidate for an intrinsic or

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Correspondence to University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy, 309 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556

[1] Putnam often refers to Thomistic-Aristotelianism, following the use of John Haldane, to whom he is responding For ease of use I use "Thomism" and "Thomistic " I also find the term "Thomistic-Aristotelianism" too narrow as implicitly suggesting that Thomism is exhausted by the Aristotelian element within it, however strong the latter may be See Hilary Putnam, *Representation and Reality* (Cambridge MIT Press, 1988), 20 for an example of his typical usage of "Aristotelian "

[2] Hilary Putnam, "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," in *Words and Life*, ed James Conant (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1995), 63

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built-in relation to the world on the part of concepts Having granted CIT to the Thomist, Putnam now looks to defeat the Thomist's position on other grounds Now he objects that the various different sciences of today reveal a multitude of essences for any particular natural kind The application to the Thomist is straightforward The advance of the sciences has shown us that there are too many substantial forms in any particular kind of thing to provide the unity of conceptual identity required by the Thomist's account To put it plainly, Putnam denies or at least doubts that "substances have a unique essence"[3] that could provide formal identity conditions for the concepts under which those substances fall In this regard, the dispute between Putnam and the Thomist is of great contemporary relevance, insofar as it bears upon longstanding questions in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology, and metaphysics

To address Putnam's objection, I will begin by describing his argument A striking feature of his argument is the family resemblance it bears to a set of arguments Aquinas faced in the thirteenth century that also argued for a plurality of essences or substantial forms for the natural kind human being This parallel suggests that a look at Aquinas's own arguments against the pluriformists or pluralists may prove helpful for providing philosophical resources for responding to Putnam in the twenty-first century Thus, I will examine the famous plurality of forms position that Aquinas argued against in the *Summa Theologiae* in order to acquire reources useful for responding to Putnam Finally, I will consider a particular case of recent scientific practice, in order to apply the results of my examination of Aquinas's arguments to the broader contemporary situation brought to our attention by Putnam's obejction, and to suggest whose position, Putnam's or the Thomist's, more adequately captures the practice of the natural sciences as we see them practiced today, and their bearing upon the metaphysical question of the nature of essence in natural kinds

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[3] Putnam, "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 74

I

Putnam's Argument for the Multiplicity of Substantial Forms

Putnam states his objection to the Thomist as follows "The greatest difficulty facing someone who wishes to hold an Aristotelian view is that the central intuition behind that view, that is, the intuition that a natural kind *has* a single determinate form (or 'nature' or 'essence') has *become* problematical"[4] He believes there is a philosophical consensus in modern thought that, given the plurality of modern sciences under which some object in a natural kind may fall, we must recognize a plurality of essences for that object, one each for each science Putnam uses the example of his dog Shlomit.[5] Take just two of the natural sciences that may investigate the nature or essence of dogs, evolutionary theory and genetic theory According to Putnam, each of these discourses will claim to be telling us what is essential to being a dog The evolutionary biologist will say that it consists in a certain history of descent shared by the members of a certain population that is the natural kind, and will discount genetic structure The geneticist will say that it consists of a certain genetic structure shared by the members of the set of dogs constitutive of the natural kind, and will discount evolutionary descent If we look directly at the essential descriptions, prima facie their conceptual contents are not identical one to another To the extent that any particular science, genetics, for instance, does not contain within itself the principles of the other science, evolutionary theory, for instance, it cannot include information based upon those other principles within its essential description

Here we have to be careful of an ambiguity in the example, since not including a feature in one's consideration of an object should not be confused with excluding it from the object that is considered In examining an apple within some discourse, biochemistry, for example, perhaps I will not include within my biochemical consideration of it that it is red Perhaps I will consider that feature in botany But by not including it in the one consideration, I have not excluded it from the object that I consider Not including it, I have made no assertion about its color Excluding it, I have So, to return to Putnam's

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[4] Ibid , emphasis added
[5] Ibid , 74–9

example, if it is to have any force, it is not enough for the respective scientists not to include the principles and elements of the other scientists Putnam's objection requires that the particular theorist assert the exclusion of the elements of the other sciences as part of the essence of the dogs that he or she studies Otherwise there is no argument among the scientists

Putnam simply provides his example of Shlomit and draws his conclusion, without giving the argument that leads to that conclusion I think it fair to construe his argument as follows

> (1) Different sciences give essential descriptions of A's (where A refers to a single natural kind, for example, the natural kind dog)
>
> (2) Inspection of the essential descriptions of A's given by the different sciences shows them to be manifestly diverse
>
> (3) Therefore, the essential forms that constitute the identity of the descriptions are diverse
>
> (4) However, the essential forms that constitute the identity of the descriptions are identical (in some sense) to the essential form(s) of the natural kind *extra animam* (beyond the soul), according to the Thomistic Aristotelian CIT
>
> (5) Thus from (3) and (4), the essential form(s) of the natural kind *extra animam* must be diverse since they are identical (in some sense) to diverse essential forms *in anima* (in the soul)
>
> (6) Therefore from (1) and (5), A's, insofar as they fall under different sciences, do not have unique essences or substantial forms
>
> (7) Therefore, the identity of the natural kind concept *A* employed in the different scientific descriptions of A's is not determined by a unique essence or substantial form of A
>
> (8) Therefore the Thomist position is false, since the Thomist assumes thecontradictory opposite of (7)

Here I think it very important to mention a crucial presupposition of Putnam's argument, which I will discuss it at greater length later on, namely, that there are natural kinds that have a certain unity to them. The argument presupposes that there is a single natural kind, even as that natural kind has multiple essential descriptions

Now each description of A, according to Putnam's Thomist, is supposed in its conceptual content to be identical to a substantial form in the world Consequently, as we have two nonidentical essential descriptions of the same natural kind A, with each description

understood in some sense as excluding the other, the conceptual contents of which are prima facie diverse, the natural kind must have at least two types of essence determined by multiple substantial forms, the evolutionary and the genetic In order to make a point in the last section of the paper, I want to emphasize here that Putnam's argument is not confined to these two sciences, genetics and evolutionary theory. Presumably it applies just as well to morphology, in which, for instance, the bone structure of a natural kind of dog is analyzed while excluding its genetics or evolutionary history So there are at least three essential descriptions, and at least three types of essence determined by multiple substantial forms, and so on for any additional sciences that happen to study such a natural kind. Thus, there is no unique essence or substantial form to determine the identity of the concept *A*, in Putnam's example the concept *dog*, and subsequently to determine the identity of the term "A" or "dog", what is essential is relativized to a systematic discourse Putnam's Shlomit is the poor cousin (on the evolutionary scale!) of Quine's unfortunate cycling mathematician, confused and conflicted of mind over the fact that he is and is not essentially bipedal [6]

Putnam's objection is not unrelated to his problems with different conceptual schemes and with what he calls "Metaphysical Realism "[7] Putnam objects to metaphysical realists that there are no essences "out there" awaiting discovery Instead the conceptual scheme of a particular science determines for itself what counts as essential for it The roots of this position run deep within modern philosophy Consider first Locke's position that

> 'tis evident, that *Men make sorts of Things* For it being different Essences alone, that make different *Species*, 'tis plain, that they who make those abstract *Ideas*, which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the *Species*, or Sort [8]

Insofar as the mind aranges congeries of ideas to determine what a substance or natural kind word refers to, objects either do or do not

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[6] Willard Van Orman Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge MIT Press, 1960), 199

[7] See, for instance, Hilary Putnam, "The Question of Realism," in *Words and Life* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1995), 303

[8] John Locke, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975), bk 3, chap 6, no 35, p 461 Emphasis in the original

fall under it, depending upon whether those objects have characteristics that bear a resemblance to the ideas constitutive of the nominal essence the mind has formed for itself Transposing this position from internal mental ideas out to the words of a language does not essentially change the claim [9] If we say that gold is a yellow metal, then a certain set of worldy objects will fall under it If we provide a different nominal essence, and say that gold is whatever is soluble in *aqua regia*, then certain objects in the world will fall under it. But the set of objects that falls under the first nominal essence may not be coextensive with the set of objects that fall under the second, for example, platinum is soluble in *aqua regia*, but it is not yellow Indeed the intersection of the two sets may be the null set, for all we know

More recently, the roots of Putnam's objection can be seen in figures like John Dewey and C. I Lewis, who reflect upon the character of modern logic against a characterization of the background of the old Aristotelian logic. Lewis writes.

> Traditionally any attribute required for application of a term is said to be of the essence of the thing named It is, of course, meaningless to speak of the essence of a thing except relative to its being named by a particular term [10]

And Putnam's thesis that what is essential to a natural kind is determined by what a particular scientific discourse considers essential is foreshadowed in Dewey, when he writes·

> As far as present logical texts still continue to talk about essences, properties and accidents as something inherently different from one another, they are repeating distinctions that once had an ontological meaning and that no longer have it Anything is 'essential' which is

---

[9] Ian Hacking has argued that the Linguistic Turn in philosophy does not dissolve the problems of the theory of ideas that animated early modern thought Instead, he argues, it transposes them from the mind and its internal objects which were called ideas to a social mind embodied in a language and its internal objects which are called words See Ian Hacking, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1975)

[10] *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (LaSalle, Ill Open Court, 1946), 41 As found in Irving M Copi, "Essence and Accident," in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds* (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1977), 181 Copi himself argues against the reduction of the notion of essence to nominal essence

> indispensable in a given inquiry and anything is 'accidental' which is superflous [11]

To be fair, Putnam thinks that once the science has made unto itself an essence in view of some interest of the scientist, everything else falls into place, it's not just anything goes [12]

Ian Hacking calls this position Putnam's "Transcendental Nominalism" in order to contrast it with what Hacking describes as a "possibly extreme" form of Kantian transcendental idealism For Hacking, transcendental idealism is about existence, as it asserts that what exists is ideal or mental, having no existence apart from the mind Putnam's position, on the other hand, is not about existence but about classification The sorting of the world that we engage in is a product of our minds, as opposed to the Aristotelian realist who believes that "the world just comes in certain kinds That is nature's way not man's "[13] So Putnam is a transcendental nominalist [14] The classifications are products of the mind and do not exist apart from them, but the individuals and their individual properties do exist apart from our classifications Not everything is a discourse, but essentially everything is

Thus, the distinct conceptual schemes of the sciences determine distinct essences But keep in mind that Putnam's own view denies that there are any such things as substantial forms or essential structures intrinsic to the beings studied by the sciences However, he grants to the Thomist essences out there, in order to show that they are in conflict with our supposed consensus about the modern natural sciences So it would seem that this position ought to be independent of both the Thomist account and Putnam's conceptual scheme account, in order that it may judge between the two without begging any questions However, on its face, the consensus just seems to be the application of Putnam's transcendental nominalism to the question of

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[11] *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (London Methuen, 1961), 138 Also as found in Copi, *Naming*, 41

[12] Putnam, "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 78

[13] Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1983), 108–9

[14] Admittedly, Hacking's classification of transcendentalisms is loose, since one traditional way of cashing out nominalism about natural kinds is through the assertion that natural kinds do not exist except as mental entities In that case, to the extent that it admits the mind-independent existence of particulars, nominalism just looks like a limited transcendentalism

the diversity of sciences The consensus seems to be entailed by Putnam's transcendental nominalism, and thus not wholly independent of it Indeed, within the context of the philosophy of biology, Putnam's transcendental nominalism is a forceful expression of just one of the various philosophical approaches to the "species problem", in particular, his transcendental nominalism appears to lead to a neopragmatist approach to species [15] Thus, prima facie, it is not obviously entailed by the results of contemporary biological science itself

Consequently, the task for the Thomist is to argue that the apparent diversity of intensional form in diverse scientific discourses does not entail a diversity of extensional form in the natural kind studied within those discourses, even as he holds on to CIT Further, if he can show that Putnam's plurality view is not adequate to the practice of the diverse natural sciences, then he will have given evidence that Putnam's account of the diversity of the sciences, consensus or not, is false, and that his transcendental nominalism applied to the sciences ought to be rejected along with it

II

Aquinas and the Plurality of Forms. With Putnam's objection in view, suppose we turn now to consider Aquinas's discussion arguing for the unity of substantial form against the pluralists in the medieval debate, I will call Aquinas's view the unity of form (UOF) position. Putnam expresses his argument with a familiar rhetorical trope, namely, that medieval philosophy is so completely bound up with the now thoroughly discredited Aristotelian natural sciences that it should not be taken seriously by informed philosophers of the present day Whatever failures recent philosophy may suffer from, at least it is more in keeping with the progress of the natural sciences The contemporary consensus against Aristotelianism that Putnam refers to is best seen against the background of this trope However, *mutatis*

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[15] For a discussion of the "species problem" that surveys the various different positions on the nature of species, see Phillip R Sloan, "Reflections on the Species Problem What Marjorie Grene Can Teach Us About a Perennial Issue," in *The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene*, ed Randall E Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago Open Court, 2002) In particular see pp 229–30, in which Sloan isolates "monistic," "pluralistic," and "neopragmatic" positions on the species problem

mutandis, some of the objections Aquinas faced are strikingly similar to Putnam's, despite the vast differences in the state of the natural sciences between the thirteenth century and the present day The larger context of the medieval plurality of forms debate is a complex philosophical and theological issue that involves such questions as the identity of Christ's body in the tomb, the material conditions necessary for human beatitude (often called the "form of corporeality"[16]), and the immortality of the soul Nonetheless, the arguments for the pluralists' position that Aquinas faced are straightforwardly philosophical Here I propose to look only at those aspects relevant to addressing Putnam's objection, one of which involves in particular the background of an Augustinian theme in Aquinas on the relationship of mind to the living activities of the body

Aquinas dealt with a position very similar to Putnam's objection in question 76, article 3 of the first part of the *Summa Theologiae* [17] Consider the terms of the medieval debate as described by Aquinas The objectors argue that there must be a plurality of substantial forms in a human being because of the diversity of Aristotelian scientific descriptions or definitions under which a human being falls, vegetative, sentient, and rational Consider in particular this objection that Aquinas cites

> The Philosopher says in *Metaph*, VIII, that the genus is taken from the matter, and the difference from the form But *rational*, which is the difference constitutive of a man, is taken from the intellectual soul, while he is called *animal* from the fact of having a body animated as form to matter by a sensitive soul Therefore the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul in a man [18]

The background for this objection is the Aristotelian scheme of providing an essential definition of a species in terms of specifying both the genus and the difference that contracts or determines the genus to that kind The example employed is the oft-cited definition, "a man is

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[16] See John F Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D C The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 346–51

[17] The *Summa Theologiae* discussion is by no means the only place where Aquinas addressed the Plurality of Forms debate For an exhaustive treatment of the various places where Aquinas addressed it, and how those treatments differ from one another, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 327–51

[18] St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (Ottawa Garden City Press, 1941), I, q 76, a 3, obj 4 My translation

a rational animal" Notice that the objection begins with a reflection upon the diversity in how a man is "called" "rational" or "animal," when an essential definition is put forward Notice also that it does not rest content with the thought that "animal" may be discussed without discussing "rational" It positively excludes "rational" from "animal"

The reason given to explain the diversity of "calling" is a diversity of substantial forms in a human being, presumably each difference of term is mapped "isomorphically" to a distinct reality in the world [19] Thus the prima facie linguistic duality involved in the definition *rational animal* is taken to be an argument for a real duality in the thing defined This argumentative strategy is paralleled in Putnam's coupling of the prima facie diversity of genetics and evolutionary theory with CIT to argue for the plurality of essences or substantial forms he thinks contradicts the Aristotelian position. Each science provides distinct essential descriptions mapped isomorphically by CIT onto distinct substantial forms in the natural kind

In the background of this medieval dispute are at least two streams of thought The Aristotelian stream of the objection is unmistakable from the language of definition, genus, species, and difference, as well as the analysis in terms of form and matter The other stream, however, is the Augustinian insight into the great diversity between animate life as we see it in other animals, and the rational life we know ourselves to possess when we turn within and reflect upon ourselves In his *De trinitate*, Augustine had distinguished the mind, the inner man, as the major part of the soul, and as consisting of memory, intellect, and will But he had also written of the "outer man" that

> anything in our consciousness that we have in common with animals is rightly said to be still part of the outer man It is not just the body alone that is to be reckoned as the outer man, but the body with its own kind of life attached, which quickens the body's structure and all the senses it is equipped with in order to sense things outside [20]

Augustine's reference to the principle that "quickens the body's structure and all the senses" is ambiguous, as it is not clear in him whether it should be taken as a part of the soul or as another soul entirely It

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[19] It will be evident later that the use of "isomorphically" here is taken directly from Putnam's discussion

[20] St Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans Edmund Hill (New York New City Press, 1991), bk 12 chap 1, p 322

is, after all, the body's "own kind of life attached" But, driven by his own reflections upon what he took to be the proper activities of the body, by contrast to the proper activities of the mind, it is clear for Augustine that the life of the body is to be wholly distinguished from the life of the mind, even if the mind and the quickening principle of the body are two distinct parts of the soul Thus, at least in this discussion from the *De trinitate*, there appears to be a real diversity in a man between his rational principle and the principle that quickens the body with its "own kind of life attached"

My reason for focusing upon the ambiguity in Augustine's discussion of mind and soul in the *De trinitate* is that it is the major source for the objections that animate Aquinas's discussion of mind in question 10 of the *De veritate*, written a decade earlier than the *Summa* [21] Aquinas clearly presupposes UOF throughout his discussion, but he does not explicitly discuss it or even mention it in question 10 [22] Thus there is no question of two formal principles in Aquinas's discussion of mind, one for the life of the mind and the other for the life of the quickened body. But in this earlier discussion, Aquinas did manage to preserve the special character of the Augustinian mind in the Aristotelian language of powers, when he held that the mind was a special "general power" consisting of the particular powers of memory, intellect, and will This general power has its own special unity over and above the unity it has in the soul with all the other powers of the soul, vegetative and sentient, and thus should be clearly distinguished from the "sensitive" part of the soul On the other hand, presupposed throughout Aquinas's discussion is that there is only one soul or substantial form of a human being, and the mind is but a part of it

This distinct life of the mind in the *De veritate* proved distinctly short lived in Aquinas He abandons this special character and unity of the Augustinian mind in the *Summa Theologiae* discussion often referred to as the "Treatise on Human Nature" [23] Though the sources of the underlying philosophical discussion of human nature are dominantly Aristotelian, it is nested within a much larger theological discussion of the Divine Verbum and man as the *imago dei* In that larger discussion, as in the *De veritate*, Augustine's *De trinitate* is the major

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[21] See Torrell, who places the composition of the *De veritate* during the first Parisian regency from 1256–9 and that of the *Prima pars* of the *Summa* in 1268 while Aquinas was in Rome Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Aquinas*, trans Robert Royal (Washington, D C The Catholic University of America Press, 1996)

[22] Aquinas held the unity of form position throughout his career, and he relies upon it as presupposed in response elsewhere in the *De veritate* itself

[23] *ST* I, q 75–89

background source setting the context of discussion But no longer are memory, intellect, and will given pride of place as a single general power within the soul, no longer do they have their own special unity apart from and mediating their unity with the other powers in the soul. Instead, all of the powers, sensitive, vegetative, and rational, are hierarchically ordered and united in and by the unity of the one soul itself

While Aquinas was not concerned with the plurality of forms discussion in the *De veritate*, in the *Summa* he clearly is A thirteenth-century Augustinian opponent could very easily use Aquinas's Aristotelianism against him and argue that if the mind has the special unity and life that Aquinas grants to it in the *De veritate*, then on Aristotelian grounds it is not sufficient to hold that it is a general power of the soul, it must be another soul entirely A form of life as distinct as Augustine emphasizes in the *De trinitate*, and as reflected in Aquinas's efforts to give it its own special unity within the soul in the *De veritate*, requires a distinctive principle of life, a distinctive soul The essence of the one soul must be distinct in reality from the essence of the other This is one way of understanding what is taking place in the objection that Aquinas considers here in the *Summa*, an Augustinian objection posed in Aristotelian terms, an objection that applies to his own earlier discussion in the *De veritate* To resist that move and retain from the *De veritate* the special character of the mind as a special part of the soul could only be ad hoc

To his credit, Aquinas rejects the ad hoc position, as he abandons the grounds for the objection He abandons throughout the discussion his earlier position that the mind has a special unity within the soul that distinguishes it from the unity it shares with all the other powers of the soul [24] One major goal of the *Summa* discussion is to maintain that the intellectual principle is none other than the principle of life of the human animal, its substantial form or soul The term "mind" now refers primarily only to the power of intellect, not to a general power uniting memory, intellect, and will. Secondarily and by analogy, it refers to the entire soul But there is no discussion at all of any special general power that unites memory, intellect, and will

Given the rejection of the special character of the mind that Aquinas maintained in the *De veritate*, what concerns me here are the reasons he gives for rejecting the plurality of substantial forms Aquinas's first response is to diagnose what he often calls "the error

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[24] See my much more extensive analysis of this issue in "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, Contra Kenny," *The Thomist* 66 (January 2002) 15–59

of the Platonists " It is a fallacy that confuses the features of our manner of knowing with the features of the thing known He writes that

> From diverse intelligible characteristics or logical intentions, which follow upon the mode of understanding, it is not necessary to posit a diversity in the natures of things, since reason is able to apprehend one and the same thing in diverse ways [25]

Notice the generality of the point It is not simply about the plurality of forms debate confined to souls and human nature It is perfectly general and concerns any movement from the plurality of the ways we understand to a plurality of things understood, and the emphasis is upon the real unity studied in diverse ways

This is a good but not entirely adequate response, and Aquinas himself treats it that way The plurality view is fallacious if it rests merely on the diversity of descriptions involved But Aquinas recognizes that with an additional thesis no fallacy is involved In this case he considers a metaphysical thesis concerning the function of the soul He writes, "the opinion [could be] maintained if, as [Plato] held, the soul were united to the body, not as its form, but as its mover."[26] As a mover of the body it must be distinct in some sense from the body This Platonic possibility focuses upon the function of the soul, rather than on how it is described in diverse discourses, and as such it avoids the fallacy

Next, Aquinas turns to offer positive arguments for the unity of the soul, and not simply a dialectical defense against the plurality position He offers three arguments, two of which bear directly on Putnam's objection, mutatis mutandis The arguments focus upon the formal character of the soul within Aristotelianism, a formal character which Aquinas has just stressed by mentioning, as a distinct contrast, what he takes to be the Platonic position of the soul as the mover of the body The first argument considers the unity of the object under consideration The metaphysical function of form is to provide the unity of being present in some object Aquinas writes.

> Nothing is simply one except through one form, through which the thing has being, for a thing is a being and is one from the same principle, and so those things which are named from a diversity of forms are not one thing simply, as for example a white man [27]

If something is described through a diversity of forms, it is because it is not absolutely one But notice the difference between saying that,

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[25] *ST* I, q 76, a 3, ad 4
[26] *ST* I, q 76, a 3
[27] Ibid

and saying that any diversity of descriptions involves a diversity of forms, the latter is what Aquinas flatly denies as fallacious Not every diversity of descriptions involves "naming from a diversity of forms " So Aquinas cannot be taking the diversity of linguistic descriptions at face value as evidence for their formal diversity Rather, the diversity or identity of forms in a description is judged on the basis of a judgment of the diversity or identity of those forms in things *extra animam* Indeed, elsewhere, commenting upon Aristotle's discussion of the semantics of terms, Aquinas makes that very point He writes

> the intention of Aristotle is not to assign identity of the concept of the soul through a comparison to articulated sound, as namely of one articulated sound there should be one concept, but he intends to assign the identity of concepts of the soul through a comparison to things [28]

Here he is commenting upon Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, where Aristotle asserts that while vocal utterances differ among human languages, the mental concepts they signify "are the same for all [men] " [29] In that context, Aquinas is determined to maintain that the identity of spoken terms is determined by the mental concepts they are subordinated to, while the concepts themselves have their identity determined by worldly objects This is not simply a metaphysical claim about the constitution of concepts It is also an epistemological claim about how we know concepts, as it speaks of determining the identity of concepts by a "comparison" to worldly things

The epistemological claim follows from the general theses in Aquinas that something is knowable only insofar as it is in act, that a concept is in act only as the knowing of some object, and finally that we primarily know material objects and know our concepts only by a secondary reflection upon them. Thus the formal identity of terms cannot be known apart from the world cognitively engaged by the community that uses those terms In other words, Aquinas does not begin with language as prima facie clear and distinct in its semantic content and identity, only to ask how it is that language manages to hook up with the world—the question that animates Putnam He begins with some known aspect of the world and asks whether this or that fragment of language as it functions within the larger context of linguistic usage adequately captures that aspect [30] Consider "a man" and "a white man " According to Aquinas's initial response, we

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[28] St Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Peryermenias* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1989), bk 1, lect 2, lines 242–8 (In Marietti, bk 1, lect 2, no 21)

[29] Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 1 16a7 in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed Jonathan Barnes (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1984)

cannot simply read off of the manifest complexity of the phrase "a white man" that it involves a plurality of forms in things *extra animam* Instead, we judge that the description "a white man" involves a diversity of forms because we already know that *white* is a diverse form from *man* in things *extra animam* [31] Apart from that, we cannot judge the description "white man" to involve any more forms than does "man" alone, or for that matter "white" alone [32]

So consider the manifest complexity of the phrase "a rational animal" Aquinas argues that "an animal with many souls would not be simply one "[33] But the unity he has in mind here is the unity of the natural kind that Putnam himself presupposes is discussed in diverse

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[30] Against the objection that this claim presupposes a fundamentally individualist account of knowledge acquisition and language learning, see my *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn* (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 2003) See also Fregus Kerr, "Aquinas after Wittgenstein," in *Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions*, ed John Haldane (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 2002)

[31] It is not necessary to take "already" here as a temporal adverb

[32] See the discussion of this topic in *Metaphysics*, 7 4 1029b11–1031a14, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle* and Aquinas, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria* (Turin Marietti, 1935), bk 7, lect 3–4 The example "white man" is a common one for Aquinas as he simply takes it over from Aristotle, and it appears in almost every discussion of definition and essential unity It is for him the paradigmatic case of a linguistic phrase that has no definition This is how Aquinas understands Aristotle's discussion of the "garment" and the "white man" in book 7 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* The imaginative suggestion is made that we substitute a single term, for instance "garment," for the complex phrase "white man" in order to signify the unity that a white man is Clearly we are to understand "garment" here to be nothing more than a sound or inscription, and not with its ordinary meaning They might as well have used "jabberwok," or even better "whiteman " The basic idea is to give a single name to what is otherwise referred to by two Then just as the single term "man" has a definition because it signifies the unity that is a rational animal, "garment" as used here is supposed then to have a definition, as it is a single term signifying the unity that is a white man And since it is a single term that is taken to be synonymous with the phrase "white man," it seems to follow that "white man" must itself have a definition And yet, following Aristotle, Aquinas denies this line of argument Whether we use "garment," "jabberwok," or "whiteman," there is no definition because the unity signified is an accidental one of diverse forms, and it does not matter whether we signify that accidental unity with one sound as in "whiteman" or with two as in "white man " In short, we do not judge the number of distinct forms from the number of distinct words, but the number of distinct words from the number of distinct forms So not every single word has a definition, since the unity it signifies may be better captured by two or more words

[33] *ST* I, q 76, a 3

scientific discourses Aquinas writes, "[I]n things composed from matter and form, something is one through the form, and derives both its unity and species (natural kind) from it."[34] In the life of an animal, when we recognize a central unity in its form of life, we recognize a unity that cannot be adequately accounted for on the supposition that there are many essences for its natural kind

Recall that Putnam grants to the Thomist his essential or substantial forms for the sake of argument But if we look closely at Aquinas's position, a substantial form is a principle intrinsic to the being under consideration It is the distinctive structure of the acts appropriate to the natural kind of which the being is a member Insofar as those acts exhibit a unity of life, they exhibit an intrinsic principle of their unity A plurality of substantial forms would leave that unity of life unaccounted for, indeed unintelligible Thus there can be only one substantial form intrinsic to the being, a form that is the principle of unity in diversity among the acts engaged in by that member of the natural kind

Aquinas's first argument for essential unity then sets the stage for his second argument that focuses directly upon what is involved in providing an essential definition of this unity—as he puts it "from the manner in which one thing is predicated of another " The key contrast is with accidental predication The example is rational animal "A man is a rational animal " Think of the contrast he has just mentioned with "a white man," or "a man is a white animal " Aquinas writes, "those things that are derived from different forms are predicated of one another accidentally "[35] A definition by contrast is true to the extent that its parts, genus and difference, are united by the definition in a way that reflects the simple unity of the form in the thing defined Thus a human being is said to be an animal through some form, a sentient one Now suppose the human being were said to be rational through another form, and vegetative through yet another form Then the relations of rational life to sensitive life to vegetative life in a human being would be accidental, no more related one to another than is the relation of being white to being vegetative, sentient, or rational, which is not at all

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[34] "[I]n rebus compositis ex materia et forma, per formam est aliquid unum, et unitatem et speciem sortitur," Aquinas, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, bk 8, lect 3, no 1725

[35] These quotes are from *ST* I, q 76, a 3

On the contrary, for Aquinas a human being is rational, sentient, and vegetative through "one and the same" form That is why the definition "a man is a rational animal" is both true and necessary It is not as if we have two or more forms tied together by some metaphysical glue called necessity Elsewhere Aquinas denies that the soul is itself composed of many subforms tied together in some form by necessity (what I have just called "metaphysical glue") We have but one simple form, and the necessity involved is the necessity of self-identity for forms, that is, the transcendental character of being called *unity* [36] The formal unity of "rational animal" is indivisible because it has no formal parts It is impossible for there to be a human being who, lacking the form of animality, retains the form of rationality, or lacking the form of rationality retains the form of animality, precisely because it is one and the same form by which a human being is an animal and is rational Recall that the setting of the plurality argument holds that a being is a human being through the rational form So Aquinas writes, "[I]t is necessary for something to be an animal and to be a man through *the same form*, otherwise no man could truly be an animal in such a way that animal could be essentially predicated of the man "[37] The other direction of analysis is equally true, namely, that no animal could be truly called "rational" in such a way that "rational" could be essentially predicated of the animal

Thus argument does not rely upon a bald assertion of unity The analysis is established and confirmed in many places in Aristotle's work, and in Aquinas's after him The most obvious case is the movement of the *De anima* from an analysis of vegetative to sensitive to rational form, as the higher type of form is not joined to the lower by metaphysical glue, but rather the higher form includes the powers of the lower form within its own unity, without containing the lower form as a part The argument is based upon recognizing in human action that reason does not add on something additional to animate acts that are the same in other animals, rather, rational is the form that animate acts take in human beings that renders them specifically different from the animate acts of other animals In Aquinas the argument relies primarily upon his emphasis on the unity of human life—in a

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[36] St Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* (Turin Marietti, 1948), q 1, a 5, ad 16

[37] Ibid

human being the actuality of being animal just is the actuality of being rational, even though the powers characteristic of such a being may be actually exercised episodically and apart from one another And even when they are exercised episodically and apart from one another, most often they enter into the constitution of intentional actions that possess a *per se* unity subordinated to rational goals teleologically determined by the nature of the human soul as the actual life of this kind of body This unity is by contrast with a *per accidens* unity Failure of one of the powers involved in the *per se* unity of such an intentional act leads to some measure of failure in accomplishing the act as such

This account is also confirmed by Aquinas's analysis of what it is "to be rational" in question 79, article 8 of the *Summa* Rationality is the distinctive form that intellect takes in an animal [38] A human being is essentially rational because the formal principle of intellect in a human being is the very same form by which the human is an animal Consequently, while it is comparatively easy to see that in a human, being an animal is not adequately understood until it is understood to be rational, it is often more difficult to see that being rational is not adequately understood until it is understood to be animate or incarnate, the act of an animal. Intellect apart from animality is not rational Finally, it involves a rejection of Augustine's position stressing the great gulf between the bodily acts of the human animal and the rational acts of the mind

Definition brings about an enrichment of the form of the subject by the form of the predicate because subject and predicate are different expressions within cognition of the same form *extra animam* Here Aquinas's remarks on the transition from the vague universal to the distinct are appropriate [39] Putnam treats CIT like a synchronic judgment that two trees, for instance, do or do not have the same form Since the linguistic expressions appear different upon simple

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[38] *ST* I, q 85, a 3–4, and particularly a 5

[39] *ST* I, q 85, a 5 "The human intellect in the first apprehension does not seize on the spot (*statim*) a perfect cognition of a thing, but in the first place apprehends something of it, namely the quiddity of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the intellect, and then it understands the properties, accidents, and encompassing essential relations of the thing And according to this it is necessary that it compose or divide one apprehension with another, and from one composition or division proceed to another, which is to reason "

reflection, they must not have the same form, just as in observing two trees we may judge that they do not have the same form The better analogy for Aquinas is the diachronic recognition that the acorn and the oak are the same being, and have the same form, in one moment of its development rudimentary or vague and in the other flourishing or distinct Simple observation at any particular moment will not tell us this Rather, we must attend to the genesis of the one from the other in order to recognize that they are really one thing after all, despite the appearance of being one thing and then another distinct thing It is the same cognitive universal that was once vague that is now distinct, expressed in a concept that has developed over time The conditions of its subsequent development are driven by the active engagement of the cognitive community with the worldly beings that set the conditions of its formal identity

Putnam has a static view of concepts, in which a conceptual change requires a change of concepts, a substitution of one for another For Aquinas, however, a conceptual change may require only that one and the same concept develop and become enriched, an enrichment that tracks the worldly development of the one who employs it Just as one cannot drive a wedge between the acorn and the oak, neither can one drive a wedge between the subject and the predicate in a definition Consequently, for Aquinas the fundamental unity among diverse essential descriptions of a natural kind—vegetative, animate, and rational—found in diverse sciences, is based upon their real unity in the form of the natural kind that they all claim to describe

From this discussion of Aquinas's argument against the pluralists, there are four elements of his argument for the unity of substantial form that I want to bring to the discussion of Putnam's objection. The first element is the presupposition of a single natural kind under discussion In Aquinas's discussion it is human kind, but it could just as well have been a kind of dog, perhaps the kind including Putnam's dog Shlomit His discussion is thoroughly general and does not depend upon any specific claims of particular discredited Aristotelian natural sciences In addition, the language of genus and species in which it is couched may no longer be of much use to logicians, as it was in the medieval period, but it has certainly not been abandoned in the classificatory schemes of modern biology The second element is the fallacy Aquinas calls the "error of the Platonists," namely, to attribute the

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features of our act of knowing objects to the objects known The third element is the metaphysical role that form has for Aquinas, following Aristotle, namely, as an intrinsic principle of unity for ways in which a being in a natural kind acts The fourth element concerns form as providing the unity amid diversity in the descriptions we provide of those beings that act, and that we study While Aquinas uses these elements to deal with a particular problem he faces in the thirteenth century, he does not use them in an ad hoc fashion They are thoroughly general philosophical tools

The end result of his discussion is to emphasize the real unity of human life as we experience it, despite the diverse ways we describe it. Certainly in looking at human life, we can attend to those aspects of it that we share in common with other animals without attending to the rational aspects of that same human life However, it would simply be a bad mistake to consider that abstract examination of human life exhaustive, and to proceed positively to exclude those aspects of human life that display rationality from a full and comprehensive view of human life Conversely, we can attend to those aspects of human life that exhibit rationality, without attending to their animal embodiment But an account of human life that positively excluded the animal embodiment of rationality in human life from its account would be simply false But Aquinas's argument against the pluralists goes even further than simply noting that human life has both animal and rational aspects It recognizes a fundamental unity in human life such that reason is the very form of the animal acts of a human being—that it is what is essential to both the animal and the rational life of a human being, which are one and the same life when considered comprehensively We distinguish in order to unite Turning now back to Putnam, we want to ask whether that recognition of essential unity in diversity isn't also the best approach to the phenomenon of the various different sciences that study natural kinds in contemporary science

III

Putnam's Presuppositions I want to begin the response to Putnam by considering three presuppositions of his argument The first presupposition is a shared language or conceptual scheme prior to the

languages of the diverse sciences Natural kind terms like "dog" must be used univocally across the diverse sciences that Putnam mentions, in particular the concept *dog* remains the same in the diverse scientific discourses If there is no such shared discourse employing the same term dog, and the concept does not retain an identity across the diverse sciences, the scientists involved are simply committing a fallacy of equivocation. Putnam's objection attempts to drive a wedge between two terms, the subject term and the predicate term of an essential description—in our example, "dog" and whatever for a particular science would fill in the predicate space of a definitional statement like "a dog is (essentially) _____ " The diverse sciences address the predicate space and provide, according to Putnam, different candidates to fill it But in order to argue about what should fill it, in order to have the argument Putnam thinks they have, they must all take the identity of the subject term for granted

The second presupposition is that there are natural kinds Putnam is not an idealist about things in the world and their particular features Objects in the world have their properties or features The various combinatorial possibilities of the features will determine different sets within which an object falls For Putnam, the entire set of actual and possible combinations of features is Wittgenstein's Tractarian form, which he says he has come to recognize is not the Thomist's form [40] His metaphysical point is that no particular subset of this set is in itself privileged over another out there Thus we are thrown back upon our interests in pursuing various sciences, and how we focus upon different features as essential Once a science has determined for itself what it will focus in upon, from then on the results it achieves are in effect determined by those features Consequently, Putnam believes that any claim about the essence of some kind of being is interest-dependent In a pragmatic vein, and quoting James, he writes "the trail of the human serpent is over all "[41]

Still, to press his argument against the Thomist, he must presuppose that a natural kind with its features is out there In his example, what is to be counted as essential is interest-dependent, but the result

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[40] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 62–3

[41] Hilary Putnam, *The Many Faces of Realism* (LaSalle, Ill Open Court, 1987), 16

of the counting is foreordained by the natural kind and its features once the interest is in place Indeed, he presupposes that any particular animal, Shlomit, for example, is a member of a single natural kind Putnam himself had written in introducing his objection that, "the intuition that a natural kind *has* a single determinate form (or 'nature' or 'essence') has become problematical."[42] The problem is not that there are many natural kinds with many essences, but, rather, that in any particular case there is one natural kind with many essences No doubt, he shares this presupposition of a single natural kind with Aquinas However, this presupposition is not something he is granting to the Thomist for the sake of argument The consensus of contemporary thought he is relying upon presupposes it, independently of any supposed Aristotelianism, in order to have the argument he attributes to the diverse sciences

We have already seen that he assumes without analysis or defense that diverse scientists share a common conceptual scheme in virtue of which they can all talk about this single natural kind, a conceptual scheme that must be logically prior to the distinct conceptual schemes of their diverse sciences Thus the unity and identity of this natural kind cannot be determined within any one of the conceptual schemes of the parties to the dispute, but come to them from without. But the antimetaphysical key to Putnam's argument consists in driving a wedge between the natural kind and its essence(s), just as at the semantic level the key was to drive a wedge between the subject and predicate in a definition

The driving of this wedge is not so easy, however, as another one of Putnam's examples shows, though Putnam himself does not recognize the problem He asks us to consider the possibility of a synthetic dog, that is, a dog, not cloned, but synthesized from the appropriate organic chemicals to have, from the point of view of the genetic biologist, the essential DNA According to Putnam, the geneticist is likely to count the being as a member of the natural kind But Putnam argues that the "evolutionary biologists would not regard a 'synthetic' dog as a dog at all From their point of view, such a thing would simply be an artifact of no interest,"[43] since it does not have the history of

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[42] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 74 Emphasis in the original
[43] Ibid , 77

descent necessary or essential to the population that makes up the natural kind Conversely, if a geneticist finds in a population of dogs an individual with a significantly different genetic structure, he will exclude it from the natural kind, regardless of its history of descent

However, this "synthetic" example complicates Putnam's objection in ways that he does not anticipate A closer look at the example shows that for Putnam kind-membership depends upon what the scientists take to be essential to the natural kind He cannot drive the wedge between natural kinds and essences that he needs for his argument with the Thomist What does the identity of this natural kind consist in? It would be ironic to say the least if Putnam, given his rejection of "Aristotelian metaphysical fantasies,"[44] fell back upon natural kinds conceived of as Platonist abstracta out there Assuming that he would just as likely reject such Platonist metaphysical fantasies, and having rejected essences out there conceived of in Aristotelian terms, it looks as though the only resource Putnam can rely upon for the identity of the natural kind is the mere extension of the set out there But if the identity of natural kinds is determined by extension, an extension determined by our interests,[45] it appears that the diverse sciences that Putnam has in mind cannot assume the single natural kind between them required by the dispute that Putnam wants to attribute to them His synthetic dog example indicates that the extension or identity of the natural kind is, like the essence(s) of the natural kind, determined by the interests of the scientists involved Insofar as the extension of their respective sets differs by either including or excluding the synthetic dog, the evolutionary theorist and the geneticist are working with different sets, and thus different natural kinds No difference of essence without a difference of natural kind The diverse interest-constituted essences provide us with diverse interest-driven identity conditions for the natural kinds Shlomit then is a member of many natural kinds But these interest-constituted natural

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[44] My paraphrase of Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no 9 (September 1994) 447

[45] It is fair to ask, given Putnam's desire to deny essential structures in things apart from our interests, by what else could the identity of a natural kind be determined

kinds are directly opposed to Putnam's need for the identity of a single natural kind to be prior to each diverse science, so that the scientists can argue about it They have no genuine argument with one another over the essence of a particular natural kind, if in fact they are not arguing about a particular natural kind

This second presupposition, then, undermines the validity of Putnam's argument While Putnam's objection requires that he hold the natural kind fixed and vary the essential descriptions, his new example suggests that on his own terms he cannot do so If the geneticist and the evolutionary theorist are not talking about the same natural kind of thing when they give their respective accounts of the essence(s) of dogs, Putnam's objection is based upon a fallacy of equivocation on the term "dogs " After all, the Thomist expects to find a plurality of essences among a plurality of different natural kinds of things The trouble, if there is one, is with a plurality of essences for one kind of thing Here we recall the central importance of a single natural kind for the Plurality of Forms debate in Aquinas

Putnam is suggesting that the geneticist and the evolutionary theorist are talking about two different natural kinds The philosopher sees it that way, but the evolutionary theorist *in media res* does not, even according to Putnam. Insofar as Putnam the philosopher claims that the geneticist would include the synthetic dog in her set of interest, while the evolutionary biologist would consider it an "artifact of no interest,"[46] Putnam suggests that the evolutionary biologist thinks there is only one natural kind determined by his own science, and that the geneticist's set is not a natural kind at all Hence, a fallacy of equivocation exists among the geneticist, the evolutionary biologist, and the philosopher To avoid the fallacy of equivocation Putnam would have to hold that the sets must be coextensive, while the essences for this necessarily coextensive set or natural kind differ However, this "must" applied to the set constituting the natural kind would be little more than a tacit appeal on Putnam's part to what he considers the errors of "Aristotelian essentialism,"[47] a "must" that attaches to the natural kind out there Putnam is forced into an

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[46] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 77

[47] Hilary Putnam, *The Threefold Cord Mind, Body, and World* (New York Columbia University Press, 1999), 5

essentialism without essences, so to speak Thus, even if it is inconsistent with his own conceptual scheme, the presumed consensus view about the sciences that Putnam relies upon to defeat the Thomist must grant to the Thomist this much, the unity of the natural kind apart from our interests Otherwise, the objection is simply fallacious

The third presupposition is Putnam's method of reading off the identity of the essential forms involved from the descriptions We are supposed to be able to tell from simple inspection of the descriptions alone that they are diverse, and that the forms involved, from the Thomistic point of view, must therefore be diverse This prior clarity and distinctness of our linguistic resources is implicit in Putnam's thesis that it is our interests that are determining what counts as essential for us And it is explicit in the transition from step (2) to step (3) in the argument I attributed to Putnam He then makes the transition from step (3) to step (4), when, using CIT, he argues from the diversity of the descriptions to the diversity of things described [48]

Interpreting present day Aristotelians as trying to answer the question how our language hooks up with the world, Putnam explicitly attributes this method to the Thomist He writes

> One might say (if one is a latter-day [Thomist] who has taken account of the linguistic turn), that, in a certain sense, the metaphysical form of our descriptions needs to be isomorphic to the metaphysical form of the object represented, for reference to succeed Speaking phenomenologically, we see propositions as imposing a certain kind of order on the world The metaphysical structure that our propositions project onto the world is what the world would copy in the best case, the case of the most successful and most complete reference, or so my 'latter-day [Thomist]' would think [49]

Notice the emphasis upon the set-theoretic notion of "isomorphism "[50] The use of "isomorphism" and the image of propositions "project[ing]"

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[48] See above, p 6

[49] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 72

[50] One feature of an isomorphism is that the set-theoretic structure of the domain and all its internal set-theoretic relations are perfectly mirrored in the codomain or target set of the isomorphism, and vice versa "Isomorphic groups are literally 'same-structured' because they differ only in the names or nature of their elements, all their algebraic properties are identical," Douglas Smith, Maurice Eggen, and Richard St Andre Monterey, *A Transition to Advanced Mathematics* (Monterey, Calif Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1983), 139 For the notions of "onto" and "one-to-one," see 81–3

structure onto the world suggest that Putnam continues to saddle the Thomist with Wittgenstein's Tractarian form, despite his disclaimer that he no longer does so If we change Putnam's use of "metaphysical" to Wittgenstein's "logical," it is this picture of propositions "projecting" logical form that Wittgenstein presents at different points in propositions 2, 3, and 4 of the *Tractatus* [51] Proposition 2 establishes for Wittgenstein that the picturing relationship of a representation is one of identity of "logical" form Proposition 3 establishes the "projective" nature of propositions Finally, in proposition 4, Wittgenstein connects the "logical" form of proposition 2 with the "project[ive]" nature of propositions of 3 by asserting that "The proposition is a picture of reality The proposition is a model of the reality, as we think it is "[52] Thus even isomorphism does not seem to be enough to capture the portrait of the Thomist that Putnam would like to paint with the Tractarian brush

> [T]he strongest line for the [Thomist] to take is to say that what enables reference to take place is a matching (mere isomorphism doesn't seem to be enough), some kind of a matching between the metaphysical

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[51] Consider these propositions from the *Tractatus*

2 1 – We make to ourselves pictures of facts

2 1511 – Thus the picture is linked with reality, it reaches up to it

2 16 – In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures

2 16 – In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all

2 17 – What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner-rightly or falsely—is its form of representation

2 18 – What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality

3 11 – We use the sensibly perceptible sign of the proposition as a projection of the possible state of affairs

The method of projection is the thinking of the sense of the proposition

3 12 – The sign through which we project the thought I call the propositional sign And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world

Later in 3 144, Wittgenstein adds that "propositions resemble arrows, they have sense " Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans C K Ogden (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 41, 45

[52] Ibid , 4 01

> structure our propositions project onto the objects and the metaphysical structure those objects actually have [53]

In Putnam's portrait of the Thomist who has taken the linguistic turn, we are to think of the elements of sentences, subjects and predicates, as the domain, the world as the codomain, and formal identity ("metaphysical" if one is Thomistic, and "logical" if Wittgensteinian) as the mapping function For his Thomist, the reference of our words is most successful and the truth of our statements guaranteed when they find their exact image projected onto reality [54] If there is logical complexity in the description it must find its exact isomorphic or projective image in some complexity in the thing described His Thomist proposes to read a metaphysical structure off of his propositions and project it onto nature, the mirror of the mind

Given these presuppositions, in what follows I will show that on the contrary the Thomistic Aristotelian is not proceeding from language to world, and that Putnam's argument fails in general

IV

A Good But Not Completely Adequate Response The movement in Putnam from the diversity of our scientific descriptions to a diversity of things described is a fallacy It is not the fallacy of equivocation I mentioned earlier Rather it is the intension–extension fallacy that Aquinas calls the "error of the Platonists " The fallacy moves from a

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[53] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 73 Consider Wittgenstein again

2 131 – The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects

2 14 – The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way

2 15 – That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another

This connexion of the elements of the picture is called its structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form of representation of the picture

2 151 – The form of representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture

2 1511 – Thus the picture is linked with reality, it reaches up to it

Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 39

[54] "Onto" is a technical term in the language of set theory and isomorphisms A function from a domain A to a set B is onto if and only if the range of the function is identical to the set B See Smith, Eggen, and Monterey, *A Transition to Advanced Mathematics*, 81

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diversity of intensional content in descriptions to a diversity of extension, or, as Aquinas described it in response to the pluralists, "from diverse intelligible characteristics or logical intentions," "to a diversity in the natures of things."[55]

Putnam is well aware of the fallacy in other contexts, as it plays a large part in the argument of his famous and widely commented upon paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning' " That paper is the Ur text in Putnam's argument against the supposed built-in, world-involving identity of mental representations As he puts it there, "the timeworn example of the two terms 'creature with a kidney' and 'creature with a heart' does show that two terms can have the same extension and yet differ in intension "[56] Notice that his example uses descriptions that may well be involved in essential descriptions of the being under consideration in diverse discourses, if we are so interested But here, according to Putnam, we are not to expect from the descriptions alone an incipient argument between the cardiologist and the nephrologist To be fair, when Putnam made this point in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" he was himself a committed metaphysical realist [57] But the point does not appear to depend upon his now abandoned realism, as later he makes a similar point more implicitly and indirectly in the very paper in which he brings up his multiplicity of essences objection to the Thomist In "Aristotle After Wittgenstein" he writes

> If we say that any pair of different sentences describe *different* events, then events themselves begin to look suspiciously like ghostly counterparts of sentences That is, events become things to which, on the one hand, we give exactly the same structure as sentences, but which, on the other hand, we put out into the world The inventions of such intermediaries is a piece of philosophical legerdemain [58]

With the negative conclusion of this passage we should heartily agree But notice again that Putnam continues to be animated by the picture of going from the sentences to the world by a "philosophical" projection He does not, however, consider how this point might apply beyond the structure of events, to his own example of the essential structure of natural kinds and our descriptions of them The multiple

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[55] *ST* I, q 76, a 3

[56] Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in *Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1975), 218

[57] Hacking, *Representing and Intervening*, 75

[58] "Aristotle After Wittgenstein," 66

essences of the presumed consensus view he relies upon look to be just other pieces of this invented "philosophical legerdemain."

I think the diagnosis of this problem is a good response to Putnam, but that it is not completely adequate. Putnam could make a plausible defense against the charge of committing the fallacy in this case. He could grant that in general it is a fallacy to proceed from a diversity of intensions to a diversity of extensions. He might add, however, that it is the Thomistic commitment to CIT that avoids the fallacy, and at the same time makes the Thomist subject to his objection. By contrast, in the ordinary case of the fallacy there is no claim involved that there is any sort of identity between the description and the thing described. The diversity of intensions in conjunction with CIT entails the diversity of extensions. That is, after all, the crucial stage of the argument I reconstructed for him in steps (2), (3), and (4). Consequently, in this special case there is no fallacy involved, and his argument appears to go through. Notice the parallel of the point I am making here with the point Aquinas made in his argument against the pluralists, namely, that with the addition of a metaphysical thesis, in the medieval case that the soul moves the body, the error of the Platonists may be avoided. Similarly here, *mutatis mutandis*, the addition of CIT is the metaphysical thesis that may allow Putnam to avoid the fallacy in his objection.

One result of this concession is that it suggests that everyone, not just the Thomist, but Putnam and those in the scientific consensus he would speak for, must hold some form of CIT. The recent consensus about the sciences is supposed to be an independent phenomenon, the touchstone against which the Thomist is to be judged. If the participants in the presumed consensus do not hold some form of CIT, what nonfallacious reason do they have for holding that a diversity of descriptions (sciences) implies a diversity of things described (essences of a natural kind)? In that case, CIT is not a particularly Thomistic thesis. The only alternative to recognizing some form of CIT would be to give up the claim that it is by a simple reflection upon the diverse essential descriptions of the different sciences that we have come to the consensus view that a natural kind does not have a unique essence. But then we can ask what reason at all anyone has for holding the multiplicity of essences thesis, particularly when we see the difficulties it drives Putnam into in the first presupposition described above.

Putnam could respond in the fashion I just sketched, but it would require that he abandon the general force of his argument His multiplicity of essences thesis is supposed to be a position coming from outside of Thomism, a consensus driven by reflection upon modern science Putnam wants to grant the internal consistency of the Thomistic account, and to defeat it as inadequate to the way things are now agreed upon by those reflecting philosophically upon the diversity of scientific practice But then it is no longer the case that the problem is with the unity of essence position as such, but rather with the joint satisfiability of the two theses, unity of essence and CIT Thus Putnam faces a dilemma Either his objection is fallacious, or, since it itself presupposes CIT, it is subject to a Thomistic response that makes clear what the position is If the Thomist position is not merely consistent, but also better able to account for the phenomena of scientific discourse, then because Putnam shares CIT with the Thomist, we have good reason to hold that Putnam's multiplicity of essence thesis must be false.

V

A Good and Ultimately Adequate Response The second side of this dilemma brings me to what I think is the good and adequate response to Putnam's objection First, as to what the position actually is, in the transition from (2) to (3) the argument requires that we be able to read off by simple inspection the diverse identity of the forms involved in the diverse linguistic expressions, the descriptions are in effect clear and distinct to our simple reflection But this movement from a grasp of the identity of our concepts in linguistic expression to the world, an expression of the Linguistic Turn as Putnam describes it, and presumably justified by CIT, is in direct opposition to Aquinas's Aristotelianism Recall Aquinas's denial of any such movement. Aquinas is not at all interested in answering the problem that Putnam wants to force onto the Thomist, namely, the skeptical question about how our language manages to hook up with the world, since he cannot get the question off the ground Why not? Because we have no purchase on our words apart from their worldly involvement Indeed, I just argued that Putnam himself must hold some form of CIT But the direction of analysis in Aquinas proceeds in the opposite

direction, from worldly things to the determination of our "projection" onto the essential identity of concepts Thomists have no reason to abandon this element of Aquinas's thought, as I have argued at length elsewhere [59]

Putnam could bandage his argument by granting that the Thomist is not going from concepts to things but from things to concepts, that is, by giving up the idea that the Thomist is trying to answer the skeptical question about how our words manage to hook up with the world Yet he could still charge that since it is a metaphysical identity thesis, the asymmetry of the epistemological movement does not matter He could assert that the essential diversity of the things themselves, genes, bones, and historical events, must lead to a diversity of essential concepts So the argumentcould be recasted as

> (1) If the formal identity of things determines the formal identity of the concepts under which they fall, then essentially diverse things determine diverse concepts
>
> (2) But the formal identity of things does determine the formal identity of the concepts under which they fall (CIT)
>
> (3) Therefore, essentially diverse things determine diverse concepts (1 & 2)
>
> (4) But the objects studied in the diverse sciences are essentially diverse
>
> (5) Therefore the objects studied in the diverse sciences determine diverse concepts, including essential descriptions and definitions (3 & 4)
>
> (6) Therefore, the essential definitions of objects supplied by the diverse sciences are diverse (5)

The conclusion of the argument is then that the essential descriptions of the objects supplied by the diverse sciences are diverse

This possible rescuing of the argument is all well and good Indeed the Thomist can happily grant the conclusion if it is not entirely general, but restricted to multiple natural kinds Again, the Thomist expects to find diverse essential definitions among multiple natural kinds If, however, the conclusion is taken to be entirely general and applies to a single natural kind, the problem is that it now straightforwardly begs the question, when it simply asserts in step (4) the

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[59] See chaps 7 and 8 of my *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn*

contradictory opposite of what the Thomist denies of a single natural kind It is not sufficient for Putnam to point out that genes, bones, and historical events are different from one another He must maintain that the genes, bones, and historical events are essentially diverse, which begs the question We have already seen that Putnam cannot argue nonfallaciously for that claim simply on the basis of the diversity of the descriptions given by the sciences for the same natural kind Perhaps there is a nonfallacious argument for it, but Putnam has not given one

Finally, the argument would no longer have the conclusion that Putnam needs, as it would not conclude to a multiplicity of essences "out there," but a multiplicity of essential descriptions "in here " But so what? Recall that in the medieval pluralist debate Aquinas does not deny that there are prima facie multiple essential descriptions of human life coming from diverse discourses This diversity of descriptions is no surprise either to Aquinas then or to the Thomist today.

But why could Putnam not just rest content with common sense, the Aristotelian's own ace in the hole, the common sense that Putnam elsewhere expresses a hope to revive and revise without the errors of "Aristotelian essentialism"?[60] Forget all the claims about the developing and coalescing modern scientific consensus that the Thomist must face Bones just are not the same thing as genes, and neither is identical to historical events and populations

Well, no In taking this tack, Putnam would be relying upon an ambiguity in his initial example. It is supposed to cover such things as historical events, genes, and morphology. But no anatomist simply studies bones No evolutionary biologist simply studies events And no geneticist simply studies genes In each case they study kinds, the history of events involving a certain natural kind (dogs), the bones of a certain natural kind (dogs), and the genes of a certain natural kind (dogs) Here we see the importance attached to Putnam's own presupposition that there are natural kinds, and that in a particular case the diverse scientists are studying only one such natural kind [61]

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[60] See Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 447

[61] "Kind" is of course a sliding term In any actual instance the scientist may be operating at a more general or more particular level in studying a genus, or family, or class, or order, or kingdom, and so forth "Dog" itself is a broad classification including within itself many subclasses down to what Aristotelians would call the *infima species*

Without reflecting upon it, Putnam is relying upon a deeper unity in the objects of study than is immediately evident when they are simply described as bones, genes, and events Which bones? Whose genes?

Looking back at his original objection, it is false that the essential descriptions of dogs given by the different sciences are manifestly diverse Because of the background context, we may no longer feel the need to repeat in each instance that we are talking about the bones of dogs, the events leading to the evolution of dogs, and the genes of dogs We take the natural kind for granted as tacitly included within the descriptions And as tacitly included, those descriptions are not diverse, however much they may appear to be The formal identity and unity of the linguistic expressions involved is to be found in the formal identity and unity of the kind considered in its evolution, genetics, and morphology, the kind tacitly referred to in any particular study That is one of the points behind the gruesome Aristotelian insight that the hand studied by the anatomist is only called a human hand analogously It must always be considered with respect to the living whole of which it is an anatomical part The anatomist never simply studies a hand, he studies a human-hand, so called because of its relation to a certain natural kind, or a dog-paw in relation to a very different kind But recall that in Aquinas's argument against the pluralists, his emphasis on the unity of the substantial form was designed precisely to account for this unity of the natural kind in both the distinctive activities characteristic of it and our efforts to define it

The French Thomist Jacques Maritain wrote, "[W]e distinguish in order to unite "[62] Despite the prima facie diversity in the definitional expressions provided by the different sciences and their subdisciplines, which we have now seen is only partial, in any particular case of a natural kind they are formally identical because they express in different ways what is not formally diverse in the thing beyond the mind Indeed, on a Thomistic theory of truth, that is what the truth of such expressions consists in, namely, that what is understood separately or diversely by the mind is predicated to be one in things, because it is one and the same in those things The logically complex understanding we possess is true insofar as it is brought to a unity that is adequate to the simple metaphysical unity of the thing understood In

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[62] The English translation of his French title, *Distinguer Pour Unir* (Paris De Brouwer, 1932) Also known as *Degrees of Knowledge*

addition, Aquinas explicitly argues concerning the truth that is found in the human soul that

> The intelligible character of truth consists in the adequacy of intellect to thing, but nothing becomes adequate to itself, rather adequacy requires distinct things [in order for one to be adequate to the other], hence the intelligible character of truth is first found in the intellect when the intellect begins to have something proper to itself which is not had beyond the soul, but that corresponds to something beyond the soul, between which an adequacy of [intellect to thing] can be recognized [63]

The thing that the intellect has that is "proper to itself" and cannot be found "beyond the soul" is the logical complexity and diversity found in the subject–predicate structure of its judgments, which results from the abstractive nature of the human intellect understanding reality in many separate, partial, and inadequate ways So, for instance, the Thomist can wholeheartedly agree with Putnam's point about events and the sentences we use to describe them that "if we say that any pair of different sentences describe *different* events, then events themselves begin to look suspiciously like ghostly counterparts of sentences "[64] But why is Putnam not willing with the Thomist to extend that insight to natural kinds and the sentences (scientific) that we use to describe them? On Putnam's plurality of essences view, do not natural kinds and their essences begin to look suspiciously like "ghostly counterparts" of scientific sentences?

We saw in Aquinas's second argument against the pluralists that what the intellect has that corresponds to reality is the actual unity of subject and predicate found in judgment that is adequate (true) to the real unity of things The unity of subject and predicate in judgment adequately captures the unity of the thing defined, and is thus true Aquinas includes among concepts these judgments or "second acts of intellect "[65] They then become developmentally available to the mind as simple elements for further judgments When it captures a simple

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[63] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, q 1, a 3 "Veri enim ratio consistit in adaeqatione rei et intellectus, idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorm est, unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest "

[64] "Aristotle After Wittengenstein," 66

[65] *In Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio* (Turn Marietti, 1955), Proem , no 4

unity like the unity of a form, it is essential and necessarily true, when it captures a complex unity like the unity of substance and accident, it is contingently true Contrary to Putnam's first presupposition, where the adequacy of truth is concerned, no wedge can be driven between subject and predicate When we engage in the act of defining some scientific object, we are in pursuit of definitions that more and more adequately express the formal unity of the thing defined So for the Thomist, there is no isomorphism between the logical and linguistic structure of our scientific discourse projected onto the metaphysical structure of the world, as if either the mind were a mirror of nature or nature a mirror of the mind possessing element by element the same structure as our understanding

VI

Modern Natural Science and the Unity of Essence At this point, all I have done is indicate what the Thomist's position is, how it differs from Putnam's characterization of it, and why it is consistent I have argued that the Thomist does not argue from mind to world as Putnam's argument against him requires I have also argued that the Thomist's account of concepts is developmental, as opposed to the static account presupposed by Putnam As of yet, I have shown neither that the position is more adequate to, that is, true to the practice of contemporary science, nor that Putnam's position is inadequate The danger is that we may be left in a standoff with each side asserting itself, for or against a plurality of forms, and begging the question against the other So in conclusion, I think it worth mentioning the actual practice of contemporary science as a relevant factor in judging between the two positions, even if I do not have space to pursue it at length here

Whose view is more adequate to the phenomena of contemporary science? I mentioned earlier Putnam's use of the trope about Aristotelian philosophy falling with Aristotelian science Putnam presents us with a picture in which the sciences, in addition to doing their work of theorizing about phenomena, and attempting to confirm or falsify their theories, are also arguing with each other concerning who among them has got the real essence of the natural kind For Putnam we "make unto ourselves the species of things" or, with Wittgenstein

in the *Tractatus*, "we make to ourselves pictures of facts,"[66] and the "we" depends upon the kind of scientist we are interested in being On Putnam's view of this argument among evolutionary scientists in particular, it appears that genetic structure, morphological structure, and history of descent are no more related to one another than are being white and being a human being, that is, no more than related *per accidens* in a living thing If they were closely related, we would not expect the argument about the essence of natural kinds that Putnam describes, but rather an investigation of the unity underlying their close relation

It is true that in contemporary philosophy of biology there are arguments about determining the appropriate criteria for biological species, whether it should be taken to be genetic structure, or morphological characteristics, or evolutionary descent, for instance However, it is not at all clear whether the criteria suggested are intended to be test criteria for species or constitutive criteria for species[67] More importantly, the different positions taken in these arguments do tend to derive on the part of the participants from a solitary focus upon one among the diverse biological fields However, the problem they face, if we are to take them seriously as bearing upon constitutive criteria of species rather than test criteria, is accounting for the extraordinary unity displayed in cooperative scientific endeavors that presuppose and integrate these diverse fields. Historical examples of a search for unity amid apparently diverse scientific discourses and phenomena are abundant at the origins of contemporary science, and include thermodynamics and the Kinetic Theory of Matter applied to the Ideal Gas Law, fluid dynamics and the Kinetic Theory applied to Brownian motion, the Quantum Theory of Radiation applied to both black body radiation in thermodynamics and the

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[66] See footnote 51, especially proposition 2 1

[67] For a discussion of the difference between "test criteria" and "constitutive criteria," see David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1980), 53–4 For a discussion of the controversies over the nature of species, see Philip Kitcher, "Species," in *In Mendel's Mirror* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2003) See also the earlier Ernst Mayr, *Systematics and the Origin of Species* (New York Columbia University Press, 1942), and more recently, Marjorie Grene and David Depew, *The Philosophy of Biology An Episodic History* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Joseph LaPorte, *Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change* (New York Cambridge University Press, 2004) Finally, see the very useful summary of the issue in Sloan, "Reflections on the Species Problem," 225–55

photoelectric effect in electromagnetism, and, finally, the bearing of the negative result of the Michelson-Morley Interferometer experiment on a number of subdisciplines within physics, all of which were discoveries of underlying unity that revolutionized modern science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries [68]

But the field of paleo-anthropology which bears directly upon Putnam's reference to genetics and evolutionary biology is perhaps the most striking example for my purpose here Paleo-anthropology employs both questions of morphology and genetic studies in determining the history of human evolutionary descent [69] A major and hotly disputed question in paleo-anthropology is whether Neandertals were a race of ancient human beings, that is, archaic *Homo sapiens* falling within the range of variation of human populations and contributing to the human gene pool, or if they represented a distinct and separate species, *Homo neanderthalensis*, which was displaced by the more recent arrival of *Homo sapiens* from Africa. In simpler terms, is *Homo neanderthalensis* an ancestor species of *Homo sapiens* or, rather, a cousin species? In the last years of their existence, up until about 30,000 years ago, Neandertals coexisted with our human ancestors Biologists have speculated that there may well have been some interbreeding, and that thus Neandertals ought to be considered among our immediate species ancestors They share with human beings certain gross morphological characteristics, as for example similar body shape, walking erect, and so on Still there are significant morphological differences, as for example having a body size approximately "30% larger than an average modern man and of great muscular strength "[70]

However, more recent work involving examining the morphological structure of the nasal cavities of Neandertal skeletons has suggested that *Homo neanderthalensis* ought rather to be considered a cousin species to *Homo sapiens*, not an ancestral one But more striking still is the independent use of genetic sequencing to confirm

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[68] For a discussion both historical and theoretical of these issues, see Paul A Tipler, *Modern Physics* (New York Worth Publishers, 1978)

[69] My discussion here is heavily dependent upon Thomas Lindahl, "Facts and Artifacts of Ancient DNA," *Cell* 90 (11 July 1997) 1–3, as well as Matthias Krings, Anne Stone, Ralf W Schmitz et al , "Neandertal DNA Sequences and the Origin of Modern Humans," *Cell* 90 (11 July 1997) 19–30

[70] Krings et al , "Neandertal DNA Sequences," 25

this judgment Researchers used the mitochondrial DNA of the fossilized remains of a Neandertal skeleton found in 1856 in Dusseldorf, Germany to extract a DNA sequence They then compared this sequence to mitochondrial DNA sequences obtained from modern human beings The result of this genetic study suggests that in fact there was little or no gene sharing in the time of the coexistence between *Homo neandertalensis* and *Homo sapiens* The most recent common ancestral species of the two existed some 550,000 to 690,000 years ago This latter figure is some 300,000 years prior to the upward bound for the existence of *Homo neanderthalensis*, and 400,000 to 500,000 years prior to *Homo sapiens* Consequently, *Homo neanderthalensis* cannot be considered a species in the ancestral history of descent of *Homo sapiens* We are distant species cousins of a common ancestor

There is no question that within this discussion we can distinguish distinct biological disciplines and the parts they play We have a larger discourse, paleo-anthropology, employing distinct biological subdisciplines, morphology and genetics, to determine an evolutionary question about the history of descent As one would expect in all scientific investigations, the results are subject to criticism, considerations of reproducibility, and confirmation within the disciplines involved Still, the recognition of the convergence toward the same truth among the disciplines is not taking place within or as a result of any particular subdiscipline Yet no one involved in the larger discourse questions the presupposition of the discussion, namely, that both the morphology and genetics of a natural kind do bear upon judgments of the evolutionary descent of that natural kind because there is some kind of unity in their diversity In addition, they all expect as a test of the question that the morphological and genetic results should converge upon one another In this case, the genetics falsifies one morphological hypothesis and confirms a competing morphological hypothesis In doing so, the genetics supports a theory change from the older standard theory about the history of descent in a distinct subdiscipline based upon morphology

If we compare the Thomist position with Putnam's in respect to this example, we see a clear difference The Thomist looks at that unity in diversity in the practice of the sciences and supposes that there is an intrinsic essential structure being studied in several different ways, in other words, the Thomist can give a philosophically

intelligible account of why the genetic study should bear upon the hypotheses of a distinct discourse, morphology, in its bearing upon species classification and descent Counterfactually, if the results of the two disciplines had not converged, then the Thomist would want an explanation, for example, of why morphological studies say "ancestor species," and genetic studies say "cousin species," the two apparently contradicting one another Perhaps such an explanation would be forthcoming, but the scientists themselves do not expect such wide divergence when they perform their studies, and they would want an explanation of the conflict

On Putnam's position, recognizing only extrinsic essentially structured schemes of classification confined within distinct discourses, the result looks at best accidental, and at worst unintelligible It looks as if the paleo-anthropologist got lucky, since at the level of the subdisciplines being used, the geneticist denies that the morphology has anything to do essentially with the natural kinds involved, and vice versa for the morphologist Indeed, for Putnam, they exclude the essential relevance of each others' work This exclusion makes the paleo-anthropologist's whole approach look unintelligible Counterfactually, if the results from the paleo-anthropological study had not converged, then it looks as if from Putnam's perspective the scientists involved would retreat into their diverse and closed discourses, and ignore the results of the other discipline as if the negative result had never occurred

The genetic and evolutionary scientists involved do not in fact believe that their results are essentially unrelated one to another Quite the contrary—they presuppose the essential unity of the object of their work, despite their diverse methods of studying the object That essential unity makes their cooperation intelligible, while for Putnam it must look like a mistake they have fallen into, as if they had forgotten the argument they were having with one another over the "real essence " Keep in mind that it was precisely to account for the unity in diversity of human life that Aquinas argued for his position on the unity of substantial form and essential structure in the medieval debate Mutatis mutandis, here the Thomistic position is at a distinct advantage for understanding the actual practice of science, while Putnam's position can find it only happenstance at best and unintelligible at worst These phenomena of scientific practice provide independent

evidence of the superiority of the Thomistic position, as well as reasons for rejecting Putnam's position.

Finally, given the detailed discussion of the analogy of terms within Thomism, the Thomist need not agree straightaway with Putnam's presupposition that any scientific discourse bears upon the essential in a natural kind in only one sense of the term "essential" For Thomists, causal genesis is the paradigm case in which a term may be extended analogously beyond its primary use In other words, the Thomist believes that a term X can be, and often is analogously extended to, the causes of X, the classic but mundane example is the term "healthy" applied to a human being and to those foods that cause health when consumed by the human being In the primary sense of the term, the human being is healthy, while the broccoli he eats is called healthy because it is a cause of that health But of course we do not apply "healthy" in quite the same sense to both, since the health of the human being involves his being alive, while the broccoli's being called healthy as a cause of health requires that it be dead [71]

Similarly, the Thomist can maintain that in the primary sense of the term, the essence of some animal is an intrinsic principle of being for that thing, determining the unified structure of its acts, and placing it within a natural kind A plausible candidate for such an intrinsic principle is the genetic structure of the animal, perhaps not, as scientific investigation may in the future discover some principle even more fundamental, one expression of which in an animal is its genetic structure Even though the mediating features of biological life complicate any simple reduction of evolutionary development to genetic development, evolutionary theorists themselves tend to attribute some causal responsibility for adaptations subject to natural selection to genetic mutations However, the history of descent of that animal may be called essential in a secondary sense of the term, insofar as it is a causal chain of events that led through natural selection to the existence of that genetic structure

One benefit of this recognition of analogy in scientific discourse is that it accounts for a background setting within which the various scientists working within different fields can have intelligible discussions with one another about how the results of their investigations

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[71] See, for instance, *ST* I, q 13, a 5

bear upon one another, in particular, why evolutionary theorists should take account of the latest results in genetics, and vice versa No one thinks the doctor is arguing with the patient over the real essence of health, when he instructs his patient to eat more fruits and vegetables because they are healthy Just as Aquinas had argued about the fundamental unity between rationality and its animal embodiment as it is displayed in human life, and recognized that unity to be essential to the phenomena of human life, so too, if we attend to analogy and the actual practices of contemporary science, we can see the ways in which the various different contemporary sciences provide us with true descriptions of some kind of thing, but descriptions which need to be brought to some kind of essential unity in order to be fully adequate to the phenomena of that kind In this regard, and employing the taxonomy of monism, pluralism-cum-realism, and neopragmatism analyzed by Phillip Sloan, the Thomist position comes down on the side of pluralism-cum-realism [72]

My argument here has not been that the issue between the Thomist and Putnam should be settled simply a priori Instead, it has been that the Thomist position on the unity of form or essence, with the qualifications made about distinct conceptual approaches to some object of investigation, and the use of analogy in sorting through these distinct approaches, is better capable of accounting for the actual goals and practices of scientific understanding as we see it practiced today than is Putnam's transcendental nominalism and neopragmatism, particularly when we leave the realm of one particular science to ask the integral question of how our different scientific approaches to the world cohere with one another, a question we evidently do ask and pursue answers to Thus, the Thomist can affirm normatively that our interests should reflect and be informed by the way things are, and that we do not "make unto ourselves the species of things " We distinguish in order to unite For all the differences between the state of the natural sciences in the thirteenth century and today, adequate philosophical reflection upon the unity amid diversity displayed in the lives of the creatures around us, as well as the unity in diversity of the actual practice of natural science, displays the strength of the Thomistic tradition in handling the plurality of forms position, whether it is dressed up in medieval garb or the most up-to-date contemporary transcendental nominalism

University of Notre Dame

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[72] See Sloan, "Reflections on the Species Problem "

PARTS, WHOLES, AND PRESENCE BY POWER. A RESPONSE TO GORDON P. BARNES

MICHAEL HECTOR STORCK

PRESENCE BY POWER, often known as virtual presence, is one of the less known aspects of Aquinas's natural philosophy, but at the same time it is an essential part of his understanding of natural things as composed of form and matter Any attempt to understand the natural world philosophically cannot simply dismiss the observations and theories of modern science, and presence by power is that facet of Thomistic natural philosophy that most obviously invites a philosophical consideration of these observations and theories Without an understanding of presence by power, Aquinas's explanation of natural things as composed of form and matter—while it may be a compelling and enlightening way of understanding the natural world—seems almost irrelevant to the way in which modern science, with its elements and elementary particles, seems both to explain and to manipulate those same things [1]

Actually, the fact that complex bodies, living and nonliving, are composed of elements was known to both the ancients and the medievals Presence by power is St Thomas's explanation of how the elements are present in a complex body [2]

Correspondence to Michael Storck, Philosophy Department, Ohio Dominican University, 1216 Sunbury Road, Columbus, OH 43219

[1] While Aquinas discusses the presence of elements *virtute*, later Thomists sometimes say that the elements are present *virtualiter* Thus the elements are often said to be "virtually" present, and their way of being present called "virtual presence " *Virtute*, however, is not an adjective, and "virtual" and "virtue" do not mean "power" in modern English, so I will follow Christopher Decaen in translating *virtute* "by power " See Christopher A Decaen, "Elemental Virtual Presence in St Thomas," *Thomist* 64 (2000) 275–6

[2] Employing the four Empedoclean elements in examples allows for a clear exposition of Aquinas However, while I am arguing that Aquinas's understanding of elemental presence is essentially correct, earth, air, fire, and water are clearly not elements—even according to Aristotle's definition of element, which Aquinas quotes in the *De Principiis Naturae* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1976), 3 This definition is "The first constituent of which a thing is composed and which is indivisible in kind into other kinds", Aristotle,

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Gordon P Barnes has recently argued that presence by power is inadequate as an explanation of the way elements are present in complex bodies, and that it would be better to explain the elements' presence by claiming that simpler substances—carbon atoms, for example—are actually and substantially present in living things [3] In order to address his arguments, I will begin by briefly presenting St Thomas's understanding of presence by power, and I will then argue that Barnes's proposal—that there is a multiplicity of substantial forms in one matter—is unsatisfactory.

When St Thomas discusses how the elements are present in a mixed body (a nonliving substance containing more than one element) or a living thing, he has to explain three things how the mixed body can be really one substance (rather than merely the juxtaposition of exceedingly small parts of the composing elements), how it can still contain the elements of which it is composed, and how it is generated from and decays into those elements

The heart of his response is that the elements cannot be held to be actually present in mixed bodies, but must, rather, be present by their powers (*virtute*) This means that the elements do not remain in the mixed body as substances—their substantial forms do not strictly speaking continue to exist This is the only way to preserve the unity of the mixed body However, since it is clear that the elements some-

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Metaphysics, trans Hippocrates G Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa The Peripatetic Press, 1979), 5 3 1014a26–7 That is, the elements are not composed of anything more fundamental and cannot be divided into things different in species Thus, the four elements are not really elements because three of them, air, earth, and water, can be divided into things different in kind, while the fourth—fire—does not have a stable nature at all It seems that the things closest to Aristotle's definition are such particles as electrons, positrons, and perhaps quarks, although it is a difficulty that quarks have never been found existing independently On this, see William A Wallace, "Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," in *From a Realist Point of View Essays on the Philosophy of Science*, 2d ed (Lanham, Md University Press of America, 1983), 185–212, and Joseph Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements A Translation and Interpretation of the "De Principiis Naturae" and the "De Mixtione Elementorum" of St Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 245–68

[3] Gordon P Barnes, "The Paradoxes of Hylomorphism," *Review of Metaphysics* 56 (March 2003) 501–23

how remain, St Thomas proposes that the active and passive qualities of the elements are in some way preserved in the mixed body [4]

Similarly, preserving the substantial unity of a living thing requires that its elements, organs, and cells cannot be present as substances While an examination of the physical processes in a living thing can explain much about that living thing's workings, especially of its vegetative operations of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, such explanations demand the presence of various accidental qualities in the parts of the living thing, but not the presence of these parts—whether elements or organs—as substances. It is because of iron's power of binding with oxygen, and not necessarily because iron is substantially present in it, that hemoglobin functions in an animal's body [5]

Because we sense and measure only accidents, it should be clear that the color of an animal's skin will be the same whether the pigments are actually present as discrete individual substances or only present by their powers, as parts of the whole The skin of a rotting salamander, which no longer has substantial unity, will, at least for a time, have the same coloring as the living salamander did In the rotting salamander, the pigments in the skin do not exist as part of a single living substance, but rather at some point become actual substances (until they too break down into their simpler components), while the pigments in the living salamander are not substances, but

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[4] St Thomas Aquinas, *De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli* (hereafter, "*De Mixt*") (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1976), lines 123–53 For the historical development of Aquinas's understanding of elemental presence, see Mario Enrique Sacchi, "La Presencia virtual de los elementos en la combinación química según Santo Tomás de Aquino," *Aquinas* 37 (1994) 126–41

[5] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter, "*ST*") (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1888–06), I, q 119, a 1, ad 2, idem, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1996), aa 8–9 When part of a living thing, an organ is not a substance When removed from the body, however, it exists independently from the body as a substance Because of a living body's extension, which follows on its substantial form, the body can have certain qualities in one part and other qualities in another part In the living body, the organ simply is certain specific qualities, including the powers of the elements, in a certain arrangement in a particular part

parts of a single living substance—parts having the same properties as the same pigment molecules existing as substances [6]

However, because the active and passive powers of the elements are contraries (for example, the heat of fire to the coldness of water), they cannot be actually present in the mixed body The same body cannot actually have the heat of fire and the cold of water at the same time However, these qualities, unlike the substantial forms of the elements, can be possessed to a greater or lesser degree Thus, in a mixed body "a mean quality which partakes [*sapiat* savors] of the nature of each extreme"[7] can be brought about from the extreme qualities For example, grey is in some way like both black and white, and tepid like both hot and cold In the mixed body, this intermediate quality is the proper quality of the mixed body, just as the untempered qualities of the elements are their proper qualities, for example, heat and dryness are the proper qualities of fire The qualities of the elements are found in this middle quality of the mixed body in the same way that extremes "are found in a mean which shares [*participat*] the nature of each of them "[8] So, the proper qualities of the elements cannot be said to be actually preserved—the full heat of fire is not found in a mixed body of which it is an element—but the powers of the elements are in the power of the mixed body in a way, partially, because the mean shares in, participates, possesses in part, the extremes [9]

The inanimate mixed body's possession of the qualities of the elements in this way also explains the generation of that mixed body from and its corruption into those same elements [10]

In the generation of a mixed body from two different elements, each of the elements acts on the other until the other is disposed to become the mixed body The powers of the elements modify each other to produce a middle or mean disposition This mean disposition

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[6] Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 2000), a 11, ad 3

[7] Aquinas, *De Mixt* , 125–8 The English translation is from Bobik's *Matter, Form, and the Elements*, 121

[8] Ibid , 137–40 (Bobik, 122)

[9] Ibid , 123–40, Decaen, "Elemental Presence," 287–94

[10] For generation from seed in Aquinas, see *Quaestiones de quolibet* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1996), 1, q 6, ad 2–3, idem, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (hereafter, "*SCG*") (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1918–30), bk 2, chaps 88–9, Peter Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, 4th ed (Rome Universitas Gregoriana, 1949), 308–12, and William A Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections on *The Modeling of Nature* Science, Philosophy, and Theology" (unpublished lecture, University of Notre Dame, Summer Thomistic Institute, July 1997), 5–6

is the same in kind (although not in number) as the proper disposition of the mixed body [11] By so altering the dispositions of the other element, the active power of each element makes it impossible for the other element to continue to exist, and at the same time brings forth the form of the mixed body from the potentiality of the matter For example, the qualities of fire and air act on each other until the moistness of air and dryness of fire are each transformed into an intermediate dampness, which is the quality of the mixed body The mixed body is then generated, its form is brought forth from the potency of the matter [12]

In a similar way, when a mixed body corrupts, the qualities of the elements, present by power in the mixed body, dispose the mixed

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[11] That is, wood is the same or nearly the same temperature just before it bursts into flame as immediately afterward The heat, however, is in one case the heat of the hot wood, and in the other the heat of fire In each case, heat is the accident of a different subject, and because an accident depends on its subject, the heat of the wood cannot survive the corruption of its subject The fire's heat may be heat of the same degree as that of the flame, but it cannot be the numerically same heat See Aquinas, *Quodlibet* 1, q 4, a 1, lines 87–94 This Aristotelian example, fire converting air into more fire by heating it until it is disposed to be fire and not air, differs both from an acorn sprouting and growing into an oak, and from a more modern example of substantial change such as hydrogen and oxygen becoming water by means of a spark In the first example, the air is potentially fire, but fire is not in the air by power, and the fire is active and makes the air like itself The acorn, however, is active, as it already has the form of the oak by power, although certain conditions of temperature and moisture are required for the form to become present actually In the modern example, the hydrogen and oxygen are only potentially water, but they are more active than the air being transformed into fire The spark does not make the gasses like the spark, but rather it helps dispose them to act on each other and unite, which they are already somewhat disposed to do by their own natures See Aquinas, *SCG*, bk 2, chap 89

[12] Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, 306–17, Christopher A Decaen, "An Exposition and Defense of the Doctrine of the Virtual Presence of Elements in a Mixture in the Writings of St Thomas Aquinas" (M A thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1996), 18–19 n 26, Joseph Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, vol 1, *Logica, Philosophia Naturalis*, 7th ed (Freiburg Herder, 1937), 292–5, Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections," 5–6, Aquinas, *De Mixt* , 37–40, 134–47 "Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, cum aduenit corpori, non facit esse corpus effectiue, set formaliter tantum, effectiue autem facit corpus esse, illud quod dat corpori formam ut perficiens, ut disponens autem illud quod preoperatur ad formam, paulatim et ordine quodam inducendo materiam ad propinquiorem formam aut dispositionem Quanto enim propinquior fuerit forma aut dispositio, tanto minor est resistencia ad introductionem forme et dispositionis complete facilius enim fit ignis ex aere quam ex aqua, quamuis utraque forma immediate assit materie", Aquinas, *Quolibet* 1, q 4, a 1, ad 2 "Omnis forma substantialis propriam dispositionem in materia requirit, sine qua esse non potest unde alteratio est uia ad generationem et corruptionem", Aquinas, *De Mixt* , 37–40

body of which they are part to corrupt into precisely those elments whose powers they are Even though the powers of the elements are present in a mixed body in a modified way, they can still act as powers of the elements (although the mean quality itself is the power of the mixed body) Thus the heat of the *element* fire, which is present in a modified way in the power of a mixed body, can act as the heat *of fire* to dispose the mixed body to become fire when it is corrupted Thus, it is because the powers of the elements are present that a mixed body decays into those particular elements of which it was composed and not others [13]

As an alternative to St Thomas's explanation of the presence of the elements in complex bodies, Gordon P Barnes has argued for the multiplicity of substantial forms that in one and the same place there is more than one substantial form I will first lay out his position and then argue that his conclusions are not only not required by our knowledge of natural things—they are not even an adequate explanation of the natural world

Before presenting his explanation of how the elements are present in living things, Barnes discusses the nature of matter He distinguishes between two kinds of matter "substance-independent matter" and "substance-dependent matter " Substance-independent matter is the matter whose "very identity does not depend on its composing this particular substance, a human being, here and now " To this, he adds that he "is assuming that subatomic particles have their own identities and natures, independently of the macrophysical substances that they compose at a given time." Thus, Barnes posits substance-independent matter as matter which could be in many different substances with not only the same qualities, but also the same identity and nature, that it has in a human being For substance-independent matter he gives the example of fundamental subatomic particles In contrast, substance-dependent matter is matter that "is essentially specified by the substantial form of a human being " Substance-dependent matter includes the various organs and tissues of a living

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[13] St Thomas Aquinas, *In librum primum Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione expositio* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1886), lect 3, no 19, idem, *De Mixt* , 140–7, idem, *Quodlibet* 1, q 4, a. 1, ad 2–3, Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, 306–12, Decaen, "Elemental Presence," 288–95, Bobik, *Matter and Form and the Elements*, 111–12, 124–5, 140–3, 228–41

body This kind of matter does not retain its own identity and nature apart from the man of whose body it is a part [14]

At this point, Barnes gives his argument for the plurality of substantial forms

> (19) The correct scientific explanations of many events and processes that occur in a living human being essentially refer to the *powers* of microscopic particles, such as molecules, atoms, and so forth, *and thus* these microscopic particles must have their own *identity and essence*, independently of their function in the whole human organism
>
> (20) If the correct explanation of some event or process involves reference to *entities* of a certain sort, then entities of that sort exist
>
> (21) Therefore there are microscopic particles that exist in a living human body, and these particles have their own identities and essences, independently of their function in the whole human organism [15]

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[14] Barnes, "Paradoxes," 507–17 Barnes understands matter differently than Aquinas He claims (following Suarez) that both the form and the matter of a substance are "incomplete substances" (ibid , 508) Form is an "incomplete substance" that is somehow united to its "complementary *entity*, matter, in order to compose a complete substance" (ibid , emphasis added) The difficulty in this position is to explain how, if form and matter are substances and even entities, they can compose one being Barnes's position would seem to make a thing composed of form and matter two things, each incomplete, but each an "entity " Another difficulty is to explain how form, if it is really an entity, comes to be, since it does not seem possible for such an entity to be educed from the potency of matter, its complementary entity See Aquinas, *ST* I, q 65, a 4, idem, *SCG*, bk 4, chap 81, idem, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a 6, idem, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, a 3, idem, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1970–76), q 3, a 5, idem, *De Principiis Naturae*, chap 2, idem, *Commentaria in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Rome Commissio Leonina, 1884), 1, lect 13, no 9, William A. Wallace, *The Modeling of Nature Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis* (Washington, D C The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 7–9, and Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, 281–7 Compare what Barnes says about matter to St Thomas's understanding of first matter "Et quia omnis diffinitio et omnis cognitio est per formam, ideo materia prima per se non potest cognosci vel diffinir, sed per comparationem, ut dicatur quod illud est materia prima quod hoc modo se habet ad omnes formas et priuationes sicut es ad ydolum et infiguratum et hec dicitur simpliciter prima" in Aquinas, *De Principiis Naturae*, 2, lines 78–85 Barnes's distinction between the two kinds of matter may not be as rigorous as it seems The transplanted heart functions in the same way in one man as in another, but is substance-dependent matter according to Barnes and so does not retain the same identity The carbon atom, on the other hand, functions differently in a carbohydrate molecule than in sodium bicarbonate, yet according to Barnes is substance-independent matter and so retains its identity

[15] Barnes, "Paradoxes," 517–18 Emphasis added, numbering in the original

Barnes begins by claiming that a complete explanation of a human being includes the *powers* of microscopic particles From this, he concludes that the particles must "have their own identity and essence," and thus must exist. Therefore, "there are things like carbon atoms that exist in my body right now, and these carbon atoms have their own substantial forms, independently of the function that they happen to perform in my body "[16]

After proposing this thesis, Barnes argues against "the most salient alternative to this conclusion" St Thomas's explanation—presence by power Barnes explains presence by power, claiming that, according to St Thomas, "the whole substance has those powers that the elements would possess were they actually present in the substance " After alleging, in passing, that St Thomas's explanation "appears to contradict the real content of modern scientific explanations," he proceeds with his main argument (which he claims to have taken from Scotus and Ockham) [17]

Barnes's argument against presence by power is based on causality

> I assume that every event that occurs in the natural world has a cause So there must be some cause of the assumption of the powers of a lower form by a higher form, whenever that occurs For example, suppose that a carbon atom appears to enter my body According to the Thomistic view, the substantial form of the carbon atom is not actually present in my body Rather, the substantial form of the whole human being acquires the powers of a carbon atom in that very region of the body where a carbon atom appears to be present Now, given our assumption of universal causality in nature, there must be some cause or explanation of the assumption of exactly these powers, the powers of a carbon atom, at this very time and place in the human body So what is the cause of this assumption of exactly these powers by the higher form? The Thomist has no explanation here, and that is tantamount to a denial of universal causality in nature Thus I conclude that the human body is composed of particles of matter that have their own substantial forms, independently of the function that they perform in the whole human organism [18]

Everything has a cause, so the body's incorporation and exercise of the powers of a carbon atom at a particular time and place must have a cause Not only must there be a cause of the human being's substan-

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[16] Ibid , 518
[17] Ibid
[18] Ibid , 518–19

tial form's getting the powers of the carbon atom, but also of its getting and using the powers of the carbon atom in a particular part of the human body, for example, in the stomach, where the food containing the carbon atom is digested Since the Thomistic position denies that the substantial form of a carbon atom is actually present after it has been incorporated into the body, Barnes claims that this position offers no explanation for the presence of the powers of the carbon atom, which is a denial of the "universal causality in nature " This leaves Barnes's own position, that carbon atoms, and thus their substantial forms, are actually present in a human body, as the most promising hylomorphic explanation [19]

Defending his position, Barnes makes it clear that he is not holding that one and the same substance, for example, a man, has many substantial forms Rather, he says that "there exists a plurality of substances in the same time and place, each with its own substantial form " This leaves him with a difficult question "How can there be a single human being that is colocated with these many other substances?"[20]

Barnes then explains how a man can be substantially one rather than an aggregate His criterion for substantial unity is

> For any set of basic particles, the x's, if there is an intrinsic property being F, such that being F is instantiated in exactly the space occupied by the x's, and it is not the case that something's being F is a logical consequence of the properties and relations of the x's as such, then there is something y, such that the x's merely coincide with y, and y is an intrinsic unity [21]

This means that, if the existence of a human body is not merely a result of the organization of the particles which seem to compose (or, according to Barnes, which share the same space as) that human body, then the human body must be a substantial unity which "merely coincides" with the atoms that compose it This irreducible property of being a human being demands a substantial form "that makes it the case that there is something that has properties that are not reducible to the properties and relations of the basic particles that coincide with it "[22]

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[19] Ibid , 519
[20] Ibid , 520–1
[21] Ibid , 521
[22] Ibid , 520–2

Thus Barnes presents his position that there are many substantial forms in one place He attacks the Thomistic position, claiming that it asserts that the substantial form of a more complex substance assumes the powers of a lower substance without any cause Having discounted St Thomas's explanation, he defends his own He claims that, because a human being is not merely an aggregate of the particles which (in his view) are in the same place as and coincide with it, there must be something, a substantial form, that makes a human person present At the same time, since a correct explanation of the human body requires reference to the powers of other entities, those other entities must be present as substances in the same place as the human body

Having laid out Barnes's position, I will argue that it is neither required by nor an adequate explanation of the way in which living things exist First, I will explain why the scientific facts do not require a plurality of substantial forms Second, I will show how Barnes's theory does not adequately explain living things Third, I will argue against Barnes's claim that St Thomas's explanation is insufficient because it denies "the universal causality of nature "

Barnes is correct in asserting that "the correct scientific explanations of many events and processes that occur in a living human being essentially refer to the *powers* of microscopic particles " However, he goes on to claim that the scientific explanation makes "reference to entities of a certain sort," namely, microscopic particles On the one hand, everyone (even St Thomas and Aristotle) agrees that the powers of the elements are found in living things, and that the activities of living things cannot be explained without reference to such powers What is not clear is whether they are the powers of substantial entities (actually present particles) or of the substance as a whole (containing the elements *virtute)* [23]

From the fact that "the correct scientific explanations of many events and processes that occur in a living human being essentially refer to the *powers* of microscopic particles," Barnes concludes that "these microscopic particles must have their own identity and essence " This conclusion does not follow from his premise, as the elements' powers are not identical with their "identity and essence " The

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[23] Ibid , 517–18, emphasis added

correct explanation of the human body makes reference to the powers of microscopic entities, but not to the entities themselves [24]

Not only do we not sense substantial forms, but we do not measure them with scientific instruments either We sense the size, shape, color, and so forth, of things, and we measure their frequency, mass, temperature, electrical charge, and so on It is only through our intellect that we are able to grasp something, often not very clearly, of the substantial forms of natural things Thus it is not correct to claim that an *entity* is present because the scientific explanation requires the presence of its *powers* [25]

In fact, sometimes it is clearly not the case that reference to the powers of something indicates the existence of the entity, at least in the way Barnes seems to think that it indicates it For example, the existence of the particle-like powers of an atom in a two-slit experiment might lead the experimenter to suppose that a particle with certain powers was present and had traveled in a particle-like way from the emitter to the detector. However, depending on the experimental apparatus, it might be the case that the atom could not have traveled in a particle-like way from the emitter to the detector, because its position at the detector is part of an interference pattern Thus, according to modern physics, the inference that because an atom exhibits particle-like powers it is a particle is invalid [26]

Therefore, the fact that the powers of carbon atoms are required to explain the workings of the human body does not require the presence of such substantial entities. Rather, it requires that the powers of carbon atoms be found in the human body Thus scientific facts do not require that there be a plurality of substantial forms in one place

Not only is Barnes's theory not required by scientific facts, but it is not even a satisfactory explanation of them. As Barnes makes clear,

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[24] Ibid , emphasis added

[25] Ibid , Wallace, *Modeling*, 239–44, George P Klubertanz, *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), 22–37, 111–13

[26] This experiment has been carried out with electrons, neutrons, and atoms For a detailed discussion of the experiment, see George Greenstein and Arthur G Zajonc, *The Quantum Challenge Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (Boston Jones and Bartlett, 1997), 1–19, Richard Feynman, Robert B Leighton, and Matthew L Sands, *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*, Vol 3 (Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley, 1965), 5–10, and Enrico Cantore, *Atomic Order An Introduction to the Philosophy of Microphysics* (Cambridge MIT Press, 1969), 67–91, 116–25

according to his version of plurality of substantial forms, "It is not one and the same substance that is said to have a plurality of substantial forms Rather, what is claimed is that there exists a plurality of substances in the same time and place, each with its own substantial form "[27] He goes on to explain that, while there are atoms actually present in every part of a human being

> In the very same region of space with such an atom, there is also something else, an atom-configured-part of a human being This atom-configured-part of a human being is informed only by the substantial form of a human being So, in summary, there is nothing that has more than one substantial form Rather, there are two distinct but coincident entities that have two distinct substantial forms What is the connection between these two coincident entities? Here is a suggestion they share the same basic matter So I am suggesting that one and the same "parcel" of basic matter can be informed by two distinct substantial forms and thereby compose two distinct substances [28]

In one and the same place, there are atoms, actually present, and a part of a human body—an "atom-configured" part This part of the human body is informed only by the human soul, while the atoms are informed only by their own forms Barnes suggests that these distinct entities can be in the same place because each substantial form informs one and the same matter The carbon atoms are not part of the human body, but only present "in the same time and place."[29]

It seems that, by stating his position in this way, Barnes attempts to avoid refutations such as St Thomas's St. Thomas argues against those who claimed, for example, that there are three souls, intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative, in one man By claiming that there are many substances in the same place, rather than many substantial forms in the same one thing, Barnes attempts to sidestep St Thomas's arguments, which are directed toward showing that a thing with many substantial forms is not one thing Barnes concedes that the man and his atoms are not one thing However, by admitting that the carbon

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[27] Barnes, "Paradoxes," 520

[28] Ibid , n 25

[29] Ibid If a part, for example, a kidney, is informed only by the form of a human being, then it is not clear what Barnes means when he says that the part is atom-configured, since (according to him) the atoms are a different substance from the human being, "coincident" with him, and merely sharing the same first matter

atoms and the man are different substances, Barnes involves himself in a difficulty [30]

The difficulty with Barnes's multiplicity of substantial forms is that it does not permit the powers of the elements which compose the human body to really belong to the human body As Barnes says, "The correct scientific explanations of many events and processes that occur in a living human being essentially refer to the powers of microscopic particles, such as molecules, atoms, and so forth "[31] The powers of microscopic bodies are part of a complete explanation, not of microscopic bodies, but of the living human being The activities of that living human being, not only nutrition, growth, and reproduction, but even sensation and emotion, are activities of the body as well as the soul, and thus are also activities of the powers of the elements I cannot really be said to be afraid unless certain chemical changes occur in my body How can a human being's fear essentially require chemical changes in some other substance which merely "coincides" with it? In fact, it is not a coincidence that the human body is composed of elements or that all life on earth is carbon-based [32]

Biologically speaking, the powers of the elements are not just in the same place as the human body, indeed, they are its powers. So much so, in fact, that many biologists and philosophers—erroneously, but not without some plausibility—think that a human being is nothing more than an arrangement of molecules The proper operation of every bodily organ requires that the organ have certain qualities, qualities ultimately requiring certain elemental powers These elemental powers are powers of the organ, and the organ is an organ of the body Thus, the powers of the elements, powers which Barnes uses to argue that the elements are actually present, need to be powers not of atoms that "coincide" with the human body, but of the human body itself [33]

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[30] Aquinas, *ST* I, q 76, aa 3–4, idem, *SCG*, bk 2, chaps 57–8, idem, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, in *Quaestiones disputatae accedit liber De ente et essentia*, vol 1 (Paris In Librariis Consociationis S Pauli, 1883), q 3, a 9, ad 9, idem, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, a 1, ad 9

[31] Barnes, "Paradoxes," 517

[32] Ibid , 517–22, Aquinas, *ST* I, q 75, a 4, ad 1–2, q 22, a 2, ad 3, q 41, a 1, Antonio R Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York Harcourt Brace, 1999), 65–7

[33] Richard J Connell, *Substance and Modern Science* (Houston Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988), 45–61, 107–16

Similarly, the human body only touches something by means of the qualities of the elements which compose its skin, and a man is killed only when something acts on the powers of the elements composing his body in such a way as to make his body unable to be a living human body Thus, Barnes fails to account for the fact that the powers of the atoms are powers of the human body when he claims that, to account for the powers of the atoms in the body, the substantial forms of the atoms (and thus the atoms themselves) must be actually present and coincide with the human body [34]

Finally, Barnes's attack on the Thomistic position as "a denial of the universal causality of nature" is not successful Barnes claims that St Thomas cannot explain why "the substantial form of the whole substance assume[s] exactly the powers of a carbon atom at this time and place "[35] However, it is the carbon atom itself that causes its powers to become powers of the natural form of the human being. While being digested, the carbon atom acts on the human body through its powers, and the human body acts on the carbon atom through its powers (which are also powers of elements already incorporated into the body) in a process which St Thomas likens to the mutual action of elements transforming each other into a mixed body The powers of the carbon atom act on the human body to make it carbon-like in exactly the place where the carbon atom is being incorporated [36]

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[34] Ibid

[35] Barnes, "Paradoxes," 519

[36] Aquinas, *ST* I, q 119, a 1, ad 2 If a radioactive atom, for example, ^{125}I, is introduced into the body, it is assimilated by the body just as a nonradioactive isotope of the same element would be However, the radioactive nucleus will decay in the same way whether or not it is part of a living thing its being part of the human body does not affect its instability While these facts are not evidence for St Thomas's explanation of elemental presence, neither do they cause any real difficulty for it The Thomistic explanation is that the radioactive element, when it becomes part of the human body, acts on the human body to cause it to gain the powers of the radioactive element while the body acts on the element to make it part of the body Since one of the properties of a radioactive atom is that it decays, the part of the human body where the atom has been incorporated has the property of decaying The decay is not the decay of an atom (a substance), but rather of a part of the human body that has the powers of a radioactive atom The energy emitted by the decay does, however, cease being part of the body See Sheldon Baum and Roland Bramlet, *Basic Nuclear Medicine* (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1975), 57–76

Having examined two rival explanations of the way in which parts are present in wholes, I have argued that, in contrast to presence by power, multiplicity of substantial forms has serious philosophical problems and is not consistent with the nature of living things After beginning with a brief review of Aquinas's presence by power, I discussed Barnes's argument for a plurality of substantial forms I concluded that Barnes's theory is not required to satisfy the modern scientific understanding of the human body, and that it fails even to explain how the human body is composed of elements

Ohio Dominican University

POTENTIALITY, POSSIBILITY, AND THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF DEATH

JASON T. EBERL

I

ONE OF THE MAIN TENETS held to be essential to the definition of death is that it is irreversible Understanding death as irreversible allows one to say that using resuscitative measures to revive a person whose life functions have temporarily ceased is not a case of bringing the dead back to life, rather, a temporary hiatus of one's life functions does not entail that a person has died since this condition is reversible The application of this tenet in clinical end-of-life cases is challenged, however, by the ability to maintain, through the use of a mechanical ventilator or a cardiopulmonary bypass machine, the vegetative functions of a body which has suffered whole-brain infarction and thus satisfies the widely accepted criterion for determining when death occurs [1] A whole-brain dead body, which has been declared irreversibly dead, does not seem dead if respiration and circulation persist through the medium of an external device [2] Is the

Correspondence to Department of Philosophy, Cavanaugh Hall 331, 425 University Boulevard, Indianapolis, IN 46202

[1] The whole-brain criterion for determining death has received legislative approval in several nations, including the U S , see President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, *Defining Death Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of Death* (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1981) It has also received moral approval from the Roman Catholic Church, see John Paul II, "Address to the International Congress on Transplants," *The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 1 (2001) 89–92, *Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death, ed* Robert J White, Heinz Angstwurm, and Ignacio Carrasco de Paula (Vatican City Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, 1992) Whole-brain death is distinct from so-called higher-brain death, in which a person is in an irreversibly comatose or persistent vegetative state, such as in the well-publicized case of Terri Schiavo

[2] Many have difficulty accepting that a loved one is dead if they see the body's chest continuing to rise and fall, and medical staff may err in making the apparently contradictory statement that the loved one "is dead, but the machine is keeping him alive "

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machine, then, reversing the patient's death? A further challenge is the prospect of cryopreserving the bodies of persons who have been declared dead, in the hope that future technological developments will allow such frozen bodies to be thawed, repaired, and thereby reanimated These challenges prompt careful reflection of how death should be conceptually defined and clinically determined

This paper offers such reflection from the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysical perspective Aristotle and Aquinas understand a human person to be composed of a rational soul informing a living, sentient, animal body What are the implications of this understanding in light of the above challenges? I have recently addressed the use of artificial technology to sustain a body's vegetative functions, as well as the implications of the view I articulate with respect to cases of prolonged somatic survival after whole-brain death and the practice of non-heart-beating organ donation [3] In this paper, I will consider the case of cryopreservation A central conceptual focus throughout this discussion is the purportedly irreversible nature of death and the criteria by which a human body is considered to be informed by a rational soul

II

Aristotle defines a soul as the first actuality—or substantial form—of "a natural body having life potentially in it "[4] Aristotle defines three types of soul. a rational soul has the relevant capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought, and is the type of soul proper to the human species, a sensitive soul has the relevant capacities for only life and sensation, and is the type of soul proper to all nonhuman species of animal; a vegetative soul has the relevant capacities for life

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[3] See Jason T Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics* (New York Routledge, 2006), 51–60, 121–6

[4] Aristotle, *De anima* (hereafter, "*DA*") 2 1 412a28–9 The translation is J A Smith's, from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed Jonathan Barnes (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1984) Compare Aquinas, *Sententia libri De anima* (hereafter, "*In DA*"), bk 2, lect 1 With respect to the subject of this paper, I find no apparent disagreement or significant differences in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas I will thus refer to both thinkers as representative of a single viewpoint This does not imply, however, that the overall viewpoint of either thinker is equivalent to that of the other

alone, and is proper to all nonanimal living organisms [5] A specific type of soul informs only a specific type of body—one properly organized to support the soul's definitive capacities. Hence, a rational soul cannot inform the body of an ant or an oak tree, it can inform only a human body which supports a rational soul's capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought [6] At the most basic level, though, a body is ensouled if it is organized such that it is potentially alive

Prima facie, the notion that a soul informs a body that is potentially alive seems to imply that such a body might be actually dead [7] As Aquinas interprets Aristotle's definition, however, this is not the case Rather, by "potentially alive," Aristotle is referring to the fact that a body which receives a soul as its form cannot already be actually alive since the soul is the actuality of a living body Hence, the "body" that is referred to in the definition of soul is simply matter that is in a state of potentiality to receive a form—in this case, the form received is a soul that actualizes such matter as a living body "The matter of a living body is that which is compared to life just as potency to act; and this is the soul, the act, by which the body lives "[8]

Having adopted Aristotle's definition of soul and further elucidated a soul's relationship to the body it informs,[9] Aquinas defines a human person's death as "the loss of that union by which a soul is united to a body as form" and "the loss of the operation of life "[10] Though he separates two understandings of the term "death," Aquinas nevertheless considers them united in one and the same event When the union of a rational soul and its body is dissolved, the dissolution of the body's unified organic functioning immediately follows [11]

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[5] *DA* 2 3 414a29–415a13

[6] It is conceivable that there may be nonhuman bodies, perhaps on other inhabited planets, which are also suitably organized to support a rational soul's definitive capacities If so, then such entities, although nonhuman, would nonetheless qualify as rational beings or persons

[7] It is important to note that, for Aristotle, ensoulment is an all-or-nothing affair Hence, there can be no vague boundaries such that something could be indeterminately alive in an ontological sense—for example, Dr Frankenstein's monster just before the initial shock was applied

[8] *In DA*, bk 2, lect 1, §222 All translations of Aquinas's texts are my own and, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's works (*S Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia* [Rome Commissio Leonina, 1882–])

[9] See *In DA*, Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (hereafter, "*ST*") I, q 75–6

[10] Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (hereafter, "*QDV*"), q 13, a 4, ad 2

[11] See *QDV*, q 25, a. 6, Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* (hereafter, "*SCG*"), bk 2, chap 58

The primary metaphysical criterion that marks a soul's ceasing to inform its body is the body's no longer being suitably organized to support the soul's definitive capacities

> Just as form does not come into matter unless the matter is made proper through the requisite dispositions, so, with the cessation of the requisite dispositions, a form cannot remain in the matter And in this way the union of soul and body is dissolved, if natural heat and moisture and others factors of this sort [that is, vital metabolic factors] are removed, insofar as by these a body is disposed toward reception of a soul [12]

Aquinas thus defines a human person's death as occurring when the body is no longer able to actualize the soul's vegetative capacities [13] If death is indeed irreversible, then the soul's separation from its body will be permanent until, according to Aquinas, the miraculous event of bodily resurrection occurs [14]

III

With the above account in mind, we can metaphysically describe a standard case of a human person's death: a person's soul ceases to inform his body once the living body, as opposed to the corpse which results, ceases to exist A substantial change occurs in which one substance—a human person—ceases to exist and another substance—a corpse—comes to exist in its place.[15] However, in any ordi-

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[12] Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*, q un , a. 9, ad 16

[13] See Jason T Eberl, "A Thomistic Understanding of Human Death," *Bioethics* 19 (2005a) 29–48, and Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, chap 3

[14] See Jason T Eberl, "The Metaphysics of Resurrection Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 74 (2000) 215–30

[15] This description is somewhat inaccurate insofar as, according to Aquinas, a human person continues to exist after death as composed of his soul alone, see Jason T Eberl, "Do Human Persons Persist between Death and Resurrection?" in *Metaphysics and God Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump*, ed Kevin Timpe (New York Routledge, forthcoming) Furthermore, Aquinas does not understand the corpse that remains after death to be a substance, properly speaking, but rather as having dissolved into the elemental substances which constitute it, see *QDV*, q 25, a. 6, *SCG*, bk 2, chap 58, and Gerald Kreyche, "The Soul–Body Problem in St Thomas," *New Scholasticism* 46 (1972) 472 Nevertheless, the substantial unity of a person's soul and his body ceases at death until resurrection, which is why a corpse is numerically distinct from the previously living body constituted of the same matter

nary death,[16] there is a brief period during which a body, the vital metabolic functions[17] of which have ceased, may be revived During this period, while the body is not actually alive, it is potentially alive [18] It is reasonable to conclude that a body which may be revived continues to be informed by its soul, even though the soul is in an apparently quiescent state until the body returns to a condition in which the soul's capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought may be actualized once again Thus, in situations where a body is clinically dead but is then revived, no substantial change occurs it is not the case that one substance—a person—ceases to exist and another substance—a corpse—comes to exist in his place, and then the corpse is replaced once again by the person when vital metabolic functions are revived It is not the case that the person dies, strictly speaking, and is then brought back to life, his soul never ceases to inform his body while the body's potential for living remains

Would this conclusion also apply to a cryopreserved body whose potential for living is completely dependent upon the use of external technological intervention to reanimate it at some future time?[19] Given the mere possibility that a dead body may be cryopreserved and revived at a later time through the application of technology, is such a body still informed by its soul, albeit in a quiescent state? Fred Feldman asserts,

> The mere possibility of suspended animation shows that death cannot be defined as the cessation life When an organism enters suspended animation it ceases to live, but it does not die The analysis of death must be consistent with the fact that not all organisms that enter suspended animation die [20]

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[16] By "ordinary death," I mean a death in which the body remains structurally intact, as opposed to a body that is blown apart, crushed, or incinerated

[17] By "vital metabolic functions," I mean spontaneous heartbeat and respiration required to circulate oxygenated blood throughout the body

[18] See Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, *The Philosophy of Aquinas* (Boulder, Col Westview Press, 2004), 157

[19] See Bronwyn Parry, "Technologies of Immortality The Brain on Ice," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 35 (2004) 391–413

[20] Fred Feldman, *Confrontations with the Reaper* (New York Oxford University Press, 1992), 62–3 Note that Feldman does not analyze death from within the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysical framework My concern is whether, within such a framework, Feldman's assertion would hold true

If Feldman is correct, then a cryopreserved body still composes a person, and to cease maintaining the body in its frozen state would bring about the person's death But this would hold true only if death were indeed irreversible by definition and the possibility of a body's being revived entails that it is "potentially alive" in a way that satisfies Aristotle's definition of soul

So, how should the notion of potentiality be understood in Aristotle's definition of soul? Does the mere possibility that a cryopreserved body may be revived indicate that it is potentially alive and thus still informed by its soul? Does it make a metaphysical difference that death, in this case, is reversible only through the application of technology that has not even been invented yet?

After defining a soul as the actuality of a potentially living body, Aristotle asserts, "We must not understand by that which is capable of living what has lost the soul it had, but only what still retains it "[21] Aquinas further specifies the relevant sense of "potential" in this case.

> For something may be said to be 'potential' in two ways in one way when it does not have the principle of operation, in another way when it in fact has such a principle, but is not acting by it Now the body, whose act is the soul, has life potentially, not indeed in the first way but in the second And so when [Aristotle] calls the body 'something potentially alive'—that is, having life potentially, which is the act of the soul—it is not said to be 'potentially alive' because it has discarded its soul—that is, it is without the principle of life, which is the soul—but because it has such a principle [22]

But the question remains whether a cryopreserved body has lost its soul or retains it while awaiting its thaw and resuscitation, which requires establishing criteria by which to distinguish a body's having a sufficient degree of potentiality to *be* ensouled versus simply being able to *become* ensouled (again)

The relevant criterion is whether a cryopreserved body has an active or passive potentiality to live again, as Aquinas specifies above. I have argued elsewhere that a being which has an active potentiality for self-conscious rational thought should be considered a rationally ensouled person [23] Furthermore, a being has such an active potential-

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[21] *DA* 2 1 412b25–6

[22] *In DA*, bk 2, lect 2, §240

[23] See Jason T Eberl, "Aquinas's Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 30 (2005b) 379–94, and Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, chap 2

ity if it has within itself everything necessary, given its proper design environment, to actualize itself in the relevant manner [24] So, for example, a human embryo, due to its genetic structure and the presence of other requisite biological factors, needs only a supportive uterine environment and the normal postnatal environment all of us require, to develop into an actually self-conscious rational being, therefore, it has an active potentiality for self-conscious rational thought and thus qualifies as a rationally ensouled person A sperm or ovum, on the other hand, has only a passive potentiality to develop into a self-conscious rational being, because each must undergo the radical change that comes about through the process of fertilization, in which each cell ceases to exist on its own and forms a new composite substance a rationally ensouled embryo [25]

Another relevant distinction is strong versus weak potentiality [26] A sperm or ovum, for example, is potentially a human person in the strong sense only if it could come to be a human person while preserving its numerical identity—that is, it remains the same substance identical with itself throughout its development from a germ cell to a fully actualized human person A change, however, from a germ cell to a human person does not appear to be an identity-preserving transformation a sperm loses its substantial identity when it fuses with an ovum, and vice versa, to form a new substance—a human embryo Furthermore, Aquinas denies that a vegetative substance—a germ cell—can change into a rational substance—a human embryo—and remain the same substance, because vegetative and rational substances are of distinct metaphysical kinds with quite different substantial forms The only sense in which a germ cell is plausibly a potential human person is in the weak sense that it provides the makings of a human person I will argue below that a cryopreserved body is potentially a living human person only in the weak sense that it too provides the material out of which a human person may be composed once that material is once again informed by a rational soul

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[24] I derive the concept of a "design environment" from Alvin Plantinga's concept of something fulfilling its proper function, according to its design plan, in an appropriate environment, see his *Warrant and Proper Function* (New York Oxford University Press, 1993), chap 2

[25] See Massimo Reichlin, "The Argument from Potential A Reappraisal," *Bioethics* 11 (1997) 13–17

[26] I am indebted to Michael Burke for bringing this distinction to my attention

It is important to emphasize that the relevant sense of potentiality for something to be rationally ensouled—Aristotle's concept of active potentiality—refers to something's capacity to *be* in a certain way, as opposed to merely the possibility of its *becoming* something [27] Of course, something could have an active potentiality to become something different—for example, a standing person has an active potentiality to become a sitting person—but such a case involves the thing in question having "a capacity to produce the requisite changes in itself "[28] A cryopreserved body, however, does not have "its own motive principle"[29] by which it is able to reanimate itself Therefore, it fails to satisfy Aristotle's conditions for a potentially living body suitable for ensoulment—that is, "one having *in itself* the power of setting *itself* in movement and arresting *itself*"[30] A cryopreserved body has been arrested through dying and being frozen, and it cannot set itself back in motion through its own power

Clearly, a cryopreserved body cannot change itself into an actually living body It thereby fails to satisfy Aristotle's definition of active potentiality, which is "a source of change in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other "[31] But perhaps the requirement that a cryopreserved body have an active potentiality to be living is too stringent After all, the mere fact that such a body can possibly be reanimated indicates that it possesses some intrinsic features that permit effective external intervention to revivify it "It must be that, for what is capable of being acted upon in some way, to have in itself a certain disposition, which is the cause and principle of that kind of passivity, and this principle is called passive potency "[32] So, despite the fact that such potentiality will be passive insofar as it is wrought by an external agent who thaws and repairs the cryopreserved body, the presence of such potentiality in the cryopreserved body—a potentiality

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[27] See Charlotte Witt, "Powers and Possibilities Aristotle vs the Megarians," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 11 (1995) 264

[28] Harry A. Ide, "*Dunamis* in *Metaphysics* IX," *Apeiron* 25 (1992) 4

[29] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (hereafter, "*M*") 9 7 1049a15 The translation is W D Ross's, from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol 2 Aquinas uses the term, "proper active principle", see Aquinas, *In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* (hereafter, "*In M*"), ed M R Cathala and Raymundi M Spiazzi (Turin Marietti, 1950), bk 9, chap 6, §1837

[30] *DA* 2 1 412b16–17 (emphasis mine)

[31] *M* 5 12 1020a1–2

[32] *In M*, bk 5, chap 14, §963

lacking, for example, in a rock or a piece of wood—may be indicative of a dormant soul awaiting external aid for it to actualize its body to live once again. I contend, however, that to infer from such mere possibility that a cryopreserved body is potentially alive to such a degree that it should be considered rationally ensouled invokes, to use John Lizza's terminology, "the most remote and promiscuous sense of potentiality."[33]

In addition to distinguishing between active and passive potentiality, recall the distinction between strong and weak potentiality. For something, *X*, to have a strong potentiality to become *Y*, it must be the case that *X* maintains its numerical identity as it becomes *Y*. There is no reason, however, to consider a cryopreserved body as numerically identical to either the previously living body or to the future living body it may become. Unless one presumes that a cryopreserved body is rationally ensouled during the interim period when it is frozen, then, given such a body's lack of an active potentiality to live, as argued above, it is more plausible to consider it to be numerically distinct from the two living bodies that bookend it.

Hence, while a cryopreserved body has a weak potentiality to become a living body insofar as it provides the material makings of such a body, this is insufficient to hold that a cryopreserved body has an active potentiality to live again and is thereby rationally ensouled. A cryopreserved body is indeed a corpse that lacks the requisite potential for life to satisfy Aristotle's definition of ensoulment. A cryopreserved body is thus not ensouled, but rather has been reduced to its constituent elements that are preserved in mere structural unity as a result of being frozen together. This mere structural unity, which differs from the substantial unity of an organism that supervenes upon ensoulment,[34] gives a cryopreserved body at most a weak passive potentiality to become a living being once again. "If from the dead must be made a living animal, it must be that it is returned to prime matter, insofar as a dead body is dissolved into the elements, and from the elements again in due order an animal comes to be constituted."[35] If a cryopreserved body were successfully thawed and made to live again,

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[33] John P. Lizza, *Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 105.

[34] See Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, 34–5.

[35] *In M*, bk. 8, chap. 4, §1752.

it would truly be a case of reanimation—its soul would inform it anew [36]

This conclusion differs significantly from Peter van Inwagen's contention that a cryopreserved organism remains alive

> I find it attractive to suppose that the cat's life persists even when the cat is frozen I would describe the frozen cat's life this way Before the cat was frozen, its life consisted mostly of chemical reactions and various relatively large-scale physical processes (the breaking and establishing of chemical bonds, the movement of fluids under hydraulic pressure, the transport of ions), when the cat was frozen, its life was "squeezed into" various small-scale physical processes (the orbiting of electrons and the exchange of photons by charged particles) Its life became the sum of those subchemical changes that underlie and constitute chemical and large-scale physical unchange But the life was *there*, disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment sufficient energy should become available to it I, who am fond of oxymorons, would describe the frozen cat as a living corpse [37]

Pace van Inwagen, I take the "subchemical changes" that persist in a cryopreserved organism to constitute its persistent structural integrity, but such changes are not equivalent to the vital metabolic processes definitive of life, mere structural unity is not sufficient for substantial, organic unity Van Inwagen recognizes that his definition of life may be "contrived and tendentious," and that one may find it reasonable to define life more precisely such that a suspended life is no life at all He thus distinguishes, for the sake of discussion, two ways in which an organism's life may cease. by disruption and by suspension [38] Hence, while the possibility of future revival may be stronger in the case of an organism whose life has been suspended, as opposed to disrupted, it is nevertheless just as dead in either case

It is worth pointing out one undesirable result of van Inwagen's first thesis, that a cryopreserved organism remains alive, which he

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[36] Or, at least *a* soul would inform it anew It remains an open question whether the rational soul that animates a revivified body would be the same soul that informed that body prior to its death and cryopreservation Given Aquinas's strong assertion, however, that each soul informs its own unique body insofar as it is the body's substantial form, it is reasonable to presume that the physical and psychological similarities between the person before death and after reanimation would indicate the same person having been brought back to life with the same rational soul

[37] Peter van Inwagen, *Material Beings* (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1990), 146–7

[38] Ibid , 147

himself would reject A corpse that is not cryopreserved also possesses persistent "subchemical changes" at the atomic and subatomic levels which will never cease Even after a corpse has naturally decayed to the point of presenting only a skeleton, the atoms that constitute the collection of bones remain active, otherwise, all there would be is unformed prime matter or inert subatomic particles Van Inwagen shares the general intuition that the persistent microlevel activity of an unfrozen corpse is insufficient to characterize it as alive He allows, however, the same level of activity in a cryopreserved body to suffice as the life—and the numerically same life—as the organism before its macrolevel life functions were suspended The only difference van Inwagen cites to differentiate the two cases is that the microlevel activity of a cryopreserved body is "disposed to expand into its normal state at the moment sufficient energy should become available to it "[39] But a great deal turns on how the requisite disposition should be defined. If we understand it in terms of Aristotelian potentiality, then, as argued above, a cryopreserved body is not sufficiently disposed to be a living (ensouled) organism

Another argument in support of considering a cryopreserved body as dead may be based upon the relationship between the body as a whole and its constituent integral parts, and the different relationship a living organism bears to its parts [40] David Hershenov contends that one could not replace all or even a large number of a cryopreserved body's integral parts without thereby replacing the body with a numerically distinct duplicate [41] At most, one could say that it is indeterminate whether the cryopreserved body survives such changes as the numerically same body [42]

A living organism, on the other hand, does not suffer from mereological essentialism Both van Inwagen and Peter Unger discuss ways in which a living organism is able to "assimilate" new matter that becomes "caught up in the life" of the organism [43] Unger denies that a

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[39] Ibid

[40] I am most grateful to David Hershenov for raising this supportive argument

[41] David Hershenov, "Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?" *Mind* 114 (2005) 31–59, esp 51–2

[42] Hershenov, personal correspondence

[43] See van Inwagen, *Material Beings*, 94, and Peter Unger, *Identity, Consciousness, and Value* (New York Oxford University Press, 1990), 147–52

cryopreserved body could assimilate new material constituents as does a living organism Aquinas also notes that the material constituents of a living organism are in continuous flux Organisms undergo cellular decay, and food is taken in and transformed by digestion into raw material to generate new cells and other bodily components As long as there is material continuity, then the same substantial form and the same body persist through such changes in microlevel constituents Aquinas compares the "ebb and flow" of an organism's constituents to a fire

> When some matter is by itself converted into a fire, then it is said that fire is generated anew, but when some matter is converted into a preexisting fire, the fire is said to be fed Hence, if all the matter loses the species of fire at once, and other matter is converted into fire, there will be a numerically distinct fire But if, little by little, as one piece of wood burns another piece is substituted, and so on until all of the first piece is consumed, it will always remain the numerically same fire, since always what is added passes into what preexisted And the same is understood for living bodies, in which is restored from nutrition what had been consumed by natural heat [44]

This is indicative of Aquinas's view that composition is not identity for human persons human persons are composed of but not identical to bodies, which are themselves composed of but not identical to their material constituents.[45] While a living human organism can survive a continuous replacement of its constituent parts, a cryopreserved body cannot This difference supports equating a cryopreserved body with a nonpreserved corpse, which Aquinas conceives of as a collection of elemental substances that are not substantially unified by a single substantial form,[46] neither is "potentially alive" in the relevant sense to assert that it is informed by a rational soul In sum, the persistent numerical identity of cryopreserved bodies and corpses appears to involve mereological essentialism, whereas the persistent numerical identity of living organisms does not, but rather involves

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[44] *ST* I, q 119, a 1, ad 5 Compare *ST* supp , q 80, a 4, *SCG*, bk 4, chap 81, Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae*, chap 159, Aquinas, *In Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruptione expositio*, bk 1, lects 15–16 See also John Chandlish, "St Thomas and the Dynamic State of Body Constituents," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Applied Sciences* 23 (1968) 272–5

[45] See Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York Routledge, 2003), 50–1, and Jason T Eberl, "Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings," *Review of Metaphysics* 58 (2004) 337–8

[46] See footnote 15 above

the relation of composition without identity Since the numerically same object cannot have distinct identity conditions, based on essentially different part–whole relationships, a cryopreserved body, like a corpse, is not numerically identical to the living organism whose material constituents it may nonetheless share [47]

IV

If a cryopreserved corpse is not, based on the mere possibility of its being made to live again at some future time, an ensouled human organism or person, then is death reversible given the logical possibility of cryopreservation and resuscitative technologies being perfected in the future? David Cole takes such a logically possible scenario seriously and argues that "irreversibility is not part of the ordinary concept of death "[48] David Lamb and John Lizza, however, criticize Cole for appealing to a merely logically possible scenario to criticize the notion that death is irreversible

> we should consider realistic impediments to a patient's condition being reversed as reasons for holding that the patient's condition is reversible Consideration of logically possible states of affairs that could reverse a patient's condition is irrelevant to determining whether a patient's condition is irreversible [49]

Lizza considers his criticism of Cole to be based on "Aristotelian realism," and I concur that, if we look at the actual status of a cryopreserved corpse and the present state of technology, the possibility of death being reversed is a far cry from the more robust potentiality at work in the case of, say, a person in cardiac arrest whose heart may be restarted through CPR

The considerations I have put forth in the previous section lead to an understanding of death akin to Lawrence Becker's

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[47] Eleonore Stump notes a similar difference in part–whole relationships that Aquinas holds between natural substances and artifacts, see Stump, *Aquinas*, 58–9

[48] David J Cole, "The Reversibility of Death," *Journal of Medical Ethics* 18 (1992) 26

[49] John P Lizza, "Potentiality, Irreversibility, and Death," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 30 (2005) 53–4 See also David Lamb, "Reversibility and Death A Reply to David J Cole," *Journal of Medical Ethics* 18 (1992) 31–3

> A human organism is dead when, for whatever reason, the system of those reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate oxygen, metabolize food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative homeostasis are arrested in a way which the organism itself cannot reverse [50]

As I have argued elsewhere, from the Thomistic perspective, the criterion for determining when "the system" Becker describes has arrested is the irreversible cessation of whole-brain functioning [51] Without the brain's regulation of heartbeat and respiration to maintain the flow of oxygenated blood throughout the body, all the processes Becker describes arrest and, unless CPR or some other form of external aid is applied, the organism will not be able to reverse this state on its own

Of course, as Hershenov points out, Becker's definition of death would imply that a person who suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest, and is then resuscitated through CPR or some other form of external aid, has died and come back to life [52] As noted above, however, it is consistent with Aristotle's definition of soul as informing a body that has "life potentially in it" that a body may cease to actualize its active potentiality for vital metabolic functions and then actualize that capacity once again with external aid Being dependent upon external aid to support the actualization of a body's capacity for vital metabolic functions is consistent, I contend, with the body's continuing to be ensouled and thus alive, even if some of its vital metabolic functions are temporarily not actualized.[53]

The external aid provided by CPR is not constitutive of a body's vital metabolic functions CPR simply jump-starts such functions, it does not actually perform those functions A mechanical ventilator, on the other hand, does perform a vital metabolic function it forces air into the lungs, which in turn stimulates cardiac activity If cardiac arrhythmia or asystole develops, which usually occurs, then additional artificial support must be provided for cardiac functioning to continue Patients who suffer the cessation of whole-brain function-

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[50] Lawrence C Becker, "Human Being The Boundaries of the Concept," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4 (1975) 353

[51] See Eberl, "Understanding of Human Death," 42–5, and Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, 49–54

[52] David Hershenov, "The Problematic Role of 'Irreversibility' in the Definition of Death," *Bioethics* 17 (2003) 99

[53] What follows is derived from Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, 51–3

ing require mechanical ventilation and other artificial life-support measures to maintain both respiratory and cardiac activity [54]

There is an important distinction between a body's vital metabolic functions being jump-started by external aid and such functions being taken over by external artificial support The distinction is in terms of whether the person composed of the body in question has control over such functions A person having control over his vital metabolic functions is, I contend, a necessary criterion for him to have the functional integrity one would expect of an organic substance that is substantially unified. I thereby propose that a person remains alive—ensouled—only if he has the capacity to coordinate his vital metabolic functions If a person cannot actually perform his vital metabolic functions, then he is dead If a mechanical ventilator or cardiopulmonary bypass machine actually performs a person's vital metabolic functions, then such functions and the capacity for performing them are no longer attributable to the patient dependent upon such a device [55]

If, however, a patient's dependence on artificial life-support is temporary and his inability to perform vital metabolic functions is reversible—for example, a patient who is put on cardiopulmonary bypass while undergoing an open-heart procedure—then his capacity to

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[54] See D R Field, E A Gates, R K Creasy, A R Jonsen, and R K Laros, Jr, "Maternal Brain Death during Pregnancy Medical and Ethical Issues," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 260 (1988) 818–19

[55] This conclusion serves as a response to D Alan Shewmon's argument that the whole-brain criterion of death is inadequate due to a number of cases of prolonged somatic survival despite whole-brain infarction See D Alan Shewmon, "Recovery from Brain Death A Neurologist's *Apologia*," *Linacre Quarterly* 64 (1997) 30–96, Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death A Critical Re-evaluation of the Purported Equivalence," *Issues in Law and Medicine* 14 (1998) 125–45, Shewmon, "Chronic 'Brain Death' Meta-analysis and Conceptual Consequences," *Neurology* 51 (1998) 1538–45, and Shewmon, "The Brain and Somatic Integration Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' with Death," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 26 (2001) 457–78 In the cases Shewmon presents, it is arguable that the patients are not dead, per Becker's definition, insofar as their bodies continue to "assimilate oxygen, metabolize food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative homeostasis " However, such metabolic functions persist only if these whole-brain dead bodies are supported by mechanical ventilation I contend, contra Shewmon, that since these patients no longer exhibit control over the primary vital metabolic functions of heartbeat and respiration, they are no longer rationally ensouled See Eberl, *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics*, 54–60

coordinate vital metabolic functions remains intact throughout the period of time when it is not actualized Although the capacity in question is not presently actualizable while the patient is dependent on life-support, it remains due to the fact that the patient's ability to engage in cardiac and respiratory activity under his own control can be restored with available technology and technique

A cryopreserved corpse, one could argue, has the same reversible inability to perform its vital metabolic functions While artificial technology would be required to thaw, repair, and resuscitate it, once resuscitated, the reanimated body would be able to engage in cardiac and respiratory activity under its own control once again. While there is this significant similarity between the two cases, there remains a significant difference with respect to the degree of internal change the two types of bodies must undergo in order to live independent of life-sustaining technology A patient who is enduring an open-heart procedure, and thus has his cardiac and respiratory functions temporarily taken over by a cardiopulmonary bypass machine, retains a high degree of organic functioning compatible with life and maintains control over some of his life functions Thanks to the external aid provided, there is no period at which vital metabolic functions altogether cease within the body or at which the patient loses total control over all his life functions And, once the external aid is no longer necessary and the patient's own cardiac and respiratory activity is restored, he regains the requisite control over the totality of his vital metabolic functions A cryopreserved corpse, on the other hand, has undergone a total arrest of all metabolic functions, and only the freezing process has prevented its organs and tissues from necrotizing. During cryopreservation, there are no life functions and thus no control of any life functions Hence, there is a radical discontinuity in a cryopreserved body's metabolic activity that an open-heart surgery patient does not experience

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I have argued that, from the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysical perspective, a cryopreserved corpse fails to have "life potentially in it" sufficient to satisfy Aristotle's definition of ensoulment Therefore, if the possibility that such a corpse may be successfully preserved and

resuscitated comes to fruition, one would have to conclude that the person's rational soul, which had separated from its body at death, has literally reanimated its resuscitated body Obviously, this conclusion has theological implications that go beyond the scope of this discussion if we regard bodily resuscitation in this manner as a form of technologically induced resurrection [56]

Another apparent implication of my argument is that death loses its irreversible nature Since a cryopreserved body is no longer ensouled, the person previously composed of that body has indeed died—although he may still exist as composed of his soul alone—and, if the body is successfully resuscitated, the person's death will have been reversed [57] However, in agreement with Lamb's and Lizza's criticisms of Cole, the strongest conclusion one could draw is that it is logically and metaphysically possible that death is reversible given possible future technological developments, but death is not reversible *in re*—that is, in reality as presently given [58]

Indiana University—Purdue University Indianapolis

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[56] The key question at hand is whether the rational soul that informs a resuscitated body that had been cryopreserved is the same soul that had informed that body prior to death

[57] This would be true if the same soul informs the resuscitated body, such that the same person comes back to life

[58] Of course, it is always open for God to reverse death through a miraculous intervention, which is how Aquinas conceives of resurrection insofar as God must provide matter for a person's disembodied soul to inform so that the person may exist again with all his proper parts as a rational animal, see Eberl, "Metaphysics of Resurrection "

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MORAL SENSE AND NATURAL REASON

MARIA ELTON

EVER SINCE THE 1950S, studies on the moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson have increased In addition to some previous classical historical or philosophical works,[1] an interesting discussion on the Hutchesonian moral epistemology has taken place among scholars such as William T Blackstone, Stephen Darwall, Jeffrey Edwards, William Frankena, Knud Haakonssen, Henning Jensen, Wolfgang Leidhold, James Moore, David Fate Norton, Elmer Sprague, J Martin Stafford, Robert M Stewart, Mark Philip Strasser, and Kenneth Winkler[2] Most of the points analyzed in this argument are related to a discussion about the cognitivism or the emotivism of Hutcheson—a discussion of contemporary ethics—even though the Scottish philosopher is obviously far removed from these philosophical problems. It is not my intention to intervene in this dispute, although I have gathered certain interpretations from some of its relevant works On the contrary, my concern is to relate the moral philosophy of Hutcheson with a traditional point of view, according to which moral philosophy depends on natural theology.[3] The analysis of this relationship is important because it is a crucial feature of the Hutchesonian moral philosophy However, this theological outlook does not entirely match his empirical moral epistemology, and this inconsistency allowed David

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Correspondence to Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de los Andes, Av San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200 , Las Condes, Santiago, Chile

[1] See William Scott, *Francis Hutcheson* (New York August M Kelley Publishers, 1966), and Thomas Fowler, *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson* (New York G P Putnam's Son, 1883)

[2] See Stephen Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought'* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1995), 337–44

[3] We understand by natural theology a metaphysical science about God—his attributes and his works, especially the creation of the world—based on natural reason, not on divine revelation and faith From our point of view the difference between theology of faith and natural theology regards their principles, namely, revelation in the former and natural reason in the latter

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Hume and Adam Smith to throw aside the theological foundation, taking from Hutcheson only the empirical aspects of his epistemology [4] My intention in this paper is to explain why this theological outlook cannot match a moral epistemology which lacks a metaphysical foundation.

In order to develop the argument, it is necessary to bear in mind some relevant points in Hutcheson's life which had an enormous influence on his thought. Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) belonged to a Scottish Presbyterian family settled in Ulster (Ireland), and lived most of his life in Glasgow (Scotland), first as a student and later as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow His father and grandfather served as ministers of their church Hutcheson was marked by this religious cast The Church of Scotland was extremely powerful at the time, and it defended its faith by means of ecclesiastic courts that attacked both heresy and skepticism Little by little, the role of philosophy in Christian beliefs emerged in the church's judgments about heresy It generated a division between the official members of the church—who maintained that the only remedy for doubt and unbelief is saving faith, and that the powers of natural reason fall short of offering adequate grounds for belief in any of the central tenets of the Christian religion—and those who, by contrast, maintained not only that the Christian religion is congruent with uncorrupted rationality, but also that its central tenets could be supported by rational enquiry.[5]

At the end of 1740, this division of the Church of Scotland created two factions, the so-called Moderate party and the so-called Evangelicals Hutcheson sympathized with the former, defending the interests of philosophy both within the church and within Scottish culture as a whole He believed that the doctrines of the Christian religion could be and needed to be presented as supported by the conclusions of philosophical enquiry, in line with the thinking of Shaftesbury and with the aid of the philosophy of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Marcus Aurelius [6] He rebelled against the strong Calvinism professed by his church, expressed in the Westminster Confession of 1647, according to which the nature of man is totally depraved, owing to

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[4] See Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 289–90

[5] See ibid , 241–2

[6] See ibid , 243–4

Adam's fall, and only the chosen and predestinated by God can reach eternal salvation by means of irresistible grace [7]

This doctrine was supported by Reformed scholasticism, a theology elaborated in response to the revival of Thomistic theology and philosophy on the part of the Jesuit controversialits of the sixteenth century, and in opposition to the Protestant Aristotelianism expounded by the Lutherans This Reformed scholasticism went back to an earlier Augustinian scholasticism based on Anselm, Abelard, Hugh of St Victor, and Peter Lombard, which maintained that man, in his present state of sinfulness, as established by the Westminster Confession, must live in societies that enable all men to live in accordance with the law of God and nature, including the lapsed and unrepentant, who lack the motivation to live in accordance with that law One of the main expounders of this doctrine was Gershom Carmichael, who was one of Hutcheson's professors at the University of Glasgow [8]

Pupil and teacher had coincidental positions, principally on the two precepts that summarize the law of nature—veneration of God and promotion of the common good—although Hutcheson wanted to base moral obligation not on the obedience of the law of God but rather on the powers of human nature from which we derive the recognition of divine providence [9] His enemies in the moral philosophical area were Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, and Pufendorf, egoists and conventionalists who were often grouped together as "selfish moralists" and anathematized for their moral skepticism [10] Against this conception of human beings as entirely dominated by self-love. with the attendant moral skepticism, Hutcheson opposed a moral philosophy centered on the reality of virtue and supported by a natural theology built on philosophical foundations

From this point of view, Hutcheson appears to be a secularizer of morality in the history of moral philosophy Robert A Green affirmed

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[7] See the introduction to Francis Hutcheson, *On Human Nature*, ed Thomas Mautner (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1993), 8–31

[8] See James Moore, "The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment," in M A Stewart, *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 2000), 39–41

[9] See the introduction to Francis Hutcheson, *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* with *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, ed Luigi Turco (Indianapolis Liberty Fund, 2007), xvii–xviii

[10] See David Fate Norton, *David Hume Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1982), 69

that the Hutchesonian "moral sense" is an instinct that serves in the increasingly secularized modern period as a substitute and synonym for the *synderesis* of Aquinas [11] But it is necessary to soften this assertion, for although Hutcheson established the bases for the secularization of morality, affirming that it is known as moral sense, which is a natural principle without divine grace, in his philosophy this faculty cannot be explained without a reference to natural theology, in the same way that the natural reason of Thomas Aquinas is understood in relation to his metaphysical theology I have previously remarked that Hutcheson, as a sympathizer of the Moderate party of the Church of Scotland, maintained that Christian religion could be supported by rational inquiry.

In basing morality on natural theology, Hutcheson is very different from his successors in the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith, who, although greatly influenced by the Hutchesonian moral epistemology, secularized moral philosophy by omitting every theological foundation While both were Scottish citizens, Hume and Smith broke with the Scottish tradition, which was essentially theological. In a certain sense, because of his emphasis on empirical philosophy to support morality, Hutcheson was guilty of this break, but his own innovations were carried out within the realm of Scottish tradition, without setting aside its theological inspiration [12] For that reason I agree with Michael B Gill that Hutcheson belongs in large part to the tradition of the medieval and early modern era, according to which morality was explained in terms of God's intentions, because in this tradition it was accepted by most as a matter of course that some kind of theological explanation would be ultimate So if morality can be explained from this point of view, its rational justification becomes clearer [13]

The fact that Hutcheson favored this tradition justifies a comparison to Thomas Aquinas for two reasons first, because of some analogies between the relevant moral faculties of Hutchesonian "moral

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[11] See Robert A Green, "Instinct of Nature Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral Sense," in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no 2 (1997) 281

[12] See MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 241–60 and 279–80

[13] See Michael B Gill, "Nature and Association in the Moral Theory of Francis Hutcheson," in *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 12, no 3 (July 1995) 281

sense" and Thomistic "natural reason", and second, because both philosophers are at the extremes of a long tradition of moral philosophy, whose theological strands can be observed in any of its variants [14] This tradition had its beginning in the great Thomistic system and its end, at least in terms of the Scottish Enlightenment, in Hutcheson's moral philosophy, after having passed through many controversies, one of the most important of which was the discussion between intellectualists and voluntarists, the latter being reinforced by Protestantism

Robert A Green's erudite paper, which I have just quoted from, is most interesting in this area, for it clarifies some analogies between Thomistic synderesis and Hutchesonian moral sense, and at the same time explains the detailed evolution of the former until it reaches its new form in the latter Green asserts that Aquinas's concept of synderesis evolved from St Bonaventure, from an intellectual principle to an affective one, until it ended in the moral sense of Hutcheson St Bonaventure made explicit what remained latent in the thinking of Aquinas, by relocating synderesis in the affective rather than in the intellectual part of man's nature In this way, synderesis came to be spoken of as not only nondiscursive but also instinctive in nature, as apprehension for which no reason can be given [15] I do not agree with Green that synderesis is an affective principle In my view, it is intellectual, but, like moral sense, it is a natural principle which apprehends morality in a nondiscursive way It is not necessary to be affective in order to have an immediate knowledge, as I shall explain

We can approach the similarities and the differences existing between Hutcheson's moral sense and Aquinas's natural reason because Hutcheson considered his and Aristotle's conceptions of moral perception to coincide The connection between Hutcheson and Aquinas is thus possible because the latter developed certain important points of Aristotelian moral psychology I shall turn to Maritain's interpretation of Aquinas's common knowledge of natural law as a context in which moral apprehension is especially dependent on sensible perception

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[14] See Jerome B Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (New York Cambridge University Press, 2005)

[15] See the demonstration of this assertion in Robert A Green, "Instinct of Nature "

I divide the development of the argument into three sections The first deals with a comparisson of moral sense and natural reason in relation to some of their principal aspects The second demonstrates Hutcheson's unfounded reduction of Aristotelian and Thomistic practical judgment to something that is merely sensible The third compares Hutcheson's and Aquinas's moral teleology and demonstrates that, in order to avoid the statements of the "selfish moralists," moral sense is insufficient compared with natural reason.

I

Moral Sense and Natural Reason Their Consistency and Incorruptibility In *A System of Moral Philosophy*, Hutcheson asserts that if we look closely and attentively at our soul, we find a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions that stem from it This determination is a sense, immediate and excellent, which has moral qualities as its only objects, excluding all other properties that might be perceived by man's other senses or by reason Even though it is a sense or instinct, it does not depend on bodily organs, rather, it is a determination that settles in the soul itself as a power of judging [16] The moral sense is thus defined as the faculty of perceiving moral excellence and its supreme objects The epistemological features of the moral sense can be understood in the context of Hutcheson's theory of knowledge, which follows and develops the lines laid out by Locke's empiricism [17] In this context a sense is any "determination of our minds to receive ideas independently of our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain "[18] In this definition, pleasures and pains are treated as types of perception or sensation and not as types of passion or affection;[19] and the ideas received—of approval or disapproval—are simple and known by

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[16] See Francis Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy* (London, 1760), bk I, chap 4, no 4

[17] See Henning Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory* (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 39–42

[18] Francis Hutcheson, *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (Manchester Clinamen Press, 1999), 12

[19] See Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense*, 40

reflection, ideas which can be explained only by synonymous words or by concomitant or consequent circumstances [20]

Moral sense cannot be confused with a determination of reason, which can only look for and know means to reach the ends perceived by it, and is only circumscribed to this moral faculty [21] In the context of the empirical epistemolgy followed by Hutcheson, reason is only an association of ideas, and it is impossible to explain how this association could present the mind with a moral object which has not been known before by perception, since ideas are only reflections on perceptions [22] According to Hutcheson, we must not be confused by the reasonableness in an action that is a very common expression [23] Actions conform to reason, not if their ends are reasonable, but if they are fit to reach a given end As such, actions can be reasonable, but from a technical—not precisely moral—point of view

Hutcheson distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons of actions The former presuppose instincts and affections, and the latter presuppose moral sense So in every calm, rational action some end is desired or intended, and is justified by moral sense, depending on its morality No a priori end and no end conceived by reason can come before them So there are no exciting reasons prior to affection [24] These assertions are enormously important, because they mean that reason is not capable of knowing moral ends These affirmations coincide with the way in which reason has been depreciated in the new theologies of the modern era, such as Protestantism and Jansenist Catholicism In this field, as MacIntyre asserts, reason can supply "*no* genuine comprehension of man's true end, because power of reason was destroyed by the fall of man 'Si Adam integer stetisset', in Calvin's view, reason might have played the part that Aristotle assigned to it."[25]

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[20] See Francis Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense* (Cambridge, Mass The Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1971), 115–16

[21] See Francis Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, bk 1, chap 4, no 4

[22] See Francis Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 135

[23] See ibid , 120

[24] See ibid , 121–2

[25] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 53–4 Unless otherwise indicated, the emphasis in a quotation is found in the original

We can suppose that the exaggeration in the above doctrine did not strongly influence Hutcheson, because he belonged to the Moderate party or Evangelicals and defended the rights of philosophy, that is, of reason, within the Church of Scotland Nonetheless, he belonged to a culture derived from it Besides, I think that his depreciation of the intellective part of the soul, insofar as he reduces it to the discovery of the means to reach moral ends settled by affections and moral sense, is principally due to the epistemological problems of the Lockean empiricism that he adopted The latter identifies reason with an association of ideas, by means of which it is not possible to know the ends of human nature, if they have not been presented already by perception [26] Nor did Hutcheson discover in Aristotle's philosophy the ability of understanding, or *nous*, to know moral ends,[27] despite the fact that he studied Aristotelian scholasticism intensively

As Jensen asserts, Hutcheson's repeated references to Aristotle, regarding the place of reason in conduct, leave no doubt that he considered himself a follower of Aristotle [28] MacIntyre points out that during his youth Hutcheson had the advantage of training in scholastic Aristotelianism from his Presbyterian Academy in Ulster, the effect of which on his later philosophical writing is notable [29] However, he

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[26] It is a wholly theoretical faculty according to the Hutchesonean empirical naturalist conception of reason (see Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought,'* 209) "Reasoning or intellect," says Hutcheson, "seems to raise no new species of ideas but to discover or discern the relations of those received Reason shows what acts are conformable to a law, a will of a superior, or what acts tend to private good or to public good In like manner, reason discovers contrary tendencies of contrary actions" (*Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 135) In this explanation, reason is descriptive but not normative It neither moves us to pursue one end rather than another nor shows us that we ought to persue any given end (see the introduction of Bernard Peach in ibid , 19)

[27] "What is *Reason*," asks Hutcheson, "but *that Sagcity we have in prosecuting any End?*" (*An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* [Indianapolis Liberty Fund, 2004], 133) The italics are an emphasis of D Daiches Raphael, in order to show that this phrase is meant as a definition of reason by Hutcheson, who always equates the word "reason" to reasoning, and who takes for granted that those who say reason is the moral faculty hold up the egoistic or prudential view of morality "He never considers the possibility that immediate apprehension can be a rational faculty" (D Daiches Raphael, *The Moral Sense* [London Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1947], 29)

[28] See Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense*, 26

[29] See MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 262

also points out that Hutcheson misread some very important Aristotelian texts, due to the fact that Shaftesbury had such an influence on him [30] The context of this criticism does not require a quotation of all these texts, but it is important to note that at least some of them refer to reason as deliberation about means and not about ends

We can analyze these Aristotelian texts in comparison with Hutchenson's quotations of them. They coincide with what Hutcheson states in the *Inquiry* when criticizing those who say that virtue arises from reason he asserts that reason is no more than the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end [31] We find a quotation of Aristotle proximate to a similar assertion in the *Illustration*, where Hutcheson, asserting that there are no reasonable ends, particularly no reasonable ultimate ends,[32] says that "this is what Aristotle so often asserts that the *prohareton* (chosen) or the *bouleuton* (elect) is not the end, but the means."[33] What Aristotle affirms in the *Nichomachean Ethics* is that "we deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends";[34] and that

> decision requires understanding and thought, and also a state of character, since doing well or badly in action requires both thought and character Thought by itself, however, moves nothing, what moves us is thought aiming at some goal and concerned with action [35]

So Hutcheson seems to interpret Aristotle well According to Aristotle, we do not grasp the ends of our actions by deliberating about them, a point for which he offers abundant practical argument in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

However, it would appear that Hutcheson does not perceive the distinction Aristotle makes between understanding (*nous*) and thought (*dianoia*),[36] because he makes no reference to it, even though in the previous quotation these functions appear to be distinct As Irwin says, "in its most restrictive use '*nous*' is confined to true ratio-

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[30] See ibid , 269

[31] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 133

[32] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 129

[33] Ibid Take careful note of Hutcheson's claim here

[34] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 3 3 1112b14–5

[35] Ibid , 4 2 1139a33–7

[36] See ibid , glossary 395, 417, 428, and 429

nal thought and understanding not resting on further justification "[37] According to Aristotle.

> Understanding is also concerned with the last things, and in both directions For there is understanding, not a rational account, about the first terms and the last In demonstrations understanding is about the unchanging terms that are first In [premises] about what is done in action understanding is about the last term, the one that admits of being otherwise, and hence about the minor premise For these last terms are the origins of the end to be aimed at, since universals are reached from particulars We must, then, have perception of these particulars, and this perception is understanding [38]

So practical *nous* grasps the relevant features of particular cases, showing, for example, that what is happening is a theft, and allowing the application of universal principles [39] This distinction marks a very important difference between Hutcheson and Aristotle, because from Aristotle's point of view, it means that the morality of actions is known by understanding—that is, *nous*—a principle of knowledge that is intellectual, not sensible like Hutchesonian moral sense But the particular actions are placed first in an appearance by the sensible perception or experience, in the context of the Aristotelean philosophy This fact establishes a proximity between Hutcheson and Aristotle that I shall analyze in the next section

Aristotelian understanding or *nous* is gathered by Thomas Aquinas as "natural reason" or "intellect." It is an aspect of reason which is understood by means of a simple act of apprehending intelligible truth, without any investigation. We can also describe it as an immovable principle, which judges certain things that are naturally known, both in specualtive and practical things, as Aristotle affirms in

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[37] Ibid , glossary 429

[38] See ibid , 6 11 1143a35–1143b5 It is necessary to note that the identification of understanding with perception, in the translation of this text, does not at all signify that the latter arises from a sense Yet in one idiomatic use, understanding is fairly represented by the English "sense," because someone with *nous* has common sense, that is, he understands what is going on and reacts sensibly (see ibid , glossary 429) So Aristotle talks sometimes about people with sense (see ibid , 3 1 1110a11, 1112a21, 3 7 1115b9), saying they always apply their *nous*

[39] See ibid , glossary 429

Nicomachean Ethics 6 6,[40] where he says that "we have understanding about origins "[41]

So Hutcheson's moral sense and Aquinas's natural reason grasp the morality of actions However, in Hutchenson this grasp is a sensible perception, and in Aquinas it is an intellectual one This distinction makes a great difference in discovering the manner in which the good aprehended by both faculties can be universalized, as we shall see. Let us now look at the theological basis of both authors in relation to these faculties

According to Hutcheson, men are determined by kind affections, located in the very frame of their nature, to desire the good of community and to study the good of others, and all have a moral sense which causes them necessarily to approve of such conduct in themselves or others [42] As synonyms of these "affections," he also uses the terms "instincts,"[43] "virtues,"[44] "tendencies,"[45] and "dispositions "[46] In this scheme, the moral sense approves of the moral quality of the affections—and the subsequent actions—which tend to the greater good of the whole In response to Burnet's question regarding the criterion that establishes the authority of the moral sense,[47] Hutcheson states that it has been implanted in men by the author of nature,[48] as a determination that necessitates our minds to approve of public affections and of consulting the good of others.[49]

This is the theological and providential dimension of Hutcheson's thought As explained in the introduction, Hutcheson's rational

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[40] See *The Summa Theologica of St Thomas Aquinas*, 2d ed , trans Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920, online edition © 2006 by Kevin Knight), I, q 79, a. 8

[41] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 6 1141a3

[42] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 209

[43] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 133

[44] See ibid , 102

[45] See ibid , 135

[46] See ibid , 178

[47] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 204 At the end of this book is appended the "Letters Between the Late Mr Gilbert Burnet and Mr Hutcheson, Concerning the True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness " Burnet was representative of the intentionist rationalism of Samuel Clarke, John Balguy, and Richard Price, which Hucheson strongly opposed in this work, see Stephen Darwall, "Hutcheson on Practical Reason," *Hume Studies* 15, no 1 (April 1997) 73–5

[48] See ibid , 214

[49] See ibid , 216

justification of morality is in terms of God's intentions. According to Norton, this can be understood as both (1) an attempt to reinstate, in a somewhat different form, the teleological conception of nature that had been seriously undercut by the new science, which greatly influenced Hobbes, and (2) a contraposition against the moral skepticism,[50] proper to the "selfish moralists" previously mentioned.[51] However, Hutcheson does not reinstate an intrinsic teleology based in a scholastic teleology or Aristotelian analysis of causes, rather, his is an extrinsic teleology that derives the activity of our natural faculties from the free activity of a benevolent and omnipotent deity who has designed and created man and nature.[52]

"If a public sense be acknowledged in men," says Hutcheson, "by which the happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his choice, this is indeed a strong evidence of the Goodness of the Author of our Nature."[53] Here we find an important similarity with Thomas Aquinas, in the acknowledgment of a divine and providential order of human nature, by which Hutcheson belonged to the medieval and early modern tradition. However, due to the Augustinian context from which he emerged, the empirical epistemology which he adopted, and the consequent loss of natural reason, Hutcheson is led to an extrinsic teleology which has marked differences with the intrinsic teleology of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. This difference establishes an important weakness of moral sense when it comes to universalize its perceptions about particular goods, as we shall see.

But first, in order to complete my argument, it is important to note that Hutcheson considers that men can be naturally virtuous in this life, contrary to the tenets of Augustinianism. In Hutcheson's view, the frame of our nature, although weakened by original sin, can overcome this weakness. On this point Hutcheson declares himself a follower of "the best of the ancients, who described virtue as the best and most perfect life in accordance with nature."[54] This assertion is taken literally from Cicero,[55] who was for Hutcheson the only histo-

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[50] See Norton, *David Hume*, 87–93.

[51] See p. 81 above.

[52] See Norton, *David Hume*, 88–9.

[53] Hutcheson, *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, 17.

[54] Francis Hutcheson, *Logic, Metaphysics and the Natural Sociability of Mankind* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), 193–4.

[55] Cicero, *On Moral Ends*, ed. Julia Annas, trans. Raphael Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), bk. IV, chap. 14.

rian of ancient philosophy [56] Cicero himself took it from Polemo of Athens, the third head of Plato's school, in order to explain how the Stoics had interpreted it In any event, it is extracted from a pagan context and introduced by Hutcheson in a Christian context, where the discussion was principally about whether divine grace was necessary or not in order to realize good actions in the present state of corrupt nature. Hutcheson writes

> For though certain parts of our nature, certain desires, carry us into many vices in the corrupt state of things in which we find ourselves, yet when we contemplate the whole fabric of human nature, disordered and corrupt though it be, and the different parts of our human nature, in particular the social and kindly (*communes et benignos*) affections and that moral sense which we may also call natural conscience, we see clearly that vices are not natural to our nature, we see the faculties which ought to moderate and govern the lower desires Therefore, though the strength and power of this sense or conscience may be so diminished that it is unable often to govern the lower desires, yet we see that by its own nature it is naturally fit to rule Clearly it is *the ruling principle* to which all things were made subject, and rightly so, in the integral state of our nature [57]

Thus, Hutcheson redefines the state of nature as understood by the Reformed theologians, and identifies it with the state of innocence,[58] thereby allowing him to compare it to "the best of the ancients. who described virtue as the best and most perfect life in accordance with nature " He offered an alternative vision of human nature and the human condition On one hand, he admits the existence of final causes in his moral psychology. Moral sense is a natural and immediate determination in our soul, as we have seen in the definition given at the beginning of this section It precedes all reasoning [59] It has been settled and foreseen by God himself, and it functions as a constant law of nature [60] On the other hand, our public affections, in other words, our benevolence, approved of by the moral sense, are a communication of the divine attribute of benevolence Hutcheson considers that the whole structure of the world, with everything contained in it, seems to

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[56] See Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*, 247

[57] Hutcheson, *Logic, Metaphysics and the Natural Sociability of Mankind*, 199

[58] See James Moore's introduction to ibid , xix

[59] See Hutcheson, *Logic, Metaphysics and the Natural Sociability of Mankind*, 94

[60] See ibid , 97

have been built according to a benevolent design, intended to preserve life and happiness, and among these things we find our moral sense [61]

Hutcheson does not think that this state of nature has been entirely destroyed by original sin, even though it has been weakened by it He says that in our present condition "all our innate desires strive against that weakness and declare that such weakness is not the end of our duties, much less the goal which nature has set for our actions "[62] Human nature was designed to allow men to live in a manner consistent with their internal sensibilities and higher desires, and its present weakness should not inhibit or divert us from acting in accordance with our nature [63] In an analogous way, Thomas Aquinas asserts that neither human nature nor its natural reason is destroyed in the present condition "Human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin," he says, "so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good "[64] For this reason, man "does not need a new light added to his natural light (that is natural reason), in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge "[65]

So it is proper to understand that moral sense and natural reason do not always work in agreement with their nature precisely because they are endowments of a fallen nature and are often made torpid by some disordered or perverse passions But their natures are integral in themselves and can work rightly [66] This doctrine is thoroughly different from the formulation of the Calvinist theology expressed in the Westminster Confession of 1647 and prevailing in the Church of Scotland, according to which the nature of man, owing to Adam's fall, is totally depraved, and God's grace in the elect is irresistible, that is, independent of any decision by the person elect [67]

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[61] See ibid , 174–5

[62] Ibid , 197

[63] See James Moore's introduction to ibid , xix

[64] *Summa Theologica* I-II, q 109, a 2

[65] Ibid , a. 1

[66] See Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, bk 1, chap 2, no 4, and *Summa Theologica* I-II, q 109, a 1

[67] See Thomas Mautner's introduction to Hutcheson, *On Human Nature*, 9–10

II

The Practical Judgment of Moral Sense and Natural Reason Similarities and Differences As previously noted, Hutcheson refers repeatedly to Aristotle, especially in his last works, not only as regards the place of reason in conduct, as we have seen, but also as regards the place of sensibility in the knowledge of the morality of actions Treating the influence of character on the particular judgment of moral actions, Hutcheson affirms that the error in this judgment is avoidable from a good character, one that is diligent and cautious about duties [68] He bases this assertion on Aristotle, who said, in Hutcheson's words, that "many points in *morals*, when applied to individual cases, cannot be exactly determined, but good men know them by a sort of sensation the good experienced man is thus the last measure of all things "[69] That the morality of individual cases is known by a sort of sensation is, in my view, a misreading of Aristotle, and we are fortunate that Hutcheson gives direct quotations of three passages of the *Nichomachean Ethics* in relation to this assertion, which justifies this interpretation.[70]

In the first, regarding the distinction between real and apparent goods, Aristotle says that "the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly, and in each case what is true appears to him,'[71] because each character has its own special view of what is fine and excellent [72] The second penetrates our subject more deeply, for in it Aristotle asserts that it is difficult to determine the morality of particular cases due to the fact that "nothing perceptible is easily defined, and [since] these [circumstances of virtuous and vicious action] are particulars, the judgment about them depends on perception."[73] Taking this passage out of context, we can read that the morality of actions is apprehended entirely by the sensible perception, in which case Hutcheson and Aristotle are in complete agreement But the key to their disagreement lies in the third passage, which has been quoted in

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[68] See Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, 237
[69] Ibid
[70] Ibid
[71] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 3 4 1113a48–9
[72] See ibid
[73] Ibid 2 9 1109b25–8

the previous section, but which we must quote in part again According to Aristotle,

> In [premises] about what is done in action, understanding is about the last term, the one that admits of being otherwise, and hence about the minor premise For these last terms are the origins of the end to be aimed at, since universals are reached from particulars We must, then, have perception of this particular, and this perception is understanding [74]

It is difficult to interpret the last phrase of this text, because, as previously noted,[75] we cannot identify perception with understanding However, what is certain is that perception and understanding—*nous*—are types of direct apprehension, so they are analogous and concur in the same moral judgment This is an interpretation in accordance with an important principle of Aristotle, namely, that there is a substantial unity of body and spiritual soul in man, and therefore of the faculties of both parts of human nature

So, Hutcheson is not far removed from Aristotle when he asserts that the good man makes a right moral judgment of particular actions by a sort of sensation According to an interpretation by Marcelo Boeri, it is possible to make an "extensive" or "analogical" use of the Aristotelian notion of *aisthesis* to the practical dominion, because it is admissible to broaden the functions of common sense in an analogical way, such as they are at the sensible level, to the dominion of perception or apprehension of practical concepts This is suggested by Aristotle at the beginning of *Politics*, where he notes that man, unlike other animals, "has sense of good and evil, just and unjust, and so forth "[76] Aristotle considers this sense a discerning faculty[77]—and not just as a passive receiver of immaterial forms—which indicates that, in some elemental or basic way, it is able "to judge" the material received [78]

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[74] Ibid 6 11 1143a35–1143b5

[75] See footnote 37

[76] Aristotle, *Politics Book I and II*, trans Trevor J Saunders (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1995), 1 2 1253a16–18 See Marcelo Boeri et al , *Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego Investigaciones sobre aspectos epistemológicos, éticos y de teoría de la acción en algunas teorías de la antiguedad* (Buenos Aires Editorial Colihue, 2007), 219

[77] *Posterior Analytics* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993), 2 19 99b35, and *De sensu*, 7 447b25–26, quoted in Boeri, ibid , 220

[78] See ibid , 220

Now, in the psychology of Aristotle, sensations are received by the imagination or fantasy, from which the *nous* takes the universal essences of particular things So it is logical to suppose that the synthetic capacity of common sense[79] can extend to the imagination and, in this way, take possession of a middle ground between sensation and thought We consider this synthesis in the sense that it has in the passage of *Politics* quoted above, as the grasp of certain practical notions related to particular actions—good, evil, just, unjust—that we can represent in order to be able to organize our practical life, once perception is gone [80] In this way the Aristotelian sort of sensation felt by good men, to which Hutcheson refers, may be no mere or simply a sensation, but indeed a sensation universalized or finalized by *nous*, which can grasp the ends from the images represented In the Aristotelian text just quoted, the last term apprehended by sensation is the origin of the end to be aimed at, since universals are reached from particulars

To demonstrate this last point, it is convenient to turn to Boeri, who argues it is prudent to give a weak interpretation of the passages quoted regarding the Aristotelian capacity of judgment of the common sense On such a weak interpretation, there is no true activity of judgment at the level of pure sensation or sensible perception, for although animals and men share the sensitive and perceptive capacity, what they clearly do not share is the capacity of judgment, which is proper to the rational soul [81] This opinion can be contrasted to Hutcheson's moral philosophy, which which bases the moral judgment of particular actions on the moral sense only, thereby greatly inflating the capacity of this sensible faculty, while claiming to agree with Aristotle on this point What is completely true in Aristotle is that moral judgments about particular actions must begin with sensible perception, because it is impossible, in the context of his philosophy, for reason to know particular things directly, because it knows universals [82] However, reason can extend itself to particulars precisely through sensible perception

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[79] *De sensu* 7 447a29–b21, quoted in Boeri, ibid , 220

[80] See ibid

[81] See ibid

[82] "It is, then, with the faculty of sense that we discriminate heat and cold and all those qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion But it is with another faculty, either separate from sense, or related to it as the bent line when it is straightened out is related to its former self, that we discriminate the quiddity of flesh" (Aristotle, *De Anima* [Cambridge University Press, 1907], 3 4 429b15–8)

In order to delve deeper into this problem, I shall refer to Thomas Aquinas's commentary of this passage of Aristotle Thomas says that understanding of practical matters deals with the singular and contingent, and with the particular proposition that is the minor of a syllogism in the practical field [83] This operation is proper of an inner sense called particular reason, to which Aristotle refers as "passive intellect" in *De Anima* Man experiences particulars through it,[84] that is, through an inner sense which perceives conceivable things sensibly—not certain proper sensibles such as color, sound, and so on,[85] he has the capacity "to judge singular practicable relations",[86] and he judges moral relations rightly when improved by prudence, that is, when he is good [87]

Up to this point, Hutcheson is essentially in agreement with Thomas, as he interprets Aristotle in the text quoted at the beginning of this section "many points in *morals*, when applied to individual cases, cannot be exactly determined, but good men know them by a sort of sensation the good experienced man is thus the last measure of all things "[88] However, Hutcheson's empirical epistemological formation did not allow him to see another essential aspect in the same Aristotelian text and therefore in the corresponding commentary of Thomas, who asserts, "the singulars about which we say understanding is concerned, are principles of what is done for an end, that is, principles after the manner of a final cause "[89] "It is obvious that singulars have the nature of principles because the universal is drawn from singulars From the fact that this herb cured this man, we gather that this kind of herb has power to cure "[90] In other words, the universal drawn from singulars is not established by the same sense But we must also assert, in the context of Aristotle's and Aquinas's philosophy, that this universal norm is not established by an association of ideas We arrive at the universal by induction, but this induction is

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[83] See St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Notre Dame Dumb Ox Books, 1951), no 1247

[84] See ibid , no 1249

[85] See ibid , no 1214

[86] Ibid , no 1215

[87] See ibid

[88] Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Perception*, 237

[89] St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, no 1248

[90] Ibid , no 1249

metaphysical, not empirical—that is, it is realized by *nous*, which is intellectual [91] All of which is quite different from Hutcheson

Interpreting this passage of Aristotle, Nancy Sherman affirms that the perception of what is last or ultimate, in the practical reasoning made by *nous*, is a grasping of what is required as regards some general end in some specific circumstances, in other words, "I must do x in this sort of circumstance *as* a requirement of friendship,"[92] for example In this decision there is a concurrence of a sensible judgment about the specific friendly action and an intellectual and universal principle of friendship, that is, sense and *nous* concur at the same time. According to Aristotle, the perception of practical circumstances through *phronesis* is itself an exercise of *nous* in the direction opposed to the grasping of the first terms in deductive accounts.[93] He asserts that "there is understanding (*nous*), not a rational account, about the first things *and* the last things "[94]

There is no systematic treatment of the way in which these two faculties concur in the judgment of the *phronesis* in Aristotle, but from a general point of view we know that he thought that *nous* can extract from the representations of the imagination or fantasy the metaphysical forms of material things and actions Yet in the moral philosophy of Aristotle as developed by Thomas Aquinas, we can find a more detailed analysis of the questions that now concern us, namely, those of a comparative interpretation of the faculties of natural reason and moral sense

According to Aquinas, prudence regarding the morality of particular actions lies in an interior sense perfected by memory and experience in order to promptly judge particular cases, which is also Aristotle's view But "this does not mean, however, that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense,"[95] says Aquinas, interpreting Aristotle properly The apprehension of the end only by the interior sense is proper to irrational animals operating through their natural estimative power Perfect knowledge of the end, by contrast,

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[91] See Aristotle, *De Anima* 3 4 429b7

[92] See Nancy Sherman, *By the Fabric of Character* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43

[93] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 8 1142a23–30

[94] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 11 1143a36 Emphasis added

[95] *Summa Theologica* II-II, q 47, a 3, ad 3

consists in not only apprehending the thing which is end, but also knowing it under the aspect of end, and knowing the relationship of the means to that end Such knowledge belongs to none but rational nature.[96]

The cause by which a man can apprehend a good under the aspect of good is the same by which he is aware of an individual thing in a common nature, which is the union of the intellect and the cogitative in one and the same subject Instinct, however, is aware of an individual thing only insofar as it is the term or principle of some action or passion, and not as in a common nature [97] If the sensitive knowledge of a particular good were reduced to itself, man would be unable to apprehend either the aspect of good in the particular action or the relation between means and ends [98]

Following this analysis we can definitively say that Hutcheson considers only the sensible aspect of Aristotelian moral judgment, a reduction which allowed him to base his moral sense on Aristotle He does not see the intellectual aspect of the moral judgment because he has a very weak concept of practical reason—as only an association of ideas unable to apprehend moral ends, and able only to judge the tendency of the actions from a technical point of view, that is, as regards their tendency to promote the advantage or the disadvantage of society or of individuals [99] This misunderstanding of the capacity of reason is perhaps owing to the influence of Locke's empirical epistemology and the voluntarism proper to Protestant culture, which permitted Hutcheson to establish only a historical morality, not a universal one I turn to this last point in the next section.

III

The Induction of Moral Laws from Moral Sense and Natural Reason As a consequence of its foundation in natural theology, the moral philosophy of Hutcheson manifests a teleological point of view, which reinstates a teleological conception of nature, but a teleology

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[96] See ibid I-II, q 6, a 2

[97] See St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima* (Notre Dame Dumb Ox Books, 1994), no 398

[98] See *Summa Theologica* I, q 18, a 3

[99] See Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, 97–8

that is extrinsic. In this characterization I follow Norton,[100] who quotes some texts of Hutcheson in which we find his thought about a teleology of human nature similar to the teleology of the physical universe In one of these texts, Hutcheson compares the universal benevolence toward all men to the principle of gravitation [101] In the other, he describes our natural state as a whole of dispositions or principles antecedent to any volition of our own, from which our actions flow without our own art [102]

We do not find in Hutcheson's conception of human nature an intrinsic teleology such as we find in scholasticism or in the Aristotelian analysis of causes, and this is because, according to his moral philosophy, humans do not participate rationally in the attainment of our moral ends We are not referred to an intrinsic *telos*, which is some formal and final principles,[103] the apprehension of which can move us to moral acts As we saw in the last section, in order to have this knowledge *nous* or intellect is necessary, but such a faculty is absent in the empiricism of Hutcheson.[104]

Instead, Hutcheson refers to the deity as an extrinsic source of our dispositions and moral sense, from whose design, order, and purpose flow our sensitive determinations "We could say that just as our stature is fixed by nature, so have been our dispositions or senses "[105] These matters have been "fixed for us by the Author of our Nature, subservient to the interest of the system"[106] he has created.[107] God has conceived and given a purpose to man and nature, but man can not participate in his wisdom by his reason when he is acting, because that reason is only an association of ideas coming from sensible perceptions As such, Hutcheson shares the principal ideas of the original reformers, who revolted against the scholastic *imago Dei* doctrine and rejected the possibility that men could have any rational

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[100] See Norton, *David Hume*, 89–92

[101] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 149

[102] See Hutcheson, *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, 104

[103] See Norton, *David Hume*, 90

[104] Although Hutcheson knew the Aristotelian and scholastic distinction between *nous* and *dianoia*, he criticized Vinnius for making it consist of the primary precepts of the law of nature in self-evident and noetic propositions, thus ignoring *nous's* knowledge See Hutcheson, *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, 108–9

[105] Norton, *David Hume*, 90

[106] Hutcheson, *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, 65

[107] See Norton, *David Hume*, 90

knowledge of God's nature, on the basis of which they could draw moral lessons for themselves They denied that we can know natural law as a "participation" in God's eternal law [108] But Hutcheson's empirical epistemology might possibly have been the principal obstacle that prevented him from accepting this point of view

The moral philosophy of Hutcheson asserts that by a benevolent providence God created man with a distinct nature that includes a moral sense by which virtue and vice are known We can ascribe the present constitution of our moral sense to the goodness of the deity, who has benevolent intentions because He is really benevolent and delights in the happiness of others [109] In short, God's benevolence guarantees the veracity of our moral perceptions [110] In this providential context, the whole frame of nature plainly contrives for the good of the whole, and any casual evil seems to be the necessary concomitance of some mechanism designed for vast good [111]

However, man participates in the divine benevolence only by a reliable moral sense, not by reason, for all reason does is find the means to realize the ends determined by moral sense and the inclinations [112] Therefore our sharing of the divine wisdom is very imprecise Moral sense depends on reason, which apprehends by observation the consequences or the effects of actions upon society But reason can affirm nothing regarding the morality of the actions observed Moral approval or disapproval is the function of the moral sense, the objects of which are not the actions, but the inward affections or dispositions which lead to them and which we infer from the actions observed [113]

So, although the constitution of moral sense is universal among men[114] and always approves of the actions flowing from benevolent affections toward the public, it can endorse evil principles of conduct in certain circumstances For example, moral sense could approve such shocking behavior as theft performed dexterously by youth in

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[108] See Knud Haakonssen, *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment* (New York Cambridge University Press, 1996), 36

[109] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 196

[110] See Norton, *David Hume*, 196

[111] See ibid

[112] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 215

[113] See Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, 97

[114] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 135

Sparta, where it was more convenient to prepare men for war than to secure possessions; the killing of old men when their infirmity is worse than death and they are a burden for the other citizens who must keep them, the killing of a deformed or weak race that could never be useful to mankind but would only be a burden, making slaves of wartime enemies, as Greeks and Romans did with barbarians [115] Hutcheson seems to justify these evil principles in specially determined circumstances by arguing that they arise from the desire for a natural good such as a "hardy shifting youth" to the state of Sparta, the securing of weakly elders against the insults of enemies, averting the danger that a weak race could involve a whole state in misery, or the suppression of barbarians and slaves identified as parts of a society that may be bent on that society's destruction [116] With accuracy, Scott asserts that "it is remarkable that Hutcheson does not even attempt to maintain the universality of the moral sense, apart from the rational process involved in the formulation of the universally benevolent character "[117]

However, Hutcheson defends the universality of the moral sense by asserting that these differences are due, finally, to considerations of reason about the tendency of actions to produce, in certain circumstances, a great quantity of good or goods upon society as a whole or upon a subset of society Reason, as an instrumental and without being specifically moral, plays an important role in determining the moral sense, provided that its technical considerations refer to actions springing from benevolent affections As previously noted, God s wisdom remains very imprecise and disguised behind this moral scheme, for it is only an extrinsic cause which moves beyond the moral sense and the benevolent affections

In the first section we saw that Hutcheson misunderstood Aristotle by not recognizing that reason has the capacity to apprehend moral ends by *nous,* which Thomas later refers to as named natural reason or intellect This natural reason, in turn, concurs with the cogitative in the knowledge of the morality of particular actions Now, in the context of Aristotle's and Thomas's philosophy, everything apprehended by *nous* or intellect is a truth, of which there are speculative

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[115] See ibid , 137–43
[116] See ibid , 138–41
[117] Scott, *Francis Hutcheson,* 208

and practical varieties The latter can be technical or moral In the context of Hutcheson's philosophy, truth is a collection of already known propositions—in other words, an association of ideas[118]—which can be speculative or practical [119] The latter is only technical, relative to the means to attain some ends [120] There are no moral truths, as the ends of life are not apprehended by reason

In Aquinas's philosophy, truth follows the operation of the intellect inasmuch as intellect judges a thing as it is In turn, truth is known by the intellect in view of the fact that intellect reflects upon its own act, knowing its own act and the proportion of its act to things This is possible precisely because intellect is spiritual, and it is not possible with sense Truth is also in sense insofar as sense judges things as they are, but truth is not in sense, however, as something known by sense, for although sense knows that it senses, it does not know the nature of its acts or the proportion of these acts to things [121] The same doctrine of the reflexive "return" is applied by Thomas to the practical reason in regard to virtues and their acts [122] As Rhonheimer says, "this reflexive 'return' of the intellect upon its own act is of great significance, because it makes possible an understanding of the fact of moral consciousness as well as the practical normativity that results from the act of the practical reason "[123]

From this point of view, the reflexivity of Hutcheson's moral sense is very limited It cannot know the nature of its acts or the proportion of these acts to things This last knowledge is proportioned to it by reason, which is not moral The moral sense can reflect only on the pleasure that an object or event gives or will give to it in the present or in the future, by means of a direct sensation [124] It knows that it senses, as in Aquinas, and so it can approve or disapprove of

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[118] It is understood from the associationism of the Lockean epistemology adopted by Hutcheson

[119] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 209

[120] See ibid , 214–15

[121] See St Thomas Aquinas, *Truth* (Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Company, 1954), vol 1, q 1, a 9

[122] "The will is understood by the intellect both inasmuch as one knows that one wills, and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power" (*Summa Theologica* I, q 87, a. 4)

[123] Martin Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason* (New York Fordham University Press, 2000), 28–9

[124] See Hutcheson, *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, 23–33

present or future actions, but it cannot establish a universal approval about the actions approved of, because it knows only that these actions are pleasurable after a technical estimation of reason According to Hutcheson, reason is not normative when it establishes that an action is good for the whole

For Aquinas, practical reason is normative He states that the commandments of the Decalogue, although they are given by God's revelation, are a matter of common knowledge to all, coming under the purview of natural reason. Among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are for the speculative order Now all the precepts of the Decalogue are related to prudence, insofar as it directs all virtuous acts [125] So, at the instant prudence perceives a moral action (for example, that this action is theft), it knows some end of human life, discerns a universal natural law ("theft is evil and not to be done, because possesions are good for men"), and applyies it to the particular action

In the knowledge of a particular action there is an induction, as previously noted, because in the instant that man apprehends by sense and intellect the morality of an action, he apprehends a universal law, because reason reflects upon its own act As Rhonheimer says, we have to distinguish between the practical and reflective levels of practical reason, a distinction that is only implicit in Thomas [126] It is also very important to understand natural law as an unwritten law [127] attainable by every man through his natural reason Rhonheimer quotes Cajetan, who in his commentary on Thomas points out that the acts of practical reason are in themselves preceptive as preconceptual acts, but are conceptualized and discussed through reflection, so the power and nature of practical reason are seen in the agent's actual acts."[128]

This induction supposes a moral order that man does not create but discovers Natural law is, as Thomas says, "the rational creature's participation in the eternal law "[129] However rational, it is not a priori

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[125] See *Summa Theologica* II–II, q 56, a. 1

[126] See Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason*, 60

[127] See Jacques Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite* (Fribourg Éditions Universitaires, 1986)

[128] See *In I–II*, q 58, a. 5, *Comm VIII*, quoted in Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason*, 147

[129] *Summa Theologica* I–II, q 91, a 2

knowledge This remark is very important, because when Hutcheson denies, in discussion with Samuel Clarke, that reason can apprehend a moral order, he is attacking an a priori rationalism [130] The knowledge of natural law as a nonwritten law is an inductive apprehension Following Thomas, Maritain explains this point well

According to Thomas, says Maritain, natural reason does not discover natural law in an abstract and theoretical way—by neither the conceptual exercise of reason nor rational knowledge Thomas says that natural reason discerns the rules of natural law by the conduct of the inclinations of human nature,[131] which signifies knowledge by inclination [132] In order to explain this, Maritain resorts to an area of human psychology where intelligence works in a way that is not conceptual, logical, or rationalist, but rather biological. It is the preconscious awareness of intelligent life itself and of reason in the moment when it extracts from the sensible experience a new intuition which is not still shaped and which will progressively become a concept [133]

This explanation connects with the sensible and intellectual aspects of the act of prudence, which were analyzed earlier This act is a perception, though sensible and intellectual at the same time In this act there is a great rapport between the Maritainian interpretation of Aquinas and the perception of Hutcheson's moral sense [134] Thomas says that "all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good," so "according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of natural

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[130] See Hutcheson, *Illustration on the Moral Sense*, 141–5

[131] See *Summa Theologica* I–II, q 94, a 2

[132] See Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 28, and *Summa Theologica* II–II, q 45, a 2 It is necessary to soften this assertion with an explanation from Maritain we also have philosophical knowledge of natural law, which is a reflective apprehension, according to which we demonstrate the principles of this law in a rational and logical way, as conclusions derived from the first principles, but this knowledge is secondhand (see Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 30), and what Aquinas refers to as "law of nations" (see *Summa Theologica* I–II, q 95, a 4)

[133] See Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 63, see also Miguel Alejandro García Jaramillo, *La cogitativa en Tomás de Aquino y sus fuentes* (Pamplona Eunsa, 1997), 354–63, where the author reflects on a series of Aquinas's texts regarding preconceptual intellection

[134] I would like to give special thanks to Prof MacIntyre for his suggestion of comparing moral sense with Thomas's knowledge by connaturality, as explained by Maritain, and for the opportunity to rest in his authority

law "[135] And Hutcheson says that man has "a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections, and actions consequent upon them," which is "a natural sense "[136]

Both thus agree on the existence of a cognitive natural principle created by God in men's soul in order to discover some inclinations or affections that God himself has also put in man, making him able to discover the moral good These affections, according to Hutcheson, are all our desires pursuing happiness and eschewing misery [137] They all "agree in one general character, of tendency to the happiness of others, and to the moral perfection of the mind possessing them "[138] In Aquinas the inclinations also have this instinctive character, but not exactly the same nature, as we shall see

Aquinas's inclinations are much more precise than Hutcheson's affections of the will, both with respect to themselves and to their objects For this reason I quote the complete passage in which they are described

> [I]n man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" (Pandect Just I, tit I), such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law, for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination [139]

The ends of these inclinations are apprehended by reason, as mentioned earlier, upon quoting another part of the same text "all those

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[135] *Summa Theologica* I–II, q 94, a. 2

[136] Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, bk 1, chap 4, no 6

[137] See Hutcheson, *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, 25, and also Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, bk 1, chap 1, no. 3

[138] Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, bk 1, chap 4, no 7

[139] *Summa Theologica* I-II, q 94, a 2 Aquinas is citing Ulpianus, *Digest* 1 1

things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good " It would have been of great benefit if Thomas had explained in the same text, and in a more detailed way, exactly how this apprehension works, but he did not Fortunately, however, Maritain, with his deep comprehension of Thomas's philosophy, delved deeper into this issue As Hutcheson's affections and Aquinas's inclinations coincide in being instinctive, it is necessary to begin with a distinction between those instincts or inclinations rooted in the animal nature of man, that is, in his biological nature, and those inclinations that arise from his rational nature. The latter inclinations suppose those that are instinctive—for example, the animal instinct of procreation—and the tendencies inscribed in the ontological frame of human beings But these instinctive inclinations are endowed and absorbed by intellect, in such a way that the intellect is a "form" of the inner universe of man For this reason the inclination to the generation of children, for example, is not only physical, but moral, because it also inclines to the unity and stability of the family The element that establishes these inclinations is not an ontological frame, but rather the object of an unformulated or unconscious view of the intellect, or certain essential aims perceived or predicted in a nonconceptual or preconscious way These rational inclinations—for example, the inclination to not abuse other human beings—can conflict with inclinations that are only instinctive—for example, the inclination to murder [140]

So when Maritain says that knowledge by connaturality is, according to Thomas, a kind of vital knowledge, obtained by means of instinct and sympathy,[141] he is referring not to a biological instinct but to the intellect consulting the inner leanings of the subject, the experience that he has of himself, listening to the melody produced by the vibration of deep-rooted tendencies present in the subject All this leads to a judgment that is not based on concepts, but simply expresses the conformity of reason to tendencies to which it is inclined [142]

This experience is as instinctive as Hutcheson's moral experience, but it differs from the latter in that it is both intellectual and

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[140] See Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 64

[141] See Jacques Maritain, *Man and State* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1951), 85–6

[142] See ibid

sensible, while the latter is only sensible This difference opens the former to a world not only metaphysical but also divine, because by the intellect men can participate in the wisdom of God It is an intrinsic teleology, turning back to the distinction established at the beginning of this section, because man is referred to an intrinsic *telos*, his formal and final principles or causes This point contrasts with the Protestant and voluntaristic tradition of moral philosophy, inasmuch as man can know natural law as a "participation" in God's eternal law.[143] This experience allows man to universalize his moral knowledge, so long as it is not clouded by perverted passions

Thomas, however, basing natural law on eternal law, does not resort to the voluntarism that Hutcheson rejected We remember, from the introduction, that Hutcheson differs from Carmichael, because he does not want "to start from the law of nature as a commandment of God, but rather wants to derive it from his teleogical recognition of providence and the powers of human nature "[144] This aim is better reached by Thomas precisely because of his intrinsic teleology

The concept of eternal law in Aquinas comes not only from the theology of faith but also from natural theology, which is philosophical in nature In this philosophical context, Thomas demonstrates by reason that God exists and is the first cause of beings, actualizing all of them. He acts by His intelligence and will, and for this reason all the universe is governed by the divine reason. This is Providence This government is the eternal law, which is the same as divine wisdom and the divine *essentia* [145] From His wisdom, every action and movement of things has its direction Among all the creatures, the rational creature "is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end "[146] So the intelligent creature participates in the eternal reason as intelligent, and because of this participation he has a natural inclination to the convenient actions and ends for him As intelligent, he is a second cause who receives his power from the first cause.[147]

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[143] See p 99 above and footnote 107

[144] Luigi Turco's introduction to Hutcheson, *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*, xvii–xviii

[145] See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q 93, a 1

[146] Ibid I-II, q 91, a. 2

[147] See Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 37–42

Thomas says that "the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light "[148] This light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is bad, is not a discursive light but the light of reason judging by connaturality on the basis of the human inclinations of our nature It is the impression of the divine light in us, which transmits the practical truth to us [149] The divine reason impresses its light on human reason by the channel of natural inclinations [150]

This comprehension of natural law as a participation of eternal law in the rational creature, although as ancient as Thomas Aquinas, is a fitting answer to the criticism that Hutcheson makes of the voluntarism or legalism of the "selfish moralists." The law-based ethics is seen invariably as egoistic by Hutcheson [151] He rejected Pufendorf's concept of natural law as authoritarian or imposed by God's will According to Hutcheson, the obligation to follow this law is not moral but prudential [152] Of course, in this context there was not a rational comprehension of natural law by natural reason as in Thomas

Now, Aquinas's natural reason is able, as we have seen, to know not only the morality of singular actions—because it knows its particulars by means of cognition—but also the natural law which establishes this morality By contrast, the Hutchesonian moral sense is able to know the morality of particular actions, but not the universal natural law which establishes it Hutcheson's moral philosophy is manifested in a very limited way by the empiricism which lies at its foundations and does not recognize *nous* as an important aspect of reason [153] So although Hutcheson in his early works argues against the theory that morality is dependent upon law, whose principal exponent was Pufendorf as previously mentioned, in his later works he

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[148] *Summa Theologica* I-II, q 91, a 2

[149] In the context of Aquinas's philosophy, this light is natural, not supernatural

[150] See Maritain, *La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite*, 42–3

[151] See Knud Haakonssen, "Natural Law and Moral Realism," in M A Stewart, *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, 70

[152] See Hutcheson, *An Inquiry*, 176–7, *On the Natural Sociability*, 202–3, and Haakonssen, "Natural Law and Moral Realism," 68–72 According to Hutcheson, prudence is always interested, is the conduct to follow the law in order to avoid punishment and obtain reward

[153] Hutcheson's ignorance of the metaphysical world to which man is opened by *nous* is explicit in his discussion about the primary and secondary precepts of the law of nature in his jurisprudence (see *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* with *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, 108–9)

puts forward a complete system of natural jurisprudence which is largely derivative of Pufendorf, because Hutcheson does not derive it from moral sense James Moore and Knud Haakonssen have discussed this apparent inconsistency at length The former argues that Hutcheson never managed to integrate these two aspects of his work [154]

IV

Conclusion Against an extreme Calvinism and a philosophy of moral selfishness, Hutcheson maintains that human nature maintains certain prerogatives which it enjoyed in its original state, even though it finds itself weakened by original sin Man is naturally benevolent, according to the intention of his Creator, who is also benevolent In Hutcheson, however, the moral teleology of human nature, within a cosmologic providential order, is obstructed by the psychological impossibility of man opening himself to a transcendent moral order, which guarantees the existence of a universal moral law Man remains enclosed in his own intersubjective moral conscience, even though its foundation is the creative intention of the author of nature

The failure of man to be open to divine transcendence does not seem, in Hutcheson, to be due principally to the influence of the Protestant tradition in his cultural and religious formation, because he himself developed a thinking that strived to moderate the excesses of extreme Calvinism It seems, rather, to be due to his adoption of Locke's empiricist epistemology as the basis of his moral philosophy, as well as to the influence of Shaftesbury

Hutcheson's strict empiricism does not allow him to discover the reality of *nous* or intellect as a metaphysical and gnoseological principle of great moral importance, in spite of the fact that he studied Aristotle intensively in his youth, in whom Thomas Aquinas found inspiration to base his moral philosophy about natural reason However, the Aristotelian tradition is near to Hutcheson because of the importance it grants to the sensible perception as an aspect of the moral judgment, even though the morality of actions does not depend on sensibility

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[154] See Haakonssen, "Natural Law and Moral Realism," 63–5

The comparison of Hutcheson's moral sense and Aquinas's natural reason is no less important in terms of philosophical value It underlines some important common features of present moral philosophy, such as moral judgment as proper to a common moral, nonscientific knowledge, and the importance of sensibility in this judgment Also, the contraposition of both principles emphasizes the importance of inductive knowledge of universal moral law, obtainable by common moral knowldege This induction is not associative but metaphysical, however, and permits man naturally to apprehend a transcendent moral order [155]

Universidad de los Andes, Instituto de Filosofía

[155] I would like to thank Fondecyt (Fondo de Ciencia y Tecnología de Chile) for having financed the research which allowed me to write this paper

THE GENEROSITY OF THE GOOD*

JOSEPH GRANGE

THIS IS NEITHER AN ELEGY NOR A EULOGY Every time metaphysics has been declared dead, it arises phoenixlike from its own ashes Something very much like that is now occurring in American philosophy The signs of its resurgence are evident in the papers delivered at this conference At its beginnings in Greece and Asia philosophy saw as its duty the obligation to respond to the difficulties of everyday life It neither was nor was ever meant to be something that was out of reach of the common person who dealt with life's vicissitudes on an everyday level My address is an endeavor to restore to its rightful place a way of thinking that is sorely lacking in our times. But there is a deeper source for these reflections on the generosity of the good I wish to meditate on Socrates' still haunting declaration that the good is superior in strength and in dignity to being itself

> Therefore you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their existence and being are also due to it, although the good is not being, but something yet beyond being, superior to it in rank and power [1]

These are strange, even uncanny, words for they declare a level of reality beyond that which is Furthermore, they state quite definitively that all we know and are is due directly to this good. These days these words fall on deaf ears

We live in an age of great deceit The institutions that were created to safeguard the real, the true, and the intelligible have swallowed what the Buddha called the "the three poisons"—greed, hatred,

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Correspondence to The University of Southern Maine, Department of Philosophy, Exeter St , 47, Portland, ME 04104

* Text of the Presidential Address for the Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America (8 March 2008) at The University of Southern Maine

[1] Plato, *The Republic*, trans C D C Reeve (Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 509b5

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and delusion [2] The political process, the churches, the universities, the institutions of commerce, and the health care industries—to name but a few—have revealed their dishonesty If the "first philosophy" cannot address these sorry failures, then it, too, has swallowed some sort of poison

In 1781, Kant told us that we cannot know being directly but only as it appears to us.[3] In 1811, Hegel told us in the *Science of Logic* that being is the most empty of words [4] In 1927, Heidegger told us that not only have we forgotten the meaning of being, but that we do not even know how to raise the question of the meaning of being Heidegger's last utterance on being was that the meaning of being is *ereignis*, an event that we must await with an open mind [5] In these latter days the story of the meaning of being has shifted to France Here Derrida declares that the meaning of being is an ineluctable *différance* that is due to our inescapable bondage to language, which in itself is structured according to differences [6] The conclusion is now drawn that speaking of being is a hopeless endeavor and the effort to express "the Metaphysics of Presence" is a contradiction

So here we are in the year 2008, unable to utter a word about being. Certain consequences follow The following vignette captures those consequences quite nicely In a conversation with an intelligent, young proponent of the school of deconstruction, I used the word "truth " She immediately replied, "Oh, I never use the word truth anymore For me things are either interesting or uninteresting " She had no response when I asked her if Custer thought it was interesting that Crazy Horse was riding right at him with a loaded rifle

It may not be Crazy Horse himself that rides this evening, but there is still much riding on the words of the *Republic* Plato tells us that without goodness, nothing can be real or true or known What could be meant by such a connection among the good, the real, and

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[2] See the *Canki Sutta, Majjhima*, 95 in *Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, trans Bhikku Bodhi (Boston Wisdom Publications, 1995)

[3] Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans Werner S Pluhar (Indianapolis Hackett, 1996), p 294–315

[4] G W F Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans A V Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ Humanities Press, 1969), chap 1

[5] Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans David Farrell Krell and Frank A Capuzzi (New York Harper and Row, 1975)

[6] Jacques Derrida, *On Grammatology*, trans G C Spivak (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 141–64

the intelligible? We know that Plato explores these relations by means of a web of images, allegories, and analogies There is the Analogy of the Sun, the Simile of the Divided Line, and the Myth of the Cave Countless commentaries have been written on these tropes (to use the current term of art) We know that Socrates refuses to give a direct answer to the question, what is the good? But we also know that he offers in its place "the Child of the good."[7] We are told that what the sun does in the natural world, the good does in the world of the intelligibly real So we ought to be able to find a correlation between the actions of the sun and the actions of the good My remarks center on the very first words of the analogy of the Sun My scholarship may be off but I have yet to encounter a sustained meditation on the very first words of the Analogy of the Sun The analogy says, "the sun gives "[8] One need not pray to the sun One need not pay priests or kings to intercede with the sun All one has to do is position one's self so as to receive the gifts of the sun. With one stroke Plato challenges countless ages of superstition, oppression, and mystification Thus is one of the most radical moments in the history of philosophy. The gods are gone and their ministers with them Kings, warriors, the wealthy, and public opinion no longer maintain their preeminent places in the hierarchy of power Fear is replaced by the search for knowledge, and the freedom of the human being to pursue such a quest is asserted The form of the good is therefore a principle and not a "man," or even anything like "a man," and thus "the third man" argument fails to understand what form acting as a normative measure really is [9]

I turn now to what the sun actually does in this story Indeed it gives, but its giving causes two effects visibility and growth Nothing could be seen without what the sun gives Light Nor would anything deprived of the sun's power develop and grow into its true reality. Before turning to the correlation between the sun and the good, it is important to understand the role of poetry and myth in Plato and in philosophy in general Plato did ban the poets from his ideal city, but he also used a prolific number of myths to convey his meaning He was

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[7] Plato, *The Republic*, 2 vols , ed Paul Shorey (Cambridge Harvard University Press), 6 506e My translation

[8] Ibid , 6 509b

[9] See Plato, *The Parmenides* 131e–132b, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1 9 990b and 11 1 1059b

anxious to have us feel the truth as a way to know the truth Plato used many means to "get it right" and among them were stories that create exceptional feelings the Myth of the Charioteer in the *Phaedrus*, the Great Ascent to Beauty in the *Symposium*, and the Myth of Er in the *Republic* [10] In our day we often use myth as a synonym for a falsehood or a lie But that is not at all what Plato is doing. He is seeking to draw together a number of signs so that all parts of our being—feelings, emotions, memories, and even bodily states—are fused in an act of participation Plato was too wise to rely solely on *nous* Poetry and story are essential dimensions of his philosophic methodology

With this in mind we return to the sun and its relation to the good First and foremost, like the sun, the good gives It is unconditional generosity There is no need to pray to it, serve it, beg it, or appease it It simply gives of itself. Once again, we note the radical departure from customary Greek life introduced here by Plato. Supplications and sacrifices, rituals and ceremonies are no longer required What is necessary, however, is that one positions one's self so as to know the good As the Analogy of the Cave puts it one must "look in the right direction." Here looking involves the intensive and comprehensive training (physical, mental, and emotional) that the would-be philosopher must undergo Whereas experiencing the sun requires finding an appropriate physical location, here it is the whole human soul (rational, passionate, and appetitive) that must be "wheeled around" so as to know the good It is described as an agony of transformation in the Analogy of the Cave In sum, knowing the good requires a complete transformation of the human being (mind, will, and body) [11]

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[10] *Phaedrus* 246–257c, *Symposium* 201d–212c, and *Republic* 614–621

[11] I am of course talking about the famous passages in the *Republic* dealing with the sun, the divided line and the cave (502d–521b) There is a great irony here for those who still fear "The Metaphysics of Presence " In his lecture "Time and Being," which many consider the long awaited "reversal" of *Being and Time*, Heidegger meditates on the German phrase for being, *Es Gibt* ("It gives") I believe his refusal to look to Plato's "Good" demonstrates the absence of ethics in what he calls his *Denkweg* But then his contemporary followers might, could, or would call this "the presence of absence," *n'est-ce pas*? See "Time and Being," in *On Time and Being*, trans Joan Stambaugh (New York Harper and Row, 1972), 1–24

It is superior to being in every way, and without it there would be no cosmos at all Again, what is first and foremost is the act of giving which is the very nature of the good The good is the good because any good whatsoever gives If it did not give, it would not be good What then does the good do? It gives reality and truth and thereby gives intelligibility to objects of thought and the power of knowing to the mind But can we go deeper into these remarkable words I suggest that the power of the good resides in the strength of its organizing force to order things All kinds of things—material things, ideas. feelings, and actions—in fact, to take Socrates at his word, everything that exists is good in some way Why is organization so important? The good grants order without which nothing could either exist or be intelligible Order in its turn grants stability by setting limits to that which exists. Value is the operative term, and relation is its agent What the good does is create limited wholes.[12] In so doing the good gives determinateness to actuality and possibility, and this in its turn makes possible intelligibility. Without some semblance of order nothing could be known It is the *Tao Te Ching* that tells us that the best (in the sense of the good) that we can do is "to know when to stop."[13] One can only be as Dionysian as one is Apollonian

The question of order has been a major target of deconstruction; but there are all kinds, and order need not be tyrannical In fact it can and has been a source of generosity. An understanding of the power of the good requires a discussion of the relation between participation and order. I think of participation in terms of Whitehead's theory of prehension [14] Recall that for Whitehead every event in the universe gathers into itself those aspects of process that it can harmonize within its own identity Earlier I said that it is best to think of the Platonic way of knowing as starting first with feeling and then proceeding toward more conceptual dimensions In orthodox process language, initial physical prehensions have a hybrid status, for they also include rudimentary conceptual feelings Platonic participation (*methexis*)

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[12] This understanding of the nature of human knowledge in its finitude is the backbone of Iris Murdoch's *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (London Chatto & Windus, 1992), see esp chap 1, "Conceptions of Unity Art "

[13] See *Tao Te Ching*, trans Stephen Addiss and Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), #46 "Therefore, knowing that enough is enough is always enough "

[14] See Elizabeth Kraus, *The Metaphysics of Experience* (New York Fordham University Press, 1998), 15–19

means the ingathering of the world into the subjective being of the knower We do not just "know" something through representative thinking Rather, we become one with what we know Put bluntly, we are what we know This is an orthodox Platonic position Given this theory of prehensive activity, I prefer to call participation "fusion" I am arguing that participation is a multiform process that takes place on many different levels Such fusion is best spoken of in terms of feeling (which feelings can reach the highest levels of knowing) Once participation is understood as a fusion of feelings, it becomes obvious that feelings stand in need of harmony Thus the normative measure for the good is harmony, which is the weaving together of identity and difference or, if you prefer, simplicity and complexity

Harmony is an ultimate act of generosity, for it widens identity so that difference can be incorporated within the identity of the event in process Hence harmony is a fitting term for the form of the good when it is acting as a normative measure or standard of excellence Harmony also provides an opportunity for intensity and depth to come into play without upsetting the balance of the good Fusion driving toward harmony is the very definition of generosity

If we are what we know, certain things follow Spinoza argued the seemingly obvious fact that a whole is simple and its parts are complex [15] This exactly reverses the metaphysics of Descartes, for whom the part was the key to the whole [16] I hope we finally have come to realize the philosophical mischief that position has caused Consider the contortions contained in any recent anthology on the subject called the "Philosophy of Mind"

Simplicity exhibits unity, the vital mode of order that the good contributes to reality That which is, if it is to be intelligible, must be determinate, it requires a fixed limit that brings about an essential order It is this fundamental organizing power of the good that brings about a reality that is truthful and therefore intelligible The identity of this determinate reality is a whole in the sense that it is this and not that Even though it is a localized whole, it is still a whole and a simple determinate reality At the same time determinate reality has con-

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[15] Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans Edwin Curley (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1985), "Definitions and Axioms," 408–10

[16] See René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans Lawrence Lafleur (New York Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), 38–50

nections with other realities, and these relations account for the complexity that is also built into any localized whole Therefore, to summarize:

> 1 The real is intelligible because it is in its insistent instances a simple, localized whole
>
> 2 This whole is good because it is so ordered that both simplicity and complexity are unified so as to make up the unique novel entity that is that event at that time
>
> 3 The generosity of the good is manifested in this simple localized whole It is destined to fade and lend both its achievements and its failures to the stubborn facts that make up reality
>
> 4 The good makes the real intelligible because it also makes it true By reason of its generous organizing power, the good allows, indeed promotes, variety and difference

My argument is best understood by defining each mode of concrete reality as an *expression* To grasp this, we need to focus on semiotic participation I adopt Peirce's view of signs, that is to say, all signs refer to a world beyond the domain of the sign itself Semiotics is triadic it includes an object, an object signified, and an interpretant This is the precise opposite of the dyadic semiotics deployed by deconstruction There is a real "external" world that is signified and we are not trapped in an unrelenting maze of signs that only lead to more signs A poised, balanced human being gifted with a measure of common sense would say, "There is a real world out there "

Semiotics is the controlled inquiry into the meaning of expressions The sun and the good are analogues because each is an expression. To express is to be this phrase is a synonym for process thought's actual occasions as well as Peirce's signs One cannot live an abstraction We live in an everyday world within which philosophy has the endless everyday task of discerning the better from the worse by reason of the form of the good, which remains indeterminate but still higher than being Peirce's semiotics is logically precise, but at the same time it is concretely attuned to this ordinary human world [17] "Firstness" is the "iconic" expression of spontaneity emerging out the chaotic creativity resident at the base of the real An icon is not quali-

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[17] See Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Categories Defended," in *The Essential Peirce*, vol 2 (Indianapolis Indiana University Press, 1998), 160–7.

fied to endure for long It is immediately challenged by secondness, which demands that firstness "indicate" its causal significance Secondness identifies an index that can lead a controlled inquiry into the value of an icon There is great turbulence between an icon and an index in the struggle to get things right This battle revolves about the causal propensities of a situation When icons win, we have the world of advertising that we presently inhabit In this world the human being assigns values to the world we inhabit Hopefully, an intelligent and informed citizen of the present age eventually learns to deal cautiously with the relation between advertising and reality On the other hand, a successful index expresses what the world has to say about the iconic expressions of firstness When we reach thirdness we experience a sign (or symbol) that results in a realm of communal expression—the general meanings that form the supportive base of a community's values [18] Through its iconic presence spontaneity has expressed itself in the world of human experience By reason of the power of indexical truth, secondness shapes firstness into a form of intelligibility that promises truthful outcomes for human experience In reaching the symbolic stage of thirdness an entire community agrees to share in the results of this labor This development is made possible by the generosity of the good that allows creative novelty to emerge and then shapes it through indexical references The process of communication reaches its fruition when the goodness of realized experience actively sinks its roots deep into the community's way of life [19]

None of this action could take place without the support of the good which provides unity (iconic firstness), aim (indexical secondness), and wholeness (symbolic generality) As Plato maintained, it is the form of the good providing normative measures for different structures of value that secures a reality that has its modes of truth as well as its levels of intelligibility. Therefore, to speak of the generosity of the good is to lay out the ways in which the good binds together

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[18] See David Weissman, *Styles of Thought* (Albany State University of New York Press, 2007) for a persuasive account of the significant differences between interpretation and inquiry as used in contemporary philosophic discourse

[19] Consider the example of a wedding ring When purchased, it sparkles with fresh possibilities (firstness), when worn through a lifetime, it shows the effects of causality (secondness), when recognized by a community of interpretants, its meaning is established (thirdness)

through a fusion of semiotic participation all three moments of this conference's theme the good, the real, and the intelligible [20] Communication takes many forms and shapes itself through physical, emotional, conceptual, and symbolic vectors Whatever the specific route used, the concept of prehension remains the underlying process whereby novel but real, true, and intelligible processes emerge from the welter of events that make up the universe

Given the active role of prehensive communication, Plato's doctrine of the dimensions of the human soul takes on additional significance First of all, it must be acknowledged that the three springs of action within the Platonic soul are more likely than not to be at war with each other In fact, these "rival springs of action"[21] quickly turn into factions when they come to dominate political life Democracy aligns itself with *epithumia* and its multiform objects of desire Living a life ruled by a ceaselessly changing array of desires eventually destroys the power of reason and a courageous spirit Inevitably, it turns the soul away from perspectives which may offer a flash of insight into a good way to be The word itself, *epithumia*, is concretely descriptive of this fundamental loss of orientation The Greek particle *epi* denotes a place where spirit or courage (*thumos*) comes to rest and settles down There are several problems with such a lifestyle (to use the current lingo) *Thumos* (courage, spirit, vitality, liveliness) is a process and not a substance When it is fixated on particular desires, *thumos* loses its capacity to act Our culture is largely built on the ways through which powerful media persuade human souls that this is not only a good way to live but even the only way to live

What then of *logistikos*, Plato's preeminent psychic power? What chance does it really stand when confronted with the distorted meanings associated with *thumos* and *epithumia*? It is significant that in the previously discussed passages dealing with the good, Plato uses the word *logistikos* and not *nous* or any of the other terms we have come to associate with the art of dialectics I take this to mean that Plato is trying to do what I believe is the chief task of every philosopher to assist human beings in their search for a good way to live To reason about the good is to struggle to identify and make practical use of good norms and standards that are relevant to our time and place

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[20] "The Good, the Real and the Intelligible," the 2008 meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America held at Portland, Maine, 7–9 March 2008

[21] A E Taylor, *Plato* (New York The Dial Press, 1927), 282

There remains the model of harmony as the primary tool to carry out the philosopher's task Done well, it brings together identity and difference by enlarging our perspective on what is possible The great traditions of Asian thought and culture also endorse balance and equilibrium as the road to the good. Comparative philosophy now becomes an essential part of the study of metaphysics We can learn from the East. The generosity of the good has a planetary reach The creation of harmony is a task of composition Good order is the ground of good composition for it widens our vision and makes novelty possible This address has had an underlying assumption My study of Plato and Whitehead (and the work of others here in this room) has convinced me that the teaching of philosophy ought to begin and end with a single question "What is a good way for [you fill in the blank] to be?" Chasing after ideal essences has not detected any lasting findings Linguistic analysis in either the Anglo-American or the Continental traditions appears to have run out of steam So far pragmatism has been unable to distinguish consequences that hold steady as the winds of change shift

Nevertheless, we do retain certain powers The first is the continuing generosity of the good which even today does not withhold its power to gather into a unity the real and the intelligible And in the end we also have the power of the art of composition I conclude by quoting Whitehead "apart from composition, there is no meaning, that is to say, there is nothing "[22] Composition requires integration Recent years have witnessed a remarkable growth in the use of what is called "mindfulness" in psychotherapy The term, of course, is taken from the Buddha (and often rather shamelessly without attribution) This is no great concern I am sure the Buddha does not mind that we are becoming more mindful about mindfulness. This mindfulness is not at all like the dichotomy introduced by the Cartesian separation of the human mind from the human body What is involved is the integration of mind and body Mindfulness is an action that is utterly different from representational thinking When practiced well, body is saturated with mind, and mind is absorbed throughout body Mindfulness is the living out of Plato's eros in its drive toward the good

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[22] Alfred North Whitehead, "The Analysis of Meaning," in *Science and Philosophy* (Patterson, N J Littlefield, Adams & Co , 1964), 137

It is immediately evident that there are countless connections here between Western and Asian disciplines such as yoga, tai chi, and any human activity that requires agile skills A concrete way is opened for real somatic work in comparative philosophy I think of Plato's gymnastic curriculum I think of Aristotle's detailed instruction on how to hit the mean in order to live a good life I think of Wang Yang-ming's insistence on the unity of action and knowledge I think of John Dewey's dogged efforts to bring together doing and knowing And I say philosophy has a very usable past, a pressing task in the present age, and a future brimming with good ways to be

But it is best to stop here The generosity of the good has brought us to a point where prospects for metaphysics in an age that disputes its value can be glimpsed, and that is a good way for philosophy to be

The University of Southern Maine

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

BRANDON ZIMMERMAN AND STAFF

ALBERTAZZI, Liliana *Immanent Realism An Introduction to Brentano* Synthese Library, Vol 333 Dordrecht Springer, 2006 xii + 378 pp Cloth, $169 00, €139 10—Franz Brentano enjoys a rare distinction among great philosophers He was famous and his writings were widely discussed during his lifetime, but he sank into relative obscurity almost immediately after his death The exact opposite is true of many thinkers who might be named in the same category, Frege and Schopenhauer come to mind Finally, Brentano's ideas have now resurfaced many years later, when unfortunately they have all too frequently been misinterpreted as precursors of later philosophical movements for which he would almost certainly have had little sympathy

Liliana Albertazzi has written a comprehensive account that seeks to present Brentano's philosophy in proper perspective and dispel some of the misapprehensions about his work She provides a chronological exposition of Brentano's central writings, focusing especially on the three editions of his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, published in three installments, the so-called *Psychologie* I, appearing in 1874 and in an enlarged edition with commentary by Oskar Kraus in 1924, II, under the title *Klassifikation der psychischen Phanomene* in 1911, and III, edited by Kraus in 1928 as *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtseins* Albertazzi emphasizes Brentano's thought more particularly as it relates to experimental cognitive psychology of perception, while seeking to explain his entire lifework as an engagement with a variety of interconnected themes in metaphysical and psychological inquiry

"Immanent realism" is Albertazzi's term for Brentano's integrated metaphysics and philosophical psychology It is the thesis beginning in Brentano's *Psychologie* I, that, as Albertazzi writes, represents an "attempt to conciliate the presence of an often *irreducible transcendent foundation* of perception with its *immanent and equally irreducible categorization* by the intentional acts" (p 128) The realism part of Brentano's philosophy in Albertazzi's equation is evidently the irreducible transcendent foundation of perception Still, it remains unclear both in Brentano and Albertazzi whether this is supposed to be the external world of sensed phenomena sometimes intended by perception

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers

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The immanent component less opaquely has to do with Brentano's notoriously difficult doctrine of intentional in-existence (as Linda McAlister has noted, in the locative rather than ontic sense), according to which the objects of thoughts are supposed to be immanently contained within the psychological acts by which they are intended Albertazzi makes an interesting move here by denying that Brentano ever sought to advance a theory of intentionality, as opposed to a theory of intentional reference, by which Albertazzi translates Brentano's phrase *intentionale Beziehung* for what might otherwise be rendered as "intentional relation " If it is true that Brentano never meant to put forward a theory of intentionality, then he might be exempt from answering such sticky questions as how intentional states can contain their objects immanently within themselves What gives pause is the consideration that in light of what Brentano does say about intentional reference (or relations) he owes the reader a much more complete account of the nature of intentionality, amounting to a theory of the subject, and of the immanent possession of intended objects by virtue of the intentionality of psychological states Albertazzi, moreover, would need to say considerably more about what she takes a "theory of intentionality" to consist in and exclude in order for the reader to assess whether she is right in maintaining that Brentano has no theory of intentionality

Albertazzi, moving from text to text, confines most of her writing in the book to an almost pure chronological exposition of the development of Brentano's thought She does not venture to criticize Brentano at any point, although in the penultimate chapter she lavishes objections on other contributors to Brentano scholarship Albertazzi is undoubtedly right that there is something seriously distorted about efforts to read into Brentano a commitment to propositivism, protoanalytic philosophy, and a proto-Fregean theory of *Sinn* or sense, let alone to a retro-Thomism or retroscholasticism Albertazzi is right also to temper the image of Brentano as an unmitigated anti-Kantian, yet her evidence is rather equivocal, when she quotes Brentano in the preface to his 1895 *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand*, saying, "One should especially not misinterpret my real opinion of Kant's philosophy in those passages in which I deal with this extraordinary thinker Independently of what I say about his philosophical system, his achievements for the natural sciences, like those of Proclus for mathematics, remain unparalleled" (p 319) The passage clearly distinguishes between Brentano's opinion of Kant's philosophy, which he does not take the opportunity to qualify or retract from his negative pronouncements in the body of the text, in contrast with his fair opinion of Kant's contributions to natural science, which he commends On reflection, I find myself equally suspicious of what I take to be Albertazzi's reading of Brentano as a proto-cognitive-experimentalist Brentano's own experiments in perception, as Albertazzi remarks, are typified as reminiscent of Goethe's *Farbenlehre*, executed informally with colored translucent paper placed over a light-source

Brentano is too individualistic a thinker to be easily categorized in any of these ways, including interpretations tending to overemphasize his general theory of "inner form" and discussion of psychology as a foundation of the other sciences On this note, I felt the book would

have benefited from more detailed discussion of Brentano's alleged psychologism in light of Husserl's among other contemporary critiques I was further surprised that in a book of this kind greater attention was not dedicated to Brentano's well-known debt to Thomas Aquinas While acknowledging the importance of Thomas to Brentano's thought, Albertazzi bequeaths to others the task of excavating this part of Brentano's intellectual heritage, when she writes, "Almost entirely lacking, however, is a complete reconstruction of the influence of medieval thought on the theory of intentional reference" (p 318) I found myself wondering in that case why Albertazzi did not supply the defect herself I would have been eager in this context to know what she might have to say about the medieval sources of Brentano's thought

The book is recommended for anyone seeking an overview of Brentano's work in metaphysics with an emphasis on his philosophical psychology and its historical and possible future implications for experimental cognitive psychology Albertazzi's expertise in the history of psychology colors her understanding of Brentano as a precursor of cognitive psychology in interesting ways, even if in the end it comes to seem as one—albeit differently—sided than the prevalent interpretations of Brentano she decries The truth is that Brentano, like other highly individual thinkers, resists neat classification at the same time that his many-faceted contributions to philosophy naturally lend themselves to interpretation in relation to the many strains of thought that have sometimes consciously or unconsciously profited from his work —Dale Jacquette, *University of Bern*

ANDREW, Edward G *Patrons of Enlightenment* Toronto University of Toronto Press, 2006 ix + 284 pp Cloth, $55 00—In focusing on the financial lives and backers of Enlightenment thinkers, *Patrons of Enlightenment* does more than provide information about how eighteenth-century philosophers earned their living Edward G Andrew uses his study to reflect on the nature of the Enlightenment itself and to investigate which environments most favor intellectual creativity The study is thus broad and ambitious it poses big, important questions, and it is necessarily comparative with chapters on the French, Scottish, and English intellectual worlds, as well as frequent reference to Kant and many North American thinkers such as Jefferson and Franklin Andrew's argument is clear and convincing patronage helped intellectual creativity to flourish in both Scotland and France, while the lack of patronage in England helps to explain why there was no English Enlightenment Although Samuel Johnson "is worth all the *philosophes* and Scottish professors combined" (p 156), philosophy was nearly silent in England The great thinkers of the eighteenth century—Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Smith—all benefited from aristocratic or royal patronage, even as they espoused independence of thought According to Andrew, rather than stifling such independence, patronage allowed greater

independence than reliance on the marketplace, which required writers to produce works that would appeal to a broad readership

Andrew provides evidence from a wide range of examples The book begins with a chapter on patronage that traces the concept back to the ancient Greek philosophers, a justifiable beginning because eighteenth-century thinkers were themselves so influenced by the ancients The next chapter covers print culture and how the expansion of printing led to the emergence of a new type, the professional writer Andrew insists, however, that "print culture did not supersede, but rather modified, authorial dependence upon patrons" (p 39) Chapter 3 returns to ancient philosophy with a lengthy discussion of Seneca and how eighteenth-century philosophers built upon or rejected Seneca's model of patronage to explain their own position relative to the great and powerful The remaining chapters treat particular cases chapter 4 focuses on Bayle, Care, and Locke, chapter 5 on Voltaire, chapter 6 on the Scottish universities, chapter 7 on D'Alembert and Rousseau, chapter 8 on Johnson, and chapter 9 on the "Irish Antagonists," Burke and Shelburne The book ends with a conclusion that brings the reader up to the present with a discussion of right-wing foundations that attempt to influence the supposedly "liberal" academic world with large grants One of Andrew's most convincing examples appears in the penultimate chapter, in his discussion of Jeremy Bentham, who "became more democratic as a result of Shelburne's patronage, just as Locke became more liberal as a result of the patronage of Lord Shaftsbury" (p 180) In addition to opening up possibilities to develop more controversial ideas, patronage allowed Bentham and others to put their ideas into practice, exhibiting their "practical bent [and] a scorn for mere theoreticians" (p 180)

Andrew is not content with simply arguing that patronage encouraged intellectual creativity He also uses his study to argue that the Enlightenment was not necessarily republican The fact that so many Enlightenment thinkers relied on royal and aristocratic patronage helps to prove his point that republicanism was not the *telos* or realization of the Enlightenment, but rather its *escatos* or termination In closing down salons and royal academies, the French Revolution "terminated the epoch we know as the Enlightenment" (p 6) The patronage of the rich and powerful—female salonnières in Paris, Frederick and Catherine the Great, Shelburne—all allowed great thinkers to live and write without having to worry about the market to keep food on the table

This is a valuable study not only because it helps us better understand how the *philosophes* managed not to starve, but also because it helps us think about the true nature of independence Is one really more independent if one has no powerful backers? Patronage permitted Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau to take the risks that came with saying something new and controversial, as they counted on their backers to protect them from persecution The market cannot protect its writers, if anything, it encourages conservatism as writers know that their readers want something that seems familiar, that does not shake up their worlds too much By taking his topic up to the present in the last pages of this book, Andrew reflects on our own period and how granting organizations and large foundations shape our own intellectual horizons This is a book that does a good job of getting us to rethink our understanding of

the Enlightenment and how and why it took place, while also forcing us to pose questions about our own time For that, it is a valuable and laudable study —Denise Z Davidson, *Georgia State University*

BAINS, Paul *The Primacy of Semiosis An Ontology of Relations* Toronto University of Toronto Press, 2006 xii + 186 pp $53 00—This is a book rather to be *read* than *read about*, for the tale that it tells in brief compass is astonishing Relation as a feature of the mind-independent world, affirmed by Aristotle and Aquinas but denied by Ockham and the moderns, Bains here presents in the light Charles Peirce (as Poinsot before him) came to see it as the one mode of being which is unaffected intrinsically by the surrounding circumstances which make the relation in question belong primarily to the mind-dependent or mind-independent order, and hence as the one mode of being which makes communication possible in the first place and "real" whenever it occurs, regardless of whether the communication in question bears upon a being as real as Napoleon, as fictional as Hamlet, or any objective mixture of reality and fiction in between

This notion of relation as irreducible in its proper being to the division between the "real and unreal," the "mind-independent and the mind-dependent," is what Bains calls "ontological", and he presents this singularity as the opening whereby semiosis, or the action of signs as involving relations irreducibly uniting three terms, enters and permeates the order of finite being And it is the recognition of semiosis that marks the frontier and divide—at least within philosophy—between thought that is merely "modern" (however advanced) and irreducibly "postmodern" by restoring "reality" to the knowable without reducing reality to what is independent of mind (which was the original point of the contrast between *ens reale* and *ens rationis*, for example, in the Latin Age)

Perhaps because he comes to the problem with no specialist background in scholasticism in general or Thomistic thought in particular, Bains astonishingly treats the Latin notion of "species" (that is, of the forms which specify the awareness of animals) with a deftness and accuracy that completely bypasses the "quo/quod fallacy" that beset the whole of twentieth-century Neothomism (see pp 45–58, esp 50)

"As the Latins said, the concept as a formal sign is that by which—or rather, that *on the basis of which*—we know (*id in quo*), it is not that which we know (*id quod*) So the contrast the *species impressae* is that 'by which' (*id quo*) we are determined (or 'specified') so as to become aware of this rather than that environmental aspect, the *species expressa* (*id in quo*) is that 'on the basis of which' the environmental stimulus is experienced as an object, while in both cases the object itself (*id quod*) is distinct from the *species*, just as a terminus is distinct from the foundation of a relation We will come to see that the *species expressae* is functioning as a Peircean *interpretant* "

With the Neothomist conflation of *expressa* to *impressa* removed by foregrounding the role of relation, Bains is further able to clear aside some facile but false oppositions that have become fashionable in contrasting Thomism with Scotism in matters epistemological

This book deserves more space than is available to me for the purposes of this review So let me say in general terms that Bains has provided in the area of philosophy the single most outstanding example I have seen of the "ecumenicalism in semiotics" that Prof Thomas Sebeok constantly called for there is nothing on the market to compare with this book in its comparative scope Modestly presented by its author, the work breaks open the dialogue most central to semiotics today in quite a startling manner Bains manages to bring to the surface a thread of fundamental discourse whose breadth of commonality on the contemporary scene probably no one, certainly not me, heretofore suspected I have long made the claim that the development of fundamental semiotics is the positive essence of what is truly postmodern in intellectual culture But what Bains has done is to demonstrate that this thesis is implicit in a broad range of contemporary works (well beyond what I myself have ever had occasion to focus upon) In doing this, he shows the need to revisit philosophy's whole history in a semiotic light, particularly the standardly neglected Latin centuries between Ockham and Descartes

Moreover, this book is the first book to show a systematic appreciation of the insight and implications of what is historically the earliest systematic semiotic, namely, the *Treatise on Signs* of John Poinsot My emphasis here is on the word "implications " For what Bains has accomplished is to show the relevance of Poinsot's doctrine that signs formally consist in "external relations" to a whole range of contemporary thinkers whose work is already, on other grounds, in the thick of contemporary discussions Although in his preface Bains mentions Deleuze, Poinsot, and Deely as his "three principal theorists," in fact the reader winds up crossing paths with many more authors in considerable fashion on the contemporary scene—not only the inevitable Felix Guattari and Claire Parnet, but Heidegger, Latour, Stengers, Muralt, Maturana, Varela, Whitehead, and a considerable number of others I learned with surprise and pleasure of the semiotic insights common across this timely range of thinkers, insights which transform the early twenty-first-century intellectual landscape when Poinsot and von Uexkull are brought into the mix

All of this is truly groundbreaking, and should assure a wide interest in Bains's book that will translate into some classroom adoptions in advanced undergraduate courses and graduate study For what Bains provides is a concrete and detailed illustration of Ratzinger's thesis as first expressed in 1970 "the undivided sway of thinking in terms of substance is ended, relation is discovered as an equally valid primordial mode of reality "—John Deely, *University of St Thomas, Houston*

CASTEIGT, Julie *Connaissance et vérité chez Maître Eckhart* Études de philosophie médiévale, Vol 91 Paris Librairie philosophique J Vrin, 2006 480 pp €55 00—This scholarly book was originally presented as a dissertation at the Sorbonne in 2002 Casteigt concentrates on a central theme of the works of Eckhart—the knowledge of truth—to show the unity of his Latin and German works The book is divided in five chapters, followed by three appendices, an extensive bibliography, and indices Casteigt's thesis is that the knowing subject is engendered in what he knows, an affirmation which is a transformation of the epistemology of Aquinas and Aristotle Her main sources are Eckhart's commentaries on the *Gospel according to John* and on *Genesis*

According to Eckhart, a simple knowledge of something is not yet a real apprehension The known has to be in the knowing subject, engendering the knowing subject in the known This theme is elaborated in the second chapter According to Eckhart, any knowing subject, because of the identity with the object known, brought about in the act of knowledge, becomes the son of what he knows, applying a particular biblical way of speaking to any kind of knowledge However, Casteigt notes that not every cognitive act corresponds to this vision, but only acts which aim at the union with God

In the third chapter the author presents some elements of Thomistic metaphysics, but one wonders whether Eckhart, in the interpretation of Casteigt, noticed the difference of the union of potency and act and that of the knowing subject and the known—which in scholastic terms is called the *unio omnium maxima* One may recall here that Aquinas, with his concern for precise terminology, writes that the cognitive faculty in act is the same as the known, but that the contents of the object are different Later on in this chapter Casteigt passes from the *one in act* (in cognition) to the birth of the Word in the soul, a rather surprising transition Certain sentences of the German Dominican are indeed difficult to explain For instance, having become the Son in this cognition, the soul would also become the Father, because of its active role in bringing about this union

The heading of chapter 4 surprises at first sight the knowledge of justice by the just In Appendix 3 the author explains in detail its connection with the main theme by knowing justice one is making oneself just In this connection Eckhart avoids speaking of univocity between the perfections of God and those in creatures Surprisingly he considers a proposition such as "the thing is good" as *de tertio adiacente*, but "Peter is good" would be *de secundo adiacente*

Truth as manifestation is the theme of chapter five Creatures are in God like a wheel in a wheel Casteigt attempts to show that for Eckhart the production of created things, the generation of the Son and the being engendered of the knowing subject go together Nevertheless he distinguishes between a duplex *esse* of things, in themselves and in their cause For Eckhart the quiddity as it exists in individuals is far removed from the purity it possesses in its cause One might call attention to the influence of Neoplatonism, which also shows in texts where Eckhart calls the Father the One instead of Being Next Casteigt points out that

the definition of truth as adequation—of that which is with the intellect—finds it most profound meaning when one understands the "that which is" or "being" as contained in its cause

Casteigt mentions different uses of the term "abstraction" by Thomas and Eckhart For Eckhart, abstraction rather than being an operation is the mode of being of the intellect But it is better to say that it is the adapting of the object the mode of being of the intellect

Eckhart's writings exercise a most remarkable attraction for students of medieval thought Casteigt shows an admirable familiarity with the works of the German Dominican, but the mass of quotations and Eckhart's continuous recourse to a spiritual or mystic terminology make it difficult to follow her exposé Casteigt would have facilitated things for the reader if she had first devoted a section to a survey of the philosophical epistemology of Eckhart, as compared to that of Thomas Aquinas — L J Elders, *Rolduc, Kerkrade, The Netherlands*

DAVIDSON, Denise *France After Revolution* Harvard Historical Studies, vol 155 Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2007 xv + 257 pp Cloth, $49 95—This book offers insight into the changing nature of gender and class identities in France in the early nineteenth century From the perspective of social history and, in particular, through a study of the tone and character of social interaction in festivals, theaters, and clubs, the author, Davidson, seeks to challenge a traditional thesis in the fields of French history and political theory The traditional thesis holds that the French Revolution was detrimental to the rights of women and that the prominent place of women in the public sphere as practiced prior to the Revolution (in salons, and so forth) was compromised by Revolutionary practice, a practice that saw women once again assigned to solely a domestic role, banished to the private sphere As she notes in her introduction, Davidson seeks to show why and how the ideology of women's subordinate status and banishing from the "bourgeois public sphere" came to dominate in the postrevolutionary period in France Through her research on various venues associated with the public sphere and the place of class and gender within them, Davidson shows that women had a public presence many years after the Revolution and that women's retreat from the public realm and from politics was not a direct result of Revolutionary practice, but rather of class antagonisms that became more salient in the 1820s

Davidson's analysis includes attention to the complexities of the issues involved when this theory of the public sphere is carried to the discipline of social history In seeking an empirical test of women's presence in the public sphere, Davidson grapples with a number of key issues, such as the ambiguities of a stark public–private distinction (recognizing that theaters, for example, harbor aspects associated with both), the significance of how women actually behaved in these public settings (was their public presence central and equal, or were they displayed in traditional roles as wives and mothers?), how class variables

had an impact on the presence and on the type of presence shown by women (with differentiation being a more salient feature for middle and upper class women), and how regional variables within France may have played a role in women's public presence In the midst of these factors she seeks to demonstrate the extent to which public settings served as arenas for testing, forging and displaying identities, through a complicated theater of contestation and mimicry

In addition to the merits of the complexity of her social analysis, Davidson works through these variables drawing from a great deal of original research from archives throughout France Her analysis studies the presence and behavior of women as represented in a number of documents and eye-witness accounts

Perhaps the greatest challenge in such a project is to uncover the motivations and multiple meanings of women's behavior in public spaces, particularly when many firsthand accounts are missing The central idea that women and men were participating in the construction of their sense of identity as mediated through Revolutionary ideology their class sense of solidarity, and their own aspirations, while also contesting the projection of identity upon them, is difficult to demonstrate in a historical study Davidson does this with great skill, but this is not to say that her aspiration is always achieved

The greatest merit of this work is that it allows for a more complex and an agent-focused understanding of the evolution of gender norms, and one that is grounded in a study of the actual behavior of historical subjects Still, the dynamic of negotiating social identity rests on an equally complex dynamic of seeking solidarity, yet contesting it at the same time, a dynamic that itself would best be illustrated alongside a well-constructed theory of social identity and its development In addition, one may do well to pause before jettisoning the analytical tool of "separate spheres " It may be true that this idea does not help to clarify our understanding of male and female roles and experiences in all historical circumstances However, in contemporary circumstances there is arguably still important political capital to be gained through continued attachment to the idea of a public sphere to be constituted in part by a stringent practice of equality between men and women —Rebecca E Kingston, *University of Toronto*

FELDMAN, Karen *Binding Words Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger* Evanston Northwestern University Press, 2006 x + 158 pp Cloth, $79 95, paper, $26 95—The preoccupation at the heart of this book is the "bindingness" of words can a text be binding on its readers, and can it perform what it sets out to demonstrate? Feldman takes up these questions by considering the catachrestic character of conscience in the major works of Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger Her major innovation is to combine performance theory (following Judith Butler) with investigation of philosophical texts This allows her to ask

two questions How do Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger describe the binding force of conscience? And how do their texts simultaneously perform the call of conscience?

Feldman begins with Hobbes's *Leviathan* She introduces the question of conscience with a clear and helpful discussion of Hobbes's nominalism For Hobbes, the right use of language consists in the proper arrangement of names according to their standard, shared meaning Therefore all metaphorical speech is erroneous because it consists in a misapplication of names The speech of conscience is the worst of these, Feldman argues, because it is metaphorical and does not announce itself as such Instead, the metaphor of "conscience" produces a realm of private opinion that is injurious to the commonwealth, which is founded on public declaration and whose laws are binding only insofar as they are publicly and explicitly expressed Feldman then asks whether, given his condemnation of metaphor, Hobbes contradicts himself by using metaphor throughout his work She argues that Hobbes's rhetoric does not undermine itself, rather, it performs the inconstancy of language that it intends to demonstrate

The next chapter provides a lucid and provocative reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* lucid because it deftly outlines the performative contradictions of conscience, and provocative because it suggests that conscience is illustrative of the contradictions of the *Phenomenology* as a whole Feldman spends the majority of the chapter explaining what she calls the "performative successes and rhetorical failures" of conscience Conscience, or immediate knowledge of duty, succeeds when it declares itself and thereby makes its inner conviction into objective duty which can be recognized and validated by others Thus success, however, fails rhetorically for several reasons The problem can be summed up by pointing out that conscience is knowledge of universals, but action (which is what conscience commands) is always particular Thus conscience always enacts something other than what it intends Feldman then makes the interesting suggestion that the contradictions of conscience are instructive for the *Phenomenology* as a whole Hegel says that his text "presents" (*darstellt*) the becoming of Science, which Feldman interprets as both description and enactment Like conscience, the *Phenomenology* must "say" itself in propositions, but as soon as it says itself it must negate itself, for the "is" of its propositions is a becoming-other Feldman concludes that the *Phenomenology* allegorizes the successes and failures of conscience, which can never bind its words conclusively to its acts

Last, Feldman considers the call of conscience in Heidegger's *Being and Time* as an enigmatic figure that exceeds subjectivity She frames her analysis within a larger conversation about Heidegger's use of language, where she argues that *Being and Time* is "profoundly figurative and specifically catachrestic" (p 80) Because Heidegger wants to elucidate being in its difference from beings, his project is not to speak "about" being but rather to confront the limits of representational language Therefore he must make use of catachresis metaphor that fills in when all words are necessarily inappropriate Feldman proposes that his strategy is to make words into "unhandy tools" and thereby to perform what he also argues about the unhandy tool This performance

occurs most forcefully, Feldman thinks, in the sections on the call of conscience This is because "it is a point of reversal where the text as a whole allegorizes what is said *in* the text about the call of conscience" (p 99) Like the call, the text is not a call "about" something but a performative attestation of the possibilities of Dasein If Feldman is right, *Being and Time* performs a call of conscience to its readers—but, according to the nature of the call—it calls only those who are ready to hear

Feldman's book is a welcome and enlightening contribution to difficult topics in philosophy It should be praised not only for its treatment of conscience, but for its larger discussion of Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger In fact, it may be more successful in its broad ambitions than its more narrow concern about "bindingness," for the discussion of the specific nature of binding is generally subsumed to the question of performativity at large Feldman does not explain why she selected Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger for her study, but any apparent arbitrariness in her chosen texts is overcome by her compelling method and analysis —A R Bjerke, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

FORNARI, Maria Cristina. *La morale evolutiva del gregge Nietzsche legge Spencer e Mill* Pisa. ETS, 2006 360 pp Paper, €21 00—This book provides an extensive account of Friedrich Nietzsche's engagements with the works of three moral philosophers of his time, Paul Rée, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart Mill It thus presents Nietzsche as developing his ethics, neither in the "untimely" isolation which his rhetoric often suggests nor with reference to the staples of the philosophical tradition, but rather through intensive critical engagements with contemporary philosophical debates The book is also noteworthy for its focus on Nietzsche's often-neglected notion of the "herd," which it presents as the sophisticated result of his engagements with these three particular philosophers

Fornari begins by arguing for the role of Rée and his *Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen* in the development of Nietzsche's first naturalistic theories about morality, as presented in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* of 1878 and the notebooks of this period In particular, Fornari refers to Rée's emphasis on English scientific method, and particularly Darwinian evolutionism, against the metaphysical and teleological explanations prevalent in German academia, his Darwinistic account of the value of altruism in terms of the survival of the community, and his deflationary account of retributive justice in terms of the forgetting of punishment's original, purely deterrent function According to Fornari, Nietzsche's engagement with these claims led him to consolidate his rejection of his earlier metaphysics, to propose his first accounts of justice in terms of power relations, and to develop his own treatments of altruism as a complex psychological and biological phenomenon originating in custom, rather than the basic instinct and

defining feature of the moral good that Rée claimed Fornari's account thus gives a strong sense of the depth of Nietzsche's engagement with Rée's theories in this period, echoing scholars such as Robin Small and Christopher Janaway in emphasising the significance of this engagement The eventual differences between Nietzsche's and Rée's positions nonetheless leave one wondering about the possible significance of other readings For instance, Nietzsche's psychological analyses of altruism also appear to owe much to his readings of neo-Kantians like Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Lange, to which Fornari refers only with regard to his criticism of metaphysics, and his developing treatment of "justice" seems also to reflect his interest in Eugen Duhring's theories and, indeed, in Rée's own later work, to which Fornari refers only in passing

In the second part of the book, Fornari presents an account of Nietzsche's engagement with Spencer's *The Data of Ethics*, with particular reference to Nietzsche's notes and published texts of the early 1880s Here Fornari argues that Nietzsche's notion of the "herd instinct" derives from his critical appropriation of Spencer's evolutionary ethics For Spencer, morally good actions are those which promote the optimal adaptation of biological organs and functions to their conditions of existence, and therefore also those which become instinctual and pleasurable, and are transmitted across generations through the nervous system Spencer insists that human society thus evolves toward a peaceful state of optimal adaptation of the human species by means of the development and transmission of instincts of altruism and justice, and that this state can also be anticipated and promoted by a rational utilitarian ethics Fornari maintains that Nietzsche appropriated from Spencer the idea of the evolutionary transmission of values through instincts, and thus abandoned his earlier, Rée-influenced claims about the origins of moral errors in forgetfulness and his interest in distinguishing egoistic and altruistic motivations Fornari argues that Nietzsche nonetheless criticizes Spencer by insisting that conditions of existence, and therefore adaptive behavior, differ across individuals and across the various instincts of each individual, and that those described by Spencer constitute only one particular type, with particular, "herd" origins Fornari further claims that this criticism of Spencer and the related development of Nietzsche's own evolutionary physiology of competing instincts (which would later become his theory of the "will to power") derived largely from his sympathetic readings of Karl Semper's and Wilhelm Roux's alternative theories of evolution Regarding these later developments one might again wish to refer to further influences, such as Karl Wilhelm von Nageli and Ernst Haeckel But Fornari's is nonetheless an illuminating account of Spencer's role in the further development of Nietzsche's critical treatment of modern concepts of altruism and social justice and his evolutionary physiology of moral principles and judgments In this, it bears comparison with Gregory Moore's important recent work

The final part of the book concerns Nietzsche's readings of Mill in the 1880s Fornari first emphasises Nietzsche's familiarity with Eduard von Hartmann's and Anton Olzelt-Newin's criticisms of Mill's attempt to ground the performance of morally good actions in the agent's

happiness, and William Lecky's criticisms of Mill's account of the sense of duty in terms of the association of ideas. According to Fornari, Nietzsche employed these criticisms to develop further his skepticism regarding the rational grounds of modern appeals to altruism and justice. Fornari then turns to Mill's concerns about the consequences of modern conceptions of equality, democracy, and economic freedom for the cultivation of individuality, culture, and politics, as expressed in his essays, *On Liberty* and *Civilisation*, and in his earlier review of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. Fornari argues that Nietzsche enthusiastically appropriated these concerns for his criticism of modern "herd" ethics, although she notes that he also ultimately rejected Mill's liberal individualism for its egalitarianism—that is, for its claim that individuals are of equal moral value. Fornari thus provides an intriguing discussion of this important but widely neglected influence on Nietzsche's ethics. However, this reader remained unconvinced that Nietzsche's engagement with Mill was as direct and intensive as those with Rée and Spencer. Indeed, the textual and bibliographical evidence provided by Fornari suggests that Nietzsche's skepticism regarding the rational grounds of modern ethics derived less from his reading of Mill's *Utilitarianism* than from his continued engagement with Spencer and his reading of Lecky's discussion of English moral philosophy in *History of European Morals*. Nietzsche's rejection of egalitarianism, on the other hand, often appears to reflect something more than the extension of Mill's own concerns about the deleterious effects of modern culture that Fornari suggests. One suspects, then, that other readings and considerations also played important roles in the development of Nietzsche's criticisms of modern ethics in the 1880s.

Fornari's book nevertheless provides a rich contribution to the understanding of Nietzsche's ethics. The analysis of Nietzsche's critical relation to Spencer's ethics is particularly illuminating, and the examination of Mill's influence raises challenging questions regarding the nature and origins of Nietzsche's antiegalitarianism. More generally, the idea that Nietzsche's notion of the "herd" constitutes a sophisticated pillar of his ethics, referring to a range of modern issues regarding moral and social progress, is a fruitful one that has been little explored by contemporary scholars. Finally, Fornari displays a familiarity with Nietzsche's notebooks, readings, and intellectual context which is typical of an important strand of Italian scholarship, but which until recently has often been lacking in English-language work. These qualities will recommend the book particularly to those interested in how Nietzsche's intensive engagements with contemporary philosophical debates informed his ethics, and in the particular philosophical issues which these engagements raise. —Tom Bailey, *University of Pisa*

FORTIN, Ernest L *Ever Ancient, Ever New Ruminations on the City, the Soul, and the Church Collected Essays, Vol 4* Edited by Michael P Foley Lanham, Md Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc , 2007 xxxi + 354 pp Cloth, $95 00, paper, 44 95—This latest volume of the collected essays of Ernest Fortin continues the task set out in the first three volumes of making available to a wider public the works of a leading Catholic theologian However, as the editor Michael P Foley warns, "this volume covers the widest possible range of Fortin's thought" (p xxix) As such, the reader is led through a seemingly disorganized collection of essays that include some commentaries on Augustine's political theology, the intentional esotericism of classical and patristic thought, the continuity and difference between classical and early Christian rhetoric, the critique of twentieth-century Catholic higher education, the question and status of ecumenism, as well as book reviews, notes, and speeches

Whatever weaknesses one might find in this book, such as its organization, or perhaps more glaringly, the impression one gets that Fortin is, at times, somewhat dismissive of *Nouvelle Théologie* which to a remarkable degree advanced the same criticism of modern secular culture that Fortin himself advocates in these essays, there is, nevertheless, one great and unifying strength that emerges in this book, namely, whether it be the origins of a rhetoric of concealment in patristic theology, or the origins of the movement of liberal democracy and its effects on the Catholic church and the ecumenical movement of the twentieth century, Fortin comes across as a keen observer and master interpreter of the origins and principles that shape or give rise to the relationship among theology, the church, and the world

That being said, the structure of the book is as follows The book consists of an assortment of essays, lectures, and public addresses that are divided into eight chapters The first chapter introduces three main themes that occupy Fortin's patristic studies First, the reader is presented with Fortin's early report and commentary on the resurgent interest in patristic studies on the European continent during the mid-twentieth century and his efforts to convey the salient features of this movement to American readers Second, the chapter also introduces two very well-written essays ("The Church Fathers and the Transmission of the Christian Message" and "The Nature of the Christian Message") that highlight the transmission of gnosis in patristic culture and a lucid and characteristic defense by Fortin of the intentional concealment of such gnosis as an act of genuine concern for the truth content and dissemination of the Christian message Third, there is a rather basic presentation of Augustine's *City of God* which, importantly, identifies two central themes that greatly impact Fortin's subsequent thought, namely, Augustine's critique of pagan thought and the elucidation of the two cities

The second chapter shifts the reader's attention to Fortin's work on the philosophical culture of the Middle Ages While this chapter includes a helpful exposition of the history of the *translatio studii* and an insightful look at the question of Vernani's accusation that Dante's political thought was influenced by Averroes, the most interesting essay of this chapter is "Thomas Aquinas as a Political Thinker " In this essay, Fortin outlines the originality of Thomas's political thought with respect

to his break with Aristotle, as well as a brief genealogy that documents the reemergence of Thomas's political thought during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the subsequent politicization and misrepresentation of Thomas's political thought by conservative and liberal Catholic thinkers during the twentieth century

The majority of essays that constitute the heart of this book and make up chapters 3–6 tie together the salient features of Fortin's mature political theology One thinks here especially of his preoccupation with the relationship between the emergent phenomenon of liberal democracy in the modern era and its effects on the Roman Catholic Church in America After an initial essay that presents this relationship ("Christianity and the Enlightenment A Forward," the editor skillfully strings together a series of works that demonstrate how Fortin understood and worked out this complex relationship To this reader, several essays in particular stand out First, there is the essay "A Tocquevillian Perspective on Religion and the American Regime," which recapitulates some of the key insights of de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* and demonstrates the enduring legacy of these insights so as to assess and elucidate the status of the relationship between the church and liberal democratic culture at the close of the twentieth century Second, there is the essay "The New Catholic College" which assesses the status of Catholic higher education at the end of the twentieth century Written in 1970, one gets a sense of the remarkable prescience Fortin possessed in decrying the fragmentation of the course of study in Catholic higher education as its leaders, such as John Tracy Ellis, sought to modify the formation of students along the lines of secular institutes and thus contributed, unwittingly, to the subsequent and regrettable sense of alienation that effected Catholic students with respect to their relationship with their tradition and cultural heritage Third, one sees how Fortin thinks about ecumenism in light of the effects of liberal democracy on the Christian churches in his essay "The Anguish of Unity A Roman Catholic Perspective " In this brief essay, and in the subsequent essays of chapter 5, especially "Ecumenism – Where Do We Go from Here?", the reader perceives that Fortin's concern with the rise of secular liberalism and the increasing collective amnesia with respect to foundational beliefs, provides the crucial fertile ground for ecumenism as all Christian churches have an obligation to engage this crisis together not "against the onslaught of modernity" but rather in the common project of moving beyond for the time being "intramural theological disputes" so as to reclaim and elucidate clearly the foundational experiences of the tradition (p 215) Fortin's attempt here is articulate and well intentioned To his thinking, what all churches share in common is not, in the first place, an obligation to elucidate the truths of theology, but rather the struggle to face squarely and together the church's relevance in the modern world

Finally, the editor includes a delightful collection of hilarious speeches Fortin gave to the tennis team at Assumption College (where he taught and served as tennis coach) These, in addition to the epilogue, which presents Fortin's autobiography, provide readers with a

personal and inside look at the man so many admired and loved — Anthony Cirelli, *St John's University*

GRANT, Edward *A History of Natural Philosophy From the Ancient World to the Nineteenth Century* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2007 xiv + 361 pp Cloth, $40 00, paper, $14 99—In an opening page, defining the scope of his enquiry, Grant reminds us that for the Greek "natural philosophy encompassed all natural phenomena of the physical world It sought to discover physical causes and all natural effects and was little concerned with mathematics By contrast, the exact mathematical sciences, such as astronomy, optics, and mechanics did not involve physical causes " Natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences functioned independently of each other The most profound changes in natural philosophy did not occur until the seventeenth century It was only then that there came to be a union of the exact sciences and natural philosophy

To begin with the pre-Socratics, only meager fragmentary writings have been left to posterity As a result, they will forever remain a shadowy group, but this much is clear Greek philosophy was advanced because of pre-Socratic emphasis on rational analysis of problems and their avoidance of appeals to divine intervention for the explanation of natural phenomena As they studied the operations of the physical world, their objective was not to control nature but to understand and explain it Astronomy had reached its greatest height in Babylon and Assyria in the period approximately 500 B C , and that work was available to the Greeks Although Plato is known for his emphasis on a mathematically structured world, Plato did not believe that we could arrive at a precise description of the material world Thus he stressed reasoned abstract analysis rather than observation and reliance on sense reports Plato's analyses and explanations are largely teleological, given that he viewed the world as the work of divine intelligence Grant muses, "We may well ponder whether a tradition of serious natural philosophy could have been derived from Plato's approach to the world "

The idea of carrying out a systematic study of nature is one that the West owes to Aristotle Known as a careful and objective student of nature, he is regarded as the founder of biology itself Some of his classifications of plants and animals were not superseded until the nineteenth century Scholars today continue to marvel at his accuracy Speaking of Aristotle's treatise, *On the Generation of Animals*, the naturalist George Henry Lewes has written "It is an extraordinary production No ancient, and few modern, works equal it in comprehensiveness of detail and profound speculative insight " Aristotle is also acknowledged to be the inventor of formal syllogistic logic As Grant notes, Aristotle constructed a system of the cosmos that endured for almost two thousand years in three different civilizations and cultures

Differentiating among natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics, Aristotle identifies the proper object of each Natural philosophy, or what we today call physics, has as its proper object bodies that undergo change and motion Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *De Anima* *Politics*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are still introductory texts studied by students throughout the West The tradition of writing commentaries on Aristotle's works began immediately after their recovery and cataloging by Andronicus of Rhodes We have some that date to about the middle of the first century B C Most of the commentaries in late antiquity were written by Neoplatonists, notably by Alexander of Aprodisias, Themistius, John Philoponus, and Simplicius When the Roman Emperor Justinian in 520 A D closed the Neoplatonic school in Athens to strike a blow against paganism, scholars, including Simplicius, moved eastward The story of how Aristotle entered the Islamic world is told in Grant's chapter 4, "Islam and the Eastward Shift of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy" The final stage of Aristotelian translations occurred in Baghdad between 900 and 1220 A D In the final phase the translations were usually revisions of older translations. When the process was completed, there were Arabic versions of all of Aristotle's works on logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics The reception of natural philosophy in Islam is a story in itself and illustrates a cultural divide between Islam and the West and its implications for the growth of science

Grant offers extended discussions of the work of al-Kindi, al-Razi, al-Farabi, ibn Sina, and ibn Rushd, and goes on to describe the suspicion and often outright hostility accorded the natural philosophers within Islam To say the least, they were not popular because they employed logic and natural philosophy in the search of truth for its own sake quite apart from their theological commitment Given their emphasis on reason and logical argumentation, they made the proponents of traditional theology look old fashioned and unsure of themselves The philosophers were careful not to rile the religious authorities, but as a result of their disfavor, natural philosophy never took root in Islam

Grant tells us "Aristotle's natural philosophy and Greek science generally did not begin to enter Western Europe until the middle of the twelfth century Before that time only a minuscule part of Greek science and natural philosophy was available in the West" There follow chapters on natural philosophy before and after the Latin translations and one illuminating chapter on the form and content of late medieval natural philosophy Grant addresses at chapter length the relations between natural philosophy and theology and moves the story to an account of the transformation of medieval philosophy from the early modern period to the end of the nineteenth century

A brief review can only intimate the richness of this volume Grant's encyclopedic knowledge, remarkable in itself, is complemented by a lifetime of scholarship that makes him a worthy guide to a fascinating history It is perhaps not out of place to say that this book would make an excellent text for an upper-division college course in philosophy — Jude P Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*

HELD, Barbara *Psychology's Interpretive Turn* Washington, D C American Psychological Association, 2007 xi + 415 pp Cloth, $79 95—It is not common in today's intellectual climate to find psychologists even engaging the philosophical issues of realism–antirealism, let alone doing so with competence and analytical discipline Barbara Held has provided in this volume a well-researched and carefully argued critique of postmodernist, antiobjectivist conjectures, with her principle focus on the influential application of these conjectures to psychology

The book is partitioned into four major parts and ten chapters, concluding with a spirited and compelling defense of rational agency, a defense indebted to the shamefully overlooked work of Edward Pols What Held makes clear is that the basic assumptions on which psychological classifications and therapies gain coherence are themselves objectivist Susan Haack's persistent attempts to make all this clear are fully acknowledged as Held concludes against seemingly moderate forms of "middle-ground" epistemologies

Against the currently enthusiastic embrace of Heideggerian hermeneutics, Held bravely records what should otherwise be obvious, namely, that the "hermeneutical circle" is, in Christopher Norris's apt phrasing, "viciously circular " Only by way of settled standards of argument, evidence, and confirmation can the hermeneutic project be launched and, once launched, the same standards are implicitly invoked in establishing whether the intended destination has been reached And on what basis was *that* the chosen destination? Indeed, significant features of personhood are captured or expressed in a narrative mode of explication but, as Held is prepared to affirm, nothing in this prevents truth itself from emerging Put another way, not all narratives are ontologically equal (*pace* Walter Middy)

There are places in this otherwise estimable treatise where too much is conceded to those who have taken the "interpretive turn " This is especially so in Held's brief discussion of the emotions, where it is claimed that the experience of joy requires that the experience be thus interpreted Attention might profitably have been paid to the substantial literature on cognitivist and noncognitivist theories of emotion Held grants (but needn't have) that "interpreting as joy" is logically necessary for there to be joy, and then goes on to note that, though necessary, this cognitive role is not sufficient (p 186)

Held is surely correct in emphasizing that the issues to which her book is devoted are not merely philosophical but rich in implications for life, for clinical practice, for the epistemic dispositions we bring to bear on the facts of experience The core issue can be traced to the pre-Socratics and would become a fixture in Plato's dialogues What confidence can we have in the epistemic claims we make regarding the external world and, for that matter, the internal world of thought and feeling? That life must proceed as if confidence is warranted offers no serious rebuttal to antirealists, relativists, and skeptics That life successfully proceeds on the basis of such confidence is to beg the question unless, of course, a very thorough defense of pragmatism is first developed

At the end of the day, the constant background of lived life is chiefly in the form of meanings, and it is thus vital that we have a grasp of what Hilary Putnam had in mind in giving his essay the title, "The meaning of

'meaning'" Putnam concluded in that influential work that meaning "ain't in the head," on the basis of the potable fluids found on Earth and on Twin Earth Though not discussing Putnam's thesis directly, Held would urge upon the uncommitted the recognition that it is only by way of an objectivist ontology that one can distinguish between H_2O and XYZ, between water and t-water The lesson she would teach those who keep turning discursively is how to avoid booking rooms in the Tower of Babel The safe way is to acknowledge that it is the objective world of reality itself that then must be coded in such meaning-patterns as to permit analysis, discussion, and debate Absent the objective world of reality, there is simply nothing to debate

If psychologists are not to drop everything and begin to examine the progress philosophers have made in these areas, they are well served by Held's critical synthesis of important phases of the overall project — Daniel N Robinson, *Oxford University*

KUCZYNZKI, John-Michael *Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind* Amsterdam John Benjamin, 2007 524 pp Cloth, $155 00—This is the latest volume in a series published under the heading, "Advances in Consciousness Research," intended to promote interdisciplinary discourse on the nature of mind and mental life The author of the volume under review provides an exemplary two-paragraph introduction to a work that is otherwise detailed, technical, and conceptually challenging What he seeks to make clear is that two influential contributions to philosophy of mind—content-externalism and the computational theory of mind—are both based on mutually aggravating conceptual mistakes Defended at the expense of these is a version of semantic externalism Where content externalism is a theory regarding what is thought, semantic externalism is a theory about what is meant as the given narrator provides first-person reports

In the first chapter, Kuczynski honors the intuitions of the uncommitted by noting that Earth and Twin Earth residents do not, alas, live parallel lives It is only insofar as Putnam-like thought experiments are given every benefit of doubt that the arguments of content externalism obtain epistemological legs Once it is thus able to make progress, it soon derives support from Fodor-like defenses of conceptual atomism with its causal theory of concepts The match is a good one, but the two theses are thus joined in their vulnerabilities In the process of his careful, even scrupulous analysis of arguments for and against these main positions and others derived from them, Kuczynski weaves his own defenses of content internalism Along the way there are entirely illuminating analyses of descriptivism and the mutually supporting arguments of Frege, Dummett, and Kripke, a sprightly revival of Russell's essentially internalist position on sense-based concepts, a remarkably economical dismantling of Fodor's "simples" story of concepts, a systematic critique of cognitive theories of subpersonal mentation, a brave and durable insistence that "the cognitive maps embodied in one's percep-

tual experience have a fundamentally egocentric character" (p 120) In all, Kuczynski has constructed a powerful and plausible refutation of several of the ruling precepts in cognitive science, offering a sophisticated and informed alternative perspective One might have hoped that so informing a dissertation could be thumbed at half the price —Daniel N Robinson, *Oxford University*

LOUDEN, Robert B *The World We Want How and Why the Ideals of the Enlightenment Still Elude Us* Oxford Oxford University Press, 2007 xiv + 324 pp Cloth, $65 00—Few historical periods are subject to such polarizing characterizations as the Enlightenment For postmodernists, the Enlightenment serves as a harbinger, an indication of modernity's teleological tendency toward the logic of totalization For others, it represents the sober-minded attempt of some of the best minds of the eighteenth century to inaugurate a new age in which the perfection of both man and the social order is achieved In this carefully researched study, Robert B Louden's goal is to offer "by no means a mere encomium to the Enlightenment," (p viii) nor is it to enable the promulgation of "caricatures of Enlightenment ideals" (p 7) Using the principle of psychological and historical realism, his goal is to "examine actual Enlightenment proposals for cultural and institutional change with the benefit of two centuries' hindsight" (p 7)

The book is divided into two parts Part I, "THEN," investigates the five fields that Louden believes constitute the Enlightenment intellectuals' "primary areas of concern" (p 9) A chapter is devoted to each of these fields Religion, Education, Economics, Politics, and International Relations Louden consistently demonstrates throughout that Enlightenment "reform efforts were motivated by moral rather than scientific concerns the goal was increased freedom and equality for all human beings" (p 4)

For example, Louden wishes to dispel any rumors that "the Enlightenment was fundamentally anti-religious" (p 15) By adopting a "unity thesis," Enlightenment intellectuals believed that divergent religious beliefs exhibited a commonality and were linked by a "thread graspable by unaided reason" (p 17) Some went even further and argued for a "common morality thesis"—that "beneath the different historical faiths there lies a shared morality" (p 22) Either way, the consensus was that "toleration [was] the true sign of genuine religiosity" (p 23), because, despite the commonality that may have supported the unity thesis, believers were still, epistemologically speaking, "companions in error" (p 24)

Part 2, "NOW," examines "the enormous gap that exists between Enlightenment ideals and current realities" (p 126) In this section, Louden develops three skeptical conclusions that are extremely relevant to our current historical–social milieu First, "there is insufficient evidence to support the widespread Enlightenment assumption that external institutional change leads to desired internal attitudinal change" (p 10) Second, "several of the means advocated by Enlightenment the-

orists to realize their ideals have not led to their predicted results" (p 10) Third, at present—due, in part, to a lack of moral transformation via institutional change—"insufficient numbers of people are strongly committed to Enlightenment ideals such as peace, elimination of poverty, reduction of inequality, and an engaged civic culture" (p 10)

The first of these skeptical conclusions is the most revealing Louden argues persuasively that "the empirical evidence shows that the connection between institutional development and internal moral development is not as straightforward as Enlightenment intellectuals assumed" (p 129) In religion, for example, the unity and morality theses have been superseded by a religion whose "message at present is predominantly antiuniversalist and exclusionist" (p 141) When the focus shifts to education, despite modernity's achievement of "a schooled world," education today is increasingly valued not for its intellectual and moral transformational possibilities but "merely as a *Brotstudium*" (p 149) In short, "economic globalization" has become a common term in the contemporary lexicon, but there is little evidence of a corresponding "moral globalization "

Part 2 concludes with a brief discussion of various "hope strategies " The type of hope that Louden is advocating is not a naive optimism but a "hope after horror [that] needs to be a more sober and chastened hope, a hope that does not want to get fooled again a vigilant hope" (p 215) Here Louden briefly introduces a "possibility argument" centered on a nonrigid notion of human possibility Are the Enlightenment ideals "humanly feasible" (p 216)? Louden then concludes with a Kantian discussion of "duty" and "moral faith " We ought to "seek to realize Enlightenment aspirations not as optional projects , but as part of the comprehensive duty to promote the highest good" (p 219) Moral faith possibilizes the ethically binding dimension of our duty because "ought implies can" (p 221) This is a "stronger sense of possibility" than was presented earlier as the possibility argument [because] realizing the highest good is possible only on the assumption that there is a God who will assist us" (pp 221–2)

There is much interesting and supportive detail here which the reviewer simply does not have the space to address, ranging from historical and international statistics on poverty to the internal politics of the U N Security Council The author should be applauded for the manner in which he is able to successfully combine philosophical investigation with empirical research The frequent citing of original sources especially those of Kant, as well as a rich collection of endnotes, make this volume an important contribution to Early Modern Philosophy and Enlightenment studies But perhaps most important, this is a text that should resonate with any member of the educated citizenry who perceives the discrepancy between Enlightenment ideals and current realities and is deeply troubled by the current state of our world —David W Rodick, *Boston College*

MAIMONIDES, Moses *Medical Aphorisms Treatises 6–9* Edited and translated by Gerrit Bos Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 2007 250 pp Cloth, $39 95—Three names have long dominated the history of Western medicine—Hippocrates, Galen, and Maimonides Each was revered for his clinical acumen as practitioner and teacher Each authored seminal works in the ethics and theory of medicine All three, however, were best known to generations of practitioners for their aphorisms, those pithy pearls of clinical wisdom that encapsulated what they had learned by careful observations at the bedsides of many patients

The founder of this aphoristic tradition was Hippocrates (c 460–377 B C E), the putative "father" of medicine His terse maxims of diagnosis and prognosis were passed on to his students, colleagues, and posterity For centuries these were the physicians' textbook and *vade mecum* Many remain startlingly accurate and prescient even in this era of scientific medicine In later centuries, they were the subject of extensive commentary

One of the most prominent of these commentators was Galen of Pergamum (c 129–199) who treated Hippocrates' aphorisms with quasi-canonical reverence Maimonides (1125–1204), the great medieval Jewish physician, continued the tradition, offering his commentary which was respectful but more critical than Galen's Maimonides pointed out errors and took Galen to task for what he considered Galen's overly generous treatment of contradictions in the Hippocratic text

Under auspices of the Middle Eastern text initiative of the Brigham Young University, an English–Arabic parallel edition of Maimonides commentary is in the process of editing and translation by Gerrit Bos Five volumes are planned, one of which, covering treatises 1–5, is already in print The current volume 2 includes treatises 6–9 Three more volumes are contemplated

The two volumes of commentary now extant confirm Maimonides reputation as an astute clinician, scholar, and critic Even in today's world of clinical science, many of his aphorisms are uncannily accurate and prescient Others are manifestly off the mark and some are more fanciful than astute Even today, the most respected physicians will cherish aphoristic pearls of their own Their students, like the students of Hippocrates, Galen, and Maimonides still carry these choice clinical morsels into their own practices

There is much value in these commentaries of Maimonides for what they reveal of one of the greatest clinicians of antiquity, of what constituted clinical wisdom in his time and how much can be learned by close observation and creative reflection on matters medical —Edmund Pellegrino, *Georgetown University*

MITJASHIN, Alexander *The World and Language, The Ontology for Natural Language* Lanham, Md University Press of America, 2007 xi + 147 pp Paper, $25 00—This is an unusual book, possibly a ground-breaking

book, for the author argues that logic and mathematics both ultimately derive from "the Grammar" of natural language (p xi) It is also, not surprisingly, a difficult book, especially for anyone not accustomed to philosophize in terms of, say, Russell's theory of types, Peano's axioms, or Brouwer's intuitionism It also cannot be denied that the text is partially written in nonstandard English, which increases the difficulty of following the argument For all these reasons the reviewer cautions the reader, and apologizes to the author, if some of the following observations are unwittingly off the mark

As I said, the author argues that mathematics, logic, and even ontology derive from the Grammar of natural language For example "To think logically means to practice the Grammar—the Grammar is first, then logic" (p 62), and again "A thing is identical to itself because it is expressed in language and language consists of the distinct terms (or signs)' (p 53) And in the concluding sentence of the whole essay "It is possible to find a sense in which a word is prior to a thing just because signs are part of the world of such entities" (p 143)

The author argues that the language that describes the world need not take the form of propositions For the terms making up the propositions are still more primitive He compares them to the points in a Euclidean manifold, and says that this concept is Wittgensteinian The Grammar of natural language is the connection of its terms, but once a term is used in an expression, that connection is afterward inseparable from the term Thus in natural language it is never really possible to reiterate the selfsame term, and in that sense he calls natural language "non-linear" Thus he can state, "We shall never utter what we have uttered," and that statement is taken to be uncontroversial (p 61) The contrasting view, which he calls "Platonism," is "that the words of language, or notions, strictly stand for entities" or universals which cannot be affected by grammatical connections (p 14)

After working out the implications of considering language as primarily a connection of distinct terms, the author concludes that the law of contradiction, which like other laws is taken to derive from the structure of natural language, is inevitably violated by language itself since it destroys the distinctness of its terms This is "the dilemma" of language The author gives an argument that one cannot evade the dilemma by distinguishing different sorts of existence (the "metaphysical" solution, p 94) Instead we must adopt the "ontological" solution, which consists in leaving language altogether! It is impossible here to restate his argument, but it concludes with the following Delphic assertions "We may say that we can assume that language is such that it is able to designate something which is iterated just because *there is really nothing that is iterated* Language is such that iterations have other meaning than what is iterated because the world is such that it can stand no iterations Language may be assumed to have no iterations because the world may not have any iterations" And "Instead of assuming that language consists of the distinct terms, we assume that the world consists of distinct entities" (pp 95–6, author's italics) This leads him to an inferred realism, but one of entities scattered as in a rubbish heap

Though the above remarks have been narrowly focused, the ambit of the book is much broader, as is apparent from the thirty-nine chapter headings which include "Iterations in Formal Arithmetic," "The Laws of Logic," "Wittgenstein's Language," "The Philosophical I," "The External World," "Realism Inferred," and "Entities in the Head " The book is complemented by a bibliography, a name index, and a (very slender) subject index The text would have been improved by better manuscript editing, including checking the accuracy of the references

If the author's arguments are sound, the book can constitute a considerable achievement The development of its argument is reminiscent of Plato's wrestling, in *Parmenides* and *Sophist,* with how the simple Forms of his earlier dialogues could possibly be related to one another, yet still be themselves Plato's own conclusions have seemed obscure to many scholars, Dr Mitjashin, right or wrong, argues in very good company —James W Felt, *Santa Clara University*

OLSON, Richard *Science and Scientism in Nineteenth-Century Europe* Champaign University of Illinois Press, 2008 ix + 349 pp Cloth, $80 00, paper, $27 00—Making a distinction between "science" and "scientism," Olson defines science as "a cultural institution characterized for each particular time and place by a set of activities and habits of the mind aimed at contributing to an organized, universally valid, and testable body of knowledge about phenomena " With that definition in mind, Olson then offers detailed discussions of several nineteenth-century traditions of natural science associated with a revival of Hippocratic approaches to medicine, with the term "positivism" in France, and the term "naturphilosophie" in Germany He subsequently explores some of the mechanism by which scientific ideas and attitudes became common intellectual currency within different segments of the population Sections on the "religion of humanity" follow There is a treatment of Saint-Simon's socialism, Auguste Comte's positivism, Kant's critical philosophy, and lesser treatises on Goethe, Schelling, and the German romanticism of the period The work of Fichte, Feuerbach, as well as that of Darwin, Mill, and Spencer come in for discussion

Olson is convinced that throughout the early years of the nineteenth century, every major tradition of natural science spawned efforts to extend scientific ideas, methods, practices, and attitudes to social and political issues of contemporary concern To provide one example, the analytic strategies associated with mechanics generally led to a presumption that society could be treated as an aggregate of individuals, with the result that it came to be assumed that the happiness of those individuals could be understood in terms of some kind of pain–pleasure calculus

Another example is taken from the field of medicine The presumed inherent equality of all human beings was challenged by medical studies Recognition of the division of labor, which had been so important for economic progress, now seemed grounded in the innate differences

among people rather than in the way they had been socialized Medical education came to be transformed when causal accounts of physiological phenomena and diseases in terms of mechanical and chemical causes were questioned because they proved to be of no value for therapeutics

Early chapters, entitled "Saint-Simonism and the Birth of Socialism" and "Auguste Comte and Positivism," offer a prelude to an insightful chapter five, wherein Olson accounts for the rise of materialism and its impact on religion and politics Much of his narrative is well known Kant, in robbing religion of its foundation in natural theology, not only deprived religion of the support of natural science but also deprived the material world of moral significance David Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach further undermined the legitimacy of Christianity Olson quotes Feuerbach, who claimed that the overarching purpose of his *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* was "to cancel above all the old cleavage between this side and the beyond in order that humanity might concentrate on itself, its world, and its present with all its heart and soul " Olson makes the link between "scientific materialism" and political liberalism Absent belief in God, immortality, and divine sanction, the traditional standards of morality are weakened, with consequences for the social order

Olson suggests that the success of materialism as an ideology is linked to the marvelous achievements of the physical sciences in the early nineteenth century "If the status of science had not been rapidly on the rise in Germany during the 1840s, the materialist appeal to scientific authority in the name of humanistic religion and liberal politics would have had little impact, but such was not the case " Olson is quick to point out that "the overwhelming majority of German scientists had certainly become fed up with religious and philosophical controversies and simply wanted to get on with their work without committing to any particular metaphysical or religious position They had no more use for the secular dogmatism of materialism than the religious dogmatism associated with Christian conservatives " Viewed from the perspective of those outside the sciences, the polemical zeal of the materialists often made it seem as if they spoke with the authority of the scientific community itself In a concluding chapter, Olson writes "The more radical thinkers, together with the German appetite for popular scientific writings, combined to make it seem to many sympathizers and opponents alike as if the scientific enterprise promoted both atheism and liberal [sic] to radical politics "

Olson comes to this study with considerable credentials He is the author of *Science and Religion, 1450–1900 From Copernicus to Darwin* and *Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750–1850 Foundations of the Victorian Scientific Style* among other authoritative works No brief review can do this book justice Suffice it to say that both the student and seasoned scholar will find his synthesis and insight compelling —Jude P Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*

PAWELSKI, James O *The Dynamic Individualism of William James* Albany State University of New York Press, 2007 xix + 185 pp Cloth, $60 00—While William James called himself a "rabid individualist," and scholars have generally agreed with that self-assessment, the precise meaning of the term has heretofore been largely unexammed Pawelski's project in this volume is to systematize the variety of presentations of individualism that are scattered throughout James's corpus This is no small task, for James's writings were published over a span of more than thirty years and represent a range of subject matter and contexts that might seem to defy collection In the first three chapters, Pawelski offers careful analysis of James's dispersed thinking on individualism, organized under three basic areas of his thought—social, psychological, and metaphysical In explicating the dimensions of individualism within each area, he also draws out some important yet problematic tensions Of particular note are the tensions between the earlier James's active, volitional individualism, which emphasizes the capacity of self-determination through personal choice and action, and the later James's passive, perceptual individualism, under which the self is fulfilled through receptive openness to and union with the wider, spiritual aspects of reality

Having noted these tensions, in chapter 4 Pawelski surveys the variety of interpretive methods that have emerged in the secondary literature In response to the vagueness, inconsistency, and apparent changes in James's thought, two basic camps have emerged The first camp takes the disconnectedness in his writings as a simple, fundamental fact Among those who argue for this position, some judge this character of James's writings to be accidental and attributable to a lack of mental clarity or perhaps to sheer carelessness (James's contemporary Charles Peirce is noted to have espoused this view) Others, still in this first camp, read the disconnectedness as not accidental but intentional, and indeed a virtue—the presentation of his thought is antisystematic and antirationalistic, and to be appreciated precisely as such

According to the second camp of interpreters, the disconnectedness is not an irremediable fact, rather, it is merely facial, with an inner coherence lying somewhere, perhaps very deep, below the surface Pawelski insightfully notes that these scholars "each suggest ways of understanding why the textual difficulties are present in James's work more than they do ways of resolving those difficulties" (p 99) They seek unity in his thinking by accounting for its disparate character variously—as a function of his consistent philosophical methodology of pragmatism, as tracking with his personal development and biography, and as the outgrowth of a fundamental dualism in his temperament Richard Gale prominently figures among those who take the last tact, and Pawelski devotes special attention to what he calls Gale's "Divided Self Thesis " According to the thesis, James's thinking reveals two irreducible personas, a "Promethean pragmatist" who is active and employs concepts as tools to maximizing his desire-satisfaction, and an "anti-Promethean mystic" who is passive and eschews concepts in favor of more authentic intimacy with immediate experience While Pawelski acknowledges the presence of these two personas in James's corpus, he

appeals to both textual evidence and the general Jamesian spirit of anti-intellectualism to argue, against Gale, that these pragmatist and mystic selves become more integrated in James's later thought

Pawelski's main contribution is what he calls the "Integration Thesis," introduced in chapter 4 and fleshed out in chapter 5, by which he argues that the tensions in James's thought are partly (but not fully) resolvable The key to such resolution lies in understanding the reflex action theory, a physiological model the influence of which is evident throughout James's career According to this theory, the nervous system is modeled dynamically as an arc, composed of three interrelated elements—sensory nerves, nerve centers, and motor nerves—which correspond to the activities of perception, conception, and volition As a dynamic system, each element is essential to the function of the others and to the system as a whole As such, the reflex action theory unites the active and the receptive aspects of the system Likewise, the model serves to integrate James's Promethean pragmatist and anti-Promethean mystic Pawelski supports this thesis by again considering the development of James's thought in the social, psychological, and metaphysical contexts The individualism of James is also compared and contrasted to that of Emerson and of Kierkegaard, and Pawelski offers a persuasive argument that James's variety outstrips the others insofar as it alone is "thoroughgoing and radical enough to maintain the irreducibility and primacy of the individual on the metaphysical level" (p 125)

Chapter 6 concludes the volume with a thoughtful consideration, in the Jamesian spirit, of certain compelling, pragmatist reasons for adopting the Integration Thesis Instead of keeping the two selves—the pragmatist and the mystic—divided, Pawelski argues that they ought to be united inasmuch as one who integrates them, as mutually enriching phases of a healthy life, may bear greater fruits of human flourishing

William James's thought is rich in both its breadth of subject matter and depth of detail, and this volume admirably does justice to that character In addition to offering a worthwhile interpretive thesis, Pawelski provides a helpful survey and critique of Jamesian scholarship Well-argued, carefully structured, and comprehensive in its coverage, this volume may serve as both a useful introduction for students and engaging reading for professionals —Elizabeth C Shaw, *Washington, D.C*

PERL, Eric D *Theophany The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite* Albany State University of New York Press, 2007 xi + 163 pp Cloth, n p —It has been some time since Neoplatonism has been seriously explored as a philosophy worthy of careful examination Deconstruction's onslaught on metaphysics has almost buried its importance in the history of metaphysical speculation Professor Perl's study of Dionysius the Aeropagite bids fair to restore this school of thought to its proper eminence Furthermore, given the fact that Derrida in his last days and even today other deconstructionists continue to discuss the

possibilities inherent in the apophatic tradition, renewed interest in this Hellenic and Christian tradition of thought is very likely

But there are more important reasons to be grateful for this exceptional, clear, well-organized, and penetrating study of Dionysius First, there is the obvious fact that this Hellenic–Christian tradition has much to say about how to speak about ultimate reality What Perl makes obvious is that there is a strong logic underlying the work of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Dionysius that dispels the notion that there is something extremely odd about this way of thinking—the separation of body and soul, the hypostases of intelligence and mind, and the "nonexistence" of evil Perl demonstrates how this way of thinking has deep roots in the Platonic tradition and continued its influence right into the High Middle Ages

In seven well-written chapters Perl discusses the Neoplatonic teachings of Dionysius on the tradition that God is "beyond being " And yet at the same time there are intelligible ways to approach the miraculous reality of this world within which we live and act What is paramount in this approach is that God is not to be thought of as a being at all Rather, God is a presence, an expression, and a manifestation of power The world we inhabit is a process within which the traces of divine causality can be limned in theophanies that have their own logic and order I would suggest that the work of Dionysius is truly revolutionary in that it is one of the very first formulations of a God of process His work also instructs us on how to understand, address, and interact with this strange and astonishing reality that is no being at all

To speak of being as theophanic is to take participation theory with utmost seriousness Theophany is the radical and continuing presence of God in the creatures of the world Unlike the causality we are accustomed to in our world of material mechanisms, causality in the world of Dionysius is through and through a direct, immediate, and continuing presence of God The relations between divinity and creatures are to be respected as always and everywhere internal The immanence of God is felt in the beauty of this world, in its goodness, and in its intelligibility What makes this world intelligible are the limits set on its processes This is the traditional Greek doctrine of the relation between the intelligible and the determinate To be is to be a limited manifestation of divine processive presence A creature is a *Logos*, constrained to be sure, but still an expression of divine power Within that structural whole dwells value, and to know anything in the temporal world demands that one know its value The ramifications of such a vision of nature for an earth threatened by global warming are obvious For Dionysius all knowing is a form of appreciation and therefore the act of "deeming" is the primal human activity In a world made through participation, the cause always remains within the effect The science of detecting, understanding, and elaborating such values and in our day protecting that glow of divinity is the root of all effective ecological action

What preserves the transcendence of God within such a philosophy? It is the simple fact that God is not a being at all The tendency to disregard the unspeakable gap between God and being is no flaw of human beings (as Heidegger would have it) Rather to harbor such an idea is a form of idol worship that compels humans to believe that what they can-

not know does not exist To quote Perl "the whole of reality is nothing but the differentiated presence of God" (p 31) This is a consequence of the doctrine of the good as overflowing presence that pours its power to be into every creature up to that limit which marks the finitude of being in that instance Similarly there is a continuum of knowing from the world of sense to the world of intelligible to the darkness of the mystical presence of that which both is and is not This remarkable work sees through that negativity and catches a glimpse of what the mystic experiences —Joseph Grange, *University of Southern Maine*

ROSEN, Stanley *Plato's* Republic *A Study* New Haven Yale University Press, 2005 viii + 423 pp Cloth, $45 00—As Stanley Rosen himself declares in the preface, his study of the *Republic* is intended, in part, to constitute a dialogue with his teacher, Leo Strauss This dialogue is conducted by Professor Rosen not without disputation His interpretation of the *Republic*, while in some way influenced by that of Strauss. is offered in disagreement with it and in an attempt to make up for what Rosen understands to be its lack of "technical detail on such crucial topics as the doctrine of ideas" (p vii) Given that this is the case it is useful in a review of Rosen's book to begin by calling to mind the broad outlines of Strauss's reading of the *Republic* as found in *The City and Man* (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1964)

In Strauss's view, the argument of the *Republic* reveals the essential heterogeneity between justice as it is in truth and justice as the city understands it It does so precisely through the attempt to unify them in the rule of philosophy over the city in speech The impossibility of the rule of philosophy brings to light the necessary difference between these two understandings of the just Political justice claims to provide for both the good of the whole or the common good and the good of the part or the individual The argument of the *Republic* shows, first, that for the city to realize a common good would require the institution of total communism which is possible only in abstraction from the body, yet the body and its needs lie at the foundation of the city It shows, second, that, apart from the philosopher, the city necessarily renders each part of the city or individual citizen unjust in making him serviceable for the city It shows, finally, that the philosopher can be made the ruling part of the city only in abstraction from eros, yet eros is the core of philosophy Political justice then is shown to be a necessary evil, and the truth of justice or philosophy to be good for a human being as such it is a good for the individual and, in a sense, the reality of the common good, though it is compatible with the utmost privacy and seems to enjoy a self-sufficiency that rivals the city's own The irreducible difference between these two understandings of the just gives the lie to the notion that there is an idea of justice in the sense in which this is ordinarily understood Rather, the reality of the idea of justice comes to light as the problem of justice, that is, the way in which these two heterogeneous

manifestations of the just are linked despite the necessity of their difference—for example, the evils of the city consequent upon the imperfection of its justice prove to be that without which the good of the life of philosophy could not come to be

The philosopher-king ruling over the city in speech is the Platonic image then for the attempt to combine the uncombinable and thereby eliminate all evils from human life Strauss's Plato shows that the good city or the city in speech, and with it the elimination of all evils, is impossible even in speech, and that if it were possible it would amount to the elimination of human life This impossibility, and the corollary notions of the necessary and the possible that are uncovered along with it, are, for Strauss, among the objects of intelligibility that the argument of the *Republic* reveals Though brought to light by the examination of the city, they are in accordance with the nature of things

For Professor Rosen, by contrast, this same impossibility is not primarily an object of cognition for the philosopher, but an object of desire The philosopher necessarily desires to extend philosophy to encompass the political not as a theoretical concern, but as a conquered realm he cannot help but wish to rule and attempt to do so either in deed (as did Plato in Syracuse) or through a writing, which has a "revolutionary" intent and serves as a "prophecy" for a new order (the *Republic* itself) The very prophecy of the new order, however, proves to be simultaneously the demonstration of the impossibility of the new order philosophy cannot rule as philosophy, but in the attempt must transform and debase itself into "ideology and tyranny" (pp 9, 20, 81, 229, 355, 396) In ruling, the justice of philosophy becomes injustice, its truth falsehood, and its knowledge manifest as useless in practice

For Professor Rosen, then, the aspirations of the philosopher meet with a tragic denouement, and the philosophical life is ultimately tragic or tragic-comic what the philosopher longs for is precisely his undoing Rosen, therefore, also disagrees with Strauss as to the relation of philosophy to poetry and particularly to the subgenres of dramatic poetry, comedy and tragedy Whereas Strauss insists that, though Plato's dialogues might initially appear close to tragic dramas, they are in fact closer to a kind of continuation of Aristophanic comedy by other means and finally transcend the limitations of tragedy and comedy altogether, Professor Rosen paints Platonic political philosophy in the colors of Sophocles' Oedipus

Accordingly Rosen must fall into disagreement with Strauss concerning Plato's account of the nature of the philosophic soul and the passion that animates it For Rosen the soul of the philosopher is divided against itself he "both desires and does not desire to rule" (pp 82, 166), he strives for knowledge of the eternal, namely, contemplation of the ideas, and so for a private life of peace and retirement, yet he simultaneously strives to bring about the triumph of truth and justice over falsehood and injustice, and so for a public life of political involvement Since the philosopher's desire for peace is at war with his desire to take up arms against falsehood and injustice, war trumps peace and "life is fundamentally war" (p 94) The philosopher's soul, as every human soul, is a "cave" in which "our own inner enactment of the dialectic of master and slave" is unceasingly played out (pp 161–3, 272–3) It would

seem that there can be no ascent from this "cave," since the philosopher cannot help but submit to the "compulsion of spirited reason" even in the face of his recognition of the impossibility of its ambitions Philosophical eros, which Professor Rosen appears to identify with "spirited reason" (pp 81–2, 229–30, 242, 284), is radically at odds with itself

For Strauss, however, the true opposition is not within the soul of the philosopher, but between, on the one hand, *thumos* or spiritedness (*the* political passion), its ambitions, its idealism, and the structure of soul of which it is the source, and, on the other hand, eros (the animating passion of the life of philosophy) Philosophical eros, Strauss argues, is at root apolitical and directed away from the transient world of politics and the limitations of the city toward the immortality that is associated with "participation in things that are unchanging in every respect" (pp 110, 125), the divine or natural things Philosophy, therefore, must be compelled to return to the city or "cave" and concern itself with the political or human things This compulsion or self-compulsion, however, is exercised not in the pursuit of rule, but in coming to know completely the "essence" of the city or the "limits" of the city in the interest of articulating with clarity the "question regarding the whole" (pp 29, 138) Socrates was compelled or compelled himself to turn to the city and the human things in the wake of the necessary failure of his attempt to give an account of the whole in terms of teleological cause, an account in which mind was said to rule all things for the best such that the good of the whole and the good of the part were unproblematically joined (*Phaedo* 97b–100a)

According to Strauss, then, Socratic political philosophy's concern with the city is ultimately in the interest of returning by way of indirection to the issue of the good or the whole Socratic "first philosophy" no longer attempts to grasp the whole directly, but rather ascends by way of partial knowledge of the parts and particularly of that part which is both closed and open to the whole—the city Socratic philosophy is, therefore, knowledge of ignorance or knowledge of the fundamental questions

For Professor Rosen, by contrast, Socrates' ascent is an ascent to the ideas, which are fundamentally objects not of a discursive apprehension, but of a noetic intuition that would seem to leave partial knowledge, at least of a single noetic object or idea, behind This leads Rosen to the conclusion that, in Plato's view, "genuine philosophers know the truth" (p 5) or transcend philosophy in the ascent to wisdom The ideas are for Rosen "the most serious element in Plato's philosophical teaching" (p 360) It is the ideas that point beyond merely political concerns of justice and rule, to the cosmological and ontological question of the relation between becoming and an unchanging, intelligible structure, that must somehow transcend and yet inform it if there is to be cognition, sense-perception, and discourse —Steven Berg, *Bellarmine University*

ROTHBART, Daniel *Philosophical Instruments Minds and Tools at Work* Champaign University of Illinois Press, 2007 xiv + 138 pp Cloth, $35 00—Rothbart believes that the introduction of scientific apparatus in the seventeenth century had important implications for philosophy, and that the highly sophisticated instruments introduced in the twentieth century have all the more important implications for it He says that "the twentieth- and twenty-first-century revolution in instrumental technologies demands its own standards of knowledge-inquiry as conceived in design plans for instruments and realized in laboratory studies" (p 2) "Design plans" is meant literally, and the book contains numerous figures depicting or reproducing various experimental apparatus This emphasis on apparatus and actual experiments shows, according to Rothbart, that "science-as-theory" should not be privileged in understanding knowledge He states that there is a "gap between laboratory researcher and detectable world [which] is bridged thorugh an indissoluble blend of apparatus and substance in the production of analytical symbols" (p 13) This statement suggests a dualism between man and nature that Rothbart criticizes in others, in particular Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F Craver, who distinguish between "entities and activities" (p 101) However, Rothbart's claim that beneath "the presence of entities and activities are the specimen's capacities" suggests a dualism of specimens and capacities Another dualism in Rothbart's views is suggested by his remark that "carpenters, machinists, and specialists in crafts gain extensive knowledge about the behavior of materials through the skilled use of tools," and that with "such knowledge, one's orientation to the physical world can be secured" (p 9), as if one's orientation to the world is not given by one's ordinary behavior such as walking, eating, and looking around

The book has seven chapters and an afterword "Science, Technology, and Philosophy," "Analogies of Design," "Testing Design Plans," "Icons of Design and Images of Art," "Microscopes, Machines, and Matter," "Atoms Easier than Ever Before," and "Specimens as Machines " In chapter 2, Rothbart defines analogy as "a resemblance between any two things," and finds its use widespread in science, Newton "explained the light spectrum through analogies to acoustics" (p 16) It is even more widespread than that Landscape architects look for analogies in the constructed world to reshape natural scapes, and ordinary problem solving relies on analogy In chapter 3, Rothbart emphasizes that scientists use "design plans" to give readers the impression that "they could reproduce the same processes and would get the same correspondence of concepts to perceptions" (p 31) In chapter 4, he claims that visual symbols are a kind of language with their own grammar "Visual literacy is required to decipher" what he calls "the hieroglyphics of pictorial symbols" (p 42) Although he provides some comments about how people perceive space in diagrams, no syntax or semantics is actually given for visual symbols Chapter 5 primarily concerns some seventeenth-century experiments He says that "[i]n their search for truth, natural philosophers were increasingly drawn to the shops of instrument makers," and that it was here that the "best natural philosophy could be learned from machinists who produced telescope and microscopes" (p 60) He relies on secondary sources and rarely gives references to the

primary sources Some of his claims seem extreme It is not true that "the new optical instruments functioned as surrogate sensory organs" (p 68), they enhanced the powers of sensory organs Similarly, to say that "[n]atural philosphers must look to machine shops for insight into the workings of the universe" is too strong Chapter 6 describes a number of experiments in twentieth-century microscopy

Rothbart's opening sentence, "The apparatus that generated a revolution in seventeenth-century science were known as philosophical instruments" (p 1), involves an equivocation In the seventeenth century, philosophy (*philosophia*) was tantamount to science (*scientia*) because philosophy was knowledge, systematic knowledge was philosophy, and natural science had not yet spun off from philosophy Isaac Newton was a professor of natural philosophy because of the absence of a sharp distinction between science and philosophy So it is not as obvious as Rothbart makes out that what they called "philosophical instruments" have important philosophical implications for us Thomas Hobbes did not think they even had implications for him I'll give him the last word "Every man that hath spare money, can be at the charge of making great moulds, and hiring workmen to grind glasses, so that they may have the best and greatest telescopes They can get engines made, and apply them to the stars, but they are never the more philosophers for all this not every one that brings from beyond the seas a new gin, or other jaunty device, is therefore a philosopher" (Thomas Hobbes, "The Reputation of Thomas Hobbes," in *English Works*, ed William Molesworth [London 1840], 4 437) —A P Martinich, *University of Texas at Austin*

STANFORD, P Kyle *Exceeding Our Grasp Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives* New York Oxford University Press, 2006 xiv + 234 pp Cloth, $55 00—"Should we really believe that our best scientific theories simply tell us how things stand in the various inaccessible domains of nature they purport to describe" (p 5)? According to explanationist defenses of scientific realism (namely, nothing other than realism makes sense of the profound success of science), yes According to Kyle Stanford's novel argument against a realist construal of science, no Stanford's tactic is to fuse two traditional objections to scientific realism the pessimistic induction over the history of science and the underdetermination thesis The former argues against realism using the preponderance of failed theories that were understood as successful at their time The latter seizes on the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives that also meet the strictures of an explanationist defense Through an examination of the purported difficulties facing these objections (for example, isolating genuine rather than contrived empirically equivalent alternatives), Stanford weaves together a new induction over the history of science that operates out of the situation of "recurrent, transient underdetermination" within scientific com-

munities, that is, not being able to conceive of viable alternatives Over time scientific theories are replaced by (very different) alternatives that are at least as well confirmed by the evidence available to support earlier theories The earlier theory was favored because no alternative had been conceived Once the alternative is articulated and further evidence is procured, it becomes better confirmed than the earlier theory, thereby effecting the replacement—but then is immediately subject to the same situation The history of science provides many reasons to believe that *present* scientists have not ruled out all relevant possibilities (unlike many cases of abductive reasoning in everyday life), and therefore the eliminative inference that licenses talking of *current* theories as approximately true should be resisted Differences between past and present theories are irrelevant to the problem of unconceived alternatives, which concerns theorists not theories Why think current individuals or communities are better able to explore the space of possible alternatives than those of the past?

The historical muscle behind this argument is Stanford's appraisal of the explanatory reasoning of Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann in the later nineteenth century regarding the nature of heredity and development For example, Darwin simply did not conceive of common cause explanations for inherited characteristics Instead of parental characteristics making a direct material or causal contribution (as in Darwin's theory of pangenesis), the appearance of a characteristic in both parent and offspring could be the result of a shared, underlying (transmitted) factor This alternative was a serious possibility given the evidence available at the time and was advocated by Darwin's cousin and regular correspondent, Francis Galton. Thus, a realist interpretation of pangenesis as approximately true was unwarranted Similar situations are demonstrated for Galton's stirp theory and Weismann's germ plasm theory—whole classes of alternatives remained unconceived Realist responses to this historical record and its implications for current theories, whether focused on the (lack of) maturity of past sciences, causal (or causal-descriptive hybrid) theories of reference, approximate truth, or selective confirmation of some components of past theories, all fail to blunt the difficulty in Stanford's estimation

Realists will object that if beliefs cannot be sorted into those confirmed by predictive and explanatory success in connection with specific evidence and those of a more mundane sort, then Stanford's position reduces to a form of general skepticism (the problem of unconceived alternatives in everyday eliminative inference) Stanford appeals to the need to recover the heterogeneity of scientific practice and recognizes that limning these differences is a formidable challenge But these differences also portend the selective confirmation of theory components (retrospectively and prospectively), thereby rescuing realism from the dilemma of unconceived alternatives Another difficulty pertains to how historical changes in scientific community structure transform the problem of unconceived alternatives This is germane because (following Stanford) it concentrates on theorists rather than theories, the dynamics of individual and social cognition under varying conditions must be considered

Does antirealism leave us without a workable understanding of science, especially the life sciences, which have an intuitive realist appeal? Most discussions of realism have concentrated on physics, where the mathematical representation of theoretical content facilitates the consideration of diverse empirically equivalent alternatives In biology, a form of realism about theoretical content seemingly undergirds the scientific discourse Recognizing that the reinterpretation or elimination of theoretical language with realist overtones is not a plausible option, Stanford begins advancing a new perspective on instrumentalism in the final chapter Although these positive components require much more elaboration, they routinely provoke further investigation Are instrumentalists more inclined to explore potentially fecund alternative conceptualizations rather than simply confirm and extend extant theories?

Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives While his instrumentalism may be resistible, there is no question that proponents of realism will have to regroup to successfully meet the challenge —Alan C Love, *University of Minnesota*

TANCREDI, Laurence *Hardwired Behavior, What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality* New York Cambridge University Press, 2005 240 pp Cloth, $28 99—Tancredi sets out in his own words to "examine the history of our general idea about morality, and its development through childhood, show how modern neuroscience research is shifting the focus to the brain as a physical organ shaping moral responses, and illustrate the outcome of defective brain wiring in the development of undesirable moral traits " In a final chapter, he paints a fantastic picture of a society 100 years from now in which, based on a change in paradigm from "mentalism" (that is, the mind as something invisible and intangible) to "physicalism" (that is, the brain as the source of moral behavior), the potential for political control to create a homogenized moral society he fears will once again rear its Orewellian head

Many neuroscientists who started out with the brain as the target of their curiosity, interest, research, and practice now see colleagues in psychology and psychiatry add the prefix "neuro-" to their areas of specialty and subspecialties

Indeed, the modern neurosciences, particularly those of chemistry, genetics, neurotransmission, and neuroimaging have contributed massively to our understanding of brain formation, maturation, function, injury, and, to a lesser extent, recovery after injury Tancredi finds a recent adaptation of MRI imaging—the functional MRI (fMRI)—of particular interest and, apparently, of particular credibility Autoregulation is the process by which the brain not only commands (demands and gets) a constant flow of blood, in both volume and velocity, across a wide spectrum of systemic blood pressures but also that within that constant supply to the entire organ, when measured within the brain,

there is enough surplus to permit the shifting of blood from less active areas to areas where more metabolic substrate is required to sustain the demand created by more active regions The brain actually regulates its own supply of nutrients in response to its own needs The fMRI is a technique whereby minute increases in blood flow to tiny areas of the brain, corresponding to the known general locations of specific nuclei, may be interpreted as increased neuronal activity of those nuclei Similarly, with decreased flow, the reverse is thought to be true

It has long since been established, however, that in pathological conditions, such as partial seizures in which one part of the brain is actually convulsing and in strokes in which part of the brain is actually "dead," the mechanism of autoregulation itself is often suspended or dysfunctional

Most studies using fMRI are based on anecdotal case reports and/or small-sample-sized case series reports Nonetheless, this technique and the numerous references made to published studies are a real asset to empiricists who are not concerned with and to nonscientists who are only marginally exposed to the classical methods of neuroepistomology And so far, so good There have not been any newly imaged centers of function that had not been known by classical neuroinvestigative methods

Tancredi also briefly describes two other processes of abiding interest to the neurobiologist, namely, selective myelinization and dendritic sprouting, both anatomical indicators of primary or recuperative learning In contrast to the sequence in which the subjects are taught in medical school—that is, anatomy first, then physiology—in most biological and engineering systems, function determines structure Most who studied a generation ago were taught that the nerve fibers with the thickest myelin sheaths conduct the fastest During the period of rapid brain growth and development, the increase in brain size from that of a small fist at birth to 95% of adult size when a person starts school in first grade is due to the deposition of the fatty substance myelin around the fibers connecting nerve cells already present at birth If myelin were distributed first to the most frequently stimulated fibers, then the most frequently used pathways would become facilitated (a pretty scary notion when you realize that most myelin is deployed before we even start formal education) Those that we avoid stimulating throughout a lifetime—pain pathways, for example—have the thinnest myelin coats and conduct very slowly It has been found that myelinization does continue into adult life, especially in higher brain centers

Dendritic sprouting is a process where by the dendrites, the receiving fibers of nerve cells, attempt and often succeed at growing new connections with previously unconnected or recently disconnected nearby stimulator fibers (axons) These are two of the mechanisms invoked to account for learning and the limited but definite improvement often seen in brain function after injury But so are all of the scientific processes cited in this well-referenced book, they reveal purported mechanisms by which human behavior may occur or indeed be monitored They ignore the possibility that there may be a mind, a spiritual compo-

nent, or an immaterial soul To the contrary, they are only helpful in explaining how the concrete brain works in support of the "abstract" but neither prove nor disprove the existence of the mind

For most of the major issues he outlines, Tancredi seems nonjudgmental He does speculate, however, that perhaps social order and morality exist only because of how the human brain is wired (the product of both nature and nurture) It must be said that the use of modern scientific tools to explain the various phenomena of brain function hardly justifies such a conclusion

Even in a prophetic and horrific last chapter, Tancredi presents both sides of the issue of legislation to regulate the treatment of criminals, who presumably are compelled to their antisocial behavior because of how their brains are wired, but this reader cannot tell which outcome of the proposed legislation he supports Tancredi is a forensic psychiatrist, a physician–attorney, and a clinical professor of psychiatry at New York University, and has consulted in dozens of cases involving a wide variety of psychiatric issues

This book may be recommended to the readers of this journal, philosophers who are interested in what some neuroscientists view as the possible outcome of their research —Gaeton Molinari, *George Washington University*

TANGUAY, Daniel *Leo Strauss An Intellectual Biography* Translated by Christopher Nadon New Haven Yale University Press, 2007 x + 272 pp Cloth, $30 00—Tanguay's comprehensive and penetrating book explores Strauss's approach to the theologico-political problem This most fundamental theme is "the expression of the eternal struggle between two antagonistic sects 'the adherents of philosophy' and 'the adherents of the Law'—each of whom claims to hold the solution to the problem of human happiness" (pp 8–9) Only a few of the strengths and complexities of this admirably translated book can be noted here.

Tanguay offers an intellectual biography in which Strauss's later works are repeatedly treated as refinements of earlier efforts Chapter 1 shows how Strauss reinvigorated the possibility of viewing orthodoxy as a fundamental way of life Young Strauss was preoccupied with examining whether "Spinoza's critique of religion, upon which all subsequent critiques of religion depend, succeeded in refuting orthodoxy on its own ground" (p 12, see also p 165 and contrast pp 166 and 197) Tanguay observes that "according to Strauss, [Spinoza] was unable to refute the position of a Calvin, who, taking an experience of the world based on faith as his point of departure, cast radical doubt on conclusions based on theory" (p 36, see, on Judaism's "intrinsic cognitive value," p 208, contrast p 165)

The first part of chapter 2 discusses Strauss's apparent identification, in *Philosophy and Law*, of contemplation with the aim of divine law, the second part culminates in a discussion of Strauss's "Farabian turn" (and

concomitant discovery of exotericism) The core claim characteristic of that turn is that happiness is available only to the philosopher Farabi's "definitive" solution appeared attractive "in Strauss' eyes, since it respects certain fundamental givens of the human condition as he [Strauss] understands it inequality, the necessity of law, the permanence of evil, the limited character of human knowledge, and the immutability of human nature " It is, however, only a partial solution since it does not "efface the original tension between Jerusalem and Athens" (pp 97–8) In the end, the "Farabian turn" becomes a "Farabian choice" (p 205)

Before providing a full presentation of that tension and thereby giving his reasons for the ultimate inadequacy of the "Farabian turn," Tanguay devotes a chapter to natural right, which is connected to the theologico-political problem by "sometimes indirect paths" (p 98) Modern natural right is related to the theologico-political problem partly because the modern break is characterized "essentially by anti-theological ire" (p 108, compare Strauss's more cautious formulation Machiavelli's project may have been "facilitated," not caused, by such ire *What is Political Philosophy?*, p 44) Additionally, if in a different direction, "revelation brought with it a vision of the best way of life which, in a new form, will become one of the foundations of modern democratic liberalism" (p 141) The latter fact remains obscured since the modern project attempts to dispose of the theologico-political problem altogether by discrediting any fundamental claims to the best life To reanimate the problem, Strauss had to reject the moderns' attempt to suppress it He did so through a return to classical political philosophy and its emphasis on the question of the best way to live as a philosopher or as a noble and good man Classical political philosophy's answer in favor of the philosopher, however, is based on "knowledge of human ends" and thus "remains within the natural order and is accessible to reason without divine aid " But, Tanguay argues, "if one introduces a supernatural end, the political life of the gentleman and the philosophic life can no longer be perceived as the highest fulfillments of man's essence" (p 141, compare p 131)

In his final chapter Tanguay provides a full formulation of the theologico-political problem and of what he sees as the problem's ultimate insolubility According to Tanguay, when "the philosopher privileges the experience of eros at the expense of the fear of God, he chooses one experience of the human soul among others " For Jerusalem "the experience of fear of God is the decisive experience," while "philosophy considers the awareness of the soul's eros to be the primary and essential experience" (p 190, compare p 191) Earlier, Tanguay had recognized that Strauss would not be completely satisfied with granting each side its own irreducible and untouchable experience, but he follows up this recognition with a discussion of natural theology and the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas, suggesting that, in order to understand and either support or reject the experience of fear of God, it is necessary to possess "a completed system of philosophy" (pp 183–9, compare pp 209–10) Since there is no such system, Tanguay can then questionably view the believer's experience as ultimately unassailable and find in Strauss "only a *weak* defense of philosophy, a zetetic defense," one based ulti-

mately on a decision, not a demonstration (p 209 and pp 147, 191, 201) —Svetozar Minkov, *Roosevelt University*

THOMASSON, Amie L *Ordinary Objects* New York Oxford University Press, 2007 xi + 240 pp Cloth, $55 00—Amie L Thomasson's defense of a commonsense ontology against eliminativist arguments that threaten to undermine belief in the reality of ordinary objects, such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, provides a significant contribution to the philosophy of language and metaphysics Noting the fact that eliminativist arguments have gained prominence over the past fifty years, and that little has been done to challenge them, Thomasson determines to fill this void in two ways by discussing the assumptions on which these arguments rest, and by demonstrating the compatibility between a commonsense ontology and a scientific ontology

To achieve these objectives, she takes into account different types of eliminativist arguments Chapters 1, 4, and 5 focus on problems relating to causal redundancy, anti-colocation, and ontological vagueness, respectively, while chapters 7, 8, and 9 perform a similar task with respect to special composition, rivalry with science, and parsimony Thomasson's analysis of these arguments reveals a remarkable resemblance among them By relying upon a limited number of interrelated claims about reference, analyticity, and modality, she is able to identify the problems behind these arguments and suggest a plausible alternative to them

After examining the flaws in the causal redundancy argument as a way of illustrating what is wrong with eliminativist arguments, Thomasson turns her attention to the explication and defense of analytic entailment, a key component of her argument in favor of ordinary objects Rejecting both Quine's notion of analyticity and causal theories of reference, she opts for the middle ground between these two positions and argues instead for a hybrid theory of reference Central to her theory of reference is the idea that analytic entailments imply that "general and singular nominative terms have certain sorts of frame-level conceptual content established by competent speakers" (p 29) Analytic entailments involve meanings and relations between meanings Without these meanings, it would be impossible to ground the reference of a term (for example, animal or material object) in empirical reality

A fundamental task of metaphysics, then, consists in sorting out, or disambiguating, the objects to which terms refer, so that perceptual experience, when it does occur, coheres with the categorical terms used to conceptualize it The successful disambiguation of terms, therefore, depends initially upon basic frame-level application conditions for the establishment of reference But since these conditions alone do not suffice to establish reference, Thomasson devotes her efforts to an analysis of the coapplication conditions, or rules, needed in order to complete the grounding process These conditions pertain to the terms that fix

the identity, persistence, and modality conditions of ordinary objects As in the case of application conditions, coapplication conditions are analytic in nature

On the basis of this understanding of analytic entailment, Thomasson is able to pinpoint the common flaws in eliminativist arguments Causal redundancy, anti-colocation, and parsimony arguments, for example, rest upon the mistaken notion that metaphysical principles, such as causality, no coincidence, and Occam's razor apply generally when, in fact, they are irrelevant to cases involving analytic entailments The key to avoiding eliminativist arguments is to embrace a hybrid theory that requires both analytic entailments and empirical fulfillment of the frame level application and coapplication conditions

Thomasson concludes the book by arguing in defense of a commonsense ontology on the basis of her theory of analytic entailment and providing her own insights into the nature and limits of metaphysics She also addresses objections to her theory, such as those regarding linguistic solutions to metaphysical problems and the specter of antirealism With respect to the former, she insists that her purpose in writing the book is to show that problems posed by eliminativism do not constitute a threat to a commonsense ontology but, rather, arise from misunderstandings embedded in language With respect to the latter, she contends that the conceptual content of analytic entailments refers not only to ordinary objects, such as sticks and stones, which exist independently of the mind, but also to objects that are mind-dependent, such as money, laws, and government

Thomasson's notion of a hybrid theory of analytic entailment, as lucid and coherent as it is in establishing a rational foundation for a common sense ontology, remains largely within the confines of a scientific worldview Problems associated with classical metaphysics such as time, the existence of God and the soul, the origin of the universe, and the ontological status of existence are beyond the range of this book, though it is possible to conceive of her metaphysics as leaving room for future consideration of these concerns from either a cultural or an aesthetic perspective Despite this constraint, *Ordinary Objects* is well worth reading because it sheds new light on how to preserve the credibility of familiar things —Marianne Djuth, *Canisius College*

TRUNDLE, Robert *A Theology of Science From Science to Ethics to an Ethical Politics* Boca Raton, Fla Brown Walker Press, 2007 xvii + 240 pp Paper, $25 95—The synopsis of this book promises moral grounds for "revitalized support of the traditional family" Given the book's title, I was somewhat cynical that a theological critique of modern science could deliver anything more than a religious, Scripture-based exhortation for the "traditional" family After reading just the Introduction, however, I had to admit, as the colloquialism expresses it, "I was schooled!"

This book is one of those exceptional works which is both challenging in its philosophical sophistication and edifying in its moral argumentation Trundle marshals his extensive familiarity with diverse philosophical areas for a full frontal sortie against positions defended by mainstream philosophy of science and its ideological allies in ethics and politics Since the late 1980s, there have been many works which have engaged the culture wars by decrying the closing of the American mind and the academic regime of illiberal education Those works tend to expose and lament the problems, but typically issue nothing more than a summons for a nostalgic revival of when times were good with great books, politically unadulterated science, and definite morality Trundle's approach, however, exposes and logically dismantles the problems, and then offers a strategy for correcting the course of science so that it can properly establish ethics and inform politics His strategy succeeds brilliantly, and does indeed demonstrate moral grounds for politically revitalizing the traditional family

The schema of Trundle's strategy can be articulated in seven steps In Step 1 he employs phenomenological analysis to secure epistemological realism He appeals to everyday experience in which we are always "directly conscious of things other than consciousness and indirectly aware of this consciousness" (p x) We are, then, "aware of our consciousness as not being either the things of which we are conscious or the thoughts we may have about them" (p x) This realization infuses a nonconceptual consciousness into our conceptual consciousness of reality, which allows for observation of reality that is not ineluctably theory-dependent

Trundle argues that under the influence of Kant and Hume, philosophy of science, as with Feyerabend, Kuhn, and even the "pseudo-realist" Popper, maintains that all observation is theory-dependent so that theories determine facts about nature, and how nature really is cannot bear on a theory's truth Truth becomes relative to theories in natural science, ethics, and politics Since reality itself is deemed as unknowable, the pursuit of truth is directed toward political models, and that pursuit is merely a quest for power Truth-criteria, which cannot be provided by a metaphysics of reality, are the ideological constructs of the "politically correct" positions which wield the most social and cultural power

Trundle's phenomenological realism sets up Step 2, which shows that the natural sciences actually presuppose the causal principle that all phenomena have causes, although the principle is not known to be true about reality He explains that the principle can be explicitly affirmed by getting beyond antirealism and recalling that the first principles of science are rooted in truths, which are expressible in ordinary language and observationally knowable through a nonconceptual consciousness of a causal continuity in the changing phenomena of reality

Step 3 asserts that a true causal principle strictly implies a First Cause, which Step 4 specifies as The Cause of Nature, or Nature's God In Step 5, Trundle defines this God (Cause) as an axiological condition so that science describes a psychobiological human nature that *is* as it

ought to be He reasons that it "is not possible for there to be a world in which fulfilling our psychobiological nature is deemed to be good when there is no normative Creator of human nature and Nature" (p 183)

Step 6 proceeds to deconstruct the Naturalistic Fallacy since the proof of Nature's God establishes that our nature *is* as it *ought* to be The dissolution of the Naturalistic Fallacy reclaims a naturalistic ethics which infers morally relevant prescriptions about how our nature ought to be fulfilled from the scientific descriptions of what our nature is as Trundle indicates about human fulfillment as health, "There must be, then, vices that impede health and virtues that fulfill it" (p 162) Finally, Step 7 references the essential mission of politics, which is to institutionalize the ethics in laws and traditions that prescribe scientifically verified healthy ways of fulfilling our nature

Trundle exemplifies his schema with abundant medical and social science evidence supporting the traditional family for the sake of human fulfillment He avers that such evidence should inform public policies, and "politically correct" constructionist theories about marriage and the family actually harm and do not nurture our nature His case for revitalizing the traditional family is made, and ideologies which insist that gender, marriage, and family have no significant basis in human psychobiology are rendered indefensible

This brief summary certainly does not do justice to Trundle's complex argumentation and philosophical erudition Because of its successful foray against the antirealist ideologies which dominate academia, his work not only deserves, but needs to be read Of course, some will be aggravated and dismiss it as an outmoded conservative platform, but to do so would only bespeak their misological replacement of truth with power —Tom Michaud, *Wheeling Jesuit University*

VON HILDEBRAND, Dietrich *The Heart An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity* South Bend, Ind St Augustine's Press, 2007 xx + 140 pp Cloth, $24 00—This book is the first volume to appear in the Dietrich von Hildebrand Legacy Project, whose mission is "to engage the contemporary world, both Christian and secular, by uncovering and disseminating the buried treasure of Dietrich von Hildebrand's thought and witness" (p ix) The work was originally published in 1965 as *The Sacred Heart* In the present introductory sections (including the preface by John Haldane, an explanation of the Legacy Project by John Henry Crosby, and Edmund Husserl's evaluation of von Hildebrand's doctoral dissertation, presented and translated by John F Crosby), the contributors make a good case for republishing it

The book has three parts (1) a philosophical/spiritual account of human affectivity, whose "center" is called the "heart", (2) a scriptural meditation on the Heart of Jesus, and (3) a meditation on the place of the human heart in our spiritual transformation in Christ

The first part is largely an effort to retrieve the place of affectivity in the philosophical understanding of the human person Von Hildebrand argues that from the ancients to the present, philosophy has largely discounted the role of the heart in the structure of human personality

He explains this oversight as the result of affectivity being detached from "the object which is its motive, that to which it meaningfully responds " Feelings are intrinsically "intentional"—intrinsically related to some person or object that gives rise to a certain emotion If the emotion is considered apart from its object, it looks like "something hollow, something without serious meaning" (pp 6–7) Cut off from their objects, affections do not have the intelligibility of knowing and willing This is especially problematic in the spiritual realm, for if religious feelings are considered apart from God as their object, they are "emptied of their real meaning and desubstantialized" (p 7) Ignoring the object of affectivity gives rise to various forms of "ungenuineness" in which "instead of focusing on the good which either affects us or which motivates an affective response, one reverts to one's own feeling" (p 9)

The next several chapters involve an insightful phenomenological and psychological account of the various kinds of human affectivity. Once "intentionality" is restored to affectivity, and affectivity is understood in terms of its object, the heart can be seen as a spiritual faculty of the same dignity as reason and will, and sometimes surpassing them (p 68) So, von Hildebrand points out that "in love the totality of the person is drawn more thoroughly into the union established with the object than in knowledge" (p 37) His account of "tender affectivity" as distinct from "energized affectivity" (p 48) is reminiscent of Anna Terruwe's distinction between "pleasure appetites" and "utility appetites" (*Psychic Wholeness and Healing* [New York Alba House, 1981], p 16) which reflects Aquinas's distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetites (*Summa Theologiae* I, q 81, a 2)

The second section of the book comprises a series of engaging meditations on various passages of Scripture in which the Heart of Jesus is revealed through his words and actions These are interspersed with verses of the Litany of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and so form a sort of meditation

The third section of the book concerns our transformation in Christ It is critical of sentimental interpretations of devotion to the Sacred Heart since the "transformation of our ethos depends upon our having a true image of Christ and of his Sacred Heart As long as we project our own mediocrity and pettiness into the Sacred Heart and nourish ourselves with this image, we remain imprisoned in that mediocrity, instead of being transformed and elevated beyond ourselves Here we are faced with the great danger of adapting the revelation to our narrow outlook, of distorting it to such an extent that the challenge to be transformed is lost" (p 114)

Von Hildebrand concludes the book by noting that "in this book, the mystery of the Sacred Heart as such was our main theme" (p 126) That intent is also made clear in his original introduction, which the editor (perhaps wishing to emphasize von Hildebrand's philosophical account of human affectivity) has turned into an appendix Readers may want to

begin with the appendix to get an overview of the book's argument It suggests that devotion to the Sacred Heart (chapters 2 and 3) may be a providential remedy to certain philosophical and moral errors, but that this devotion that can be appreciated only if we first understand the human heart—"the grandeur and glory of true affectivity" (p 134)

The book remains a timely contribution to philosophy and Christian spirituality and, as the first fruit of the Legacy Project, can only be applauded —Michael Dodds, *Dominican School of Philosophy & Theology*

WILSON, Emily *The Death of Socrates* Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2007 240 pp Cloth, $19 95—Wilson's book is what she calls a "kind of archeology in the history of ideas" (p 4) Her focus is the West's various reactions to the death of Socrates why and how it has mattered, as much or more than his arguments, to so many subsequent philosophers, writers, artists, and other cultural figures Her broad study discusses the reflections and works of Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Lucian, the Cynics and Stoics, Christians of different eras, Milton, Montaigne, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hegel, Nietzsche, Popper, Stone, Brecht, Martin Luther King, Woody Allen, Derrida, Foucault, and others If it has any flaw, it is this breadth of scope, which has predictable limitations On the other hand, however, Wilson's synoptic account of the West's profound and continuing reaction to Socrates' death, both as a historical event—insofar as we can treat it as such, given our Platonically mediated access to Socrates' deathbed—and a controversial existential ideal, provides us with a much richer understanding of just how influential "the man who drank the hemlock" has been It was not his ideas, but the way he died, that made him immortal

In her very engaging introduction, where she describes Socrates as both a source of personal inspiration and distrust, Wilson situates her thesis against the positions of Alexander Nehamas and Mario Montuori On Nehamas's view, Socrates' death did not become culturally significant until the eighteenth century, when people first began to see it primarily as an image of the free thinker's critique of culture and struggle against intolerance And on Montuori's view, history had been universally kind to Socrates until the eighteenth century, he claims, Socrates had always been perceived as the good man wrongly killed Wilson challenges both of these positions As she says, "there have always been people who thought Socrates hardly died soon enough" (p 8), and Socrates' death, especially how and why he died, has always influenced the West's assessment of his historical and philosophical significance

One of the most interesting general ideas with which Wilson leaves her reader is that, while Socrates is often exalted as a secular martyr, a man who lived and died for reason and skepticism, individualism, and civic loyalty, it is also "possible not to admire Socrates" (p 2) Many of Socrates' commentators clearly did not, and for various reasons, as Wil-

son shows by examining literature and art from every major era of Western history Plato and Xenophon (but especially Plato) hoped to make Socrates into the new Greek ideal, a hero who died painlessly in prison, rather than courageously on the battlefield, promoting "self-care" rather than imperial expansion and glory But beginning at Socrates' trial, and continuing to the present day, the West's reception of this Socratic ideal has been anything but universally kind to Socrates

The Romans wondered whether Socrates was merely an irrelevant and unmanly "chatterbox," an antidemocratic political threat, or an existential and moral hero who could provide them with a model of how best to live and die The early Christians, who compared Socrates' death to that of Jesus, did not respect Socrates' painless and faithless death, and they used his supposedly inferior demise as the lynchpin in their arguments about the relative merits of Christian and pagan morality This is clearest in the case of Tertullian, who appropriates the imagery of Plato's *Phaedo* and argues that it is "the Christians, not the pagan Socrates, who die in a truly 'Socratic' manner" (p 147) The Enlightenment rationalists were divided between treating Socrates as (1) their ancient precursor, insofar as he rejected traditional mythology and claimed to rely on reason for moral guidance, and (2) a protofanatic, insofar as he trusted his *daimon* as his ultimate intellectual and moral authority After the Enlightenment, thanks in large part to Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Socrates' trial becomes more important than his death On Hegel's view, "the Athenian jury destroyed Socrates, but Socrates even more thoroughly destroyed the Athenian culture in which he had been born," because he introduced subjective judgment in ethical deliberation (p 195)

Wilson concludes by wondering why twenty-first-century culture has lost interest in Socrates' death, or only reflects on it in a superficial and simplified guise She suggests that it might be a symptom of our increasing discomfort with death in general, and she argues that we can benefit from reflecting on why the death of Socrates mattered so much more in the past Indeed, she even suggests that such reflections "can change your life" (p 214) we can learn from our ancestors' interest in dying well While Wilson's thesis will be of interest to other scholars insofar as it usefully corrects the mistaken assumptions of others, *The Death of Socrates* will primarily interest undergraduates and general readers with no prior background or training in philosophy or the classics —Mark Ralkowski, *University of New Mexico*

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Edith Stein A Life Unveiled and Veiled, JOYCE A BERKMAN

Drawing on diverse first-person documents, philosophical writings, and historical scholarship, this bio-historical introduction to Edith Stein examines her crucial life choices and philosophical creativity within the framework of her formative personal and historical circumstances Drawn deeply to unravel the mysteries of life that she prized as a fertile hidden darkness, Stein deliberately disclosed and concealed her inner tumult and reflections This essay argues that the axis of her life was her agonizing struggle—rife with ambiguity, confusion, contradiction, and luminous clarity—to redefine and reconstellate her various selves as a highly educated woman, Jew, German, Catholic convert, philosopher, mystic, educator, nun, citizen, friend, and family member At the heart of her striving for psychological coherence was her unquenchable curiosity, her search for complex truth, her sustained optimistic belief in human agency and empathic potential, her longing to help create a better world, and, after World War I, her invincible faith in God

Thinking Community and the State from Within, ANTONIO CALCAGNO

Stein describes the peculiar mental life of the community as a *Gemeinschaftserlebnis* or lived experience of the community Such an experience is marked by a certain form of consciousness insofar as one knows that one is dwelling with and for the other (*miteinander und füreinander*) at varying degrees of intensity Furthermore, one experiences solidarity as one dwells within the experience of the other and vice versa Two central problems arise with this phenomenological description First, one wonders whether the doctrine of empathy itself can account for these higher social mental states without necessarily arguing for a specific form of consciousness that is particular to community Second, the question arises as to why community is described as being accompanied by a peculiar mental state, whereas other

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review* We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed

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social structures like the mass, society, and the state are not described in this way This article has as its focus these two questions

Edith Stein's Theory of the Person in her Munster Years (1932–33), BEATE BECKMANN-ZOLLER

The new critical edition of Stein's lectures on philosophical and theological anthropology makes it possible to further research her theory of the person as developed during her middle period in Munster, that is, between 1932 and 1933 Her project revolves around the anthropological foundations of a Catholic pedagogy This phase of her work is marked by various debates On one hand, she attempts to bring the intellectual legacy of Husserl and phenomenology into dialogue with Thomas Aquinas and other scholastic thinkers On the other hand, she confronts the ideas and spirit of National Socialism with her Catholic faith Stein's Munster phenomenological method contrasts with Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, she develops an "eidetic psychology within a universal ontology " In her "somatological" anthropology, the human being appears as a unity of lived body, soul, and mind As a person, the human being is investigated as species, double species (man–woman), individual, as having a communal essence (outside the concept of race), and, ultimately, as a seeker of God Stein examines the freedom of human beings, which lies between the givens of nature and grace, as well as the tension between knowledge and faith In the final section of this paper, the author discusses Stein's position over against contemporary deconstructivist feminism

A Nothing That Is Edith Stein on Being Without Essence, WALTER REDMOND

St Thomas Aquinas has been considered a *kairos* in intellectual history for seeing God's essence as being Martin Heidegger criticized philosophers for representing being as a be-ing and identifying it with God, and Jean-Luc Marion speaks of "God without being " In her *Potency and Act* Edith Stein introduced the category of being without essence, but such being is not God but "the opposite " For St Augustine sin was an approach to nonbeing, and Stein saw it leading to a "displacement into nonbeing," to an "annihilation" where only a "null being" is retained This eschatological reflection is an intriguing aspect of her "fusion" of scholasticism and phenomenology

Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence, SARAH BORDEN SHARKEY

In her later philosophical writings, Stein works to synthesize the medieval scholastic tradition and contemporary phenomenology Stein draws heavily from Thomas Aquinas's work so that the prevalence of positive references to Thomas has led many to read Stein as a Thomist On critical questions regarding being and essence, however, Stein is not a Thomist In addition to mental and actual being, she also affirms essential being, which is properly the being of intelligibilities as well as potencies Essential being is

never separate from an entity with either mental or actual being, but it is a distinct type of being In this essay, the author attempts to contrast briefly Stein's account of being and essence with Thomas's position and to bring out the way in which Stein's affirmation of essential being leads her in a more Scotist than Thomist direction, at least on questions related to essences and universals

Edith Stein's Proof for the Existence of God from Consciousness, KARL SCHUDT

The author examines Edith Stein's argument for the existence of God found in *Finite and Eternal Being* Although largely Thomistic in its structure, the proof is unique in its details, starting with the life of the ego (*Ichleben*) and ascending to the being of God The ego is shown to be contingent in its being as well as in the meaning-content through which it lives Stein argues that this dependent being cannot be accounted for without a being that does not need to receive its being, namely, God She then turns to the felt security of being as a counter to Heideggerian *Angst* as a revelatory mood, arguing that security puts us into contact with divine being She concludes by admitting that proofs rarely convince because of the infinite distance between creature and creator, but concedes to them a role, nonetheless, in shrinking the distance between belief and unbelief

Artistic Truth and the True Self in Edith Stein, TERRENCE C WRIGHT

This paper explores Stein's treatment of truth and art as a way of approaching her philosophy of the self Stein argues that one can distinguish between the truth of what something is and the truth of what something ought to be She maintains that the work of art helps us to understand this distinction because it can serve as a revelation of the truth of what something is, but the work of art succeeds only when it also reflects what its subject ought to be Stein makes an analogous distinction regarding the self as it is and as it ought to be In her anthropology she argues that human beings are individuated not only by matter but also by form and that understanding our individuating form is the key to becoming the person we ought to be Stein develops the theory that persons are called to be their true selves through their relationship to the divine The paper argues that for Stein art and life are related in such a way that striving to be one's true self transforms one's life into a work of art

Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein The Question of the Human Subject, ANGELA ALES BELLO

The goal of this article is to analyze the way in which Edith Stein describes the human subject throughout her research, including her phenomenological phase and the period of her Christian philosophy In order to do this, the author traces essential moments in Husserl's philosophy, showing both Stein's reliance upon Husserl and her originality Both thinkers believe

that an analysis of the human being can be carried out by examining consciousness and its lived experiences Through such an examination Stein arrives at the same conclusion as Husserl, namely, that the human subject is formed of body, psyche, and spirit (*Geist*) Stein's originality consists in a further development of the complexity of the human being She maps this out, providing detailed analyses of the I, the soul, the spirit, and, ultimately, the person She makes use of medieval philosophical anthropology, including that of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo

Toward the Subjectivity of the Human Person Edith Stein's Contribution to the Theory of Identity, PETER J. SCHULZ

Edith Stein's work revolves around one central question, namely, the identity of the person Discussions of this topic are already present in Stein's dissertation The author examines her theory of identity, developed throughout her work and maturing in her magnum opus, *Finite and Eternal Being*, in three stages, each of which is historically relevant and original First, Stein's development of the question is examined phenomenologically, focusing on Stein's early work Second, the author shows how Stein takes her early phenomenological positions concerning the nature of the human person and combines them with Greek and medieval insights into ontology Here the author focuses on *Finite and Eternal Being* Finally, the author concentrates on the meaning and value of Stein's theory of identity as it contributes to a theory of the person in connection with Greek and medieval metaphysics, and a phenomenological philosophy of consciousness Together, the three stages of the essay demonstrate Stein's systematic contribution toward a theory of personal identity, one of the most difficult problems of philosophy

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AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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When Did the Modern Subject Emerge? ALAIN DE LIBERA

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger's account of the "modern," that is, the "Cartesian," "subject " It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some "thing" that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (*nous*, *mens*) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) ones, developed in connection with such problems as that of the two wills in the incarnate Christ Starting with Nietzsche's criticism of the "superstition of logicians" (the belief that "the subject *I* is the condition of the predicate *think*") and Peter Strawson's question in *Individuals* ("Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?"), the article discusses Peter Olivi's and Thomas Aquinas's treatments of the problem, as well

as the principle invoked to resolve it *actiones sunt suppositorum*, "actions belong to subjects" Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger's notion of "subjecticity" and Armstrong's "attribute-theory" in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the self

A Change in Thomas Aquinas's Theory of the Will Solutions to a Long-Standing Problem, YUL KIM

The idea that St Thomas's theory of the will changed from an Aristotelian stage to a voluntaristic stage, which was first proposed by Lottin in the 1920s, is still accepted by many scholars despite some criticisms This paper criticizes Lottin's interpretation and elucidates the precise meaning of the change in Thomas's theory of the will The author's method of criticism is to examine closely the indications of the change on which Lottin and his followers have insisted He thinks these indications are an effect of Thomas expanding his understanding of the structure of the motion of the will In conclusion, the change in Thomas's theory does not involve a fundamental shift in his thinking, but only an elaboration of his analysis of the will's act and of his proof of the freedom of the will

The Sustainability of Nietzsche's Will to Affirmation, JAMES McGUIRK

The article discusses the positive aspect of Nietzsche's thought This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence "as it is" In this regard, the author draws especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose *Nietzsche and Philosophy* remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche's thought In the second part of the paper, however, he argues that the "higher morality" generated by this position is essentially "otherless" While this critique is not in itself devastating, the author goes on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche's thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed

Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers, DERMOT MORAN

Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? This paper examines attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with neo-Thomism), and also considers the influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made transcendence an explicit theme of his writing The author argues that Husserl does recognize the essential experience of transcendence

within immanence, even the idea of a physical thing has "dimensions of infinity" included within it Similarly, Husserl asserts profoundly that every "outside" is what it is only as understood from the inside Jaspers too makes the experience of transcendence central to human existence, it is the very measure of my own depth For Edith Stein, everything temporal points toward the timeless structural ground which makes it what it is Transcendence is an intrinsic part of being itself Furthermore, the very lack of self-sufficiency of my own self shows that the self requires a ground outside itself, in the transcendent There is strong convergence between the three thinkers studied on the concept of transcendence, which is indeed a central, if largely unacknowledged, concept in phenomenology both in Husserl and his followers (Stein), but also, through Jaspers, in Heidegger

On a Common and Unmooted (Neo-)Platonic Source for the Husserlian and Augustinian Conceptions of Memory A Response to Michael R Kelly, ROGER WASSERMAN

Although Michael Kelly, in his article, "On the Mind's Pronouncement of Time" (*Proceedings of the ACPA* 78 [2005] 247–62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, the author argues that the similarity does not lie where Kelly thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl's early period Instead, the author locates the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which he finds expressed at *Parmenides* 151e–152e This essay shows how the Neoplatonic conception of time, which the author claims inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experiment from 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as "trapped" in the present The point is a significant one if, as the author concludes, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completed succession of nows, eternally fixed

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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The Road to Kazanistan, LENN GOODMAN

The article examines the theories of John Rawls on political philosophy, which are premised on the social contract theory and on the art of democratic statesmanship It criticizes his theories such as the redistribution theory, and how he perceived the social contract of John Locke Under the social contract theory, people form an organization where they surrender certain extent of their rights to the authority, so that the authority can protect

them from outside threat Corollary to the social contract theory are justice and fairness among the members of the society, in which Rawls's argument of political systems is partly based Hanna Pitkin interposed that the proper question about social contract theory is on what the people ought to consent and not what the people have consented

Recent Work on Free Will and Science, ALFRED R MELE

The article examines the line of argument regarding the role of consciousness and free will in human behavior, advanced by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner It overviews the argument in the work of Libet concerning the state and function of the human brain and free will in deciding to do certain actions Wegner supported the argument of Libet and added the relationship of conscious intentions, free will, and subsequent actions The article also discusses some concepts in both works, such as intentional action and free will, decisions, and consciousness of mind

Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on the Notion of Possibility, HERMANN WEIDEMANN

The article examines the notion of possibility as postulated by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* and discusses how the Megaric notion of possibility survived the challenge imposed by the Master Argument of Diodorus Crunus in trying to overturn the definition of possibility It offers critiques of the central thesis in the third chapter of *Metaphysics*, which states that something is possible for a thing when it is capable of becoming something and that something is being done for that thing The article details the argument advanced by Aristotle in refuting the Megarics, including the absurdities of analogy on the master-builder theory, object perception of human, and human animal perceptive faculties

Metaphysical Realism and Thought, SANFORD C GOLDBERG

The article discusses the concept of metaphysical realism and context externalism in philosophical explanation of the appearance of things and human nature It argues that metaphysically, it is not impossible that some empirical truths cannot be known through human inquiry in seeking knowledge of external world Accordingly, metaphysical realism is premised on the idea that some empirical truths are beyond the province of ideal human inquiry On the other hand, context externalism holds that some attitude-types of subjects depends on the nature of their environment for their individuation

Trigraphs A Resource for Illustration in Philosophy, NICHOLAS RESCHER

The article presents case studies illustrating the importance of a three-by-three tic-tac-toe style diagram in delivering philosophical argumentation It highlights how the trigraph is utilized in presenting argument in different subject in philosophy, such as conjectural gap-filling, actuality to modality,

cognitive failings, and appearance and reality, among others Accordingly, tic-tac-toe affords clear illustration that two intelligent opponents in life can compete and be frustrated over another's efforts and provide potential source of defeat

Is Simplicity Evidence of Truth? ADOLF GRUNBAUM

The article examines the veracity of philosophical claim of Richard Swineburne, which states that truth is exemplified through simplicity It explores some ideas from Swineburne's *Simplicity as Evidence of Truth*, and compares them with those of Sir Karl Raimund Popper's philosophy of science The article details how the theory of Swineburne is doubted considering the prevailing theories in science, the general theory of relativity and the special theory of relativity Swineburne was party flawed in that he did not provide a representative explanation of his claim that there is rough content-comparability of conflicting theories

World Poverty and Individual Freedom, NICOLE HASSOUN

The article discusses premises on the validity of compromising individual freedom for the sake of eradicating global poverty problems It presents an outline of arguments and premises from the vantage of argument from autonomy Three of these arguments involve the recognition of a coercive global institutional system, that people have the role in ensuring the legitimacy of the institutional system, and that preservation of mind and body of people under the system should be ensured Premises of the arguments include the role of international organizations in a coercive international system, such as the United Nations, World Court, and World Trade Organization

Mundane or Incredible!? Identifying When an Explanation is Required, GORDON PETTIT

The article discusses the difference of two aspects of probability something being extremely improbable yet believable, and something incredible in a sense that is unbelievably improbable It highlights on the principles proposed by John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen which are helpful in explaining the probabilities of events John Leslie's principles concern the distinctions between a chance and explanatory events, while van Inwagen sets guidelines for when it is reasonable to ascribe from an improbable event to mere chance The article also critiques these theories and offers counterproposals

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AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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'Αδύνατον and Material Exclusion, FRANCESCO BERTO

Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold and are true, and that it is rational to accept and assert them Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the law of noncontradiction (LNC) But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since he is (cheerfully) required to accept them by his own theory The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the law which appears to be unquestionable, in the sense that the Priestian dialetheist is committed to accept it without also accepting something inconsistent with it, on pain of trivialism—that is to say, on pain of lapsing into the position according to which everything is the case This is achieved via (a) a discussion of Priest's dialetheic treatment of the notions of *rejection* and *denial*, and (b) the characterization of a negation via the primitive intuition of content exclusion Such a result will not constitute a cheap victory for the friends of consistency We may just learn that different things have been historically conflated under the label of "law of noncontradiction", that dialetheists rightly attack some formulations of the law, and orthodox logicians and philosophers have been mistaken in assimilating them to the indisputable one

Autonomous Reasons for Intending, RANDOLPH CLARKE

An autonomous reason for intending to *A* would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for *A*-ing Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue This paper describes cases that more clearly favor the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort Several objections to this view are considered and rejected Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending

The Reasons of Trust, PAMELA HIERONYMI

The author argues to a conclusion she finds at once surprising and intuitive although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust

itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand In fact, the author suggests that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response

Trust, Hope and Empowerment, VICTORIA McGEER

Philosophers and social scientists have focused a great deal of attention on our human capacity to trust, but relatively little on the capacity to hope This is a significant oversight, as hope and trust are importantly interconnected This paper argues that, even though trust can and does feed our hopes, it is our empowering capacity to hope that significantly underwrites—and makes rational—our capacity to trust

What Luck is Not, JENNIFER LACKEY

In this paper, the author critically examines the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature lack of control accounts and modal accounts In particular, she argues that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky Hence, she concludes that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the concept of luck

A Puzzle about Other-Directed Time-Bias, CASPAR HARE

Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? "Sometimes yes, sometimes no"—it is tempting to answer But this is not right On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people

Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes, JENNIFER NAGEL

Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called "need-for-closure") relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief, it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition Given these effects, it is a mistake to assume that high- and low-stakes subjects provided with the same initial evidence are perceived to enjoy belief formation that is the same as far as truth-conducive factors are concerned This mistaken assumption has underpinned contextualist and interest-relative invariantist treatments of cases in which contrasting knowledge ascriptions are

elicited by descriptions of subjects with the same initial information and different stakes The paper argues that intellectualist invariantism can easily accommodate such cases

Motivating Reductionism about Sets, ALEXANDER PASEAU

The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory

Modal Realism with Modal Tense, TAKASHI YAGISAWA

Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism

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INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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The Overlooked Work of Art in "The Origin of the Work of Art," K GOVER

This essay calls attention to the fact that there is a work of art in Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," and yet almost no one talks about it the C F Meyer poem "Roman Fountain " This critical silence is all the more ironic, since (1) it is a self-sufficient artwork, and not just described or mentioned in the text, and (2) the poem's fountain, as manmade spring, seems to speak to—if not speak of—Heidegger's thesis concerning the Ur-sp rung of the artwork itself The author argues that the poem illuminates a central problem or question concerning the status of art as mimesis, and suggests that the reason why this poem tends to be overlooked amid the "obsessive" critical attention that it otherwise attracts can be found within the essay itself

Nature and Ethics, H O MOUNCE

The first part of this paper deals with Mill's influential criticism of the natural law tradition According to Mill, this tradition is based on a mistaken conception of nature This essay argues that Mill's own view of nature is misconceived and that this misconception leads him to misrepresent the tradition itself The second part deals with those modern philosophers who reject the natural law tradition but who nevertheless attempt to account for morality as being based on human nature Certain criticisms are made of their

views The chief criticism is that their views are based on an idea of nature that is no different from Mill's

Is There Natural Purpose? JOHN PETERSON

In human beings, choice and action require a cause of a different kind to link them Otherwise a vicious regress breaks out Thus is cause in the sense of end or purpose It stands between choice and action, making a reciprocative causal triad Yet apart from our projects, this triad obtains in nature too, and for the same reason In reproduction, as in choice and action, means are activities that are directed to the replication of preexisting patterns as ends Further, when agents are taken not as active but as capable of certain activities, the latter are not means as in reproduction but themselves ends In this sense, it can be said that persons have a natural end as persons, a thesis for which two arguments are proposed

Divine Light and Human Wisdom Transcendental Elements in Bonaventure's Illumination Theory, JOHN R WHITE

This paper argues that structural elements of Bonaventure's illumination theory significantly parallel Kantian transcendental philosophy The question of whether and what elements of transcendental thought can be found in Bonaventure's philosophy is potentially instructive both for understanding medieval influences on transcendental philosophy and for raising the philosophical question of why substantially similar premises and thought-patterns result in substantially different solutions After defining what he means by "transcendental philosophy" and justifying that definition, the author turns to Bonaventure's illumination theory and highlights thought-patterns parallel to Kantian transcendental philosophy that emerge in Bonaventure's epistemology Finally, he discusses how their differences help us to understand the variations in medieval and modern solutions to what is sometimes termed "the transcendental problem "

How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts, RICHARD D WINFIELD

Hegel presents two very different accounts of the initial categorization of essence in his *Science of Logic* and his later *Encyclopedia Logic*, thereby raising the question of whether this discrepancy undermines the univocal necessity of systematic logic A close examination of these arguments reveals that the *Science of Logic* account captures a necessary ordering that is incompletely presented in the *Encyclopedia* The details are provided for comprehending why the logic of essence must begin with a contrast of the essential and the unessential, how this reverts to illusory being (whose determining entails three successive forms of reflection), and why identity depends upon the transformation of reflection from being positing to being external to being determining in character Significantly, the self-developing nature of these logical developments calls into question the foundationalism entailed by any privileging of the categories of essence

Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? ERIC LAROCK

The author argues on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explores some alternative, nonreductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness He proposes an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation

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Desgabets as a Cartesian Empiricist, MONTE COOK

A long tradition regards Robert Desgabets as a Cartesian empiricist He says things that sound strikingly like Locke, and he argues against antiempiricist reasoning in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld Moreover, throughout his writings he endorses the empiricist principle that nothing is in the intellect except what was previously in the senses Since the Cartesians are generally supposed to be prototypical nonempiricists, Desgabets's being a Cartesian empiricist would make him a particularly interesting specimen In this paper, however, the author challenges the case for taking Desgabets to be an empiricist

Arnauld's God, STEVEN NADLER

In this paper, the author argues that Arnauld's conception of God is more radical than scholars have been willing to allow It is not the case that, for Arnauld, God acts for reasons, with His will guided by wisdom (much as the God of Malebranche and Leibniz acts), albeit by a wisdom impenetrable to us Arnauld's objections to Malebranche are directed not only at the claim that God's wisdom is transparent to human reason, but at the whole distinction between will and wisdom in God, even if that wisdom were "hidden " Arnauld's God, in fact, approaches the extreme voluntarist God of Descartes, and thus transcends practical rational agency altogether

Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation Malebranche's Two Arguments for Occasionalism, SUKJAE LEE

Malebranche presents two major arguments for occasionalism the "no necessary connection" argument (NNC) and the "conservation is but continuous creation" argument (CCC) NNC appears prominently in his *Search After Truth* but virtually disappears and surrenders the spotlight to CCC in his later major work, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* This paper investigates the possible reasons and motivations behind this significant shift The author argues that the shift is no surprise if we consider the two ways in which the CCC is preferable to NNC it is not only more effective against opponents but also more consistent with his own views on freedom

Berkeley, Divine Concurrentism, and Human Agency, JEFFREY K McDONOUGH

This paper aims to offer a sympathetic reading of Berkeley's often maligned account of human agency The first section briefly revisits three options concerning the relationship between human and divine agency available to theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early modern eras The second argues that, of those three views, only the position of concurrentism is consistent with Berkeley's texts The third section explores Berkeley's reasons for adopting concurrentism by highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system Finally, the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley's understanding of human activity by looking at how we might understand his claim that "we move our legs ourselves" in light of his commitments to idealism and concurrentism

Apostate Rationalism and Maimon's Hume, PETER THIELKE

The paper examines the way in which Salomon Maimon (1753–1800) combines Humean skepticism and Leibnizian rationalism to mount an innovative challenge to Kant Maimon's position can be described as an "apostate rationalism," which holds that reason makes unavoidable demands on us that are nonetheless not satisfied in experience An appreciation of Maimon's arguments also sheds new and interesting light on the surprising role that this apostate rationalism plays as a component of Hume's skeptical naturalism

François Lamy, Occasionalism, and the Mind–Body Problem, FRED ABLONDI

There is a long-standing view that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists accepted occasionalism to solve the problem of interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies Recently, however, scholars have shown this story to be a myth Malebranche, Geulincx, La Forge, and Cordemoy adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide a solution to a perceived mind–body problem Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the "traditional" reading is largely on the mark François Lamy argues in the second volume of his *De la Connoissance de Soi-Meme* much as the standard story has it In this article the author

discusses and analyzes Lamy's argument, showing how he deals with some of the many concerns that made occasionalism attractive, and how he brings out some of the thorny questions that an occasionalist must face

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Goodness and Reasons Accentuating the Negative, ROGER CRISP

This paper concerns the relation between goodness, or value, and practical reasons, and in particular the so-called buck-passing account (BPA) of that relation recently offered by T M Scanlon, according to which goodness is not reason-providing but merely the higher-order property of possessing lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond in certain ways The paper begins by briefly describing BPA and the motivation for it, noting that Scanlon now accepts that the lower-order properties in question may be evaluative He also insists that the BPA is not biconditional (wisely, since otherwise goodness becomes a "Cambridge property"), which leaves him with the task of explaining why goodness arises only in a subset of cases in which lower-order properties ground reasons Having rejected two attempts to do this, based on elucidation of the responses and of the reasons, the author suggests that Scanlon may claim that goodness arises in, and only in, cases where the lower-order properties are evaluative and that goodness itself provides us with a way of distinguishing the evaluative from the nonevaluative In other words, he should retain the negative component of BPA, according to which being good is not itself reason-providing, while surrendering the positive, according to which the property of goodness is merely the higher-order property of having lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond

Desires, KRIS McDANIEL and BEN BRADLEY

It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires This paper examines extant attempts to analyze conditional desire From the failures of those attempts, the authors draw a moral that leads them to the correct account of conditional desires They then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires It emerges that desires do not have the structure that they have been thought to have The authors attempt to explain the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desire in light of their account of desire They show how to use their account to solve Wollheim's paradox of democracy and to save modus ponens Finally, they extend the account of desire to related phenomena, such as conditional promises, intentions, and commands

Rule-Following, Explanation-Transcendence, and Private Language, CYRUS PANJVANI

The author examines what he takes to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule He contends that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following He first shows that it serves as a key premise in a skeptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules He then argues that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case against what he describes as a realist view of rules This realist view requires that our understanding of a rule extend beyond what can be understood from any set of instructions or explanation For Wittgenstein, because this is to transcend publicly available means of conveying understanding, this realist's understanding is a private understanding He calls this private source of understanding an "intuition," and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his "private language argument " This paper defends a nonverificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so construed

Vague Representation, AUGUSTIN RAYO

The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of content for vague language The author's proposal is based on the following three theses (1) language-mastery is not rule-based—it involves a certain kind of decision-making, (2) a theory of content is to be thought of instrumentally—it is a tool for making sense of our linguistic practice, and (3) linguistic contents are only locally defined—they are defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities

Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal Frege on "The Essence of Logic," WILLIAM W TASCHEK

In the opening to his late essay "Der Gedanke," Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" "points the way for logic " But in a short piece from his *Nachlass* entitled "My Basic Logical Insights," Frege writes that the word "true" makes "an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic," asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word 'true' but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered " Properly understanding what Frege takes to be at issue here is crucial for understanding his conception of logic and, in particular, what he takes to be its normative status vis-à-vis judgment, assertion, and inference This paper focuses attention on clarifying the latter claim and Frege's motivations for making it, exposing what the author takes to be a fundamental tension in Frege's conception of logic Finally, the author discusses whether Frege's deployment of the horizontal in his mature *Begriffsschrift* helps to resolve this tension

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism, BERIT BROGAARD

Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like "right" and "wrong" But it is a very radical view Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment, it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift However, the author argues that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds

Brogaard's Moral Contextualism, LARS BINDERUP

Brogaard's nonindexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims The moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about the semantic workings of their own language But, second, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism looking weaker than a Mackie-style invariantist error theory about morals The latter is equally nonobjectivist, but less revisionist, since it takes the semantics of moral discourse at face value, and can also explain all of Brogaard's other linguistic evidence

What's Wrong With Contextualism? JOHN GRECO

This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogs that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity Two theses are defended (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest-dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are overstated in any case Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favor of attributor contextualism over "subject-sensitive invariantism," both in epistemology and in moral theory But here the author notes an interesting result the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its antiskeptical force

Greco on Knowledge Virtues, Contexts, Achievements, DUNCAN PRITCHARD

The author discusses John Greco's paper "What's Wrong with Contextualism?", in which he outlines a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic while also being allied to a form of attributor contextualism about "knows"

Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism, WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG

This précis summarizes the author's book *Moral Skepticisms*, with emphasis on his contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and his Pyrrhonian moral skepticism based on metaskepticism about relevance This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers

A Dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism, GERRY HOUGH

In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all skeptical hypotheses He suggests that it is sufficient if we have "modestly justified beliefs," that is if our evidence rules out all nonskeptical alternatives The author argues that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out skeptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is a kind of epistemic justification, but is not truly independent of our ability to rule out skeptical hypotheses

Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism, PETER BAUMANN

In his recent book *Moral Skepticisms* Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge The author raises three questions concerning this view First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Second, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account

Contesting Pyrrhonian Constrastivism, MARTIJN BLAAUW

The author airs three kinds of problem to which Sinnott-Armstrong's epistemological contrastivism seems to be exposed (a) the theory gives an unplausible account of justification attributions, (b) the Pyrrhonism which results from its inability to identify relevant contrast classes bars us from epistemic responsibility, (c) contextualism does just as well as Pyrrhonism, despite Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments to the contrary

Replies to Hough, Baumann, and Blaauw, WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG

The author replies to comments by Gerry Hough, Peter Baumann, and Martijn Blaauw on his book *Moral Skepticisms* The main issues concern whether modest justifiedness is epistemic and how it is related to extreme justifiedness, how contrastivists can handle crazy contrast classes, indeterminacy, and common language, whether Pyrrhonian skepticism leads to paralysis in decision-making or satisfies our desires to evaluate beliefs as justified or not, and how contextualists can respond to his arguments against relevance of contrast classes

Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism, PEKKA VAVRYNEN

The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is noninferential Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics The author shows that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take noninferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible noninferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable) However each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics

Intrinsic Finks, RANDOLPH CLARKE

Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks, on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it

Scepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming, JONATHAN ICHIKAWA

As a solution to dream skepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs, so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams The author argues that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible The proper upshot of the imagination model is to recharacterize the way we think about dream skepticism the skeptical threat is not that we have false beliefs So even

though dreams do not involve false beliefs, they still pose a skeptical threat, which the author elaborates

Defending the Unity of Knowledge, TIMOTHY CHAPPELLE

PHILOSOPHY
Vol 83, No 3, July 2008

Sigmund Descartes? ANDRE GOMBAY

For all his insistence that the mind has no parts, Descartes often describes inner mental conflicts, sometimes his own ambivalence and fixation to childhood prejudice are for him fixtures of human life The article examines this aspect of his thought

Hume, Malebranche and "Rationalism," P J E KAIL

Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an empiricist critique of rationalism This view is often illustrated—or rejected—by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes However, the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical rationalist is with Nicolas Malebranche The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between rationalism and empiricism, and that there is some truth in the traditional story This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called rationalism

The Irreducible Importance of Religious Hope in Kant's Conception of the Highest Good, CHRSITOPHER INSOLE

Kant is clear that the concept of the "highest good" involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands that we obey the moral law for its own sake, not out of interest in the consequences Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood) The author argues that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval

theology, the author argues that the hope for the *summum bonum* is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge

On What There Is (In Space), D GOLDSTICK

Dispositions depend on categorical facts definitionally and pedagogically Must they always depend on them also ontologically for grounding? Does there really have to be an ultimate bottom level of matter, and must it be categorical? The concepts microphysics supplies, however, are dispositional in meaning What predicates aren't? Besides shaping and locating predicates, predicates expressing degrees of similarity and dissimilarity are nondispositional enough in meaning, but the predication of all these features of things depends upon other features for these to bound and to relate to one another comparatively Faced with the uncomfortable alternative of "dispositions all the way down," Simon Blackburn proposes antirealism Possibly, though, predicates' dispositionality or categoricality can be relative to a given level of the organization of matter

The Equality of Lotteries, BEN SAUNDERS

Lotteries have long been used to resolve competing claims, yet their recent implementation to allocate school places in Brighton and Hove, England, led to considerable public outcry This article argues that, given appropriate selection is impossible when parties have equal claims, a lottery is preferable to an auction because it excludes unjust influences Three forms of contractualism are discussed, and the fairness of lotteries is traced to the fact that they give each person an equal chance, as a surrogate for their equal claim to the good It is argued that this can be a reason to favor an artificially constructed lottery to a "natural" lottery where there is suspicion that the latter may be biased

The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief, JAMES A MONTMARQUET

This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue epistemic virtues like open-mindedness, motivational virtues like courage, and more robustly moral virtues like justice A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues

Can A Secularist Appreciate Religious Music? DANIEL PUTMAN

David Pugmire has argued that secularists can genuinely appreciate religious music because of our imaginative powers combined with the Platonic nature of the emotions expressed in such music The author argues that Pugmire is wrong on both counts Religious music is Platonic not because it is

subject to levels of imagination but because it has a definite object which makes imaginative readings inferior Moreover, since religious music does have a clear object taken by the believer as real, a gap exists that cannot be bridged by the imagination of the secularist, even imagination of the emotional "last instance "

PHRONESIS
Vol 53, No 3, November 2008

Aristotle's "So-Called Elements," TIMOTHY J CROWLEY

Aristotle's use of the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements In this paper the author questions the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια in this way The author offers a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular he compares Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλουμενοζ (-η, -ον) in other contexts He concludes that Aristotle's use of the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια does not carry ironical or skeptical connotations, and that it ought to be understood as a neutral report of a contemporary opinion that the elements of bodies are fire, air, water, and earth The author leaves aside the question as to whether or not Aristotle himself endorses this opinion

Aristotle on Natural Slavery, MALCOLM HEATH

Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (*Politics* 1 5 1254b20–3) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in *thumos* (*Politics* 7 7 1327b18–31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of *eudaimonia* without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of *eudaimonia* are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology

Individuation, particularisation et détermination selon Plotin, GWENAELLE AUBRY

Plotinus's formulation of the problem of the individual should not be reduced to the question of whether or not one can accept forms of individuals First, if Plotinus does indeed posit an intelligible foundation of individuality,

there are no grounds to identify this foundation with a form it must rather be considered a logos Second, we must, in addition to this intelligible "principle of distinction," allow for a sensible "principle of individuation" the living body Finally, we have to distinguish a third level that of the *hêmeis*, the individual as a person, capable of freedom and consciousness This latter's compatibility with the other two seems problematic, so that the real difficulty may lie in this tension, in Plotinus' thought, between an ontological and an ethical concept of the individual

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RATIO
Vol 21, No 1, March 2008

Recombination and Intrinsicality, ROSS P CAMERON

In this paper the author argues that warrant for Lewis's principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination This, he claims, leads to a vicious circularity warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground

Peacocke's Self-Knowledge, ANNALISA COLIVA

The paper reviews Christopher Peacocke's account of self-knowledge His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental states may be given to a subject so as to function as reasons, from his point of view, for the corresponding self-ascriptions Peacocke's *Being Known* elicits two different views of how that may be the case a given propositional attitude is considered to be conscious if, on the one hand, there is something it is like to have it, and, on the other, if it can occupy a subject's attention without being an object of attention The author examines both views and concludes that, on the latter, Peacocke's proposal risks of not offering an independent reason for the self-ascription, and, on the former, of offering no reason at all The author then turns to some ideas from his *The Realm of Reason* and claims that they can help stabilize his earlier account only at the cost of surrendering internalism in the epistemology of psychological self-ascriptions and of contaminating internalist proposals about knowledge of any subject matter with an externalist base which would betray their point Unless one doesn't want to pay this price, Peacocke's account offers no solution to the problem of self-knowledge

The Fabrication Metaphor, D GOLDSTICK

Modern philosophers have often likened perception/cognition to a fabrication process But disanalogy can be seen in the fact that in real fabrication the raw materials are used up, being literally present in the product The

metaphor has arguably misled both "logical construction" philosophizing and epistemology influenced by the fabrication view's arch-exponent, Kant In fact, though, there isn't any reason to trace the results of our cognitive processes to inversely varying inputs from the world and the mind in such a way as to commit realism to the cognizing mind's passivity

Freedom and Weakness of Will, PAUL HOFFMAN

Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom The author challenges the coherence of this position His strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will—Descartes, Aquinas, and Reid—to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak-willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them

Essential Stuff, KRISTIE MILLER

Here is a common view There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, "thing" is a count noun, and "stuff" is a mass noun Syntactically, "thing" functions as a singular referring term that takes "a" and "every" and is subject to pluralization, while "stuff" functions as a plural referring term that takes "some" and is not subject to pluralization Hence there exists *a* thing, and *some* stuff Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles about portions of stuff The first principle is that (temporal) mereological essentialism is true of portions (parcels, masses, quantities) of stuff, where mereological essentialism is the thesis that for any persisting object or portion of stuff, that object or stuff has the same parts at every time at which it exists The second principle is that portions of stuff obey a principle of stuff composition for any two portions of stuff P_1 and P_2, there exists a portion of stuff that is the fusion of P_1 and P_2 The author argues that these two principles are inconsistent In particular, she argues that mereological essentialism is false of portions of stuff

Transcending Absurdity, JOE MINTOFF

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important However, reflection seems to undercut this meaningfulness our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, those activities are themselves insignificant, and leave little of any real permanence The aim of this paper is to explore whether this discrepancy is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations of the old idea that we can transcend it by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut The paper contrasts the life

of doing good (devoted, for example, to working for a moral cause) and the life of knowing good (devoted to the appreciation of the so-called higher things in life, such as art and science) as ways of finding meaning

Why Qualia Are Not Epiphenomenal, HANS MULLER

This article gives an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert The author shows that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question

Permutations and Foster Problems. Two Puzzles or One? J ROBERT G. WILLIAMS

How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favoring a reference scheme that assigns *London* to "Londres," rather than one that assigns *Sydney* to that name The paper argues, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favors The principle required to make the argument work allows the author to resurrect Foster problems against the Davidsonian position The Foster problems and the permutation inscrutability problems stand or fall together they are one puzzle, not two

Reply to Goff on Physicalism, ROBERT KIRK

RATIO
Vol 21, No 2, June 2008

Ratiocination An Empirical Account, FRED SOMMERS

Modern thinkers regard logic as a purely formal discipline like number theory, and not to be confused with any empirical discipline such as cognitive psychology, which may seek to characterize how people actually reason Opposed to this is the traditional view that even a formal logic can be cognitively veridical—descriptive of procedures people actually follow in arriving at their deductive judgments (logic as laws of thought) In a cognitively veridical logic, any formal proof that a deductive judgment, intuitively arrived at, is valid should ideally conform to the method the reasoning subject has used to arrive at that judgment More specifically, it should reveal the actual reckoning process that the reasoning subject more or less consciously

carries out when he makes a deductive inference That the common logical words used in everyday reasoning—words such as "and," "if," "some," "is," "not," and "all"—have fixed positive and negative charges has escaped the notice of modern logic The present paper shows how, by unconsciously recognizing "not" and "all" as "minus words," while recognizing "and," "some," and "is" as "plus words," a child can intuitively reckon, for example, "not (-) all (-) dogs are (+) friendly" as equivalent to "some (+) dogs aren't (-) friendly"

Persons and Relics, ROLAND BREEUR and ARNOLD BURMS

The authors describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolization each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolized entity Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here they are cherished, desired, or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because of their material link with some significant individual person Crucial for the hypothesis the authors wish to defend, is the fact that a human being can in some cases and for some others function as a relic of what he used to be, in these cases a human individual has a specific significance in virtue of a material link (bodily continuity) with his own past The authors argue that this phenomenon can be extended and that the importance of bodily continuity for personal identity is constituted by the kind of symbolization upon which the existence of relics is based

Incommensurability, Relativity, Scepticism Reflections on Acquiring a Concept, NATHANIEL GOLDBERG and MATTHEW RELLIHAN

Some opponents of the incommensurability thesis, such as Davidson and Rorty, have argued that the very idea of incommensurability is incoherent and that the existence of alternative and incommensurable conceptual schemes is a conceptual impossibility If true, this refutes Kuhnian relativism and Kantian skepticism in one fell swoop For Kuhnian relativism depends on the possibility of alternative, humanly accessible conceptual schemes that are incommensurable with one another, and the Kantian notion of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves gives rise to the possibility of humanly inaccessible schemes that are incommensurable with even our best current or future science In what follows the authors argue that the possibility of incommensurability of either the Kuhnian or the Kantian variety is inescapable and that this conclusion is forced upon us by a simple consideration of what is involved in acquiring a concept It turns out that the threats from relativism and skepticism are real, and that anyone, including Davidson himself, who has ever defended an account of concept acquisition is committed to one or the other of these two possibilities

Lowe's Defence of Constitution and the Principle of Weak Extensionality, DAVID B HERSHENOV

E J Lowe is one of the few philosophers who defend both the existence of spatially coincident entities and the principle of weak extensionality that no two objects which have proper parts have exactly the same proper parts at the same time Lowe maintains that when spatially coincident things like the statue and the lump of bronze are in a constitution relation, the constituted entity (the statue) has parts that the constituting entity (the lump) doesn't, hence the compatibility with weak extensionality The author's contention is that Lowe's argument for why the statue has parts the lump of bronze lacks can also be used to show that the lump of bronze has parts the statue doesn't This will mean that there is no basis for saying the statue and the lump are in a constitution relation The author argues for accepting a modified account of constitution and abandoning the principle of weak extensionality

Kantian Value Realism, ALISON HILLS

Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as "Kantian constructivism," that is far superior to the traditional "value realist" theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism But this is a mistake In this paper, the author sketches a rival Kantian theory of value, which she calls Kantian value realism The author argues that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism While her aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, she tries to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study

Doomsday, Bishop Ussher and Simulated Worlds, ALISDAIR M RICHMOND

This paper attempts three tasks in relation to Carter and Leslie's Doomsday Argument First, it criticizes Timothy Chambers's "Usshenan Corollary," a striking but unsuccessful objection to standard Doomsday arguments Second, it reformulates the Usshenan Corollary as an objection to Bradley Monton's variant Doomsday and Nick Bostrom's simulation argument Finally, it tries to diagnose the epistemic/metaphysical problems facing Doomsday-related arguments

Robustness and the New Riddle Revived, ADINA L ROSKIES

The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science In response to Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction," Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, the author argues here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrates that his solution to the grue paradox fails to rule out the possibility of equally justified contradictory inductions More importantly, in illuminating where Jackson's argument fails, the paper casts a new light on the problem of induction, locating the problem not in the nature of the next (unexamined) x, but in the counterfactual robustness of properties of already examined x's

Intricate Ethics and Inviolability Frances Kamm's Nonconsequentialism, FIONA WOOLLARD

*DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 2007–2008**

University at Albany
(49) (49) (11)

JULIETTE STEVENS, "Mental Causation A Nonreductivist Perspective" Adviser Ron McClamrock
JOHN STYLES, "Empirically Grounded Metaphors in Science" Adviser P D Magnus.

University of Alberta
(45) (40) (15)

CHRISTOPHER G LEPOCK, "Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue" Adviser Adam Morton
SEYED N MOUSAVIAN, "Empty Names and Neo-Russellianism" Advisers Bernard Linsky and Adam Morton

University of Arizona
(45) (45) (23)

STEPHEN BIGGS, "Modality and Mind" Adviser Terry Horgan
CHRIS BROWN, "Beneficience" Adviser David Schmidtz
STEFAN SCIARAFFA, "Role Identification and the Authority of the State." Adviser Thomas Christiano
PAUL THORN, "Three Problems of Direct Inference" Adviser John Pollock

Boston University
(43) (43) (24)

JONATHAN HANEN, "Self-Knowledge and the Art of Politics in Plato's *Alcibiades Major*" Adviser David Roochnik
BESIM KARAKADILAR, "Hilbert's Metamathematical Problems and Their Solutions" Adviser Jaakko Hintikka
ALICE MACLACHLAN, "The Nature and Limits of Forgiveness" Adviser Daniel Dahlstrom

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*The three figures below each institution's name refer to (1) the number of graduate students enrolled in its philosophy department, (2) the number of "full-time" graduate students as the term is understood by the institution, and (3) the number of faculty members teaching in the graduate program

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INGVILD TØRSEN, "After Aesthetics Martin Heidegger and the End of Art" Adviser Daniel Dahlstrom
FRANCO V TRIVIGNO, "The Philosophical Muse On Comedy in the Platonic Dialogues" Adviser David Roochnik

Bowling Green State University
(38) (33) (13)

GREG HAKOS, "Experience in the World of the Living" Adviser Michael Bradie
NICHOLAS MALOBERTI, "Individual Sovereignty and Political Legitimacy" Adviser Fred Miller
JONATHAN MILLER, "Mystical Experiences, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Reality" Adviser Marvin Belzer
JOHN MILLIKEN, "The Authority of Morality" Adviser Raymond G Frey
MATHEW STICHTER, "The Skill of Virtue" Adviser Daniel Jacobson

University of British Columbia
(40) (38) (18)

TIMOTHY CHRISTIE, "Persons and Partiality Limitations on Consequentialist Justifications" Advisers Catharine Wilson and John Beatty

Brown University
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AARON-DIRK BOYDEN, "Reducing Realism" Adviser Jaegwon Kim
BENJAMIN P FIEDOR, "Doxastic Involantarism and Epistemic Deontology" Adviser Ernest Sosa
PAUL J NEUFELD, "The Fitting and the Virtuous in Stoic Ethics" Adviser Victor Caston
REBEKAH L H RICE, "A Causal Approach to the Nature of Human Action" Adviser Jaegwon Kim

University at Buffalo
(58) (56) (19)

TIMOTHY CONNOLLY, "The Moving Being The Role of Change in Plato" Adviser Jiyuan Yu
VALERIE JOHNSON FRANKS, "Empirical Idealism. A Modern Foundation for the Science of the Mind" Adviser John Kearns (Awarded in 2007)
NATHAN HEBERLIG, "On the Ontological Status of Space–time Scientific Realism and Geometrical Explanation" Adviser Randall Dipert
YOUNGJAE LEE, "Referring" Adviser John Kearns

ASHUTOSH KALSI, "The Ending of Nihilism From Nietzsche to Krishnamurti " Adviser Kah Kyung Cho
JOSEPH PATERNO, "The Problem of the Causal Account of Memory A Solution and its Consequences " Adviser Randall Dipert (Awarded in 2007)
GEROL PETRUZELLA, "Eternal Goods from Socrates to the Stoics " Adviser Jiyuan Yu
PAUL SYMINGTON, "The Identity of the Categories Aquinas, Scotus and Lowe " Adviser Jorje Gracia

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YOSHIKI KOBASIGAWA, "Meinong Plus " Adviser Ali A Kazmi (Awarded in 2007)
JENNIFER RUNKE, "Towards an Adequate Theory of Scientific Metaphor " Adviser Marc Franklin Ereshefsky
RAFAL URBANIAK, "Lesniewski's Systems of Logic and Mereology History and Re-evaluation " Adviser Richard Zach

University of California, Berkeley
(43) (43) (15)

ANDREAS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, "Aristotle on Change and Potentiality " Adviser Alan Code
AGNES CALLARD, "An Incomparabilist Account of Akrasia " Adviser Samuel Scheffler
KENNY EASWARAN, "The Foundations of Conditional Probability " Adviser Brandon Fitelson
MICHAEL TITELBAUM, "Quitting Certainties A Doxastic Modeling Framework " Adviser Brandon Fitelson
JOEL YURDIN, "Aristotle From Sense to Science " Adviser Alan Code

University of California, Davis
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University of California, Riverside
(43) (42) (19)

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GUSTAVO LLARULL, "Narrative Self-Conception, Ethics and Literature " Adviser Georgia Warnke

JESSICA LUDESCHER, "Corporations and Responsibility" Adviser Georgia Warnke
AMY L MACARTHUR, "The Duty of Self-Knowledge in Kant's Ethics" Adviser Andrews Reath
MICHAEL STANNARD, "Material Ends of Reason Kantian Formalism, Pure Intelligent Existence, and the Possibility of a Deduction of the Postulate of Freedom" Adviser Andrews Reath

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GREGORY CHARAK, "The Vienna Circle" Adviser Nancy Cartwright
ERICK CONRAD, "Science and Objectivity" Adviser Gerald Doppelt
MATTHEW EGAN, "The Apotheosis of a Human Ideal" Adviser Eric Watkins
AARON SCHILLER, "Concepts in Experience An Essay on Conceptualism" Adviser Rick Grush

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SEAN CHOI, "The Libertarian Dilemma, Incompatibilist Transfer Principles, and Agent Causation" Adviser Anthony Brueckner
TRANG D LE, "A Contextualist Justification of Deliberative Democracy" Adviser Chrsitopher McMahon
HEATHER SALAZAR, "Meaning, Reasons, and Endorsement" Adviser Matthew Hanser
JOSEPH SIMONIAN, "Game Theory and Social Choice The Expected Utility Hypothesis and Its Applicability to Collective Decision Making" Adviser Christopher McMahon

The Catholic University of America
(167) (167) (18)

JOHN MARSHALL HERSEY, "The Question of Ground and the Truth of Being in Heidegger's WS 1931/32 Lecture Course *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit zu Platons Hohlengleichnis und Theatet*" Adviser Richard Velkley
JOEL NIMITZ STEINMETZ, "Cognitional Arguments for the Immateriality of Mind" Adviser Michael Gorman
PAUL ANTHONY STEVENS, "Mathematics and Dialectic in Plato's *Theaetetus*" Adviser Kurt Pritzl

University of Cincinnati
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ALBERT BROWN, "Particularism in Justice" Adviser Lawrence Jost

ANTHONY LANDRETH, "Far Beyond Driven On the Neural Mechanisms of Motivation " Adviser John Bickle
GIOVANNI MION, "Knowledge Attributions and Objective Contexts " Adviser Christopher Gauker
VIOREL PASLARU, "Ecological Mechanisms in Philosophical Focus " Adviser Robert C Richardson

University of Colorado
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PETER HIGGINS, "Immigration Justice A Proposal for Constructing Just Admissions Policies " Adviser Alison Jaggar
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JONATHAN PEETERS, "The Building Blocks of Reality Atomism in the 17th and 18th Centuries " Adviser Robert Pasnau

University of Connecticut
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Cornell University
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LOUISE VIGEANT, "Of Contradictions and Tautologies " Adviser Zoltan Szabo

University of Dallas
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DePaul University
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JULIA DAVIS, "The Poet as Destiny The Inauguration of Heidegger's Dialogue with Holderlin " Adviser Will McNeill

HERNANDO ESTEVES, "From Subject to Citizen An Essential Transition in Latin American Nineteenth-Century Political Thought " Adviser Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert

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DHAROL TANKERSLEY, "The Neurobiological Foundations of Altruism " Adviser Alexander Rosenberg

SUN KYEONG YU, "Reducing Biology " Adviser Alexander Rosenberg

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VICTOR BICEAGA, "The Concept of Passivity in Husserl's Phenomenology " Adviser Jay Lampert
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JOHANNA FINEGAN, "Essays on Obligation " Adviser Judith Thomson
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JESSICA SIN, "Essays in the Philosophy of Psychiatry " Adviser Richard Holton

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(38) (36) (14)

SUZANNE ANTLEY, "Collective Utterances and Meaning in Legislative Language " Adviser John L Tienson
JAY JULIAN, "Discovering Existence with Emmanuel Levinas, 1929–1951 " Adviser Robert L Bernasconi
DAVID SCOTT, "The Naiveté of Thought The 'Critique' of Phenomenology in the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze " Adviser Leonard R Lawlor

University of Miami
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JEREMY MORRIS, "The Epistemological Significance of Pure Indexicals " Adviser Risto Hilpinen

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The New School for Social Research
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ZSOFIA ZVOLENSZKY, "Modality, Names and Descriptions" Adviser Kit Fine

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KATE MORAN, "Community and Moral Progress in Kant " Adviser Paul Guyer
ECE YETIS, "Living as Technê A Portrait of Xenophon's Socrates " Adviser Charles Kahn

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ALEXIS GEORGE BURGESS, "Identifying Fact and Fiction" Adviser Gideon Rosen
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NICHOLAS STANG, "Kant's Moral Metaphysics" Advisers Desmond Hogan and Beatrice Longuenesse
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MYRON A PENNER, "Fallibilism and Warrant" Adviser Michael A Bergmann
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MICHAEL THUNE, "The Epistemology of Disagreement" Adviser Michael A Bergmann
CHRISTOPHER SEAN TUCKER, "Neo-Mooreanism, Inferential Justification, and Transmission Failure" Adviser Michael A Bergmann

Queen's University
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JOHN O'NEAL, "Levels and Reality" Adviser Richard Grandy

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(76) (50) (20)

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AMANDA PRINTZ, "The Scope and Significance of George Berkeley s Language Model" Adviser Gideon Yaffe
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IN MEMORIAM

Armand A Maurer, C S B (1915-2008)

On March 22, 2008, Holy Saturday in the Christian calendar, Fr Armand Maurer, C S B passed away in Toronto at a hospital close to the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies where he had spent nearly the entirety of his illustrious academic career Born January 21, 1915 to parents of modest means, Fr Maurer first became interested in philosophy at the Aquinas Institute High School where he also encountered priests of the Basilian order into whose number he would soon be admitted Encouraged to pursue his education at St Michael's College of the University of Toronto, Maurer enrolled in the College as a student of honors course in philosophy in 1933 After graduating with a B A in 1938, Maurer entered the novitiate of the Basilians, making his profession of vows in 1941 After teaching for two years at the Aquinas Institute, he returned to Toronto to study theology and was ordained to the priesthood there August 15, 1945 by Archbishop James Charles McGuigan Undertaking graduate studies at the University of Toronto, he completed in short order both his licentiate and doctoral degrees, graduating with his Ph D in 1947 After spending a period of post-doctoral study in Paris from 1947 until 1949, Fr Maurer was appointed a fellow of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in 1949, a position he still occupied at his death

The recipient of numerous awards for his scholarship and learning, Fr Maurer was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1954, elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1966, President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1979, and the recipient of the Association's Aquinas Medal in 1987

The scholarship of Armand Maurer ranged far and wide over the whole of medieval philosophy and even ventured into modern and contemporary philosophy Many students and not a few professors first became acquainted with medieval metaphysics and epistemology by reading Maurer's translations of Aquinas's *De ente et essentia* and his *Super Boetium De Trinitate* Maurer's translations were not only remarkable for their unfailingly accuracy and readability, they were also supplied with outstanding introductions that summarized the state of scholarship, both North American and European, on the text in question As a result, students could enter immediately into the finer points of Aquinas's arguments or begin researches of their own. Nor was Maurer's textual scholarship limited to translations his numerous editions in articles of shorter texts from figures such as Henry Harclay and Adam of Buckfield were complemented by his fine edition of Siger of Brabant's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* In terms of philosophical studies of his own, Maurer's work ranged from histories of medieval and modern philosophy to a profound study of the concept of beauty (*About Beauty A Thomistic Interpretation*, 1983) The final large work of this sort was his monograph on *The Philosophy of William of Ockham In the Light of its Principles* (1999), written over a period of many years and published when

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its author was 84 years old This final major study had all the earmarks of Maurerian scholarship extremely clear and concise writing, refined analyses of the key arguments for crucial points, and keen awareness of what principles were at work in the formation of a major philosopher's thought

For those of us privileged to know Fr Maurer and to study with him, he will be remembered as the model of a Christian gentleman as well as an exemplar of philosophical scholarship His door was always open to graduate students, however inexperienced and under-prepared, his kindness and gentle manner were always evident Yet intermixed with this generosity of spirit and concern for the individual needs of the student were a firm commitment to the highest standards of scholarship and an insistence on the precise understanding of the philosophical principles at stake in discussing any issue

Known throughout the world to students of medieval philosophy, Fr Maurer's work had already been celebrated by the time of his death with a *festschrift* honoring the man and his extensive writings At the end of that volume in an accompanying autobiographical sketch, Maurer modestly mentions the numerous philosophers and scholars whose acquaintance he enjoyed during his many research trips to Europe and years of teaching at the University of Toronto his mentor, Professor Gilson, the existentialist Gabriel Marcel, the distinguished Sorbonne historian of fourteenth-century thought, Paul Vignaux, the famous editor of Franciscan philosophical texts, Ephrem Longpré, O F M , and the renowned Dominican scholar, Dominique-Marie Chenu, O P , among others Yet the present note on his life would be seriously defective were it not to mention what Fr Maurer's humility would not permit him to say how worthy he himself is for inclusion in the ranks of these illustrious philosophers and scholars Truly may we say *laudemus eum virum gloriosum et lux aeterna ei luceat* —Timothy B Noone, *The Catholic University of America*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

2007 Dissertation Entry Contest

The *Review of Metaphysics* is pleased to announce that the winner of the 2007 Dissertation Essay Contest is Eric E Wilson for his submission, "Kantian Autonomy and the Moral Self" Dr Wilson wrote under the direction of Rudolf A. Makkreel at Emory University His essay will appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Review*

Because the balloting was relatively close, we are also pleased to announce a runner up Paul Humphrey, for his paper, "Light and the Active Intellect in Aristotle's *de Anima*," written under the direction of Peter Manchester at the State University of New York at Stony Brook

We thank all of our participants, we had many fine papers this year We are now welcoming submissions for the 2008 Dissertation Entry Contest Please see the announcement on the inside back cover for more information

New Website

The *Review of Metaphysics* is proud to announce the launching of its new website on September 1, 2008 The address, www reviewofmetaphysics org, remains the same but the aesthetics, navigability, and content have been vastly improved The most significant change is that it is now possible to subscribe and resubscribe to the *Review* through our website Another improvement is that we will now post the table of contents of the most recent issue on our website and we will begin archiving the tables of contents of past issues We invite you to pay us a visit

We heartily thank Will Hawking for creating this new website for us

New Database

The *Review of Metaphysics* would like to express its deep appreciation to Steve Kunath for creating a new book review database for us Our old one became inoperative shortly before the publishing of issue 61 4, which is why the publishing of "Recent Titles in Philosophy" has been delayed

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

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

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

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

Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates

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NATURE AND INERTIA

THOMAS J. MCLAUGHLIN

NEWTON'S FIRST LAW OF MOTION, also known as the principle of inertia, says "Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed "[1] I will argue that inertia is an inherent principle and that inertia and Newton's First Law are in this way natural in the Aristotelian sense Indeed, many difficulties concerning inertia and the First Law of Motion may be resolved by understanding them through an Aristotelian conception of nature

However, philosophers from different traditions have argued that the principle of inertia treats a body as if it had no inherent principle of nature and were devoid of an inner source of activity According to Kant,

> This mechanical law alone must be called the law of inertia (lex inertiae), the law that every action has an equal and opposite reaction cannot bear this name For the latter says what matter does, but the former only what it does not do, and this is better adapted to the expression of inertia. The inertia of matter is and signifies nothing but its lifelessness, as matter in itself From the very concept of inertia as mere lifelessness there follows of itself the fact that inertia does not signify a positive effort of something to maintain its state [2]

Correspondence to St John Vianney Seminary, 1300 S Steele Street, Denver, CO 80210

[1] Isaac Newton, *The Principia Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy A New Translation*, trans I Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz (Univ of California Press Berkeley, 1999), 416 All English quotations from Newton's *Principia* are from this work, unless otherwise indicated This edition is prefaced by Cohen's *A Guide to Newton's Principia*

[2] Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans with intro by James Ellington (Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill Co , 1970), 105–6 According to Heidegger, "How does Aristotle's descriptive observation of nature and concept of motion relate to the modern one, which got an essential foundation in the first axiom of Newton? Motions themselves are not determined according to different natures, capacities, and forces, the elements of the body, but, in reverse, the essence of force is determined by the fundamental law of motion Every body, left to itself, moves uniformly in a straight

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According to Sir Alfred North Whitehead, the creed of science is mechanism:

> The great forces of nature, such as gravitation, were entirely determined by the configurations of masses Thus the configurations determined their own changes, so that the circle of scientific thought was completely closed This is the famous mechanistic theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever since the seventeenth century It is just the orthodox creed of physical science [3]

Whitehead holds that Newton's First Law of Motion "is the first article of the creed of science "[4] This orthodox creed denies inherent natures and final causes

> There persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter senseless, valueless, purposeless It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being [5]

The Thomistic natural philosopher James Weisheipl claims that the principle of inertia treats a body as having no nature

> In this formulation [Newton's First Law of Motion], it would seem, two original ideas are assumed and one ancient idea is affirmed First, a three-dimensional body (*corpus*) is conceived as a *corpus mathematicum* completely devoid of "nature" in the Aristotelian sense, or of anything that would affect the presence or absence of motion [6]

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line Therefore, the difference between natural and against nature, i e , forced, is also eliminated, the βία, violence, is as force only a measure of the change of motion and is no longer special in kind Therefore, the concept of nature in general changes Nature is no longer the *inner* principle out of which the motion of the body follows, rather nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative positions of bodies, the manner in which they are present in space and time, which themselves are domains of possible positional orders and determinations of order and have no special traits anywhere " Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?* trans W B Barton and Vera Deutsch (Chicago Henry Regnery Co , 1967), 85–8

[3] Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York The Free Press, 1925), 50

[4] Alfred North Whitehead, *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York Philosophical Library, 1948), 171

[5] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 17

[6] James A Weisheipl, O P , "Galileo and the Principle of Inertia," in *Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages*, ed William Carroll (Washington, D C Catholic Univ Press, 1985), 69 According to Vincent Smith, "The empiriological physicist, as such, must ignore being His view of reality feeds on the notion of inertia, which thins a material thing into an indifferent state, depending for its reality wholly on the transeunt forces acting from outside of it Such an inert and indifferent thing, when considered in itself, is really nothing " Vincent Edward Smith, *Philosophical Physics* (New York Harper & Brothers, 1950), 142

Other philosophers assert the complementary view that "the principle of inertia does not even try to explain uniform rectilinear motion, but only says it needs no explanation "[7]

Against the views of these philosophers, one begins to see that inertia is an inherent principle and is natural in the Aristotelian sense by considering why Newton's First Law of Motion is also called the principle of inertia Newton explains what he means by inertia in Definition III of the *Principia*, a definition that implies and partly explains the First Law

> *Inherent force of matter* [*Materiae vis insita*] *is the power of resisting by which every body, so far as it is able* [*quantum in se est*], *perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward* This force is always proportional to the body and does not differ in any way from the inertia of the mass [inertia massae] except in the manner in which it is conceived Because of the inertia of matter [inertiam materiae], every body is only with difficulty put out of its state either of resting or of moving Consequently, inherent force [vis insita] may also be called by the very significant name of force of inertia [vis Inertiae] Moreover a body exerts this force only during a change of its state, caused by another force impressed upon it, and this exercise of force is, depending on the viewpoint, both resistance and impetus resistance insofar as the body, in order to maintain its state, strives against the impressed force, and impetus insofar as the same body, yielding only with difficulty to the force of a resisting obstacle, endeavors to change the state of that obstacle Resistance is commonly attributed to resting bodies and impetus to moving bodies, but motion and rest, in the popular sense of the terms, are distinguished from each other only by point of view, and bodies commonly regarded as being at rest are not always truly at rest [8]

About this definition, the Nobel Prize winning physicist S Chandrasekhar comments "There is hardly anything that one can usefully add to Newton's careful explanation of the concept of inertia "[9] Nevertheless, the passage is full of paradoxes and difficulties,[10] for Newton is struggling with the fact that inertia is not inert

Before taking up what Newton means by calling inertia an inherent force, I shall first consider inertia's characteristic activities In Definition 3 of the *Principia*, Newton maintains that the inertia of a body is an inherent source of two characteristic activities, perseverance in uniform rectilinear motion or rest and resistance to external

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[7] Glen Coughlin, *Aristotle's Physics, or Natural Hearing* (St Augustine's Press South Bend, IN, 2005), 276

[8] Newton, *Principia*, Def 3, 404–5

[9] S Chandrasekhar, *Newton's Principia for the Common Reader* (Oxford Clarendon, 1995), 19

[10] "Def 3 is, in many ways, the most puzzling of all the definitions in the *Principia* " Cohen, *Guide to Newton's Principia*, 96

impressed forces Contemporary physicists also view inertia as the source of these same two activities With respect to perseverance in uniform rectilinear motion or rest, the Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Feynman writes, "[the] property of inertia: if a particle is moving it keeps on going in the same direction unless *forces* act upon it "[11] In their textbook, *Elements of Newtonian Mechanics*, physicists Knudsen and Hjorth say, "No external force is necessary to maintain uniform motion. The motion continues unchanged due to a property of matter we call inertia "[12] A baseball, after being thrown, continues moving not only because it is in a state of motion but also in some way because of its inertia. Of course, the baseball does not continue moving in a straight line at a constant speed but that is because various forces, such as gravity or air resistance, are acting upon it The baseball's motion is complex and determined by multiple principles. The continuing motions of other projectiles and of orbiting bodies, such as planets, or rotating bodies, such as a child's top, are similarly explained The inertial component of such motions, unlike the external force component, persists without any ongoing mover and without any manifest effort or labor Although physicists do not regard inertia as a moving cause, nevertheless, three hundred years after Newton, it would be odd for them to talk about inertia as a property of matter if, as Kant maintains, it only signified what a body does not do Rather, the point made by physicists is just the opposite A body, once put in its state, perseveres in inertial motion of itself and not through the constant action of another [13] In what sense a body's inertia is present in persevering in inertial motion or rest will be considered later

A body's inertia is also an inherent source of its resistance to impressed forces The quantitative measure of this resistance is called mass or, more properly, inertial mass A P French, in his textbook *Newtonian Physics*, writes "'*Inertial mass*' is the technical phrase for that property which determines how difficult it is for a given applied force to change the state of motion of an object "[14] Hans Ohanian, a former associate editor of the *American Journal of Physics*, says

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[11] Richard P Feynman, Robert B Leighton, and Matthew Sands, *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*, vol 1 (Reading Addison-Wesley Pub Co , 1963), chap 2, p 3

[12] Jens M Knudsen and Poul G Hjorth, *Elements of Newtonian Mechanics*, 2nd ed (New York Springer-Verlag, 1996), 27

[13] "[T]he natural tendency of a body is to continue moving in a straight line " Raymond A Serway and Jerry S Faughn, *College Physics*, 3rd ed (New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 183

[14] A P French, *Newtonian Mechanics* (New York W W Norton & Co , 1971), 164

"mass is an *intrinsic* property of a body, measuring the resistance (inertia) with which the body opposes changes in its motion "[15] A bowling ball has a greater inertial mass than a baseball and, other things being equal, thereby exerts a greater resistance to efforts at throwing it, changing its speed or direction, or stopping it. The same amount of force applied to the bowling ball and the baseball produces different responses—the baseball offers less resistance and accelerates more Consequently, inertia can not signify merely what bodies do not do, and the principle of inertia does not treat bodies as lacking an inherent principle or as entirely under the control of external forces [16]

Resistance is often associated with weight or perhaps with some other force such as friction, or with a property such as solidity However, these are not the resistance of inertia. Bodies resist impressed forces even in the weightless environment of an orbiting space station [17] An astronaut pushing or pulling a container would find that the container resisted such efforts, though once the container was in motion no effort would be required to keep it going A mundane experience of inertia also helps distinguish it from weight When we want to find out how difficult a box is to move or how much more difficult one box is to move than another, we sometimes heft the box up and down rather than just holding or lifting the box to determine its weight In hefting the box, we are not seeking to find its weight but its resistance to our efforts to change its motion or rest and its tendency to continue moving Our concern is not so much with the box's weight but with a different though related property, its inertia [18] In addition, a body's inertia is the same whether it is on the Earth, the Moon, or in interstellar space whereas its weight varies with location Indeed, the fact that a body's inertia is the same everywhere indicates that it is inherent and that the body is not entirely determined by its external relations with other bodies

The resistance of inertia is evident in ordinary cases of accelerating, braking, or turning in cars or other vehicles In accelerating, we

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[15] Hans C Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 1 (New York W W Norton & Co , 1985), 122 Italics in original

[16] Historians of science have also made this point "Meanwhile it was apparent to everyone that matter cannot be wholly indifferent to motion since unequal amounts of effort are required to cause equal changes of velocity in unequal bodies " Richard S Westfall, *Force in Newton's Physics* (New York American Elsevier Pub Co , 1971), 450

[17] Weightless bodies on Earth also resist forces For example, tying up a blimp requires handling by teams of workers

[18] I Bernard Cohen, *The Birth of a New Physics* (New York: W W Norton, 1985), 157

feel pressed back into our seat. In braking, we feel pushed forward, and in turning, we feel shoved to the side Nevertheless, no external force is pressing, pushing, or shoving us Instead, we are experiencing our inertia. As a car accelerates forward, the backs of the passengers' seats press against the passengers to accelerate them with the car, but the passengers inherently tend to remain either at rest or moving with uniform velocity Because they tend to continue as they are, the passengers, in virtue of their inertia, resist the impressed forces exerted by their seats and thereby press into them Inertial resistance is especially manifest in cases of very great acceleration or deceleration, such as that experienced by passengers in a car brought to a sudden and violent halt As the car suddenly halts, the passengers' inertial tendency is to continue moving at, for example, sixty miles per hour The passengers resist the restraining force of their seatbelts, which must exert considerable force in order to keep the passengers from continuing at the same velocity toward an impact with the dashboard or a flight through the windshield [19]

In the above examples, no efficient cause makes a body resist external forces The body, in virtue of its inertia, does so from within as a spontaneous and automatic response to an impressed force. Currently, no one knows how to turn off a body's inertial resistance, all of which indicates that inertia is, contra Kant, something positive within a thing by which it tends to maintain its state

As Newton notes in Definition 3, the exercise of inertia in response to an impressed force is both resistance and impetus, depending upon the point of view Resistance and impetus are different considerations of the same exercise of the *vis inertiae* A body, when acted upon, resists actions that would change its state, and in resisting endeavors to change the state of the body that acts upon it Thus, the *vis inertiae* can be the source of an impressed force exerted upon another body. A couple of dramatic examples illustrate the impetus or endeavor of inertia Occasionally, construction workers are injured when they try to stop a massive moving beam They think that because a crane supports the beam's weight and because the sideways motion of the beam is slow and not sustained by a continuously acting mover that merely by holding out a hand or foot they can easily stop the beam's sideways motion. The beam, as they think of it, does not have any significant inherent capacity to act upon them However, the beam, in virtue of its rather considerable inertia, resists the

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[19] Louis A Bloomfield, *How Things Work The Physics of Everyday Life* (New York John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 106–17

efforts of the construction workers to stop it and, by persisting in its motion, acts upon the workers and injures them Similarly, an astronaut building a space station could conceivably be injured or killed by a weightless girder Because of its inertia, a moving girder will resist the efforts of an astronaut to stop it The girder, though weightless, might then pin and crush the astronaut against the space station [20] The 1997 impact of a supply ship with the Mir space station illustrates the danger of collisions between weightless bodies whose inertia is indeed something positive by which they tend to maintain their state

Inertia also has various practical applications, such as inertial guidance systems[21], inertial stabilizers on ocean liners, and the inertial containment of nuclear fusion reactions [22] These practical applications, such as the use of inertial navigation by submarines to sail under the north polar ice cap, help show that inertia is something definite within bodies by which they act in uniform and characteristic ways and is not, as described by the philosophers noted above, indifferent, purely negative, null, or nothing The views of such philosophers do not accurately reflect the physics of inertia and the First Law of Motion

In order to show that inertia and Newton's First Law are natural in the Aristotelian sense, I now want to consider Aristotle's conception of nature According to Aristotle, "*nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily*, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute "[23] An important feature of the Aristotelian definition, and the one with which I shall be most concerned, is that nature is an intrinsic principle According to Aristotle, a thing that exists by nature "has *within itself* a principle of motion and of stationariness "[24] Commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas writes, "We say that those things whose principle of

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[20] Isaac Asimov, *Understanding Physics Motion, Sound, and Heat* (New York New American Library, 1966), 60

[21] "The inertial guidance systems used aboard ships, aircraft, and missiles take advantage of the absolute character of acceleration to keep track of the motion of the reference frame From a knowledge of the acceleration (both the magnitude and direction) as a function of time and a knowledge of the initial position and velocity, a computer can automatically calculate the position and velocity of the ship at any later time " Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 1, 110

[22] Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 2, interlude J, p 10–11.

[23] Aristotle, *Physics* 2 1 192b23, trans R P Hardie and R K Gaye in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed Richard McKeon (New York Random House, 1941). All references herein to Aristotle are from McKeon, except where otherwise noted

[24] Aristotle, *Physics* 2 1 192b14–5

motion is in themselves are moved by nature "[25] In addition, Aristotle's definition regards a body as acting from itself in a uniform way [26] Further, what acts naturally does so without effort [27] Finally, and very famously, according to Aristotle, nature acts for an end [28] This paper will not directly address issues related to final causality, a topic which would require more lengthy treatment.

In Aristotle's definition, nature is proper to a specific kind of thing For example, an element, such as carbon, has characteristics that are necessary and peculiar to carbon and do not belong to the other elements Inertia, however, is not proper to bodies of only one specific nature, for bodies of many different natures have inertia Nevertheless, as Vincent Smith notes,

> We often use the terms **nature** and **natural** for any essential intrinsic characteristic even though that characteristic is not primary Thus we say that man walks by nature or naturally even though he does so because of the genus to which he belongs and not because of what he has primarily To know what is essential to a thing but not proper to it is to know its nature in only an imperfect way [29]

Similarly, I will argue that inertia is a generic natural principle, not a nature, and, I will grant that considering a body only with respect to its inertia is a very incomplete consideration, especially since inertia is nature considered at a very minimal—perhaps its most minimal—formed level

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[25] St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, trans Richard J Blackwell, Richard J Spath, and W Edmund Thirlkel (New Haven Yale University Press, 1963), bk 8, §1023 All English quotations from Aquinas' *In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio* are from this translation

[26] "For since nature always operates in the same way, it is natural for the other cases to be the same " Aquinas, *On Aristotle's Physics*, bk 8, §1103

[27] "For whatever is moved with labor is being moved against the natural motion of its body—for which reason it is laborious for an animal to move upwards Now in the case of things moved against their nature, if such a motion is to continue, it must be maintained by some violent mover imposing on them a motion of coercion—for natural necessity leads only to what is according to nature Everything such, i e , which is subject to a motion contrary to its nature, must be in more and more labor as it is more alien to its best disposition, i e , that which is according to its nature " Aquinas, *Exposition of Aristotle's Treatise On the Heavens*, trans R F Larcher and Pierre H Conway (Columbus College of St Mary of the Springs, 1963) bk 2, §294 All English quotations from Aquinas' *In Aristotelis Libros De Caelo et Mundo Expositio* are from this translation

[28] "Nature belongs to the class of causes that act for the sake of something." Aristotle, *Physics* 2 8 198b10

[29] Vincent Edward Smith, *The General Science of Nature* (Milwaukee Bruce Pub Co , 1958), 132

Even though inertia is a principle of nature considered at a very minimal level, to show that inertia is natural is significant because the genus that inertia properly characterizes is very wide and because inertia and the First Law are fundamental to Newtonian and relativistic physics [30] Aristotelian science, by contrast, did not know of such a broad commonality, a property possessed by celestial and terrestrial bodies, by all the elements, and by animate and inanimate things Fire and earth, for example, possessed levity and gravity respectively Because inertia is common to so many different kinds of bodies, the proper principles of many different natures can be neglected for various purposes and nature can be analyzed at a minimal level That a given inertial body is a pumpkin is irrelevant for some purposes, and this is not only a consequence of the mathematization of nature. Inertia is undoubtedly a thin treatment of nature, but that is not the same as treating a body as if it had no nature nor need it exclude a fuller treatment of a body's nature Failure to recognize this point may mislead a thinker into maintaining that the principle of inertia denies inherent principles of nature.

Another distinction is also necessary Kant and other thinkers are in one sense quite correct The principle of inertia is opposed to many of Aristotle's specific conceptions of the natures of things Aristotle held that the sublunar elemental bodies, earth, water, air, and fire, have natural motions following from inherent tendencies to natural places which are absolutely situated in the universe [31] Unless restrained, the elemental bodies do not remain at rest outside their

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[30] The question of what kinds of bodies do or do not have inertia will not be addressed here Some bodies, such as light, do not have rest mass, and, therefore, might be said not to have inertia The nature and status of massless entities is, however, not exactly settled physics Born, for example, argued that even though photons do not have rest mass, they do have inertia inasmuch as photons have energy and momentum See Max Born, *Atomic Physics*, 8th rev ed , trans John Dougall, rev R J Blin-Stoyle and J M Radcliffe (New York Dover Pub , 1989), 57–9, 375

[31] "So, too, with heavy and light light is generated from heavy, e g air from water (for water is the first thing that is potentially light), and air is actually light, and will at once realize its proper activity as such unless something prevents it. The activity of lightness consists in the light thing being in a certain situation, namely high up How can we account for the motion of light things and heavy things to their proper situations? The reason for it is that they have a natural tendency respectively towards a certain position and this constitutes the essence of lightness and heaviness, the former being determined by an upward, the later by a downward, tendency For it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher " Aristotle, *Physics* 8 4 255b8–21 See also Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 1 8 276a18–277b25

natural places but immediately move toward them Once brought to rest in the places proper to their natures, the elemental bodies remain at rest in virtue of an inherent natural principle For example, an earthy body is inherently heavy and falls toward the center of the universe where it is naturally at rest. Air is inherently light and naturally rises away from the center of the universe and toward a region above earth and water but below the region proper to fire. Contrarily, the principle of inertia implies that bodies do not have inherent tendencies by which they spontaneously move toward natural places Inertia has no preferred direction or inherent orientation to a place According to the principle of inertia, unless acted upon by external forces, a body at rest tends to remain at rest wherever it is, and a body in motion tends to continue moving at a constant speed in the same direction In this sense, Newton's First Law of Motion is indifferent to place and is a universal law

However, a general definition of nature should be distinguished from more specific conceptions of nature The incompatibility of Newton's First Law with many of Aristotle's views about the nature of gravity, levity, and the elementary bodies need not imply that the First Law is also incompatible with Aristotle's general definition of nature. Heidegger and others go too far in thinking that a denial of natural motions following from inherent tendencies to natural places is a denial of an inner principle of nature simply and in general. One can reject Aristotle's specific views concerning the natural motions of the elemental bodies without rejecting his general conception of nature just as one can reject Aristotle's view that the purpose of leaves on a tree is to provide shade to the fruit and nevertheless insist that photosynthesis is natural and teleological [32]

Similarly, the principle of inertia should be distinguished from the mechanistic philosophical lens through which it is commonly viewed and within which it was formulated Whitehead and others go astray in failing to observe this distinction and in too readily reading mechanism into the principle of inertia They have, in general, mistaken a certain philosophy of inertia, the lens through which inertia is typically conceived, for inertia itself. It is more appropriate to speak of inertia in the plural, of principles of inertia, in the way that John Paul II famously spoke of theories of evolution, the different theories

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[32] "By gradual advance in this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which is conducive to the end—leaves, e g grow to provide shade for the fruit " Aristotle, *Physics* 2 8 199a25

being differentiated by the different natural philosophies upon which they draw.[33]

Newton's philosophy of inertia is partially expressed through his problematic conception of inertia as an inherent force In Definition 3 of the *Principia*, Newton very strikingly and paradoxically describes inertia as *vis inertiae*, the force of inertia, and identifies this force with *materiae vis insita*, translated here as "inherent force of matter " The Latin *insita*, used here as a past participle modifying *vis*, is taken from *insero, inserere, insevi, insitus* and means implanted, innate, or inborn About Newton's use of this word, the Newton scholar I Bernard Cohen writes,

> Throughout this Introduction, and in other writings, I have translated Newton's 'vis insita' by 'inherent force' and 'vis insita materiae' by 'inherent force of matter' or 'force inherent in matter ' But the literature abounds with a different rendering, 'innate force.' We may learn what Newton's intention was by examining the intermediate usage in *De Motu corporum*, prior to *LL*, *M*, or the printed editions 'Vis insita' or 'vis insita materiae' is a difficult concept to render into English The root meaning of 'insita' is 'implanted' or 'inserted', it would usually be rendered by 'ingrafted ' But Newton was not referring specifically to an act of putting this 'power' into matter, rather he was using the derived meaning of 'naturally inborn' and hence 'innate' or even 'natural,' as commonly used even in classical Latin Thus Newton's 'vis insita' is necessarily present in a body from time past to time future, infinitely, and so is almost an 'immanent force '[34]

In Book 3 of the *Principia*, when Newton contrasts gravity and inertia, he reiterates his view that by the term "*vis insita*" he means inertia "Yet I am by no means affirming that gravity is essential to bodies By inherent force [*vis insita*] I mean only the force of inertia [*vis inertiae*] This is immutable "[35] Inertia, according to Newton, is some kind of inherent, unchanging, natural force that is essential to matter It does not depend upon external forces or the changing relative positions of bodies

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[33] John Paul II also distinguished different theories of evolution by the different mechanisms of evolution that they posit EWTN Document Library, John Paul II, "Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences On Evolution," available at http //www ewtn com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022 HTM

[34] I Bernard Cohen, *Introduction to Newton's 'Principia'* (Cambridge Harvard Univ Press, 1971), 66–7

[35] Newton, *Principia*, Bk 3, Rule 3, 796

Newton's Definition 3 also contains the unusual phrase *quantum in se est*, here translated as "so far as it is able "[36] According to Cohen, by "*quantum in se est*" Newton means "to the degree that it can of and by itself."[37] Cohen argues that Newton took the phrase from Descartes, who had taken it directly from Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*.[38] Newton's plan to include 90 lines from *De Rerum Natura* in the second edition (1713) of the *Principia* also contained references to the phrase *quantum in se est*.[39] According to Cohen, in using the phrase, Newton is saying that the capacity of a body to persevere in its state is both quantitatively limited and due to its own nature or natural power [40] Thus, for Newton, uniform rectilinear motion and rest are natural

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[36] Motte, in his translation of the *Principia*, renders the phrase "as much as in it lies " Cajori's revision of Motte's translation retains this rendering See Sir Isaac Newton, *Sir Isaac Newton's 'Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy' and his 'System of the World,'* trans Andrew Motte, rev Florian Cajori (Berkeley Univ of California Press, 1962), Def 3, p 2

[37] Newton, *Principia*, 404, note a

[38] I Bernard Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est' Newton's Concept of Inertia in Relation to Descartes and Lucretius," *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London* 19 (1964) 131–54 Henceforth, Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *Roy Soc* I Bernard Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est' Newton, Kepler, Descartes, and Lucretius," *Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1964) 36–46 Henceforth, Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *ACPQ* Other scholars have followed Cohen in recognizing the phrase as linking Lucretius, Descartes, and Newton See J E McGuire, "Natural Motion and Its Causes Newton on the 'Vis Insita' of Bodies," in *Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton*, eds Mary Louise Gill and James G Lennox (Princeton Princeton Univ Press, 1994), 308, Alan Gabbey, "Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century Descartes and Newton," in *Descartes Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics*, ed Stephen Gaukroger (Totowa, N J Barnes and Noble, 1980), 248 and 315, n 175 At least one historian of science argues that Newton may have taken the phrase directly from Lucretius or his commentators See William L Hine, "Inertia and Scientific Law in Sixteenth Century Commentaries on Lucretius," *Renaissance Quarterly* 48 (1995) 728–41

[39] Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *ACPQ*, 46, Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *Roy Soc* , 148–9 Newton read and studied *De Rerum Natura* in the early 1690's Also, about the same time as the publication of the first edition (1687) of the *Principia*, Newton wrote an unpublished draft in which he traced the origins of the principle of inertia back to the ancient philosophers According to Cohen, "A major portion of this document deals with Lucretius, presented as one of those who knew the Law of Inertia " Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *Roy Soc* , 139, 141, 148–9

[40] "Translators and commentators, unable to give equal emphasis to both meanings at once, have chosen to stick close to Newton's words, in the literal rendering 'as much as in it lie' Because they have thereby stressed primarily the concept of a quantitative limitation of the inertial 'power' in bodies, their modern readers are apt to have lost the idea of 'naturally' or 'by its own force' which Newton and Descartes and the seventeenth-century students of Lucretius knew to be another essential part of the sense of *quantum in se est* " Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *Roy Soc* , 148

However, for Newton, "nature" and "natural" have the sense, derived from Lucretius, of what a body would do if left to itself, although for Newton what comes from a body of itself is not, as it was for Lucretius, downward motion in a straight line Instead, a body left to itself remains either at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion in whatever direction It does not spontaneously move downward [41] As the phrase "*quantum in se est*" indicates, the notion of "nature" survived in Newton's physics, although in a form that draws from Lucretius rather than Aristotle Newton's use of the phrase also shows that he regarded inertia as a quantitatively limited source within a body from which certain characteristic activities proceed He did not view the First Law as eliminating an inherent principle.

In order to cast more light on what Newton meant in calling inertia a force, I want to consider a further argument that persevering in either uniform rectilinear motion or rest, resisting an impressed force, and endeavoring to change the state of a body impressing a force are all activities that originate from within a body

Not long after the publication of Newton's *Principia*, Leibniz considered the view that a body itself contributes nothing positive to its state of motion or rest and is entirely indifferent with respect to external forces He did so while criticizing Descartes' views of motion According to Leibniz,

> I admit that every object perseveres in its state until some sufficient reason for change arises That is a principle approaching metaphysical necessity, but it is not the same thing whether we assert that something simply preserves its state until something happens to change it—a case which also arises when the subject is quite indifferent in regard to both states—or whether, on the other hand, we assert that it is not indifferent but possesses a power accompanied by an inclination to preserve its own state and thus to resist actively causes that would change it. I myself previously, in a youthful work, started from the assumption that matter was inherently indifferent to motion and rest, and then have demonstrated as a consequence of the laws of motion holding for such a system the hypothesis that a very large body at rest must be set into motion by the push of another body no matter how small that other body is without the least diminution of the latter's motion The case of such a

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[41] "Throughout the seventeenth century, therefore, *quantum in se est* was taken to mean 'naturally,' or 'by nature,' or 'without external force ' Descartes—and Newton, following Descartes—were thus merely specifying what would happen to a body left completely to itself Lucretius was interpreted as referring to a body moving naturally, without any external forces producing a 'violent' motion But Descartes and Newton, from the point of view of the new inertial physics, meant a body either at rest in a location where there were no external forces acting on it or in uniform rectilinear motion in the absence of external forces in a nutshell, a body in a purely inertial state " Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *ACPQ*, 46

> world in which matter at rest offers no resistance to being moved, might be conceived as possible, but it would be a pure chaos [42]

Leibniz distinguishes between two different senses in which an object may persevere in a state In one sense, an object has a power and a positive inclination to persevere in its state and as a consequence actively resists causes that would change its state In another sense, an object lacks any power and positive inclination to persevere in its state and remains in its state only because nothing happens to change it The object is completely passive and indifferent to its motion or rest Leibniz argues that if bodies had no power and inclination to persevere in their states, then one body could not resist another nor could one body react to another, so that actions could occur without corresponding reactions As Leibniz remarks elsewhere, "everything could be affected by any thing" and a quantitative science of dynamics would be impossible [43] In a world in which the ground did not resist our efforts to push upon it and boulders did not resist our most meager pulls, motion and rest would be quite problematic A body cannot be completely indifferent to its own condition It must then have some positive power and inclination of persevering in its state

Leibniz conceives of perseverance in uniform rectilinear motion or rest as following from a positive inclination arising from a power within a body In virtue of this inclination to persevere, a body resists efforts to change its state of motion or rest Resistance, for Leibniz, presumes a prior positive inclination to persevere Newton, however, reverses the order of perseverance and resistance The force of inertia is a force of resisting by which a body perseveres in its state, it is not a force of persevering by which a body resists changes to its state Even though the word "perseverance" (*perseverare*) ordinarily connotes activity and though in Definition 4 Newton writes that "a body perseveres in any new state solely by the force of inertia," nevertheless, the *vis inertiae* operates only (*solommundo*) during a body's change of state in response to an impressed force On Newton's account, mere perseverance in uniform rectilinear motion or rest is an inactivity and not a positive inclination originating from within a body, for a body does not exert its *vis inertiae* merely in persevering

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[42] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "On Substance as Active Force Rather Than Mere Extension," in *Leibniz Selections*, ed Philip P Wiener (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 159–60

[43] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Specimen Dynamicum," in *Leibniz Selections*, ed Philip P Wiener (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 129

in a state If a body were not subject to an impressed force, it would persevere in its state, but its *vis inertiae* would do nothing

The *vis inertiae* is a very strange force Kant regarded the expression "inertial force" as contradictory [44] It is at least paradoxical "Inertia," which usually means inactivity, absence of motion, or passivity, seems to have a meaning opposed to that of "force," which usually means an action by an agency producing some kind of effect One translator of Newton's *Principia*, Florian Cajori, renders Newton's "*vis inertiae*" as "force of inactivity "[45] The historian Richard Westfall makes a similar point "In the *Principia*, Newton himself summarised the paradox in another anomalous phrase, *vis inertiae*, which we might translate freely as 'the activity of inactivity', or perhaps 'the ertness of inertness' "[46] Similarly, an inactive motion is an odd conception, for motion is typically regarded as the paradigm case of activity [47]

Newton uses the same word "force" in two very different ways In one way, "force" means what Newton calls "impressed force," an action exerted on a body that tends to change its state of uniform rectilinear motion or rest, that is, to accelerate a body It originates in a cause external to the body acted upon [48] Newton's First, Second, and Third Laws of Motion and Universal Law of Gravitation use "force" in this sense Contemporary physicists, in speaking of the four

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[44] "The designation force of inertia (*vis inertiae*) must, then, in spite of the famous name of its originator, be entirely dismissed from natural science This must be done not only because this designation carries with it a contradiction in the expression itself " Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, 114

[45] *Sir Isaac Newton's 'Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,'* Def 3, p 2

[46] Westfall, *Force in Newton's Physics*, 450

[47] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9 3 1047a30–32, Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans John R Rowan (Chicago Henry Regnery, 1961), bk 9, §1805. Descartes, though disagreeing with the common conception of motion, acknowledges that motion is ordinarily understood as an action See René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, trans John Cottingham, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol I (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1985) bk 2, §24–5

[48] "*Impressed force is the action exerted on a body to change its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward* This force consists solely in the action and does not remain in a body after the action has ceased For a body perseveres in any new state solely by the force of inertia Moreover, there are various sources of impressed force, such as percussion, pressure, or centripetal force " Newton, *Principia*, Def 3, 405 Contemporary physicists often make the same claim "In Newtonian mechanics, the force acting on a body is considered to be the *cause* of the acceleration of the body " Knudsen and Hjorth, *Elements of Newtonian Mechanics*, 73 "In this chapter we will see that the cause of acceleration is force " Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 1, 91

fundamental forces of nature, also use the term "force" in roughly this sense. Although contemporary physicists usually refer to inertia as a property and not as a force, they do sometimes use the term "inertial force" in reference to fictitious or pseudo forces A P French's explanation is worth quoting at length

> Imagine that you are sitting in a car on a very smooth road You are holding a heavy package The car is moving, but you cannot see the speedometer from where you sit All at once you get the feeling that the package, instead of being just a dead weight on your knees, has begun to push backward horizontally on you as well Even though the package is not in contact with anything except yourself, the effect is as if a force were being applied to it and transmitted to you as you hold it still with respect to yourself and the car If you did not restrain the package in this way, it would in fact be pushed backward You notice that this is what happens to a mascot that has been hanging at the end of a previously vertical string attached to the roof of the car
>
> How do you interpret these observations? If you have any previous experience of such phenomena, you will have no hesitation in saying that they are associated with an increase of velocity of the car—i e , with a positive acceleration . Nonetheless, it does feel just as if the package itself is somehow subjected to an extra force—a "force of inertia"—that comes into play whenever the effort is made to change the state of motion of an object
>
> These extra forces form an important class They can be held responsible for such phenomena as the motion of a Foucault pendulum, the effects in a high-speed centrifuge, the so-called *g* forces on an astronaut during launching, and the preferred direction of rotation of cyclones in the northern and southern hemispheres These forces are unique, however, in the sense that one cannot trace their origins to some other physical system, as was possible for all the forces previously considered Gravitational, electromagnetic, and contact forces, for example, have their origins in other masses, other charges, or the "contact" of another object But the additional forces that make their appearance when an object is being accelerated have no such physical objects as sources Are these inertial forces real or not?[49]

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[49] French, *Newtonian Mechanics*, 493–4 "One can do this by comparing the gravitational force of the earth with the centrifugal force due to the earth's rotation, which is a purely inertial effect A similar experiment may be carried out by comparing the gravitational force due to the sun, to the inertial forces associated with our orbital motion about the sun " Richard P Feynman, *Feynman Lectures on Gravitation*, ed Brian Hatfield (Reading, MA Perseus Books, 1995), 3–4. "This new type of force clearly is *not* an interaction force It is called an *inertial force* and arises because of the acceleration of the coordinate system S´ An accelerated coordinate system is not an inertial frame Inertial forces occur only in accelerated and rotating coordinate systems, never in inertial frames " Uno Ingard and William L Kraushaar, *Introduction to Mechanics, Matter, and Waves* (Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley Pub , 1960), 295

In the above example, a car with a passenger in it begins to accelerate with respect to the road on which it is moving The behavior of the package on the passenger's lap is due to its inertial tendency to persevere in its state of uniform rectilinear motion, to resist accelerating with the passenger and the car, and to endeavor to change their state of motion The action of the package even retards (slightly) the car's acceleration

For some purposes, however, it is very useful to adopt the car as a reference frame and regard it as if it were not accelerating but were at rest or moving uniformly in a straight line (that is, an inertial frame) Viewed in such a way, the behavior of the package in pressing against the passenger may usefully be regarded as produced by an external force, as if something external to the package were pressing it into the passenger However, no such external force exists No cause external to the package is pushing it into the passenger The passenger has simply regarded the reference frame of the car as if it were at rest (or in uniform rectilinear motion) instead of regarding it as accelerating with respect to the reference frame of, for example, the road [50] The "force" experienced by the passenger is then fictitious The package, considered as being pressed into the passenger's stomach by a fictitious force, does not react (via Newton's Third Law of Motion,

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[50] "That is, since Moe's coordinate system is accelerating with respect to Joe's, the extra term *ma* comes in, and Moe will have to correct his forces by that amount in order to get Newton's laws to work In other words, here is an apparent, mysterious new force of unknown origin which arises, of course, because Moe has the wrong coordinate system This is an example of a pseudo force, other examples occur in coordinate systems that are *rotating* " Feynman, *Feynman Lectures on Physics*, vol 1, 12 11 "Fictitious forces are distinguished from 'actual' forces by the fact that the *fictitious forces depend only on the motion of the frame S*, the position , and the velocity . of the particle, and on the inertial mass of the particle The presence of an actual force F can always be related to an interaction between the particle and another material body For example, if an electrical force acts on the particle there is an interaction with other electrically charged particles If a gravitational force acts, there is an interaction with some body The fictitious forces cannot in any obvious way be related to an interaction with other bodies The third law, the law of action and reaction, is *not valid for fictitious forces*, for there is no other body upon which a reaction force can act " Knudsen and Hjorth, *Elements of Newtonian Mechanics*, 108

action and reaction) upon the source of the fictitious force, for no such source exists [51]

As spoken of by contemporary physicists, inertial or fictitious forces, though related to Newton's *vis inertiae*, do not have exactly the same meaning, though for both, a body's inertia is acknowledged as a true source of the phenomena under consideration In any case, in speaking of fictitious forces, physicists acknowledge a whole class of phenomena that arise from a body's inertia In the above example, the behavior of the package and the experience of the passenger are certainly real, and even deliberately imaginary explanations of them

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[51] "We now want to compare what we observe when we are moving with a uniformly rotating reference frame The observer intuits that a force is acting even when there is no force The impression is so strong that it is actually useful, and leads to the invention of the class of nonexistent, apparent, virtual, fake or adventitious forces called 'centrifugal' force and 'Coriolis force'" Henry M Stommel and Dennis W Moore, *An Introduction to the Coriolis Force* (New York Columbia Univ Press, 1989), 12 "Since we have used the term 'centrifugal force' and have now introduced the 'Coriolis force,' it is necessary to inquire as to the physical meaning of these quantities It is important to realize that the centrifugal and Coriolis forces are not 'forces' in the usual sense of the word, they have been introduced in an artificial manner as a result of our arbitrary requirement that we be able to write an equation which resembles Newton's equation and at the same time is valid in a noninertial reference frame In spite of their artificiality, the usefulness of the concepts of centrifugal and Coriolis forces is obvious To describe the motion of a particle relative to a body that is rotating with respect to an inertial reference frame is clearly a complicated matter On the other hand, the problem can be made relatively easy by the simple expedient of introducing the 'noninertial forces' which then allows the use of an equation of motion that resembles Newton's equation" Jerry B Marion, *Classical Dynamics of Particles and Systems* (New York Academic Press, 1965), 347–8 "From the standpoint of an observer in the accelerating frame, the inertial force is actually present If one took steps to keep an object 'at rest' in S′, by tying it down with springs, these springs would be observed to elongate or contract in such a way as to provide a counteracting force to balance the inertial force To describe such a force as 'fictitious' is therefore somewhat misleading One would like to have some convenient label that distinguishes inertial forces from forces that arise from true physical interactions, and the term 'pseudo-force' is often used Even this, however, does not do justice to such forces as experienced by someone who is actually in the accelerating frame Probably, the original, strictly technical name, 'inertial force,' which is free of any questionable overtones, remains the best description" French, *Newtonian Mechanics*, 499

can be given, but they come forth from the inherent inertia of the package and not from an external force It is precisely the point that a body, by virtue of its inertia, does some things of itself, for concerning these phenomena physicists employ external forces merely as useful fictions Consequently, fictitious or inertial forces further show that the principle of inertia is a principle of nature, that the activities characteristic of inertia originate from within a body as spontaneous and automatic responses of a natural principle

Since Newton's time, various physicists have sought to show that inertia and its characteristic activities have some external origin Christiaan Huygens, Newton's great contemporary, developed an unsuccessful relativistic physics that sought to eliminate fictitious forces, especially centrifugal "force "[52] In the 19th Century and the early 20th Century, some physicists unsuccessfully sought to account for the inertia of bodies in terms of electromagnetism [53] Some recent hypotheses also seek to explain the origin of inertia in terms of electromagnetic processes [54]

Other thinkers have maintained that Einstein's Special Theory Relativity shows that inertia is not an inherent property of a body In Special Relativity, the mass of a body increases with its velocity according to the formula

$$m = m_0 / \sqrt{1 - v^2 / c^2}$$

where m is the relativistic mass of a body, v is its velocity relative to some frame of reference, m_0 is the rest mass of the body, and c is the speed of light.[55] The increase in mass with velocity is quite small, except when the velocity approaches that of light in a vacuum Since the velocity of a body varies depending upon the frame of reference with respect to which it is measured, the mass of a body likewise depends upon the frame of reference with respect to which it is measured Thus, since the mass of a body is not a constant but varies with and partly depends upon its relations to things external to it, Special

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[52] Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, 3rd ed (New York Dover Pub , 1993), 122–6

[53] See Max Jammer, *Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics* (Mineola, NY Dover Pub , 1997), 136–53

[54] Bernard Haisch, Alfonso Rueda, and H E Puthoff, "Inertia as a zero-point-field Lorentz force," *Physical Review A* 49, no 2 (1994) 678–94 For further references, see the articles listed at the Calphysics Institute, available at http //www calphysics org/index html

[55] "The mass that a particle has when at rest is sometimes called its rest mass " Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 1, 186

Relativity was viewed by some as showing that inertia is not an inherent property of a body [56] However, the rest mass (m_0) in the equation is reasonably interpreted as referring to a constant, inherent property of the body, for it must be taken into account and has the same value from any reference frame that one might use to determine the body's relativistic mass According to John Wheeler, "Does **rest mass** have the same value in every inertial frame? Yes . Rest mass is thus an *invariant* "[57] Newton's fundamental insight that inertia is an inherent property of bodies is not overturned by Special Relativity but, considered as rest mass, is preserved and reinforced by it

Another attempt to account for inertia and its activities is known as Mach's Principle and originated with the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach and, to a lesser extent, the philosopher Berkeley [58] Mach argued that inertial or fictitious forces are caused by the distant matter of the universe and that if the background of fixed stars did not exist, there would be no inertial forces The physicist Dennis Sciama, a proponent of Mach's Principle, compares Newton's and Mach's different accounts of the origin of inertia.

> Ever since the time of Isaac Newton the classical view has been—and experiments have seemed to prove—that inertia is an intrinsic property of matter, *i e*, that the inertia of a body is in no way affected by its

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[56] "In the same way, the mass of a moving body was found to depend on its measured speed of motion, and thus in turn depended on the measurer, or rather on the coordinate system he adopted Thus absolute mass fell out of science." Sir James Jeans, *Growth of Physical Science* (Cambridge Cambridge Univ Press, 1951), 267

[57] Edwin F Taylor and John Archibald Wheeler, *Spacetime Physics* (San Francisco W H Freeman and Co , 1966), 134 "It is very often said in textbooks that the theory of relativity has shown that mass increases with velocity according to the relation $m = m_0\gamma$, where m_0 is the rest mass Expressed in this way it appears as a new and profound property of matter, whereas it is really a result of a particular definition of relativistic velocity If we insist on retaining Newtonian dynamics, and the Newtonian definitions of velocity and acceleration, then we can still obtain relativistically correct results if we pay the price of allowing the mass to depend on the velocity If however we adopt Einsteinian dynamics, the mass remains invariant " J R Lucas and P E Hodgson, *Spacetime and Electromagnetism* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1990), 192

[58] C Brans and R H Dicke, "Mach's Principle and a Relativistic Theory of Gravitation," *Physical Review* 124 (1961) 925 See Ernst Mach, *History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy*, trans Philip E B Jourdain (Chicago Open Court, 1911), 75–80, idem, *The Science of Mechanics*, 6th ed with revisions through the 9th German edition, trans Thomas J McCormack (La Salle, Ill Open Court, 1989), 271–97, George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, in *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings*, ed David M Armstong (New York· Macmillan, 1965), §111–17, and *De Motu*, trans A A. Luce, in *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings*, §52–71

> environment But a few physicists and philosophers have insisted on the opposite view that a body has inertia only because it interacts in some way with other matter I propose to uphold the second view here and to review the evidence, which seems to me strongly to favor the conclusion that the inertia of any body depends on the rest of the matter in the universe [59]

Mach's Principle originated as a philosophical view that was only later developed into a theory of physics [60] Einstein hoped that General Relativity would instantiate Mach's principle and "suggested that the inertial forces are not fictitious but are gravitational in origin "[61] General Relativity, however, fails to instantiate Mach's Principle, except in very limited ways [62] As a consequence, some physicists, such as Brans and Dicke in the 1960's, have sought to develop a modified version of General Relativity [63] Others have formulated new theories of gravity

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[59] Dennis Sciama, "Inertia," *Scientific American* 196 (1957) 99

[60] "A principle as sweeping as that of Mach, having its origins in matters of philosophy, can be described in the absence of a theory in a qualitative way only " Brans and Dicke, "Mach's Principle," 926

[61] Sciama, "Inertia," 102

[62] "Einstein's work shows that inertia is connected to gravitation However, as Einstein himself was the first to point out, general relativity does not fully account for inertia Thus a new theory of gravitation is needed " Dennis Sciama, "On the Origin of Inertia," *Abstracts of Dissertations, 1953-1954*, (Cambridge Univ Press, 1956), 276 as quoted in Harold Aspden, *Modern Aether Science* (Southampton, England Sabberton Pub , 1972), 101 "These ideas [Mach's and Berkeley's] have found a limited expression in general relativity, but it must be admitted that it has not yet been possible to specify boundary conditions on the field equations of general relativity which would bring the theory into accord with Mach's principle." Brans and Dicke, "Mach's Principle," 925 "An argument based on the impossibility of satisfying Mach's principle within general relativity is given which leads to the idea of unified field theory A possible alternative is discussed " Joseph Callaway, "Mach's Principle and Unified Field Theory," *Physical Review* 96 (1954) 778 See also Adolf Grunbaum, "The Philosophical Retention Of Absolute Space In Einstein's General Theory Of Relativity," in *Problems of Space and Time*, ed J J C Smart (New York Macmillan Pub Co , 1976), 313–17, and Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, 192–8

[63] The Brans-Dicke theory made several predictions that were unsupported by experiments and measurements See Clifford M Will, *Was Einstein Right?* (New York Basic Books, 1986), 135–59 See also Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, 199

that instantiate Mach's Principle [64] To date, these efforts have not succeeded [65]

Physicists have also sought to account for inertia by means of quantum mechanics [66] Recent theoretical work attempts to account for the origin of inertia in terms of the as yet undetected Higgs particle and field [67] These speculative attempts have been unsuccessful so far, which is, of course, no reason why research into the origin of inertia should not continue

Several conclusions may be drawn from these efforts to account for the origin of inertia. First, as the quotation from Sciama indicates, most physicists have regarded inertia as an inherent property that is a source of certain characteristic activities. Second, since Newton's

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[64] See, for example, Dennis Sciama, *The Unity of the Universe* (Garden City, NY Doubleday Anchor, 1961), 69–160, idem, "On the Origin of Inertia," *Monthly Notices Roy Astron Soc* 113 (1953) 34, and Ignazio Ciufolini and John Archibald Wheeler, *Gravitation and Inertia* (Princeton Princeton Univ Press, 1995) Further attempts are described and cited in Peter Graneau and Neal Graneau, *Newton Versus Einstein How Matter Interacts with Matter* (New York Carlton Press, 1993), 59–101

[65] "Einstein was strongly influenced by Mach's argument However, Einstein's theory of general relativity does not satisfy Mach's principle, and many cosmologists, including Einstein himself, have tried in vain to incorporate the principle into the theory " Joseph Silk, *The Big Bang*, 3rd ed (New York W H Freeman and Co , 2001), 59 "If the philosopher is good enough, after some time he may come back and say, 'I understand We really do not have such a thing as absolute rotation, we are really rotating *relative to the stars*, you see And so some influence exerted by the stars on the object must cause the centrifugal force ' Now for all we know, that is true, we have no way, at the present time, of telling whether there would have been centrifugal force if there were no stars and nebulae around We have not been able to do the experiment of removing all the nebulae and then measuring our rotation, so we simply do not know We must admit that the philosopher may be right " Feynman, *Feynman Lectures on Physics*, vol 1, 16 2 See also, Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, 215–37

[66] See, for example, Corey S Powell, "Unbearable Lightness," *Scientific American* 270 (May 1994) 30–31, and Jean-Pierre Vigier, "Derivation of Inertial Forces from the Einstein-de Broglie-Bohm (E d B B) Causal Stochastic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics," *Foundations of Physics* 25 (1995) 1461–1494 Some physicists have sought to combine both approaches and establish Mach's principle as a theorem of a quantum mechanical theory of gravity See, for example, K.P Tod, "Mach's Principle Revisited," *General Relativity and Gravitation* 26 (1994) 103–111

[67] Gordon Kane, "The Mysteries of Mass," *Scientific American* 293 (July 2005) 41–8, Frank Wilczek, "Mass without Mass I Most of Matter," and "Mass without Mass II The Medium is the Mass-Age," *Physics Today* 52 no. 11 (1999) 11–13 and 53 no 1 (Jan 2000) 13–14 respectively Many particle physicists are optimistic that the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) will detect the Higgs particle The LHC is located at CERN near Geneva, Switzerland and will resume operations in the spring of 2009

time, some physicists have objected to this standard or classical view and have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to explain inertia by something external These failed efforts show that those philosophers are mistaken who hold that the principle of inertia repudiates an inherent principle of nature or signifies merely what a body does not do. The opposite is indeed the case the principle of inertia is itself an inherent principle If the principle of inertia treated bodies as devoid of an inherent principle, then there would be no reason for physicists to look for an external cause of inertia Three centuries of failed efforts to explain the origin of inertia by external forces and relations highlight the fact that the principle of inertia has so far always affirmed an inherent principle to bodies No currently accepted physics has shown otherwise, and Special Relativity has even supported the classical view With regard to modern physics, inertia is the obvious counterexample to an entirely mechanistic philosophy

Attempts to explain the origin of inertia in terms of other principles may one day be successful. Then, it will be necessary to determine if such an explanation shows that inertia is or is not an inherent principle. Given what is now known about inertia, if inertia is explained in terms of other principles, it seems unlikely that any such explanation will show that inertia is not an inherent principle, though inertia may turn out to be a different kind of inherent principle than is currently thought Perhaps, what may be shown is that inertia is like what is now called an emergent property Another possibility is that if inertia does turn out to have some kind of extrinsic origin, then it may be natural somewhat in the way that gravity is natural in general relativity Depending upon one's conception of nature, an extrinsic cause need not mean that something is not natural

Newton's use of the same word, "*vis*," in impressed force and inertial force and his use of the term *vis insita* may suggest that inertia is an internal efficient cause or agency that moves a body from within, and some writers have interpreted Newton in just such a way [68] However, as we have seen, Newton is at pains to maintain that a body

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[68] See, for example, E J Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the World Picture*, trans C Dikshoorn (Oxford Oxford Univ Press, 1961), 466, McGuire, "Natural Motion and Its Causes," 310, Zev Bechler, "Newton's Ontology of the Force of Inertia," in *The Investigation of Difficult Things Essays on Newton and the History of the Exact Sciences in Honour of D T Whiteside*, eds Peter M Harman and Alan E Shapiro (Cambridge Cambridge Univ Press, 1992), 287–304, and Cohen, *Guide to Newton's Principia*, 98

persevering in uniform rectilinear motion is not moving itself.[69] In the *Opticks*, first published in 1704, Newton also makes it clear that the *vis inertiae* is not an agency within a body that causes it to move or rest·

> The *vis inertiae* is a passive principle by which bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted By this principle alone there could never have been any motion in the world Some other Principle was necessary for putting Bodies into Motion, and now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion [70]

In contrast to inertia as a source of characteristic activities, this passage emphasizes passivity. The passivity of the *vis inertiae* precludes it from being an agency of a body's own uniform rectilinear motion or rest, for that would make it an active principle, which for Newton is a kind of efficient cause [71] If inertia were an internal agency that moves a body from within, then Newton could not reasonably claim that on the basis of the *vis inertiae* alone there could never have been any motion in the world. Thus, by its inertia, a body cannot drive or push itself to continue moving in a straight line at constant speed nor can it force itself to rest

A comparison with Kepler further illuminates this point.[72] Kepler conceived of inertia as an inherent inclination of matter to resist motion and to be at rest [73] By contrast, Newton conceived of inertia as

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[69] For further argumentation in support of this claim, see Dudley Shapere, "The Philosophical Significance of Newton's Science," in *The Annus Mirabilis of Sir Isaac Newton 1666-1966* (Cambridge, Mass. M I T Press, 1970), 287–9

[70] Sir Isaac Newton, *Opticks*, bk 3, query 31, p 397 (New York Dover, 1979), 397

[71] "Seeing therefore the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing, there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active principles, such as are the cause of gravity . and the cause of fermentation " Ibid , 399

[72] Newton planned but did not carry out an emendation to the third edition of the *Principia* that would add the following to Def 3. "I do not mean Kepler's force of inertia, by which bodies tend toward rest, but a force of remaining in the same state either of resting or of moving " Newton, *Principia*, 404, note c, and, Cohen, *A Guide to Newton's Principia*, 101 Newton's position is a kind of middle way between that of Lucretius in which atoms are never at rest and Kepler's in which bodies tend toward rest

[73] According to Kepler, inertia "a primary quality of matter, is a kind of laziness, an abhorrence of being moved " Cohen, "'Quantum In Se Est'" *ACPQ*, 41 See also Jammer, *Concepts of Mass*, 52–9

persevering either at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion and as resisting changes to either state However, uniform rectilinear motion and rest are opposed states, for a body cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time and in the same respect Therefore, since a body by its inertia persists in either of the opposed states of uniform rectilinear motion or rest, inertia cannot be an agent cause of a body's uniform rectilinear motion or of its rest If inertia were an agent cause of uniform rectilinear motion, then a body, by its inertia, could not also persist in a state of rest. Similarly, if inertia were an agent cause of a body's rest. then it could not also be that by which a body perseveres in uniform rectilinear motion. Consequently, a body, in virtue of its own inertia, is determined to neither state. Thus, inertia is neither a force of rest nor a force of uniform rectilinear motion

However, the openness of inertia to either rest or uniform rectilinear motion is incompatible with Newton's conception of nature and natural as what a body does when left to itself Given Newton's conception of inertia, a body left to itself would be neither moving nor resting. If a body is moving inertially or is at rest, then the action of some other body determined it to one or the other state and only then does the body, if left to itself, persevere at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion. Thus, Newton's conception of nature is inadequate because as the quote from the *Optics* makes clear, inertial motion implies a causal relationship to another body even if the action of that other body occurred only in the past. A notion of nature that excludes any kind of explanation in terms of external causes is too extreme for the First Law of Motion

Newton has several dilemmas. On the one hand, he cannot ascribe a body's inertial motion to a continuously acting external force, nor can he ascribe its continuing motion to an inherent force, which would make a body self-propelled On the other hand, he cannot maintain that a body of itself contributes nothing to its uniform rectilinear motion or rest and is entirely determined by external forces, for a body, in virtue of its inertia, acts uniformly in characteristic ways Yet, inertia is passive, open to both uniform rectilinear motion and rest, and not ordered toward any particular place or direction It is not an efficient cause of its own activity Thus, inertial motion and rest point toward an external cause, which is problematic for Newton's conception of nature However, inertia is inherent and necessary and thereby implies some conception of nature Though Newton regards inertial motion and rest as inactive, nevertheless, inertia is somehow present in them Also, for Newton, resistance is passive,

although resistance to an impressed force is something a body does, and so seems active. Even more curiously, for Newton, inertia is a passive principle, although by it a body endeavors to change the state of bodies that act upon it Newton's solution to these difficulties and his explanation of the First Law draw upon the very inadequate conceptions and language available to him in his own natural philosophy, the thinking characteristic of his age, and a mathematical approach to nature, which are the sources of many of the paradoxes and difficulties of Definition 3 in the *Principia* Newton's general framework fails to solve the dilemmas and difficulties posed by inertia and the First Law Another framework is needed

An Aristotelian conception of nature helps resolve Newton's dilemmas In the Aristotelian sense, nature may be considered as material and as formal As material, nature is the source of various potentialities for extrinsic influence As formal, nature is a source of activity Newton famously rejected the notion of form, but ironically the notion of form along with the attendant Aristotelian principles of potency and act can help explain how the principle of inertia is a natural principle Inertia, considered in terms of these principles, would be a generic accident of a body that results from a form [74] An accident further specifies its subject [75] Some accidents are necessary to a thing and others are not [76] Inertia would be an accident that necessarily belongs to a thing by virtue of the principles of its nature As such, inertia would be inherent and inseparable from a body, a description of inertia that fits that given by physicists

As an accident of a body resulting from a form, inertia is a form in a subject. Since a form is an act or actuality of that which it forms, inertia, considered as form, would be an act of a body [77] As such, inertia

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[74] "[A]ccidents that result from the form are properties belonging to the genus or species, and consequently they are found in everything sharing the nature of the genus or species" Thomas Aquinas, *Being and Essence*, 2nd rev ed , trans and notes by Armand Maurer (Toronto The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1968), chap 6, p 69

[75] "Because essence is what the definition signifies accidents must have an essence in the same way that they have a definition Accidental being results from an accident and a subject when the former comes to the later" Aquinas, *Being and Essence*, 6 66

[76] Ibid , 4 56

[77] "Because form causes actual existence, form is said to be an act" Thomas Aquinas, *The Principles of Nature*, in Joseph Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements A Translation and Interpretation of the 'De Principiis Naturae' and the 'De Mixtione Elementorum' of St Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame Univ of Notre Dame Press, 1998), chap 1, p 6

would be an inherent principle by which a body acts in the characteristic ways that Newton ascribes to the *vis inertiae*, for everything acts according to its form [78] Since inertia is an act, a body simply acts so as to persevere in uniform rectilinear motion or rest because "everything acts in so far as it is in act "[79] Put in another way, an inclination follows from every form [80] Thus, if inertia were regarded as determined by a formal principle, a body in virtue of its inertia would have an inclination to persevere in either uniform rectilinear motion or rest, to resist impressed forces, and to endeavor to change the state of another body impressing a force upon it

In addition, and very importantly, form, in inanimate things, is not an efficient cause of a body's own activity [81] For Aquinas, nature is a principle of motion and should not be conceived as a moving cause [82] Some of his harshest words are used for those who would modify Aristotle's definition of nature so that nature becomes a *vis insita* [83] Thus, inertia considered as a form would not imply that a body is self-propelled or that it is moving itself through some kind of immanent force Consequently, when physicists say that the motion of a body continues because of its inertia or that a body perseveres in uniform rectilinear motion or rest by the force of inertia, this should be understood to mean that inertia is a formal and not an efficient principle of a body's inertial motion or rest Inertia "maintains" a body in uniform

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[78] "Everything acts in accord with its form " Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, q 4, a 3c in *The Basic Writings of St Thomas Aquinas*, ed Anton Pegis (New York Random House, 1945) Henceforth *ST* All references herein to *ST* are from Pegis, except where otherwise noted "Nothing is actual except by its form " Aquinas, *ST* I, q 7, a 3c

[79] Aquinas, *ST* I–II, q 55, a 2c

[80] "[S]ome inclination follows every form " Aquinas, *ST* I, q 80, a. 1c

[81] Aristotle, *Physics* 8 4 255a5–19

[82] On the distinction between a principle and a mover and the tendency of thinkers to reify principles, see James A Weisheipl, O P , "Specter of *Motor Coniunctus*," in *Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages*, ed William Carroll (Washington, D C Catholic Univ Press, 1985), 100, 113–18, "Aristotle's Concept of Nature Avicenna and Aquinas," in *Approaches to Nature*, ed Lawrence D Roberts (Binghamton, N Y Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), 146–54, "The Principle *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* in Medieval Physics," *Isis* 56 (1965) 38–41, and *Nature and Gravitation* (River Forest, Ill Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1955), 22–9

[83] "Hence they are to be laughed at [*Unde deridendi sunt*] who, wishing to correct the definition of Aristotle, tried to define nature by something absolute, saying that nature is a power seated in things [*natura est vis insita rebus*] or something of this sort " Aquinas, *On Aristotle's Physics*, 2 145

rectilinear motion or rest as a formal constituent from which such motion or rest follows [84] As formal, inertia is not a propulsion source for a body's inertial motion Put in another way, Kant's view of inertia as signifying nothing but the lifelessness of a body involves a false dichotomy. a body need not be alive to act from an inherent principle.

Furthermore, since the inertia of a body is not of itself determined to either of the opposed states of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, inertia is open to one or the other of the opposed states Thus, a principle of potency is implied, for a body that is open to opposed states must be in potency to them [85] Consequently, some force external to a body must determine it to one or the other state, thereby further forming it A body, after being acted upon by an external force, is then either in the act of rest or the act of uniform rectilinear motion. Motion or rest, which are generable and corruptible and caused by an external force, add to inertia, which is an inseparable but incomplete accident.[86]

Inertial motion, then, would follow from a form generated in a body by an external force that has further determined the body So considered, inertial motion would be consistent with Newton's claim that the *vis inertiae* of a body does not operate as a continuous mover that keeps a body in uniform rectilinear motion A body's inertial motion (as distinct from its inertia) would be received from another and would follow from an act enduring in the body as a further actualization of it. Thus, a body would persevere in inertial motion without requiring a continuous moving cause to sustain its ongoing uniform rectilinear motion, that is, it could persist in uniform rectilinear motion when it is no longer being acted upon. The body would just remain in act, which adequately captures the sense of passivity that Newton claims for the *vis inertiae* while at the same time doing

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[84] The conception of inertia as a formal constituent is represented mathematically in momentum mv and kinetic energy $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$ where m is the inertial mass and v is the velocity

[85] "For the same thing can be potentially at the same time two contraries, but it cannot be actually" Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans W D Ross, 4 5 1009a34–6,

[86] "But sometimes accidents are caused only as aptitudes, and they are completed by an external agent, like transparency in the air, which is complemented by an external luminous body In cases like these the aptitude is an inseparable accident, whereas the completion that comes from a source external to the essence of the thing, or that does not enter into its constitution, will be separable from it, like movement and other accidents of this kind" Aquinas, *Being and Essence*, 6 69–70

justice to the dynamic character of what inertia and inertial motion and rest do

With respect to rest, Newton and other thinkers, such as Descartes, regarded rest as an absence of activity because a body at rest remains the same and is unchanging [87] This would be true if "activity" were limited to change or the production of something new in or by a body However, for Aristotle, rest is a motionless act or an unchanging activity.[88] If one embraces Aristotle's larger notion of activity in which a constant unchanging act is an activity, then rest is an activity A body at rest is in act Newton, following Descartes, not only conceived of rest as an unchanging state but also regarded uniform rectilinear motion as an unchanging state equivalent to rest [89] For this reason, Descartes and Newton thought that uniform rectilinear motion, unlike accelerated motion, did not require a continuously acting mover.[90] Consequently, just as rest was not considered an activity, so too persevering in uniform rectilinear motion was not considered an activity, which is one reason that on Newton's account the *vis inertiae* is inactive in such motion. On this view, a body, whether at rest or in inertial motion, is not doing anything, and, thus, the *vis inertiae* need not operate. Newton, lacking Aristotle's analogical notion of act and activity, could not understand how inertial motion could be an activity and yet not be the result of a continuously acting agency. Newton, therefore, resorted to the paradoxical notion of *vis inertiae* in attempting to solve this and related problems

Inertia, considered in terms of form, potency, and act not only better expresses the facts about inertia but also solves an additional problem to which Newton's *vis inertiae* gives rise The problem concerns how Newton's inactive and passive *vis inertiae* is called into exercise when bodies collide [91] Consider a collision between bodies A and B According to Newton, each body, by means of its *vis inertiae*, resists the other and endeavors to change the state of the other The

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[87] Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 2 24–8 For the influence of Descartes on Newton, see Alexandre Koyré, "Newton and Descartes," in *Newtonian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass Harvard Univ Press, 1965), 53–114, and Gabbey, "Force and Inertia," 230–320

[88] "[T]here is not only an activity of movement but an activity of immobility" Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans W D Ross, 7 14 1154b26–7 See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9 8 1050a15–1050b2

[89] Shapere, "The Philosophical Significance of Newton's Science," 285–99

[90] Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 2 37–8

[91] Ernan McMullin, *Newton on Matter and Activity* (Notre Dame Univ of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 36–42

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two bodies supposedly impress forces upon each other as a result of resisting the impressed force of the other The problem concerns the origin of the impressed forces Neither body, in virtue of its *vis inertiae*, can exert an impressed force *upon* the other unless they resist an impressed force *from* the other Body A cannot exert an impressed force on B unless B exerts an impressed force upon A However, body B cannot exert an impressed force upon body A unless A exerts an impressed force upon body B How does one get an original impressed force? Two passive and inactive forces cannot mutually set each other into operation In order for the two colliding bodies to change from passive perseverance to active resistance, some other force must be involved, but Newton posits no such force. Thus, on Newton's account, two colliding bodies could not exercise their *vis inertiae* and could not resist and endeavor to change each other However, inertia, considered as an act of a body, and inertial motion and rest, regarded as further actualizations of a body, explain how two bodies act upon each other in collisions The bodies collide with each other and then act because they are already in act Once brought into mutual contact, each of the colliding bodies, in virtue of its inertia and of its rest or uniform rectilinear motion, tends to persevere in its motion or rest and to resist and endeavor to change the other because a thing acts insofar as it is in act Thus, the inertia of a body and its perseverance in inertial motion or rest are better understood as acts of that body and not as something inactive Considering inertia and inertial motion and rest in this way avoids the problematic conception of inertia as a force and treats the resistance and endeavor of inertia as following upon its inclination to persevere in uniform rectilinear motion or rest rather than reversing the order of perseverance and resistance as Newton did

Special Relativity further supports the notion that inertia is an act or activity, for according to Einstein's famous equation $E=mc^2$ the inertial mass of a body is itself a form of energy Inertia is not accurately described as brute resistant matter. Even in prerelativistic physics, a body moving inertially has kinetic energy [92] Thus, the inertial motion of a body is an energetic activity even if there is no

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[92] Kinetic energy is the energy of motion and is a measure of a body's capacity to do work in virtue of its velocity A body's kinetic energy (in Newtonian physics) equals one half the mass of the body multiplied by its velocity squared ($\frac{1}{2}mv^2$) Ohanian, *Physics*, vol 1, 162–3 The form by which a body moves inertially and its relation to kinetic energy, momentum, and heat are analyzed in Anthony Rizzi, *The Science Before Science* (Baton Rouge, LA IAP Press, 2004), 193–203

ongoing action of one thing upon another A body at rest may also be thought to have energy in virtue of its position For example, the work done in raising a heavy body some distance above the ground might be thought of as building work or energy into the body at its position [93] In virtue of its position and in respect to an external force, the body then has potential energy [94] Energy is commonly regarded as something active. Consequently, since inertia, uniform rectilinear motion, and rest all involve forms of energy, they are reasonably regarded as activities even though they need not involve the ongoing action of one thing upon another Newton could not recognize this not only because he did not have the notion of energy but also because of his limited notion of activity

The solution presented above offers several advantages from an Aristotelian or Thomistic perspective First, the principle of inertia shows the dependence of motion on a mover better than the natural motions of the Aristotelian elemental bodies [95] The natural motions of the sublunar bodies, though following upon their natures, are from another For this reason, Aquinas says that *gravitas* is a passive principle [96] The generator of a heavy or light body is the efficient cause of

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[93] "You will undoubtedly be familiar with another way of interpreting a potential energy such as *U(h)* in the last equation It represents exactly the amount of work that *we* would have to do in order to raise an object through a distance *h*, against the gravitational pull, without giving it any kinetic energy " French, *Newtonian Mechanics*, 378

[94] Expressed mathematically, the gravitational potential energy of an apple with respect to the ground equals *mgh* (for small displacements near the Earth's surface) where *m* is the mass of the apple, *g* is the acceleration produced by gravity near the surface of the Earth, and *h* is the height of the apple above the ground Since *mg* equals the constant force of gravity on the apple, the apple's potential energy with respect to the ground equals the force of gravity on the apple multiplied by its height above the ground French, *Newtonian Mechanics*, 376–7

[95] In previously published work, I have addressed issues concerning Newton's First Law of Motion, mover causality, and the Aristotelian definition of motion See Thomas J McLaughlin, "Aristotelian Mover-Causality and the Principle of Inertia," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1998) 137–51, and "Local Motion and the Principle of Inertia Aquinas, Newtonian Physics, and Relativity," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (2004) 239–64

[96] "Now we do not find in any non-living body any originative source of motion There is in living things an active principle of motion, namely, the soul, while in non-living bodies there is no such active principle of motion which could move, but such things are moved by an external mover, which is the generator or that which removes what prevents motion Yet they do have a passive principle of motion within, by which they are apt to be moved, for example, heaviness or lightness " Aquinas, *Exposition of Aristotle's On the Heavens*, 2 305

its natural motion Nevertheless, once formed, a sublunar body immediately moves toward a place that fulfills its nature Its local motion is then consequent upon a formal principle of motion [97] The movements of such bodies present the greatest difficulty because that from which their motion is derived is not clear Therefore, it is not as evident that they are moved by another [98] By contrast, the local motion of a body that has inertia is not inherently consequent upon its property of inertia [99] Inertia, simply of itself, has no preferred direction or inherent orientation to a place. Motion does not follow from it alone because, of itself and wherever it may be, inertia is indeterminate with respect to motion or rest Something further is required for a body to be in motion. In this respect, inertia is unlike the Aristotelian notions of *gravitas* and *levitas*, which are more easily misconstrued as movers than is inertia. A body, in virtue of its inertia, is more clearly moved by another than are the Aristotelian elemental bodies Thus, the principle of inertia better shows the dependence of motion on a mover

A second advantage from an Aristotelian or Thomistic perspective concerns the distinction between natural and compulsory motion Heidegger, in a quotation footnoted at the beginning of this paper, asserts that Newton's First Law eliminates "the difference between natural and against nature, i e , forced." However, the principle of inertia does provide a basis for a distinction between natural and compulsory motion if one considers the resistance of inertia to various impressed forces. For by its inertia, a body does not resist gravity in the way that it resists other forces A body in freefall, that is a body

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[97] "However, in heavy [*gravibus*] and light [*levibus*] bodies there is a formal principle of motion (But a formal principle of this sort cannot be called the active potency to which this motion pertains Rather it is understood as passive potency For heaviness [*gravitas*] in earth is not a principle for moving, but rather for being moved) For just as the other accidents are consequent upon substantial form, so also is place, and thus also 'to be moved to place.' However, the natural form is not the mover Rather the mover is that which generates and gives such and such a form upon which such a motion follows " Aquinas, *On Aristotle's Physics*, 2 144 "Hence, to ask why a heavy thing is moved downward is nothing other than to ask why it is heavy The same thing which makes it heavy also makes it to be moved downward " *On Aristotle's Physics*, 8 1034

[98] Aristotle, *Physics* 8 4 254b7–255a5 See also Aquinas, *On Aristotle's Physics*, 8 1021–8

[99] The motion of bodies without rest mass, such as light, would seem to follow from their nature Light, however, cannot rest, though it can be impeded

which is not subject to any forces other than gravity, does not feel heavy nor do weighing scales and other such devices record any weight In freefall, a body is weightless, though gravity is not, of course, absent. Weight requires an obstacle to gravity When an obstacle prevents or hinders a body's gravitational motion, the body then feels heavy and measuring devices record a weight [100] Consequently, in freefalling gravitational motion and in persevering in uniform rectilinear motion by its inertia, a body, in Aquinas' words, "is not moved with labor."[101] Such motions are natural However, because of the way in which inertia resists many other forces, a body is moved by these other forces "with labor" They are resisted in manifest and measurable ways Therefore, considered with respect to its inertia, the acceleration of a body by such forces would be compulsory

An advantage of Aristotle's notion of nature compared to that of the ancient atomists is that on an Aristotelian conception of nature, something can have an extrinsic cause and still be natural Some causes outside a body are natural and others are not [102] Aristotle's principle of potency makes this broader conception of nature intelligible As material, nature is the source of various potentialities for extrinsic influence, and so, a body's potency can be actualized by an extrinsic cause to which it is naturally disposed The resulting motion or actualization would then be natural. Therefore, gravity and gravitational motion, even viewed as having an extrinsic cause, can be natural Whether something is according to nature or against nature depends upon the potency of the body and its relation to an agent Although a developed account of natural and compulsory motion will not be given here, the basis for distinguishing between natural and compulsory motion is present in inertial physics, even if physicists think of it in different, perhaps confusing, terms [103]

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[100] French, *Newtonian Mechanics*, 285

[101] See fn 27

[102] "And the motion of things that derive their motion from something else is in some cases natural, in others unnatural Some of them are capable of causing motion unnaturally (e g the lever is not naturally capable of moving the weight), others naturally (e g what is actually hot is naturally capable of moving what is potentially hot) So when fire or earth is moved by something the motion is natural when it brings to actuality the proper activities that they potentially possess" Aristotle, *Physics* 8 4 254b20–255a30

[103] For an account of natural and compulsory motion and of final causality, see John W Keck, "The Natural Motion of Matter in Newtonian and Post-Newtonian Physics," *The Thomist* 71 (2007) 529–54

Finally, according to Aristotle, nature acts for an end As noted previously, the task of this paper is not to argue that inertia and motion according to Newton's First Law are goal directed For now, I merely note that an argument for final causality *could* begin by considering the respects in which inertia and Newton's First Law are natural in the Aristotelian sense and then argue on the basis of the principle that nature acts for an end that Newton's First Law of Motion and the property of inertia must be teleological. The task would then be to discover that teleology

Inertia is a generic principle of motion and rest within a body, though at a minimal formed level Inertia informs the First Law of Motion, which is thereby called the principle of inertia In virtue of its inertia, a body acts and is acted upon in very definite, characteristic and uniform ways Newton and physicists from his time to ours have regarded inertia as an inherent principle by which a body perseveres in either uniform rectilinear motion or rest, resists impressed forces, and endeavors to change the state of those bodies upon which it acts In short, inertia is not inert The various physical examples given in this paper show that the principle of inertia does not treat a body as if it has no inherent principle The unsuccessful attempts by physicists to find an extrinsic origin of inertia, though they may eventually lead to new discoveries, further support the view that inertia is an inherent principle of nature Newton himself understood the principle of inertia through an eclectic but largely nonAristotelian conception of nature and matter and by the problematic notion of a *vis inertiae* However, Newton's general philosophy of nature should be distinguished from the more specific content of the First Law and of inertia itself A general Aristotelian conception of nature can resolve many of Newton's difficulties Thus, inertia and the First Law of Motion are reasonably regarded as natural in the general Aristotelian sense, though a teleological account of these principles remains to be given [104]

St John Vianney Theological Seminary

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THE MORAL INEVITABILITY OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE MOMENT: READING KANT'S *WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?*

ANTOON BRAECKMAN

S*YMBOL AND TEXT* Where the Enlightenment is concerned, there are few philosophical texts which are so often cited as Kant's famous essay *An Answer to the Question What is Enlightenment?*[1] This occasional text, which started out as an answer to a question raised incidentally in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, has in the course of the last two hundred years grown to become the symbolic text of the philosophical Enlightenment.[2] The reasons for this are obvious It is a text which, in terms of its textuality already displays a number of features

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Correspondence to Center for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium

[1] Kant's text originally appeared in December 1784 in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* The secondary literature on this famous text is now almost too extensive to survey, hence the instructiveness of the anthology compiled by James Schmidt, which includes both the texts which provided the immediate impetus for Kant's essay and the most interesting documents in its (contemporary) philosophical reception *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and Twentieth Century Questions*, ed James Schmidt (Berkeley University of California Press, 1996) More recent studies of Kant's text and its philosophical significance can be found, among others, in the proceedings of the "IX Internationaler Kant-Kongress," which was held in Berlin in March 2000 and was devoted to "Kant und die Berliner Aufklarung" *Kant und die Berliner Aufklarung*, eds Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher, *Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, vol 5 (New York Walter De Gruyter, 2001)

[2] The question "What is Enlightenment?" had appeared in an article by the preacher, theologian, and educationalist Johann Friedrich Zollner (1753–1804) in the December issue of 1783 Zollner was responding to an earlier, anonymous text published in the same journal in which a plea was made for purely civil marriage. In a footnote, Zollner raised the question (in translation) "*What is Enlightenment?* The question, which is almost as important as the question *What is truth?*, should be answered before one begins to enlighten others And yet I have never found it answered anywhere " Apart from Kant (1724–1804), Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) also took the opportunity to formulate an answer to this question Mendelssohn's contribution appeared in September 1784 under the title "Uber die Frage was heisst aufklaren?" (*On the Question what is Enlightenment?*) The *Berlinische*

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traditionally associated with the phenomenon of the Enlightenment To start with, there is the element of self-reflection and self-justification In Kant's text, the *Aufklarung* seeks to give an account of itself, and tries to understand and explain itself In addition, the text's pronouncements are those of an intellectual who speaks out freely, relies on his own understanding, and addresses a broad public via a readily accessible text As a piece of writing, *What is Enlightenment?* is thus thoroughly "enlightened." Yet we also find the classic agenda of the Enlightenment in Kant's very argument. Characteristic here is the plea for the emancipation of thinking and the insistence on the importance of thinking *for oneself* (*sapere aude*) Equally typical is the link which is made between this question and the political conditions which make it possible Kant refers expressly to the need for politically guaranteed publicity, in which this independent thinking can be articulated freely and without hindrance One final recognizable feature is the way in which the *Enlightenment* becomes embedded in an historical-philosophical dynamic, which is intended to demonstrate that the Enlightenment is inevitable because it is ingrained in the very nature of things, and that it should therefore be immediately promoted and brought about.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in numerous publications both past and present, *What is Enlightenment?* figures as a model text for the Enlightenment, or what is taken to be the Enlightenment [3] This is

Monatsschrift functioned at that time as the public mouthpiece of the so-called "Wednesday Club" (*Mittwochgesellschaft*) in Berlin a secret (!) club of "friends of the Enlightenment," founded in 1783, in which around twenty intellectuals (writers, philosophers, clerics) and leading civil servants at the court of Frederick the Great (lawyers, financial advisers, doctors) met on a regular basis to discuss the prospects and consequences of the Enlightenment See James Schmidt, "The Question of Enlightenment Kant, Mendelssohn, and the *Mittwochgesellschaft*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50 (1989) 272–5, see also James Schmidt, "What Enlightenment Was How Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant Answered the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 30 (1992) 77–101 Fundamental to these discussions was the question how far the Enlightenment could go without damaging the social order Behind Zollner's apparently casual question and Mendelssohn's answer there thus lay intense discussion of which Kant had no knowledge (Schmidt, "The Question of Enlightenment," 272)

[3] An excessively homogeneous and monochrome picture of the Enlightenment is often still painted in the literature It is the great merit of authors such as Panajotis Kondylis to have pointed out that what we nowadays call *the* Enlightenment is essentially an amalgam of various currents and convictions which often stood in tension with one another Thus he shows that the

no less true in Habermas's reading of *What is Enlightenment?*[4] and in that of Foucault[5] They may avoid offering a predictable reading of Kant's essay, but like many others they all too readily refer *What is Enlightenment?* back to a number of central ideas and insights that can be easily linked with the great themes of the Enlightenment, or at any rate with their interpretation of it Thus Habermas in his reading emphasizes the role that Kant assigns to publicity (*Offentlichkeit*) In Kant, Habermas argues, this publicity assumes its full significance for the first time[6] This is because, for Kant, publicity is not just the sphere where people become mature (*aufgeklart*), but also the sphere where that maturity is deployed politically as a mediating factor between political authority and the citizen. The only problem is that Kant still regards the origination of this publicity, in historico-philosophical terms, as an inevitable step in the gradual progress of

intellectual trends within the German *Aufklarung*, the French *Siècle des Lumières*, and the British Enlightenment display distinctly differing orientations The pietistic and sentimental-philosophical components of the German Enlightenment are hard to reconcile with the austere rationalism and materialism of the French Enlightenment, while eighteenth-century British empiricism and sensualism present yet another face of the Enlightenment Somewhat provocatively, Kondylis also argues that if one can speak of a common denominator in these disparate Enlightenment phenomena, it should be sought in the "rehabilitation of sensuality" rather than in some form of putative rationalism In this conception, Kant therefore appears rather as an exception, not as an exponent of the German *Aufklarung* See Panajotis Kondylis, *Die Aufklarung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus* (Stuttgart Klett-Cotta, 1981), pp 19, 638–40

[4] Jurgen Habermas, "Publicity as the Bridging Principle between Politics and Morality (Kant)," in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge MIT Press, 1991), 102–17 For Habermas' broader vision of the "project of enlightenment" (and its supposed enemies), see Jurgen Habermas, "Die Moderne—ein unvollendetes Projekt," in Jurgen Habermas, *Kleine politische Schriften I–IV* (Frankfurt Suhrkamp, 1981), 444–64

[5] Foucault's "What is Enlightenment" was originally published in English in *The Foucault Reader*, ed Paul Rabinow (New York Pantheon Books, 1984), 32–50, for the French version, "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?" see Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954–1988*, vol II 1976–1988 (Paris Gallimard, 2001), 1381–97 Another text by Foucault entitled "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?" about Kant and the Enlightenment appeared in *Magazine littéraire* in 1984 (no 207, May 1984 35–9) This is an extract from a lecture by Foucault given on 5 January 1983 to the "Collège de France " This text is also included in Foucault, *Dits et écrits* (II), 1498–1507

[6] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 102 Habermas offers an even more teleological formulation "its theoretically fully developed form " For a critique of Habermas' over-rapid identification of Kant's "public use of reason" and the liberal idea of a political public sphere, see Ciaran Cronin, "Kant's Politics of Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41 (2003) 54–5

mankind and its institutions towards a complete (cosmopolitan) civic order [7] Foucault for his part pays hardly any attention in his reading of *What is Enlightenment?* to this question of publicity, or to its historico-philosophical underpinnings For him,

> in the text on *Aufklarung*, [Kant] deals with the question of contemporary reality alone He is not seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement He is looking for a difference What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?[8]

The way in which Kant raises the question about the present and elevates this question to the status of a philosophical task, Foucault argues, is new [9] So much so, in fact, that Foucault believes it is a point of departure "the outline of what one might call the attitude of modernity "[10] By this Foucault means an attitude toward the present which can be defined as a critique of our historical way of being, of the historical way in which we constitute ourselves as subjects here and now, and of the possibilities contained therein of transcending this historical specificity [11] Foucault refers in this connection to a philosophical ethos [12] He sees the possibility of remaining linked with the spirit of the *Enlightenment* as lying in the permanent reactivation of this attitude, rather than in staying true to specific doctrinal principles [13] For Foucault too, *What is Enlightenment?* thus represents an important event, albeit in a fundamentally different sense than for

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[7] Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 111, see also 104, 109

[8] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 34

[9] Ibid , 38, see also 33–4

[10] Ibid , 38

[11] Ibid , 42, 45

[12] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 45, Foucault, *Dits et écrits* (II), 1506 Referring to Baudelaire, Foucault also defines this ethos as follows "For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it" (Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 41)

[13] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 42 On Foucault's reading of Kant and the significance of the concept of Enlightenment in Foucault see, among others, Christopher Norris, "*What is Enlightenment?* Kant according to Foucault," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed Gary Gutting (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1994), 159–96, Jurgen Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present," in *Foucault a Critical Reader*, ed David Couzens Hoy (Oxford Blackwells, 1986), 103–8, Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves, "Between Nietzsche and Kant Michel Foucault's Reading of *What is Enlightenment?*" *History of Political Thought* 20 (1999) 337–56

Habermas [14] Whereas for Habermas Kant's essay marks the historical moment at which publicity first acquired its full theoretical articulation, for Foucault the same text represents, likewise for the first time, a modern way of relating critically to the (historical) limits of the present and the possibility of transcending them [15]

However, these divergent interpretations of Kant's text must not cause one to overlook the fact that they are products of the same reading strategy. Both writers attribute to Kant's text an unequivocal meaning that the text does not evince at all, apart from the philosophical merits of both readings, Kant's text is reconstituted with a univocality which is at odds with the manifest ambivalence that strikes the reader right from a first contact with the text

In the following, therefore, I put these and other commentaries on Kant's famous essay aside and seek to confront the text afresh by means of a close reading In terms of methodology, I take the polysemy referred to above as my starting-point, in the conviction that careful exploration of it will contribute to a plausible interpretation of the text and the elucidation of its meaning [16]

II

Obvious ambiguities Contrary to what one might suppose, the striking ambiguity of *What is Enlightenment?* is independent of

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[14] For the divergent readings of Kant in Foucault and Habermas, see Hubert L Dreyfus, & Paul Rabinow, "What is maturity? Habermas and Foucault on *What is Enlightenment?*" in *Foucault a Critical Reader*, 109–21 However, in his critical assessment of Dreyfus & Rabinow's reading of Foucault, Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves points out that both overlook the Nietzschean character of Foucault's reading of Kant He claims that Foucault's "ontology of ourselves," and indeed his ethos of transgression and aesthetic self-styling, are far closer to Nietzsche's "revaluation of all values" than Kant's idea of "maturity" (Passerin d'Entrèves, "Between Nietzsche and Kant," 356)

[15] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 47

[16] Obviously reference is made in the literature on occasion to unclear points or ambiguities in Kant's text, but as a rule these are "resolved" through reference to the essay's historical context In the following I take precisely the opposite approach, I tackle these unclear points and ambiguities not as impurities to be explained (away) with reference to the context in a text which otherwise communicates a clear message, but as entry points for prizing open the text to reveal its underlying and often polysemic layers of meaning

external, editorial factors It is not the genre—that of an essay intended for a broad public which is compelled to dispense with the precision of technical philosophical language—that is responsible for the ambiguous character of the text, nor, indeed, for any verbal inconsistencies, implicit contradictions, or unclear positions Kant's text is by no means free of such features, but the cause of the ambiguity does not lie in that quarter The text's ambiguous character derives from the striking ambiguity of the key players within the enlightenment process as sketched out by Kant, the result being that, in Kant's essay, the phenomenon of the Enlightenment itself becomes thoroughly ambivalent

Why Kant attributes such an ambiguous character to the key players within the Enlightenment requires clarification Yet it is necessary to first explain in what sense they are ambiguous Incidentally, in answering this question we shall discover that the elements that Habermas and Foucault put forward as the core of Kant's argument, such as. publicity, the historico-philosophical inevitability of the Enlightenment, the role of the intellectual, the task of philosophy as a critical ontology of the present, et cetera, share this same ambiguity

"*Enlightenment,*" runs the famous opening sentence of Kant's essay,

> *is the human being's emergence from his self-incured minority Minority* is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another *Sapere aude!* Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment![17]

With a single sentence, Kant indicates what enlightenment is thinking for oneself, no longer following others in one's thinking, but having the courage "to use one's own understanding "[18] Enlightenment, Kant tells us, in this sense runs counter both to those who lack the courage

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[17] Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Akademie-Ausgabe (Berlin Walter de Gruyter, 1902) (henceforth "AA"), vol VIII, 35, Immanuel Kant, *An answer to the question What is enlightenment?* in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, ed and trans Mary J Gregor (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17 (Kant's texts will be referred to throughout by volume and page number of AA, followed, between parentheses, by the page numbers of their English translation)

[18] In what follows "the Enlightenment" refers to the eighteenth-century cultural and political movement at large, "enlightenment," by contrast, refers to the process that Kant seeks to define in his essay and whose intended meaning should not be restricted to the eighteenth century

to think for themselves and the many "guardians" (*Vormunder*) who put themselves forward as their mouthpieces and leaders Kant reserves harsh comments for both categories. "It is because of laziness and cowardice that so great a part of humankind nevertheless gladly remains minor for life."[19] And.

> That by far the greatest part of humankind should hold the step toward majority to be not only troublesome but also highly dangerous will soon be seen to by those guardians who have kindly taken it upon themselves to supervise them [20]

According to Kant, this interaction between human inertia and the paternalistic posture of the *Vormunder* is therefore the main obstacle to the elimination of immaturity and the dawning of enlightenment So much so, in fact, that Kant regards it as particularly difficult and hence improbable that an isolated individual will be capable of discarding his immaturity *unaided.*[21]

It is thus highly remarkable that a few lines later, Kant presents these same *Vormunder* as the ones who will in fact set the *enlightenment* process in motion among the masses

> For there will always be a few independent thinkers, even among the established guardians of the great masses, who, after having themselves cast off the yoke of minority will disseminate the spirit of a rational valuing of one's own worth and of the calling of each individual to think for himself [22]

In this way, according to Kant, the general public can, gradually, achieve enlightenment [23] Later on in the text, this idea is further reinforced by the actual thesis of Kant's essay, in which the enlightenment process is made directly dependent on the possibility that independent thinkers have of making public use of their own reason in all respects [24] Enlightenment on a broad scale, runs the argument, only becomes possible when independent thinkers can address the masses publicly and without hindrance Only in this way, adds Kant, can enlightenment be brought about among people [25] Like the just-quoted passage, however, this position implies that the enlightenment of the

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[19] AA 8 35 (17)

[20] Ibid

[21] Ibid 8 36 (17) "Thus it is difficult for any single individual to extricate himself from the minority that has become almost nature to him "

[22] Ibid 8 36 (17–18)

[23] Ibid 8 36 (17)

[24] Ibid 8 36 (18)

[25] Ibid 8 37 (18) "The *public* use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings "

masses is only possible in the wake of a few guardians who set the enlightenment process in motion This means that not all guardians can be tarred with the same brush Apparently, there are not just "bad," but also "good" leaders those who do not oppose the enlightenment process, but in fact make it possible The existence of guardians thus does not *ipso facto* represent a hindrance to the continuation of the enlightenment On the contrary, guardians are essential to the process Thus, paradoxically, there are guardians from whom the public needs to emancipate itself in order to achieve independent thought, as well as guardians whose example the public should follow in order to achieve independent thought

The concept of guardians thus turns out to be less unequivocal than it might seem at first sight And that ambiguity instantly contaminates a series of other terms This is the case with the concept of "the public" and with the ideal of independent thought that is held up before it After all, how are we to understand this call to independent thought, if the public is supposed to emancipate itself not from all, but only from some leaders? Does this not imply that the public is pushed back into the passive role of immaturity? But if this is so, to whom is the cry "*sapere aude*!" addressed? In other words, should the public remain passive and permit itself "to be enlightened", or should it actively cast aside immaturity through independent thought? And is such a thing possible? Does such a process not in fact presuppose people being helped by others who have already cast aside their immaturity, who are already enlightened and can therefore take the lead in the process? But if this is the case, how do these *Aufgeklarten*, these intellectuals (*die Gelehrten*) as Kant also calls them, relate to the process of enlightenment as a whole?[26] Are they necessary conditions for it, or are they its effect? Do they make enlightenment possible or are they its symptom? Here we come up against an ambivalence which, it will turn out, touches on the core of Kant's essay Because as a text, *What is Enlightenment?* is more than just an attempt to accurately define what enlightenment is It is also and above all an intervention in the process of enlightenment In writing and publishing *What is Enlightenment?*, Kant has in fact assumed the

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[26] In Kant's view, "der Gelehrten" embodies his idea of enlightenment as he, through his writings, "speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is, the world" AA 8 38 (19), see also AA 8 37 (18) In the English translation, the term "Gelehrten" has been translated as "scholar "

guise of one of the intellectuals who seek to promote the enlightenment process among the general public [27] In this way, he seeks to "enlighten" the public about enlightenment to make clear what enlightenment is, what it stands for, and what it presupposes Moreover, he does so in a manner which is consistent with what he substantively defines in the text as enlightenment [28] By publishing an accessible essay devoid of philosophical technicalities in a journal which is likewise no specialist philosophical publication, the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, he freely addresses the general public and exclusively uses his own reason in his treatment of the issue, in this case the answer to the question· *What is Enlightenment?*[29] In this sense, Kant's text is a living proof, an exquisite sign of enlightenment But to the extent that enlightenment is tangibly present in the text, Kant's essay presents itself more as a product of the enlightenment process than as its condition; the text forms a proof of enlightenment rather than an intervention in order to make it possible

This ambiguity affects the notion of enlightenment itself because the fact that Kant's essay is unable to pull off the feat of simultaneously functioning as condition and symptom of enlightenment seems to say something about enlightenment itself It makes it clear that talking about enlightenment with the aim of disseminating it already presupposes enlightenment It suggests that, strictly speaking, enlightenment is not something that can be brought about, and therefore constantly eludes the initiative of those who seek to realize it This is something that Kant himself recognizes, incidentally, as is apparent from the passages in which he roots the enlightenment process and hence makes it dependent on a broader historico-philosophical development In doing so, Kant neutralizes any sense of proactive initiative with regard to enlightenment He conveys the message that the onset and continuation of enlightenment is not a question of any

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[27] Thus Kant presents himself as a guardian, albeit, in his view of the *bona fide* sort

[28] For a similar observation, see Cronin, "Kant's Politics of Enlightenment," 65

[29] In this compact form these very criteria are to be found in Kant's discussion of what enlightenment might mean for a cleric "On the other hand as a scholar, who by his writings speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is, the world—hence a clergyman in the *public use* of his reason—he enjoys an unrestricted freedom to make use of his own reason and to speak in his own person" (AA 8 38 [19])

specific initiative, but is dependent on a development which lies in the nature of things and as such transcends any specific initiative These passages occur at the point where Kant responds to the hypothesis that malicious intellectuals might conspire to sabotage the enlightenment process Kant replies·

> I say that this is quite impossible Such a contract, concluded to keep all further enlightenment away from the human race forever, is absolutely null and void This would be a crime against human nature, whose original vocation lies precisely in such progress "[30]

In this respect, too, any voluntarism is unwelcome· the enlightenment process cannot be halted Enlightenment, the text gives us to understand, is too closely bound up with the natural progress of mankind "People gradually work their way out of barbarism *of their own accord* if only one does not intentionally contrive to keep them in it "[31]

But if the Enlightenment really is a virtually inevitable stage in the spontaneous progress of mankind towards its ultimate destination, we are again confronted with the question of the role of the intellectual What, in this case, can be the point of the intellectual's attempts to advance this process? What can be the sense of interventions such as the one by Kant himself? For it is unclear whether his actions as an intellectual help to make the enlightenment process possible, or whether, conversely, these actions are made possible thanks to the enlightenment process

It is undoubtedly the case that Kant, despite what is suggested here, associates the phenomenon of the enlightenment in the text far less, or at any rate far less directly, with the role and position of the intellectual Rather, his thesis is that enlightenment stands or falls with the freedom to use one's own reason in public [32] Thus the fundamental requirement for the enlightenment is not any specific intervention on the part of any specific intellectual as the bearer of any specific competence, but the freedom to use one's own reason publicly Moreover, it is on the basis of this more fundamental requirement that Kant defines the idea of the intellectual An intellectual, we read, is anyone who makes free use of his own reason in public [33] Thus Kant declares

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[30] AA 8 39 (19–20)
[31] Ibid 8 41 (21), my emphasis
[32] Ibid 8 36 (18)

that enlightenment and the idea of the intellectual, as he defines it, share a common origin, and in this sense he unequivocally answers the ambiguity that has been pointed out However, this merely displaces the problem. The ambiguity that was noted in the determination of the intellectual's role for enlightenment returns in the plea for freedom of thought as a precondition for enlightenment. Here too, the same peculiar tension is found between the emphasis with which freedom of thought is called for and the fact of Kant's text itself, which demonstrates precisely the existence of such freedom of thought, and hence the reality of enlightenment At the textual level, incidentally, a related tension can be identified between the same demand for freedom of thought and the historico-philosophical affirmation of the inevitability of its realization Additionally, both tensions are further reinforced towards the end of the text with the eulogy of Frederick the Great, who is praised by Kant because a start has actually been made on introducing this freedom of thought under his rule [34]

Ambiguities abound, it turns out Although these are predominantly generated by the opposition between what the text is arguing for and what it is actually doing, the text contains further obscurities still Kant's definition of the intellectual is one of these. In the text, he defines the intellectual not as the holder of some competence, but with reference to a practice. Anyone who makes public use of his own reason, who addresses a universal public in his writing, is an intellectual.[35] Kant gives the example of the officer and the clergyman, who in the exercise of their profession are clearly confined in the use of reason, but outside this context, to the extent that they address a universal public in writing, must be free to use purely and simply their own reason [36] It is not as functionaries that the officer and the clergyman are intellectuals, but precisely to the extent that they are not functionaries and address the public as a whole in their writings.

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[33] In the text Kant expresses it as follows "But by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone may make of it *as a scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*" (AA 8 37 (18)) He makes a distinction between this public use of reason, associated with acting as an intellectual, and the private use of reason, associated with a person's role as the holder of a function or office "What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain *civil* post of office with which he is entrusted" (AA 8 37 [18])

[34] Kant goes so far in this connection as to rename the Age of Enlightenment as the Age of Frederick (AA 8 40 [21])

[35] Ibid 8 37–8 (18–9)

[36] Ibid

This may be an interesting way to define the idea of being an intellectual, but two factors raise questions about the scope that Kant gives to this definition Firstly, there is the striking insistence on the importance of writing and publishing.[37] Without these, Kant appears to argue, it is impossible to address a universal public, and the requirement of functioning as an intellectual is thus not fulfilled Secondly, when giving examples of intellectuals we find that Kant falls back on certain groups or classes who are well documented as suppliers of intellectuals in the traditional sense Thus, he refers to groups such as writers, doctors, army officers, clergymen, and so on [38] Everything thus suggests that Kant, despite the fact that in the text he associates the idea of an intellectual almost programmatically with the practice of using one's own reason publicly via writings, nonetheless has a clearly defined group of publicists in mind for whom such a practice is particularly appropriate

This is also clearly apparent from *The Conflict of the Faculties*—a text which, although it dates from much later (1798), can in many respects be read as a substantiation of *What is Enlightenment?* Here, Kant considers in concrete terms which intellectuals are restricted in their speech and which are able to make free use of their own reason in public As a preliminary, he draws a distinction between the "true intellectuals," who are to be found in the universities, academies, and scientific associations, and those who have enjoyed an academic education, but are working as officials on behalf of the government. As such, the latter are not free and are thus not true intellectuals [39] What is interesting, incidentally, is that Kant, in parallel with this distinction between intellectuals and those with a university education, also draws a distinction between two types of writing publications intended for colleagues within the university, and manuals for the general public Unlike the texts for specialists, in which the academic imparts his own insights with complete freedom, such manuals are, according to Kant, restricted with regard to their contents by what the government regards as admissible [40] Inevitably, then, such writings

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[37] See AA 8 37 (18) "the entire public of the *world of readers*," AA 8 37 (18) "by his writings," AA 8 38 (19) "by his writings," AA 8 39 (20) "publicly, that is, through writings," AA 8 40 (20) "the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insight "

[38] AA 8 35, 37 (17, 18–9)

[39] AA 7 18, Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans Mary J Gregor and Robert Anchor in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed and trans Allen W Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2001), 247–8

[40] Ibid 7 8 (241)

are not free and are thus not the writings of intellectuals In the process, we also learn in this way that writings are always aimed at a specific public, and not simply at a universal one, as Kant was still suggesting in *What is Enlightenment?*[41] "The public" is clearly plural But even within the group of the so-called true intellectuals, the university professors, the members of the academies and scientific associations, Kant believes that he can identify a further important distinction, between the three "higher" faculties of theology, law, and medicine and the "lower" faculty of philosophy [42] Only the philosophical faculty, runs the argument in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, is truly free compared with the higher faculties This is because theology, law, and medicine all serve the government Via the theologians, the government seeks to maintain control of the inner convictions of its subjects, via the lawyers, it attempts to regulate and control behavior and interactions between citizens, and via the doctors it ensures itself a strong and large population which is at its disposal at all times [43] Moreover, adds Kant, these higher faculties are not even free of obligation as academic educations None of them bases its teachings purely on individual reason theology relies on the Bible, the lawyer on the prevailing, positive law, and the doctor on the entirety of recognized medical treatments [44] Thus, only the philosophical faculty is completely free,[45] from which Kant, on the basis of the argument from *What is Enlightenment?* at any rate, ought to conclude that only philosophers are true intellectuals It is clear that such a conclusion,

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[41] Ibid 7 34 (260–1) "On the other hand, the teachings and views that the faculties, as theorists, have to settle with one another are directed to a different kind of public—a *learned* community devoted to the sciences, and since the people are resigned to understanding nothing about this, the government does not see fit to intervene in scholarly discussions "

[42] *Conflict of the Faculties*, AA 7 19 (248)

[43] Ibid 7 21–2 (250–1)

[44] Ibid 7 23 (251)

[45] Ibid 7 19–20 (249) "It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university also contain a faculty that is independent of the government's command with regard to its teachings, one that, having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly For without a faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government's own detriment), but reason is by its nature free and admits of no command to hold something as true (no imperative "Believe!" but only a free *credo*) The reason why this faculty, despite its great prerogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature, for a human being who can give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command " See also AA 7 27–9 (255–6)

although formally consistent with the argument in *What is Enlightenment?*, deviates significantly from Kant's position in the 1784 essay, in which the idea of an intellectual was still defined as a practice, in principle accessible to anyone, of making free and public use of one's own reason.

One final significant point which is unclear in *What is Enlightenment?* relates to freedom "For this enlightenment [that is, for emerging from minority], however," declares Kant in a famous passage, "nothing is required but *freedom*, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom namely, freedom to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters "[46] In the name of enlightenment Kant here asks for the ability to speak out about any subject in public However, he does not request anything more For Kant, the requirements for enlightenment are satisfied once such public freedom of thought is politically safeguarded once the ruler ceases to oppose such free and public use of individual reason.[47] So, at any rate, it turns out from the close of the famous essay Kant writes

> A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's freedom of *spirit* and nevertheless puts up insurmountable barriers to it, a lesser degree of the former, on the other hand, provides a space for the latter to expand to its full capacity "[48]

Freedom of thought, Kant surprisingly informs us here, does not presuppose civil freedom On the contrary. the fewer civil liberties there are, the more chance freedom of thought has. Thus according to Kant, freedom of thought and enlightenment which directly results from it have little to do with the granting of civil liberties, strictly speaking, not even with the granting of the right of freedom of speech Freedom of thought, in Kant's view, is not a right which the citizen

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[46] *What is enlightenment?* AA 8 36 (18)

[47] Ibid 8 40–1 (21–2) "A prince who does not find it beneath himself to say that he considers it his *duty* not to prescribe anything to human beings in religious matters but to leave them complete freedom, who thus even declines the arrogant name of *tolerance*, is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful world and by posterity as the one who first released the human race from minority, at least from the side of government, and left each free to make use of his own reason in all matters of conscience But only one who, himself enlightened, is not afraid of phantoms, but at the same time has a well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public peace, can say what a free state may not dare to say *Argue as much as you will and about what you will, only obey!*"

[48] Ibid 8 41 (22)

can claim It is a matter for the ruler, who seeks to safeguard it politically, either from a sense of duty, if he himself is enlightened,[49] or out of calculated self-interest, if he is simply prudent For he quickly realizes that

> When nature has unwrapped the propensity and calling to *think* freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom in acting*) and eventually even upon the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity "[50]

Kant's apology for freedom as the foundation and precondition for enlightenment thus remains rather limited in scope, especially for a text regarded as a model and benchmark for the Enlightenment [51] Enlightenment is safeguarded, according to Kant's thesis, once a ruler guarantees freedom of thought politically. This viewpoint is both simultaneously endorsed and substantiated in *The Conflict of the Faculties*

> *Enlightenment of the people* is the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong Since only natural rights and rights arising out of common human understanding are concerned here, then the natural heralds and expositors of these among the people are not officially appointed by the state but are free professors of law, that is philosophers The latter, precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are objectionable to the state, which always desires to rule alone, and they are decried, under the name of *enlighteners*, as persons dangerous to the state, although their voice is not addressed *confidentially* to the people (as the people take scarcely any or no notice at all of it and of their writings) but is addressed *respectfully* to the state, and they implore the state to take to heart that need which is felt to be legitimate This can happen by no other means than that of publicity in the event that an entire people cares to bring forward its grievances (*gravamen*) Thus the *prohibition* of publicity impedes the progress of a people towards improvement, even in that which applies to the least of its claims, namely its simple, natural right "[52]

On close inspection, Kant here reduces the general plea for freedom of thought from *What is Enlightenment?* to the plea for freedom of thought for philosophers Philosophers must have the freedom to use

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[49] Ibid 8 39–40 (20–1)

[50] Ibid 8 41–2 (22)

[51] In this respect, Cronin is right to criticize Habermas for being overready to identify Kant's view of the public arena and the required freedom of thought therein with liberal views on this matter (Cronin, "Kant's Politics of Enlightenment," 54)

[52] AA 7 89 (305)

their own reason in public because they and they alone are the suitable go-betweens mediating between people and ruler This is because they alone are capable of drawing the people's attention to its natural rights and duties, and for the same reason they are also best placed to request the ruler to respect these natural rights of the people Enlightenment, or enlightenment of the people (*Volksaufklarung*) as it is called here, thus stands or falls with the public freedom of thought of the philosophers within the state, its prohibition is at any rate an obstacle to the people's progress along the path of self-perfection Another striking feature of the quoted passage, but one which again is entirely in line with the argumentation on this point in the essay on enlightenment, is that this freedom of thought is not presented as a right or civil liberty which can be claimed by the people and *a fortiori* by the philosopher, but as a prerequisite of the ruler, which he should deploy immediately if he is at least prudent and does not wish to stand in the way of the people's momentum Here again, the conditions for the enlightenment process have to be made possible from the top down, rather than being realized from the bottom up.[53] The freedom to use one's reason in public, of which the philosopher in particular has such an explicit need and without which enlightenment is absolutely impossible, ultimately lies in the hands of the ruler Finally, if we compare this with the famous opening of *What is Enlightenment? "Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority . Sapere aude!* Have courage to make use of your own understanding!"[54] one is immediately struck by its ambiguous character Exactly how can or should man emerge from his minority? And in what sense is that minority self-imposed? What does thinking for oneself mean? And above all, to whom is this exhortation addressed? Who is authorized to make this "motto of enlightenment," as Kant calls it, his own? These are questions which, as a result of the foregoing reading, have ceased to be obvious and can no longer be clearly answered

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[53] Kant in fact confirms this in so many words To the question of how progress towards "the better" should be expected, his answer is clear "not by the movement of things *from bottom to top*, but *from top to bottom*" (*Conflict of the Faculties* AA 7 92 [307])

[54] AA 8 35 (17)

III

"What is" and "what should be" The question now is how we are supposed to understand this remarkable ambiguity in the text? When we reread the text and try to relate the highlighted ambiguities to one another, it turns out that they are virtually all generated by the same fundamental tension that seems to dominate the argumentation in the text and is responsible for its surprising ambiguity

In terms of argumentation, this tension can be described as follows: firstly, the text indicates that enlightenment will in any case continue in accordance with a historico-philosophical dynamic, yet at the same time it makes an insistent plea for the concrete conditions to be satisfied so that this realization of enlightenment will actually take place This tension recurs at the level of the text as an historic act, as a concrete intervention Secondly, the publication of such a text proves that, to a certain extent, enlightenment is already a *fait accompli*, yet at the same time there is every indication that the text understands itself and is meant to be read as an intervention in view of helping enlightenment to come about, or, as the case may be, to promoting it If we take these two tensions together, the message of Kant's text is roughly as follows A start has already been made with respect to enlightenment and in principle this process will continue, provided it is not opposed at any rate I therefore regard it as intellectually important to take action and to call on everyone who is responsible to continue to satisfy the conditions for the continuation of this process, and above all to safeguard it

If we read the text in this sense, its historico-philosophical perspective is substantially reduced in favor of its significance as a concrete, historical intervention According to this interpretation, what is intended here from the historico-philosophical viewpoint is more in the nature of "what should be" rather than "what *will* be the case," it represents a normative ideal—one to which Kant wishes to contribute in order to realize it—rather than an historico-philosophical *telos* which inevitably will be realized Precisely because the historico-philosophical dimension of the text is reduced in this reading to a normative appeal, the focus on "what actually is" increases, and hence too the importance of the text as an historical intervention To formulate it in a way that is closer to the issues of the text as the historico-philosophical "prophecy" becomes less prominent, so the possible

threat to the enlightenment process needs to be taken more seriously, and so too Kant's own intervention becomes more significant.

The question then is whether there are good reasons to interpret the historico-philosophical perspective of *What is Enlightenment?* in the above sense. This comes down to the question what epistemological status Kant attributes to his historico-philosophical declarations Without claiming to offer an exhaustive treatment of the issue here, there are two important texts in which Kant expresses himself more explicitly about this point than he does in the essay about enlightenment *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, which in fact dates from the same year, 1784, and the previously mentioned *The Conflict of the Faculties* from 1798, which, as stated, can to a certain extent be read as a substantiation of the enlightenment essay. *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* is an especially interesting text from this viewpoint, as the (epistemological) status of the philosophy of history that has been expounded in the foregoing pages is made very clear at the end of the text. Kant writes *"A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind,"* which is precisely what Kant seeks to do in this essay,

> *must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself* It is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends, it would seem that only a *novel* could result from such premises. Yet if it may be assumed that nature does not work without a plan and purposeful end, even amidst the arbitrary play of human freedom, this idea might nevertheless prove useful And although we are too short-sighted to perceive the hidden mechanism of nature's scheme, this idea may yet serve as a guide to us in representing an otherwise planless *aggregate* of human actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a *system* "[55]

Kant here accounts for the possibly problematic status of the philosophy of history The comparison with a novel does at least indicate that Kant recognizes that philosophies of history inevitably include an element of fiction, but, the passage suggests, this does not detract

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[55] AA 8 29, Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, in Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed H S Reiss, trans H B Nisbet (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51–2

from the special value of such philosophies of history To start with, it enables us to bring coherence to the chaos of events In this way, the philosophy of history fulfils an important "Ersatz" function, as we are incapable of perceiving the actual rational coherence in the multiplicity of events, although such a coherence has to be assumed in one way or another Moreover, and this is a second point, such a philosophy of history invariably rewrites history in view of an idea, that is, of an ideal which is ultimately to be achieved, and thus may in turn be conducive for the actual realization of that ideal. Thus philosophies of history, so Kant seems to argue, have both a heuristic, methodological function and a historical, practical one They bring order into the totality of historical events on the basis of a preconceived normative ideal, and in doing so they also actually contribute to the concrete, historical realization of that ideal.

Applied to the Enlightenment essay this would mean that the historico-philosophical perspective that enlightenment acquires in it, need not be taken as a purely theoretical affirmation, but rather as a practical construct· as an historico-philosophical design within which the enlightenment process is presented as a necessary and inevitable phase on the way to the eventual realization of the postulated moral purpose of history, ultimately with the intention of actually promoting the realization of that purpose in this way If we read the historico-philosophical remarks in *What is Enlightenment?* from this perspective, it proves that they are not at all inconsistent with Kant's intention of promoting the enlightenment process via the text, but serve the same goal because, in Kant's view, the teleological presentation of history itself helps actually achieve the defined *telos* Such a reading of the Enlightenment essay would thus offer a way of understanding a significant ambiguity in the text, while at the same time placing greater emphasis on the normatively driven interventionist nature of Kant's text

In *The Conflict of the Faculties* the historico-philosophical subject matter is somewhat different, but here too we see that Kant remains cautious about attributing too much epistemological weight to historico-philosophical views. In the second part, which is devoted to the "conflict of the philosophy faculty with the faculty of law" and dates from 1797, he explicitly considers this question The question that is raised here reads as follows "Is the human race constantly progressing?"[56] After many deliberations in which he demonstrates the

[56] *The Conflict of the Faculties*, AA 7 79 (297)

limits of various types of philosophies of history,[57] Kant concludes that this question can only be answered on the basis of particular experiences which from the historical viewpoint display a symbolic character and as such permit deductions to be made from them regarding the future course of history Kant refers in this connection to a "historical sign (*Geschichtszeichen—signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon*)"[58] in which something is revealed about the direction in which history as a whole is moving In *The Conflict of the Faculties* Kant regards the enthusiasm for the French Revolution as such a historical sign [59] This enthusiasm, he argues, makes it clear that people experience in the occurrence of the French Revolution something of moral value, a moral progress that now represents an ineradicable experience, whatever happens in reality. For this very reason, one can predict without too much risk on the basis of such experiences that history will move in this direction For people will wish what has been perceived as moral progress to be realized one day [60] Although he does so in a completely different sense from in *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose*, Kant thus once again draws a link between the issue of (the progress of) morality, and the relevance of historico-philosophical speculation.

If we were to reinterpret *What is Enlightenment?* in this light, and hence inevitably extend its meaning, we would again have to relativize thoroughly the theoretical status of its historico-philosophical passages The emergence of enlightenment in countless manifestations, such as the publication of Kant's text, could then be regarded as a historical sign involving a moral progress that indicates the inevitable continuation of the enlightenment process, whatever attempts were made to prevent it Of course, the historico-philosophical passages in Kant's Enlightenment essay do not fit with this viewpoint (or not yet, at any rate), but even so it is striking that they permit such an interpretation This is most evident when we look at the arguments with which Kant substantiates the inevitability of the enlightenment process As historico-philosophical arguments, they sound rather odd, to say the least, because all but one are formulated normatively, expressing not what *will* be, but what *should* or *should not* be the case To the question of whether a number of treacherous guardians could halt the enlightenment process, Kant successively answers

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[57] Ibid 7 81–2 (298–9)
[58] Ibid 7 84 (301)
[59] Ibid 7 85–6 (302–3)
[60] Ibid 7 87–9 (303–5)

that such a thing "is impossible,"[61] "is contrary to human nature,"[62] "is illegitimate,"[63] and "is an inadmissible infringement of sacred human rights "[64] Although the context of the argumentation is different from that in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, we recognize two major components of the argument presented there firstly, the conviction that the coming about of enlightenment represents moral progress, and secondly, that this progress will continue, because it should, regardless of any steps that are taken against it Here too, the historico-philosophical perspective on the enlightenment process thus seems to be informed and carried by a moral position rather than by any presumed theoretical knowledge about the course of history necessitated by the nature of things Although it should be added right away that the terminology used by Kant, here and elsewhere, often suggests the reverse. To conclude from all this that *What is Enlightenment?* already contains the subtle philosophy of history of *The Conflict of the Faculties* in an implicit form would of course be naive However, this is no reason to commit another form of naivety and take Kant's historico-philosophical remarks unequivocally in a theoretical sense The foregoing makes it sufficiently clear that a primarily normative interpretation of these remarks can be related to other pronouncements by Kant on the matter, and above all eliminates a number of striking ambiguities from the Enlightenment essay Such an interpretation shows that these historico-philosophical passages primarily depict a normative ideal, as a result of which a powerful tension is generated in the text between "what should be" and "what is," and not between "what is" and "what will be "

IV

Actuality as crisis If we read Kant's essay along these lines and understand his historico-philosophical account of the Enlightenment primarily in a normative sense, the focus in the text shifts from the historico-philosophical promise of a completely "enlightened age" to the precarious, risky "age of enlightenment" which Kant claims to be situated in [65] It then becomes clear that this "enlightened age" is not guaranteed, but only can and will be as a normative ideal to the extent

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[61] *What is enlightenment?* AA 8 39 (19–20)
[62] Ibid 8 39 (20)
[63] Ibid
[64] Ibid
[65] *What is Enlightenment?* AA 8 40 (21)

that the process of enlightenment continues and is not blocked Once we understand the inevitability of enlightenment's continuation as a moral rather than a natural inevitablity, the here and now, the moment at which Kant as an intellectual is addressing the public, gains in significance It then becomes clear what is at stake in this "now": it is determinative of what will happen and what will not As a result of the historico-philosophical presentation of the still-to-be-realized normative ideal, the present is thus not neutralized or reduced to sheer meaninglessness; on the contrary, it is potentialized and laden with significance. The present, the moment at which Kant intervenes thus becomes the decisive moment at which something may be won, but also lost It is determinative of whether the preconceived ideal still has a chance or will be definitively abandoned.

This explains the remarkable and seemingly paradoxical focus in the text on authorities that constitute a threat to the supposedly inevitable progress of the enlightenment process I refer to the laziness and the lack of courage to think for oneself, and especially to the treacherous guardians who keep the people in a state of minority and try to bind them to that state, to the possible conspiracies among intellectuals to call a halt to enlightenment, and to the potentially destructive interventions in the enlightenment process on the part of the ruler. In this way, Kant recognizes the contingent nature of enlightenment and the precariousness of the moment, whether enlightenment will continue or implode depends on choices that are being made right now

As a result of the paradoxical contrast between the normatively colored, historico-philosophical *telos* and the problematization of the acute tensions in the here and now, the present thus appears in Kant's text as a crisis [66] The essence of this actuality is precisely to be a crisis being the moment at which things are decided, at which choices are made which could equally mean "progress" towards more, or "regression" towards less enlightenment. There is every indication that Kant, because of his awareness of the present as crisis, as a risk-fraught moment, sought to intervene with *What is Enlightenment?* in the hope that in this way he could help to ensure that the genuine possibility of less enlightenment in fact became somewhat less likely

K U Leuven (Belgium)

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[66] For the crisis concept in relation to eighteenth-century philosophy of history, see Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Cambridge The MIT Press, 1998), 14, 158–86, and especially 173–4, 183

FROM LOGIC TO THE PERSON: AN INTRODUCTION TO EDMUND HUSSERL'S ETHICS

HENNING PEUCKER

MANY POPULAR INTRODUCTIONS to ethics attempt to systematize ethical theories by distinguishing three different types of normative ethics virtue ethics, which can be traced back to Aristotle, deontological ethics of a Kantian type, and consequentialist theories, including, most importantly, utilitarianism While such a classification is too broad to tell us anything of much use about the details of most ethical theories, it can be helpful for looking at the guiding but perhaps hidden principles in an ethical theory However, if we confront the Husserlian ethics with this classification, we will find that it does not fit. Instead, Husserl's ethics includes elements of all three of these types of ethical theories and combines them in a way that is both historically and systematically fruitful. Husserl's mature ethical theory, in particular, combines a modern, Kantian or Fichtean approach based on a strong concept of a free and active ego capable of shaping its life autonomously through its own will with a more Aristotelian theory of the virtues that help us to shape our lives in order to reach happiness or *eudaimonia*

Before entering into this theory I will begin this introduction to Husserl's ethics with a historical overview of the development of his ethical theory Since there are different periods in this development we cannot speak about the Husserlian ethics as such At least two different positions and periods must be distinguished from one another.[1]

Correspondence to University of Paderborn, Institute for Human Sciences–Philosophy, Warburger Str 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany

[1] Ullrich Melle, the editor of Husserl's early ethical writings, makes the distinction between a pre- and a post-war ethics This is a useful classification, even if some of Husserl's ethical writings from the so-called pre-war period were in fact written at the end of World War I See Ullrich Melle, "The Development of Husserl's Ethics," *Études Phenomenologiques*, No 13–14 (1991) 115–35, and Ullrich Melle, "From Reason to Love," in *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy A Handbook*, eds John Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht Kluwer, 2002), 229–48

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There is first Husserl's early ethics, which is strongly influenced by his mentor Franz Brentano, whose lecture courses on ethics Husserl attended when he was a student in Vienna from 1884 to 1886.[2] This early ethical theory is characterized by a strong parallel between logic and ethics, each of which is part of a comprehensive theory of reason that also comprises a theory of science and an ontology. Husserl himself did not publish his early ethical theory, but his lecture courses on ethics and some manuscripts from this period, which are preserved in his *Nachlass*, are available in the series of his collected writings, the *Husserliana* (hereafter "*Hua* "). Most of this material can be found in *Hua* 28 ("Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory"),[3] which contains the lecture course on ethics and axiology from 1908/09 that Husserl repeated in a slightly changed version in 1911 and 1914. This volume also includes the remaining fragments of Husserl's first lecture courses on ethics from 1897 ("Ethics and Philosophy of Law")[4] and 1902 ("Elementary Questions of Ethics"). Additional texts on Husserl's early ethics are published in the first book of the *Ideas to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* from 1913,[5] and in Husserl's lecture course on "Logic and General Theory of Science" from 1917/18, which is published in *Hua* 30.[6]

In Husserl's second ethical theory the parallelism between logic and ethics no longer plays an important role. Instead, the background

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[2] Brentano's lecture course on ethics is published in Franz Brentano, *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, compiled from his Lectures on Practical Philosophy*, trans. E. H. Schneewind (London: Routledge, 1973), or in German *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978).

[3] Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908–1914)*, *Husserliana* 28, ed. Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), henceforth *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*. Citations from this and other writings by Husserl will list the *Husserliana* volume number and the page number in Arabic numerals. All translations from Husserl's collected writings (*Husserliana*) used in this article are my own, but I quote the German text in the footnotes as well.

[4] *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 381–419.

[5] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, bk. 1, *Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie*, *Hua* 3, part 1, ed. Karl Schuhmann (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1976), see especially §37, §95, §116, §121, §139, §147, §148.

[6] Edmund Husserl, *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1917/18. Mit erganzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung 1910/11*, *Hua* 30, ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), see particularly §65.

of this later ethics is a refined phenomenological theory of the subject as a person who finally strives toward happiness or blessedness. Husserl developed this theory beginning around 1917 under the influence of his readings of Fichte and Kant He published his basic ideas in a series of articles on the topic of "renewal" (*Erneuerung*)—a crucial term in this ethics—in the Japanese journal "*The Kaizo*" in 1922 to 1924 [7] Other important documents of this theory are the extensive lecture course on ethics from 1920 ("Introduction to Ethics") which he repeated in 1924,[8] parts of his lecture course "Introduction to Philosophy"[9] from 1922/23, a short text on "The value of life,"[10] and some smaller manuscripts

Almost all of the aforementioned texts have been published in the last few years, and they now provide the basis for a discussion of Husserl's ethics that has only recently begun [11] There may yet appear one more volume in the series of the *Husserliana* that would contain Husserl's latest ideas on ethics from the 1930s, which are embedded in a broader metaphysical conception However, in this paper I will not take these late manuscripts into consideration, but will rather focus on the two periods of Husserl's ethics, which are available in his

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[7] Edmund Husserl, *Aufsatze uber Erneuerung*, in Edmund Husserl, *Vortrage und Aufsatze (1922–1937)*, (*Hua* 27), eds Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp (Dordrecht Kluwer, 1989), 3–94, henceforth *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*

[8] Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924*, (*Hua* 37), ed Henning Peucker (Dordrecht Springer, 2004), henceforth *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*

[9] Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Philosophie Vorlesungen 1922/23*, (*Hua* 35), ed Berndt Goossens (Dordrecht Kluwer, 2002), 40–6, henceforth Hua 35, *Einleitung Philosophie*

[10] Edmund Husserl, "Wert des Lebens Wert der Welt Sittlichkeit (Tugend) und Gluckseligkeit (Februar 1923)," *Husserl Studies* 13 (1997) 201–35

[11] See for example Robert Sokolowski, *Moral Action A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1985), Thomas Nenon, "Willing and Acting in Husserl's Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory," *Man and World* 24 (1990) 301–9, James G Hart, *The Person and the Common Life Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics* (Dordrecht Kluwer, 1992), John J Drummond, "Moral Objectivity Husserl's Sentiments of Understanding," *Husserl Studies* 12 (1995) 165–83, John J Drummond, "Aristotelianism and Phenomenology," in *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy A Handbook*, eds John Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht Kluwer, 2002), 15–45, Thomas Nenon, "Husserl's Conception of Reason as Authenticity," *Philosophy Today*, Vol 47, 5, SPEP Supplement 2003 63–70, Janet Donohoe, *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity From Static to Genetic Phenomenology* (Amherst Humanity Books, 2004), Ullrich Melle, "Husserl's Personalist Ethics," *Husserl Studies* 23 (2007) 1–15

already published writings. Accordingly, the paper consists of two sections; the first is about Husserl's early ethical theory and its parallelism between logic and ethics, the second presents Husserl's theory of the ethical person from the 1920s.

I

In 1906, Husserl sketched, in very existentialist-sounding personal notes, his main aims as a philosopher.[12] In these notes he mentions that his primary task is to write a general critique of reason.[13] This task can be broken down into three major parts, since reason (*Vernunft*) comprises for Husserl three different subspecies: theoretical, practical, and axiological or evaluating (*wertende*) reason. Accordingly, the elaboration of the critique of reason comprises three philosophical disciplines, namely, logic, ethics, and, axiology. Husserl's early ethical theory has to be understood against the background of this comprehensive conception of reason, in which ethics is conceived on a strict parallel with logic.

According to Husserl, logic and ethics are, in their final stage, practical, or applied theories, for he understands both as theories of art, as *Kunstlehren*, that is, as the art of producing true statements (or knowledge) and practical goods, respectively. In this sense, logic and ethics obviously have a practical orientation, they should help us to find the truth and obtain goods. Husserl stresses this practical orientation of ethics in all of his lecture courses on this subject. Already in his lecture course "Ethics and Philosophy of Law" from 1897 he conceives of ethics as a "theory of art [*Kunstlehre*] which discovers the highest ends of life [and] sets rules which should help the acting person to build a reasonable order in living and acting with regard to these ends."[14] The same idea of ethics as a practical discipline serves also as a starting point in the lecture course on ethics from the 1920s.

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[12] Edmund Husserl, *Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, in Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, (*Hua* 24), ed. Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984), 442–9.

[13] Ibid., 445–6.

[14] "Die Ethik ist jene Kunstlehre, welche die höchsten Lebenszwecke erforscht, andererseits aber auch Regeln aufzustellen sucht, welche dem einzelnen Handelnden eine vernünftige Ordnung des Lebens und Tuns in Hinblick auf diese Zwecke erleichtern sollen." (*Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 384)

Here Husserl presents ethics as a universal theory that investigates the sensible relations between means and ends, and asks for the final ends that are worth striving for [15] Ethics is in this respect both a normative and a practical discipline, since it aims to tell us which ends are valuable enough for us to try to obtain them and also provides us with rules for doing just this It thus stands parallel to logic, which aims to provide us with rules in order to realize a good, namely, the truth Consequently, logic has to be regarded as a universal theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*) since the sciences are the means to finding the truth [16]

With this understanding of ethics and logic, Husserl stands in the tradition of Aristotle, Bolzano, and Brentano In fact, he drew his early conception of ethics from Brentano, who already conceived of ethics and logic as practically oriented theories of art or *Kunstlehren.*[17] Brentano himself was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian conception of logic as a comprehensive theory of science (*Organon*) and ethics as a theory which reveals the final ends of our lives and gives us the means to realize them

The closeness of Husserl's theory to Brentano becomes even more obvious when one compares how both philosophers combine reason with the accomplishments of our consciousness Both think that the three disciplines of reason have their subjective origin in certain acts of consciousness, which can be clarified through an investigation of these acts logic by going back to acts of presenting and judging, ethics through the acts of willing and acting, and axiology through the acts of feeling and evaluating. According to Brentano and Husserl, in all three types of acts we can also raise the question of their correctness or validity, since all three can be either right or wrong, correct or incorrect Because of that, these acts stand in a very close and intricate relation to the normative distinctions that we make in the sphere of reason when we, for example, claim something as being true or good

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[15] See *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 3–7

[16] See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol 1, *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, *Hua* 18, ed Elmar Holenstein (Den Haag Nijhoff, 1975), 27–42, 230–52, and *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie Vorlesungen Wintersemester* 1917/18, *Hua* 30, ed Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht Kluwer, 1996), 255–76

[17] Franz Brentano, *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik* (Hamburg Felix Meiner, 1978), 2–9

Despite Husserl's general agreement with Brentano's conception of ethics, however, he strongly opposes his teacher when it comes to the question of a philosophical foundation of this practical discipline Logic and ethics as theories of arts are supposed to set rules in order to recognize the truth or to realize the good, but the philosophically relevant question in this context is how we can justify these rules Husserl vigorously claims that any applied science must be based on a theoretical science, and that this foundation can only be provided by a pure theoretical science that deals with ideal concepts and laws that do not have any empirical status or background Thus, in order to provide a philosophical foundation for ethics as a practical discipline, Husserl fights against any attempt to provide an empirical foundation for ethics. His foundation of ethics, instead, consists of the same systematic steps known through the foundation of logic he outlines in the *Logical Investigations* [18] first, a refutation of empiricism, especially psychologism, second, an exposition of some fundamental a priori laws for the sphere of axiology and practice (*Praktik*), and finally, the phenomenological investigation of the givenness of those laws. Let us look more closely at all three parts of Husserl's foundation of ethics and its problems

The refutation of logical psychologism in the *Prolegomena*, the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* from 1900, is one of Husserl's most famous philosophical accomplishments Psychologism, a species of empiricism, attempts to ground logic on psychology as a natural science Husserl shows the failures and the absurdity of such an attempt by revealing its presuppositions and its skeptical consequences To ground logic on psychology would reduce logical laws to those empirical laws which govern the activities of our brains; it would reduce the validity of logical laws to that of the merely factual results of the empirical sciences, which are only valid under certain specific conditions in space and time According to Husserl, such an approach would not only misinterpret the meaning of logic and its laws as unconditionally valid ideal laws but also lead to relativistic consequences, since it would make it impossible to speak about truth in an absolute sense Husserl sees analogous skeptical-relativistic

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[18] For volume 1, see fn 16, volume 2, *Untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Hua* 19, ed Ursula Panzer (The Hague Nijhoff, 1984)

consequences in any attempt to ground ethics on a psychology of acts of feeling and willing. Thus, in strict parallelism with his struggle against logical psychologism, he also attacks an empiricist position that he calls "ethical psychologism"[19] Ethical psychologism tries to find a foundation for ethics as a practical discipline through a psychological investigation of our factual mental processes or behavior Husserl claims that such an approach ruins the sense of ethics and morals, since its relativistic consequences must distort the absolute meaning of ethical laws and obligations into merely psychologically, historically, or culturally valid facts According to Husserl, such relativism—which results from the attempt to ground normative ethics on natural science—would undermine the possibility of ethics and pervert the meaning of ethical terms like "good" and "bad," since they would refer to certain conditioned usages in a particular group or society Husserl's critique of psychologism and relativism in ethics is based on his strong conviction that we do have ethical laws that are absolutely valid, not merely factual or empirical rules These a priori ethical laws are to be provided by a pure theoretical discipline that serves as the philosophical basis of Husserl's early ethics, namely, axiology and practice.

Husserl regards his discovery of a sphere of fundamental a priori valid laws for ethics as one of his most important contributions to ethics Here again his ethical theory is influenced by the example of logic Just as logic as a theory of art is in the end based on the laws of a purely formal logic, which are valid a priori, so, too, is ethics grounded on purely theoretical laws with an analogous validity status And just as formal logical laws provide us with rules which we must obey in order to form meaningful and possibly true sentences, so, too, do the laws of formal axiology and practice provide us with rules for formally correct evaluations and acts of will Thus, according to Husserl, thinking, evaluating, and willing are governed by particular a priori laws having an ideal character that cannot be traced back to psychological or any other empirical facts In Husserl's foundation of ethics, these axiological laws are the most basic laws since they govern our acts of evaluating something, and evaluating always stands

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[19] "Ethischer Psychologismus," *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 29–30, *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 13

prior to willing, for we can never want something that we have not first evaluated in a positive manner

These fundamental axiological laws govern the realm of values and constitute a particular field of reason. Values, the relations between them, and the corresponding acts of evaluation are therefore the subject matter of a specific discipline of reason, that is, axiology Husserl investigates this field of reason and the axiological laws in his early ethics [20] There is, for example, the law of the excluded fourth, which claims that everything is either valuable, worthless or neutral with regard to its value-property. This law has a parallel function to the logical law of the excluded middle from the theoretical sphere There are also the mereological laws of value-summation (*Summationsgesetze*) and value absorption, which say that the sum of certain values always has a higher value than each of its single values, and that a relatively high value will always be absorbed by the realization of an even higher value Like formal logical laws, all of these axiological laws are uninformative in that they only determine the conditions of formally correct acts of valuing Just as the formal logical laws cannot predict the factual validity of the content of a given sentence, the axiological laws cannot determine the truth of any concrete material evaluation They only set the rules for all formally well-formed evaluations

Formal axiology, or value theory, serves as the basis of Husserl's early ethics. Its laws are also crucial for our acts of volition since these are founded in acts of evaluating, namely in the approval of something as being good The sphere of the will and the realm of praxis are, however, also ruled by certain particular formal laws of the will According to Husserl, there are formal laws that regulate, for example, the relation between means and ends [21] There is also the law that the best will is always the one that tries to realize the best among the attainable ends. These formal laws for the sphere of the will are disclosed by a discipline that Husserl calls formal practice

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[20] Husserl's theory of basic axiological laws is also strongly influenced by Brentano In §31 of Franz Brentano's *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans Roderick M Chisholm and Elisabeth Schneewind (New York Humanities Press, 1969), he briefly sketches most of the axiological laws that Husserl unfolds in his axiology much more extensively Compare with *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 74–101

[21] See *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 51–6

(*formale Praktik*) The highest law in this sphere is a "categorical imperative" that Husserl took over from Brentano "Do the best that is attainable "[22] This categorical imperative is in Husserl's ethical theory a fundamental law for the entire practical sphere It informs us about the formal condition of a correct, and in this respect true and good, will

Husserl's philosophical foundation of ethics as a theory of art cannot be completed without one more decisive systematic step that must follow the critique of psychologism and the disclosure of a priori laws for the practical sphere This final step has to be carried out by phenomenology itself. Phenomenology is the discipline that discovers the essential structures of our consciousness, or, to be more precise, the ways in which something is given to us in certain acts of this consciousness This discipline is originally motivated by the epistemological question about the basis of our knowledge. Phenomenology is charged with the task of clarifying our knowledge and the meaning of its objects through a descriptive investigation of the subjective acts in which these objects are given to us Husserl developed this method in his *Logical Investigations*, where he investigates the epistemological foundation of logic and ultimately claims that the subjective basis for the givenness of logical terms and laws rests on categorial intuition and certain acts of categorial abstraction [23] When Husserl conceives ethics on analogy to logic, he also needs to incorporate a phenomenology of the acts of evaluating and willing into his ethics These acts are the subjective basis for axiology and ethics, and in order to complete his all-embracing critique of reason, they must be investigated in a reflexive analysis

It is one of the most striking features of Husserl's ethical theory that it combines a strong conviction of the existence of absolute ethical laws with a demand for a phenomenological analysis of our emotive and volitional consciousness According to Husserl, our evaluations are not primarily performed by the intellectual consciousness but rather by our feeling consciousness In feelings we originally react to the things in the world positively or negatively, which means with approval or disapproval Thus feelings give things specific value

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[22] *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 221 In *The Person and the Common Life*, 297–300, James Hart shows how Husserl's categorical imperative is closely linked to his axiological laws

[23] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigation* 6, part 2, chap 6, §§45–52

properties, which a pure intellectual or theoretical act could never grasp. Consequently, the givenness of values or value-properties can only be clarified through a phenomenological investigation of the emotive or affective consciousness. This investigation must reveal the forms and structures which allow us to have the experience of a world with objects having different values For this task, phenomenology must describe the processes of our feeling consciousness that constitute the givenness of values or value-properties In addition to such a phenomenology of our feeling consciousness, Husserl's ethics must be completed through a phenomenology of our acts of volition Both the phenomenology of willing and that of our feelings play the most decisive role in the foundation of Husserlian ethics However, in his early manuscripts, the investigations of emotive and volitional consciousness are much less well developed than his phenomenological investigations of logical or theoretical consciousness

In his analysis of the subjective foundation of ethics, Husserl became aware of several difficult problems with which he still had to struggle in his later ethics Before I enter into this later ethical theory, I will briefly sketch some of the most difficult problems for Husserl's early ethics, which emerged in all three systematic tasks of his foundation of ethics, namely, in his critique of psychologism, his axiology, and the phenomenology of feeling consciousness

The critique of ethical psychologism is for Husserl much more difficult than his refutation of logical psychologism, which is based on the problem of the pragmatic or performative self-contradiction of the skeptic The skeptical denial of the validity of the most elementary logical laws runs into this self-contradiction when it claims its own skeptical position as being valid and simultaneously denies the general logical conditions for the validity of sentences It tries to criticise the logical conditions of truth while implicitly using these logical presuppositions of any true expression However, such a performative self-contradiction is no problem for the ethical skeptic, who claims that there are no absolute ethical norms and obligations Husserl was aware of this difference and he knew that he needed other tools to refute the ethical skepticism [24] His demonstration of the obvious validity of the formal axiological laws is one such tool, but this leads directly to problems which are connected with the axiological laws as such

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[24] Husserl explicitly criticises Hugo Munsterberg, a contemporary philosopher who claimed that the ethical skepticism would lead to contradictory consequences analogous to those of logical skepticism See *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 23–31

Axiology, or value-theory, has to be confronted with several general concerns One can first raise the question of the ontological status of values and their relation to other things in the world One can also ask which specific kinds of objects are ruled by these axiological laws Moreover, Husserl had to struggle with the question of the relation in which the values stand to one another Are different values at all comparable to one another? This question is of particular importance with respect to the categorical demand that we should always realize the best that is attainable, since it presupposes that the values are somehow arranged or set in a certain hierarchical order Otherwise there would be no way to decide which of the different values is the best. But how can a person—in a situation of choice—decide, for example, whether supplying a baby with new diapers is "better" than playing a piano sonata instead? The pure axiological laws give us no criteria to make any decisions here They cannot help in answering the question of which of two values from different classes—ethical and aesthetic values in the example—is better than the other and should be preferred. Thus, merely on the basis of the axiological laws we cannot apply the Brentanian and Husserlian categorical imperative, since we would need to have more than just formal criteria about the ranks of certain values in order to do so Values from different classes could only be compared if we also had material criteria with which to consider the specific quality of values [25] However, Husserl did not develop a material value-ethics which could solve this problem by classifying different values in a ranking with several qualitative levels [26] I think that Husserl did not develop a material value ethics because he was aware of the epistemological problem of justifying ethical statements with a material value-content These epistemological problems had already arisen in the phenomenological foundation of his early ethical theory

Husserl's phenomenological investigation of feeling consciousness should clarify the subjective processes that enable us to

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[25] The Munich phenomenologist Moritz Geiger raised the objection to Husserl that values from different areas are not comparable with one another Husserl dealt with this problem which would have forced him to come up with more than a purely formal axiology even if he had never developed a material value-theory See *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 419–20 Concerning this issue, see also Janet Donohoe, *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity* (Amherst Humanity Books, 2004), 157–60 and James Hart, *The Person and the Common Life*, 297–303, 324–5

[26] Compare Ullrich Melle, *Einleitung des Herausgebers, Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, p xxxiv–xxxv, footnote, and Ullrich Melle, "The Development of Husserl's Ethics," *Études Phénoménologiques*, Nr 13–14 (1991) 121–2

experience something with a certain value-property According to Husserl, feelings are the subjective basis for the experiences that the objectifying acts from the sphere of the theoretical or intellective acts cannot accomplish The early Husserl distinguishes emotions or feelings from theoretical acts by stating that the latter are objectifying acts whereas the former are non-objectifying acts, since they do not present objects in the manner in which the theoretical acts do This distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts is quite important, since it enables Husserl to separate the reason of feeling consciousness from the usual theoretical reason [27] This differentiation, however, runs into trouble if Husserl also claims that feelings or emotions give us a certain access to specific properties which the theoretical acts cannot reveal, namely value-properties Here the question arises as to how feelings can do this if they are not objectifying acts How can they open up something from the world when they are not acts that make something objective? How is the givenness of values in feeling consciousness understandable if it is not carried out by objectifying acts? Husserl raised these crucial questions[28] but admitted that he could not answer them with his early ethical theory In the final part of his lecture course on ethics and value theory from 1908/09, he writes "I could not manage the problems with the feeling consciousness, the entire essence of its foundation, and its relation to the objectifying acts "[29] Thus, Husserl's foundation of ethics as a theory of art remains in his early ethical theory incomplete, since it has no

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[27] Husserl developed this distinction between these types of acts already in the *Logical Investigations* where he criticizes Brentano's claim that every intentional act is either a presentation or based upon it Husserl replaces the function of Brentano's concept of presentation with his refined theory of the objectifying acts that he understands as our most elementary way to get aware of something For more details on this issue compare also, Ullrich Melle, "Objektivierende und nicht-objektivierende Akte," in *Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung*, ed Samuel Ijsseling (Dordrecht Kluwer, 1990), 35–49

[28] See *Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 260–9 and 332–44

[29] "[I]ch konnte mit den Gemutsakten und mit dem ganzen Wesen der Fundierung bei ihnen und ihrer Stellung zu den objektivierenden Akten nicht fertig werden" (*Hua* 28, *Wertlehre*, 337) Husserl's dilemma is that he distinguishes the valuing acts of our emotive sphere from the intellectual acts by claiming that the former are not objectifying acts, but simultaneously claims that the emotive acts are giving access to a specific field of objects, namely values By doing so he distinguishes emotive and valuing act from objectifying act but also ascribes an objectifying, namely value-giving function to them This problem has been clearly pointed out by Karl Schuhmann, "Probleme der Husserlschen Wertlehre," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 98 (1991) 106–13

adequate solution to the epistemological problems that are perhaps the most difficult for any value-ethics

II

In Husserl's phenomenology of the 1920s, we find a new conception of ethics in which the ethical life is conceived as thoroughly shaped by reason The basis of this conception is no longer logic but rather the phenomenology of the person Husserl developed this new ethical theory not so much in order to overcome the unsolved problems of his early ethics but rather as a consequence of the extensive phenomenological analyses he carried out in these years After the *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), Husserl widened his focus from the narrow questions concerning the foundations of logic and mathematics to more general problems, such as time-consciousness, the original associative genesis of meaning, the constitution of space, the differences between imagination, perception, and memory, the theory of noetic-noematic correlations, and the structures of consciousness in general, including especially the analyses of the consciousness of the ego at the center of all intentional life However, for Husserl's ethics the concept of the transcendental ego is not as important as his phenomenologically much richer concept of the personal ego, or personal I

The ego as a person is characterized by the variety of its lived-experiences and the dynamic processes among them According to Husserl, personal life includes many affective tendencies and instincts on its lowest level, but also, on a higher level, strivings, wishes, volitions, and body-consciousness All of this stands in a dynamic process of arising and changing, lived-experiences with their meaningful correlates rise from the background of consciousness into the center of attention and sink back, yet they do not totally disappear, since they are kept as habitual acquisitions (*habituelle Erwerbe*) Thus, the person has an individual history in which previous accomplishments always influence the upcoming lived-experiences Husserl viewed this dynamic of the personal life as a meaningful connection in which single experiences and episodes are intertwined by laws of motivation into a meaningful history He strictly separates these laws from the

causal laws that rule events in nature [30] Consequently, it is one of the striking features of the personal life and its history that it cannot be explained by the natural sciences, since they cannot grasp the meaningful internal and motivational connections that are crucial to it For Husserl, these processes can only be understood through a phenomenological analysis The sphere of the person has, in other words, an entirely different ontology than that of natural things.

On several occasions Husserl emphasizes how the personal life is determined by striving tendencies "To the essence of the human life," Husserl says, "belongs continuous striving "[31] This moment of striving can be found already in the involuntary, affective levels of personal life, on which the meaningful and emotional strivings affect the tendencies of the "higher-ordered" I and find their way into conscious egoic expressions Husserl describes this completely elementary field of personal life as pre-egoic On top of this, the explicitly conscious and egoic sphere of the person has a character of striving which expresses itself in knowledge–intentions as a striving for clarity and fullness, of course this striving occurs most articulately in the actions of will and their tendency to obtain what is desired "All life," Husserl says, "completes itself in the widest sense in the striving "[32] The ultimate end of our strivings is, according to Husserl, a state of fulfilled happiness that he once even called "*eudaimonia* "[33]

Husserl speaks about *eudaimonia* in an Aristotelian sense and not in the sense of a mere satisfaction of sensuous-bodily strivings. *Eudaimonia* is the ultimate end of our strivings in our common life Its satisfaction is the "best possible"[34] or "perfect"[35] life. Husserl also calls the ideal end of such striving "happiness," "bliss" (*Gluckseligkeit*), and "salvation" (*Seligkeit*) [36] He relates the idea of "genuine"

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[30] See Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, bk 2, *Phanomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, *Hua* 4, ed Marly Biemel (Den Haag Nijhoff, 1972), 211–80

[31] "Zum Wesen des Menschenlebens gehort daß es sich bestandig in der Form des Strebens abspielt" (*Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 25)

[32] "Alles Leben vollzieht sich im weitesten Sinn im Streben" (*Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 248)

[33] *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 11

[34] *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 252

[35] "Vollkommen", *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 30

[36] See *Hua* 35, *Einleitung Philosophie*, 43–4

(*echt*)[37] or "true" (*wahr*)[38] man with the ideal fulfillment of our strivings for such happiness What human beings essentially or truly are shows itself in the fulfillment of their particular strivings This relation of fulfillment of our strivings and the idea of a true human being is important for the practical orientation of ethics For ethics as a practical discipline has a task to discover the aims of our strivings and the means to realize them, so that the idea of the fulfilled human life can be determined Husserl writes,

> ethics always wanted to be a theory and a practical discipline of the perfect human life and human being, a theory and practical discipline of the methods of the self-shaping of the subject and its life to perfection or to happiness [39]

Happiness or bliss is, according to Husserl, the perfect limit-state consisting of a fulfillment of all of our intentions, it would be "a consistent life which in all intentions and strivings would proceed permanently in the form of pure fulfillment "[40] Such a state is not at all achievable for human beings, since our life is characterized by disappointments, errors, and inhibitions in our strivings According to Husserl, we fail to attain the ends of our strivings, and moreover, we posit aims which do not survive a critical examination, that is, which ultimately cannot satisfy us Without illusions and with an existentialist tone—and perhaps under the influence of his experience of World War I—Husserl speaks about experiencing the doubts, negations, and devaluations that go along with our striving Thus, he concludes, "man generally lives an unhappy life "[41]

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[37] *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 22, 29, 33

[38] *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 164, *Hua* 27, *Kaizo* 27, 33, 36 Thomas Nenon, "Husserl's Conception of Reason as Authenticity," *Philosophy Today* 47 (2003) 63–70 explains in a comparison of Husserl's *Kaizo* lectures and his *Crisis* work the idea of a genuine and true life by referring to the concept of living an authentically human life "

[39] "[I]mmer wollte Ethik die Theorie und Kunstlehre vom vollkommenen Menschenleben und Menschsein sein, Theorie und praktische Lehre <von> den Methoden der Selbstgestaltung des Subjekts und seines Lebens zur Vollkommenheit bzw zur 'Glückseligkeit' " (*Hua* 35, *Einleitung Philosophie*, 46)

[40] "[E]in einheitliches Leben, das nach allen seinen Intentionen, nach allem seinem Streben, immerfort in der Form reiner Erfüllung verliefe" (*Hua* 35, *Einleitung Philosophie*, 44)

[41] "So lebt der Mensch alles in allem ein unseliges Leben," (*Hua* 35, *Einleitung Philosophie*, 44) In a manuscript Husserl describes in moving words the human life as something that is always embedded in a "dark horizon", and accompanied by disappointments and hostile fate See Husserl, "Wert des Lebens, Wert der Welt, Sittlichkeit (Tugend) und Glückseligkeit," *Husserl Studies* 13 (1997), 215–25

All these disappointments are in various degrees painful, but they are also the starting point of deliberations about how they can be avoided, that is, how life can be improved in the future Thus, the experience of inhibition in our strivings and of destructions of that which we have already achieved serves as a motivation for avoiding vain striving It motivates an attitude of critique, and makes one focus on that which can resist critique

> It is this motivation, which comes from the awkward cancellations and disappointments, which motivates the need for such a critique and the particular striving toward truth [*Wahrheitsstreben*], or alternatively, the striving toward confirmation, toward ultimate insightful justification [42]

Such critique affects not only the theoretical sphere of knowledge, but also the sphere of praxis and will Critique of knowledge and, first of all, critique of the will serves as a protection against the experience of errors, disappointments, and cancellations, but is motivated by these experiences If such a critique should be successful, it must encompass all of our egoic acts Then, life "would be fully justifiable in all of its activities and a pure, continuing satisfaction would be warranted."[43] The type of critique that would be a necessary condition for such a life is a radical self-critique that would challenge the entire egoic life The result of it would be a complete re-organization of one's whole life that Husserl calls renewal, "*Erneuerung*." Persons are capable of such a radical criticism, because they stand in a relation to themselves that takes place in several different forms self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*), "personal self-contemplation" (*personale Selbstbetrachtung*), "self-evaluation" (*Selbstbewertung*), and "practical self-determination" (*praktische Selbstbestimmung*) [44] According to Husserl, these capacities are essential to persons, and distinguish them from other living beings. Regardless of all their affective and passive tendencies, persons are capable of free activity which arises from the ego-pole, the *Ich-Zentrum* [45] Thus, Husserl

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[42] "Die von [den] peinlichen Entwertungen und Enttauschungen ausgehende Motivation ist es, die das Bedurfnis nach solcher Kritik und somit das spezifische Wahrheitsstreben bzw das Streben nach Bewahrung, nach 'endgultiger' Rechtfertigung durch einsichtige Begrundung motiviert" (*Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 30)

[43] "[Leben, dass] in allen seinen Betatigungen voll zu rechtfertigen ware und eine reine, standhaltende Befriedigung gewahrleistete" (*Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 30)

[44] *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 23

[45] Ibid , 24

conceives of the essence of persons fully in the tradition of modern philosophy, or, more precisely, in the tradition of Kantian and Fichtean theories of subjectivity Persons are free and autonomous beings and are therefore able to shape and determine their own lives

Husserl illustrates our capacity to shape our lives by reference to situations in which we choose our professions or careers Our professions are one of most influential factors in our lives. They occupy many hours of our everyday life and determine much of the course of our lifetime Thus, by deciding for or against a certain profession we also govern our lives in accordance with the ideas that we connect with this profession. This means that, in choosing a profession we also choose a certain "form of life" (*Lebensform*)[46] which determines our own personal future Such life-forms are structured by our professions and also by the things we are striving for In his *Kaizo* articles Husserl lists examples of such aims in life, including goods such as power, richness, or fame, but also the goods of artists and scientists, which are the beauty and knowledge [47] All these life-forms are the results of a deliberate orientation and an active shaping of our own life, through which we hope ultimately to reach happiness.

If we ask which kind of self-shaping or life-form is most qualified for avoiding errors and disappointments in our life, or, in other words, which is most justified, we come to a surprising result Even though each professional-life (*Berufsleben*) is based on an active, egoic self-determination of our own life, it does not make up our whole life, since it leaves some areas of our life untouched by that regulation The same is true for the life of the artist or the scientist, since their lives are also not completely regulated but include some space or leeway of unregulated activities, namely, simple, ordinary activities that are not justified In contrast to these life-forms, Husserl conceives of the idea of life that would be not only partly but wholly guided by reason and free acts of volition. Such a life of universal self-regulation would be a life that would be "fully justifiable in all of its activities,"[48] it would be a thoroughly rational and will-guided life According to Husserl, this life-form is the ethical life The ethical life is a life which would be guided as far as possible by a rational and volitional

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[46] *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 29

[47] See *Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 28, *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 9, 248–51

[48] "[I]n allen seinen Betatigungen voll zu rechtfertigen" (*Hua* 27, *Kaizo*, 30)

self-determination Husserl gains this conception of the ethical life by an extension or universalization of the self-determination that already takes place in our professional life The ethical life would be a life that we achieve when we live our life completely in accordance with rationality

One consequence of Husserl's understanding of the ethical life is that it cannot be reached through mere passive habituation of certain manners of virtuous actions A person is not ethically good if he or she simply adopts normally accepted rules of virtuous behavior, even when they shape their own character in a positive way Although Husserl, like Aristotle, claims that virtuous acting becomes almost automatically a kind of "second nature"[49] of the person, he primarily stresses that the real ethical life has its origin in the activity of the acting ego and not in a passive and naive process of habituation According to Husserl, the constitution of the ethical person has its origin in a radical decision of the will of the self-determining ego The ego becomes through these decisions or resolutions of the will (*Willensentschlusse*) the "*causa sui* of its own morality" [50] Consequently, ethical life has its only origin in the free and active foundation (*Urstiftung*) of the ego.

Despite Husserl's emphasis on the voluntaristic origin of ethical life, his analyses are also useful for a better understanding of the traditional concept of virtue Virtues are relatively stable dispositions to act in a certain manner, and Husserl's analysis can show how they arise precisely from the original experiences and the concrete history of persons Persons are, for Husserl, striving beings with individual histories in which previous lived-experiences influence future experiences and actions The activities of the ego leave marks, as it were, and constitute in this manner the individual history of a person and his or her habits This history and these habits will later passively influence the thinking and acting of the person Against the background of this analysis, virtues are to be understood as individually acquired passivities of a person Virtues need to be distinguished from the original passive tendencies in the personal life, such as drives and strivings on a very low personal level

However, in his ethics lecture course of the twenties, Husserl discussed the concept of virtue and distinguishes between the "authentically virtuous acts" (*eigentliche Tugendakte*) and the acts that

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[49] *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 165
[50] Ibid

originally found morality (*Moralität ursprünglich stiftende Akte*) The latter acts originally create the ethical ego The "authentically virtuous acts" are usually acts executed without reflection, though performed by a person who has already developed an ethical character They display the ethical character of a person and can be compared with the virtues of the Aristotelian ethics [51] More important for Husserl's theory of the ethical person, however, are the acts of self-determination through which the ego freely decides to live an ethical life In a systematic respect these morality-founding-acts establish the foundation for the ethical person Husserl's emphasis on these acts cannot only be understood in terms of Aristotelian virtue ethics but must rather be understood in reference to the Kantian and Fichtean idealistic theory of subjectivity, which deeply influenced Husserl in his post-war period [52] Thus, on the one hand Husserl's theory of the ethical person clarifies the origin of the virtues in the free activity of the subject, and on the other it extends the voluntaristic conception of subjectivity to encompass the passively constituted habits In this way, Husserl combines and Aristotelian-style virtue ethics with modern theories of subjectivity It is this combination of modern and Aristotelian elements in Husserl's ethics that makes it a systematically fruitful and promising contribution to ethical theory [53]

University of Paderborn

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[51] See *Hua* 37, *Einleitung Ethik*, 162–5 In this passage Husserl stresses the importance of a critical self-reflection for the constitution of the ethical life against the idea of a virtuous life without such a reflection Husserl's ethical person no longer has the innocence of paradise, since it is originally founded in its own reflective and critical activity

[52] The importance of Fichte's popular ethical writings for Husserl's ethics of the 1920s has been investigated by James Hart in "Husserl and Fichte, with special regard to Husserl's Lectures on Fichte's Ideal of Humanity," *Husserl Studies* 12 (1995) 135–63

[53] I am very grateful to Moira Hill, Mirja Hartimo, and especially Thane Naberhaus for correcting and improving this article I would also like to thank the "Center for the Study of Mind in Nature" at the University of Oslo in Norway and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tampere in Finland Both institutions gave me the opportunity to present a previous version of this paper in September 2007 My stay in Finland was supported by the Finnish Academy of Science, Helsinki

A FUNCTIONALIST REINTERPRETATION OF WHITEHEAD'S METAPHYSICS

GEORGE ALLAN

IN HIS CONTRIBUTION to a 1936 APA symposium on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, John Dewey complains that *Process and Reality* attempts to combine a method of philosophizing based on the mathematical sciences with one based on the natural sciences He argues that the two methods are not compatible, however, and that the result is an unfortunate series of bifurcations between "a succinct system of independent definitions and postulates" on the one hand and, on the other, corrigible distinctions arising from "experimental observational inquiry." Whitehead's metaphysics is an incoherent mix of "morphological" and "genetic-functional" generalizations [1]

Dewey illustrates his claim by noting that the relation of Whitehead's eternal objects to actual occasions is one of "ingression " This term "suggests an independent and ready-made subsistence of eternal objects" which then requires "the conception of God," an agency able "to act selectively in determining which eternal objects ingress in any given immediate occasion "[2] Whitehead's ontology involves two different kinds of reality, one eternal and one temporal, one a consequence of his mathematical method, one of his empirical method These two contrasting kinds of reality then need a third to relate them Dewey thus implies that Whitehead has the same problem of ontological incoherence as Descartes, and solves the problem in the same unsatisfactory manner—by the addition of a divine agent

Dewey's solution, unsurprisingly, is to propose that Whitehead abandon the mathematical method, that he construe eternal objects in

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Correspondence to Dickinson College, P O Box 1773, Carlisle, PA 17013-2896

[1] John Dewey, "Whitehead's Philosophy," *Philosophical Review* 46, no 2 (March 1937) 174–5, reprinted in *John Dewey The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 11 1935-1937*, ed Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 150–1

[2] Ibid , 176, 152

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terms of the genetic-functional method Were Whitehead to take this approach, "the egression of natures, characters, or universals" would be understood as resulting from "the necessity of generalization from immediate occasions that exists in order to direct their further movement and its consequences "[3] Eternal objects—that is, possibilities "which are 'eternal' in the sense of not being spatio-temporal existences"—would "emerge because of the existence of problematic situations," as "suggestions" which could then be "operatively applied to actual existences" in an attempt to resolve those problems [4] Experimental intelligence would replace God as the agency needed to relate actual existences and eternal objects, the latter now understood to be emergent rather than timeless

Dewey's concluding "plea" is that Whitehead embrace this "alternative direction of development of his thought " It is "in essence a plea for recognizing the infinite fertility of actual occasions in their full actuality "[5] In his response to the symposium papers, Whitehead rejects Dewey's plea, insisting instead that

> the historic process of the world, which requires the genetic-functional interpretation, also requires for its understanding some insight into those ultimate principles of existence which express the necessary connections within the flux [6]

My aim in this essay is to respond positively to Dewey's plea, not by abandoning Whitehead's "ultimate principles of existence," but by giving them a "genetic-functional interpretation " First, I will explicate the metaphysical incoherence resulting from Whitehead's ontological identification in *Process and Reality* of possibilities as eternal objects, the relational features of which depend upon the work of a primordial agent Second, I will explore the resources in *Process and Reality* for a functionalist understanding of possibilities, with Whitehead's categoreal obligations doing the work Whitehead claimed could only be done by God Third, I will argue that in *Adventures of Ideas* Whitehead embraces a functionalist approach, abandoning the aspects of *Process and Reality* I have been criticizing

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[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid , 177, 154
[6] Alfred North Whitehead, "Remarks," *Philosophical Review* 46, no 2 (March 1937) 179, reprinted as "Analysis of Meaning," in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York Philosophical Library, 1947), 94

Whitehead ends up far closer to Dewey than Dewey recognized—and than most Whiteheadian commentators realize Whitehead's philosophy, when transformed by means of functionalist concepts, is rescued from its debilitating incoherence It becomes thereby a genuinely process philosophy, one that keeps its metaphysical promise to take time seriously

I

In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead identifies three metaphysical reasons for including God in his cosmology All are associated with the primordial nature (1) God as a receptacle for the ordered system of all possibilities, on which cosmic order depends, (2) God as the source of novelty in the initial aims of actual occasions, and (3) God as a constraint on that novelty needed for the stability that undergirds the creative advance Whitehead has two other reasons for including God, both associated with the consequent rather than the primordial nature (4) God as the preserver and perfecter of whatever value actual occasions create before perishing, and (5) God as influencing the world through how subsequent occasions experience this everlasting holistic value These latter reasons are religious rather than metaphysical, however, and so are not a primary concern in this essay, although they are the reasons why Whitehead called the entity in question God

Whitehead's justification for including an entity with a primordial nature in his metaphysics is most clearly explicated in his brief account of scientific prediction in the last section of the chapter on "The Propositions" (Part 2, Chapter 9, Section 8) in *Process and Reality* In preceding sections, he has been explicating the "statistical ground for a probability judgment,"[7] which can be roughly summarized as follows Prediction presupposes a stable social order, an order in which present activity is dominated by past achievement In Newton's physics, this domination was complete, the present was taken to be causally determined by the past This determinism is loosened in a quantum universe to statistical probabilities, the present no longer

[7] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (1929), Corrected Edition, ed David Ray Griffin and Donald W Sherburne (New York Free Press, 1978), 206 The Corrected Edition completely supercedes the original

understood as reducible to the causal efficacy of prior conditions Novel factors are constantly in play during any causal transition They lead to outcomes that could not have been deduced from what had been given, but that can be inductively predicted as falling within a statistically defined range of likelihood. The range of these likely outcomes is too great, however, to account for the stability that in fact exists in the universe

In addition to a statistical ground, therefore, Whitehead claims that "another factor" is required, from which "a non-statistical judgment of probability can be derived"[8] We have an intuition, says Whitehead, that more is going on than mere chance when random deviations from the statistical mean occur. We have "an intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a presupposed situation," an outcome for which statistical predictions cannot adequately account We sense that a "preferential adaptation" of selected possibilities occurs, involving their "graduated 'intensive relevance'" to the novel alternatives the situation permits[9] Thus intuition is not just that some realizable novelties will in fact be realized but that they will be biased toward those conducive to stability and to the enhanced values it provides, to intrinsically more suitable outcomes. The suitability is not statistical. "it depends upon the fundamental graduation of appetitions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminations of transition."[10]

In no sense is this a religious intuition, insists Whitehead, for it lies "at a far lower level of experience than do the religious emotions."[11] Yet neither is it merely an intuition of an inexplicable bias toward the intrinsically more suitable The intuition is metaphysical, a sense that this bias is due to an agency at the base of things, influencing the character of temporal transitions Whitehead calls this agency "God" but is then careful to empty the term of its standard religious meaning. "the secularization of the concept of God's functions in the world is at least as urgent a requisite of thought as is the secularization of other elements of experience"[12] This secular agency, its

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[8] Ibid , 207.
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid

function purely metaphysical and primordial, is "the ground of all order and of all originality "[13]

Whitehead's intuition is fourfold that novel possibilities emerge constantly in the course of things, that there is a bias in their character toward the actualization of greater value, that this bias is the result of their graduated relevance to that outcome, and that this relevance is affected by a primordial agency Any process philosopher would affirm the first aspect of this intuition, and most the second and third aspects, but whence comes the seemingly gratuitous addition of the fourth, that the bias is due to the work of a metaphysically fundamental agency? Why does the cosmic order require not only a ground for the stability and the originality it manifests, but also an agent affecting that ground? The answer, I wish to argue, is because of Whitehead's oddly nontemporal approach to possibilities, which he calls "eternal objects" and, in the fifth of the Categories of Existence in his Categoreal Scheme, defines as "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact, or forms of definiteness."[14]

In Whitehead's metaphysical system, eternal objects are precisely the "independent and ready-made" subsisting entities Dewey decried Their definition is stipulative "Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object '"[15] To conceive of an eternal object is not thereby to learn anything about the actual world Whatever is actual comes to be and perishes, it occurs once and uniquely An eternal object need never be actualized, but should it be it may then recur first as an actualized feature of one specific occasion, then of another, and then another, but always and everywhere—timelessly—remaining nonetheless a potential feature for some subsequent occasion

Whitehead's difficulty comes not from his claim that possibilities are eternal in this sense but that their eternality entails that they are essentially self-contained, an infinite plurality of isolated possibilities, a "barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities"[16] having no internal—no intrinsic, no essential—relatedness to one another "There is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity"[17] unless the

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[13] Ibid , 108
[14] Ibid , 22, deleting capitalizations
[15] Ibid , 44
[16] Ibid , 40
[17] Ibid , 257

eternal objects are brought together by God—not created by God, for they are eternal, but brought together into a specific organization, a systemic order imposed on their otherwise disjunctive chaos The imposed systemic order is primordial, it does not occur at any temporal moment because it is the precondition for cosmos of any sort, including the current spatiotemporal cosmic epoch

A simple eternal object as well as a complex one, a sensum as well as a pattern, has in addition to its "individual essence" a "relational essence" that comprises "its potentialities of relationship "[18] This relational essence abstracts from any specific manner of an eternal object's relatedness to other eternal objects or to actual occasions, however It is not intrinsic to the eternal object, for "the general relationships of eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their relationships in God's conceptual realization."[19] An eternal object has a relational essence in only a Pickwickian sense

Eternal objects are existences that "stand out" with the same "extreme finality" as actual entities,[20] but these two kinds of existent differ sharply The individual essence of an actual entity is its relatedness, its making of a single existent from the multiplicity of its relations to predecessor existents An actual entity is intrinsically and without remainder a concrescing process In contrast, the individual essence of an eternal object is its unchanging relationless unity. Its relational features are purely extrinsic, the consequence of orderings it is given and into which it is thrust

Given this understanding of eternal objects, Whitehead is forced to populate his cosmos with a primordial agency, for three reasons The first reason is that according to the "ontological principle," the eighteenth category of explanation,[21] "all real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality "[22] Therefore eternal objects as an ordered system of possibilities must be an aspect of the formal constitution of an actual entity, as aspect of its "unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality "[23] The order

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[18] Ibid , 115
[19] Ibid , 257
[20] Ibid , 22
[21] Ibid , 24–5
[22] Ibid , 32
[23] Ibid , 343

requires an orderer, and since that ordered system has categoreal conditions that are the "timeless source of all order," of "the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends,"[24] its orderer must also be ultimate, which is to say timeless

Whitehead's second reason for including a primordial agent in his metaphysics is that eternal objects not already instantiated in the actualization of past occasions would be "relatively non-existent" for a present actual occasion Without an "agency of comparison" able to disclose the "definite relevance" of possibilities never before actualized in temporal events, those possibilities would be unavailable to a present actual occasion's concrescent decisions[25] Relevance is a determination that some members of a group, in this case of the totality of all possibilities, are comparatively more useful to what might emerge from a given situation than are others Their ingression in a concrescing actual occasion is more conducive to its achieving optimal intensity of satisfaction than other ingressions would be This eternal object is relevant to this situation, that one is not Therefore this one but not that one should be made available to the nascent actual occasion in its particular concrescent situation Relevance means gradation; gradation means rating the relative value of a number of options, and rating requires a rater, a judging agent The eternal objects must be ordered not only ontologically but also existentially

The third reason why a nontemporal actual entity is metaphysically required is because the "primordial permanence" of this entity is that whereby the creative advance "re-establishes itself," offering from moment to moment novel possibilities relevant to each subsequent occasion[26] It is not enough to provide the necessary conditions for the temporal emergence of a cosmic order It is crucial as well to provide for the originality necessary both to sustain that cosmic order as a stable background for more intense but also more ephemeral modes of order, and to effect when needed a viable transition from a failed cosmos to its successor

In short, Whitehead offers three related metaphysical reasons for why there must be a primordial agent It provides the conditions of

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[24] Ibid , 32
[25] Ibid , 31
[26] Ibid , 347

cosmic order, affects the possibility for specific achievement, and creates the conditions for continued achievement in the temporal progression and valuational enhancement of that order His motivation for adding this notion of God to his philosophical system—it is indeed added, the first of the Derivative Notions that follow upon but are not a part of the Categoreal Scheme composed of "the primary notions which constitute the philosophy of organism"[27]—is to assure its coherence and explanatory adequacy

The result is quite the opposite, however Whitehead says that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles,"[28] but the notion of a nontemporal actual entity is an oxymoron Actual entities are events, but God in its primordial nature does not come to be and in its consequent nature does not perish—God is an event, but one that does not actually occur The possibility of temporal cosmos must be timelessly primordial since nothing can come to be unless the conditions for its doing so are already in place, and yet the "acquirement by creativity of a primordial character" is "a free creative act" that "exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions" for temporal achievement[29]—a primordial agent must logically and temporally precede the categoreal conditions for agency. The relevance of eternal objects to whatever the forms and contents of actual worlds might be, their graded intensive relevance to each nascent actual occasion must be timeless because primordial, but the future is open and cannot be fully anticipated—a primordial God in an open universe has no way in advance of the creative advance to be relevant.

If coherence and adequacy is to be restored to Whitehead's system, it must be purged of the unfortunate addition of a God responsible for the primordial tasks assigned it in *Process and Reality* We should cleanse the philosophy of organism of its secular deity—and then look elsewhere for a way to address the religious aspects of experience

Why, I wonder, must possibilities be essentially timeless, without relation, and inaccessible? Suppose instead, as Dewey suggested, that they are inherent features of the given, functions of a particular spatio-temporal context. Their proximate relevance is then part and

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[27] Ibid , 18
[28] Ibid , 343
[29] Ibid , 344.

parcel of their nature, it constitutes their individual essences. They are ordered intrinsically with respect to the actual world they qualify Their relatedness is internal to their temporal context, nor something imposed on them by a nontemporal orderer The ontological principle is satisfied because every possibility exists as a feature of some determinate nexus of actual occasions A possibility is never nowhere, but always embedded in a spatiotemporal context where it is available for prehension by the situated agents emerging as the successors of that context.

Whitehead claims that without hybrid physical feelings of God's conceptual feeling of the relevance to it of the given universe, an actual occasion's initial aim would not be sufficiently innovative, unable to achieve anything of value and unable to sustain any value it might inherit

> Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility [30]

This is not so, however, if the needed relevance is already inherent in its past Novel possibilities, found as aspects of the initial data physically prehended by a nascent actual occasion, suffice The possibilities to be found in any occasion's past are of three sorts previously actualized possibilities, possibilities previously entertained but never actualized, and possibilities never before entertained They are all available, potent features of the realities impinging on the present, resources for the concrescing occasion in its struggle to become a concretely potent actuality

Contrary to what Whitehead seems to think, his Categoreal Scheme, sketching the "generic notions inevitably presupposed in our reflective experience,"[31] is quite able to account for novel possibilities and the conditions necessary for their actualization The philosophy of organism, without benefit of divine agency, can be transformed into a metaphysics that is adequate to experience and coherent because it is devoid of essentially timeless entities posited as being needed by experience rather than actually derived from experience

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[30] Ibid , 247
[31] Ibid , 18

I shall proceed in the next sections of this essay to explore some of the resources for this transformation, guided by Whitehead's injunction that a metaphysics:

> should be "necessary" in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact There is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality Speculative philosophy seeks that essence [32]

II

There are ample resources in *Process and Reality* for a functionalist interpretation of eternal objects and their role in the creative advance, one that does not require the relevance and novelty of possibilities to be dependent on a primordial agency The keystone for this alternative construction is "Creativity," Whitehead's Category of the Ultimate which "expresses the general principle presupposed in the three more special categories"[33] that comprise the Categoreal Scheme of "primary notions which constitute the philosophy of organism "[34]

Creativity is

> that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity The "creative advance" is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates [35]

It lies in the nature of things that the many occasions of the past must be felt such that they will be compatible for entering into complex unity, that there are processes of concrescence and that they must have an outcome. "The sole appeal" in defense of this claim about the nature of things, says Whitehead, "is to intuition "[36] Creativity thus rests on an intuition more fundamental than Whitehead's intuition of an agency-caused tendency toward a suitable outcome It is the intuition that there be an outcome, whether or not it be suitable

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[32] Ibid , 4
[33] Ibid , 21
[34] Ibid , 18
[35] Ibid , 21
[36] Ibid , 22

The necessary conditions for achieving this unity are specified by what Whitehead calls "Categoreal Obligations" Four of them specify the basic constraints upon concrescence required for it to result in any determinate outcome whatsoever Subjective Unity stipulates that the initial diversity of data physically prehended in an actual occasion's process of concrescence "are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject"[37] Objective Identity stipulates that each distinct element in the final outcome of the process of concrescence "has one self-consistent function"[38] Subjective Harmony and Objective Diversity stipulate similar conditions for conceptual prehensions[39]

More is required, however A novel occasion, in the sense of a new unique addition to the creative advance of the cosmos, must make novel decisions regarding its inheritance if it is to satisfy these four basic categoreal obligations Pure repetition is impossible, for a successor's world differs from its predecessors' at least in having what the predecessors cannot have. those predecessors as its inheritance and itself as a living present. To assure that the necessary novelty is available to a new concrescence for dealing with these novel features, further categoreal obligations are needed

The most fundamental of these further conditions is Conceptual Valuation

> From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of [exemplified in] the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt[40]

In keeping with the standard empiricist dictum that "mentality originates from sensitive experience,"[41] Whitehead affirms the primacy of physical prehensions but then allows direct derivation from them of conceptual prehensions The immediate past is prehended by a newly emerging concrescence as a concrete determinate datum or a multiplicity of data The eternal object characterizing this definiteness is abstracted from it and entertained in its own right It is a possibility for exemplification extracted from an actual exemplification.

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[37] Ibid , 26
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid , 27, 26, respectively
[40] Ibid , 26, repeated at 248 except for bracketed change
[41] Ibid , 248

The manner in which this possibility is felt by the nascent occasion, the subjective form of its prehension, is not necessarily how it was felt by that past occasion. "The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is valuation," which "introduces creative purpose" into that feeling.[42] The subject, in breaking the eternal object free from its prior ingression, can value it more or value it less than it had previously been valued, and it does so as a function of its own developing effort to achieve concreteness. This conceptual feeling, felt with a novel subjective form, is then reintegrated with the physical feeling The past datum is not only prehended as being what it is, but appreciated or depreciated with respect to its likely value, its functional utility for the nascent occasion's effort to achieve a new determinate outcome.

The brute facticity of the impinging past is inescapable "The deterministic efficient causation is the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of its own feelings, with their own intensive strength, felt and reenacted by the novel concrescent subject "[43] But an actual occasion is a process of self-determination, which "is always imaginative in origin." Its concrescence involves not only "conformation to pattern" but also "subjective valuation," which is "the work of novel conceptual feeling "[44] These conceptual feelings are novel because they are functions of the emerging occasion's existential situation, its unique standpoint and the unique decisions thereby required in order to achieve a determinate outcome

> In proportion to its importance, acquired in complex processes of integration and reintegration, this autonomous conceptual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range of feeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integration [45]

The valuations are novel, their use an autonomous exercise. "Each creative act is the universe incarnating itself as one, and there is nothing above it"—nor before it, neither metaphysically nor temporally—"by way of final condition."[46]

The categoreal condition identified by Conceptual Valuation is the requirement that although the concrescence of an actual occasion

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[42] Ibid
[43] Ibid , 245
[44] Ibid
[45] Ibid
[46] Ibid

begins with the massive influence of its immediate past, the idea derived from this inherence, although also inherited, is evaluated by the inheritor in terms not only of its prior relevance but also of its relevance to the inheritor's new situation An emerging present is never fully determined by the causal objectivity of its impinging past because its initial response is to reassess the potential value of that objectivity in the light of its own situational needs This valuation may be negligible, but when the inheritance is complex enough the power of valuation is enhanced and the usual dim glimmer of novelty becomes the "flash of autonomous individual experience "[47]

Whitehead says that the valuation of conceptual prehensions is "the subject determining its own ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autonomously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum," and with respect to this function of its mental pole the occasion is "out of time "[48] These references to the timeless, the ultimate, and the eternal do not imply any reality independent of temporal becoming and perishing, however Creativity is the ultimate principle asserting the primacy of temporal process. The eternal principles by which each new quantum of that temporal process modifies its inheritance and its aim in order to make something of itself are those of the categoreal obligations, which together demand of the occasion that it be creative enough to instantiate Creativity, to add a successor space-time quantum to the one now perishing. Autonomous valuation is out of time because it is a concrescence function, an aspect of the process that fashions what is temporal

I have called this demand for effective autonomy an "Aristotelean transcendental"[49]—Aristotelean because the demand governs a teleological process by which possibilities are actualized, transcendental because the demand is grounded not in an agent entity but in the nature of things

It is not sufficient that the many must constantly become one, however, because this demand is compatible with the decay of value, with a loss of complex structure and contrastive intensity Whitehead's intuition that the creative process involves a bias toward not merely value but enhanced value is expressed in the categoreal

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[47] Ibid

[48] Ibid , 248

[49] George Allan, "Whiteheadian Recollection," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 15, no 3 (2001) 217–8

obligation of Subjective Intensity, which stipulates that "the subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (α) in the immediate subject, and (β) in the *relevant* future."[50] Or as Whitehead puts it later, the aim is at "maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence "[51] If an actual occasion is an instance of Creativity, it is essentially an aim not only at a unified determinate outcome It is in the nature of things that its aim must also be at optimal short-run and long-run intensity. Its essence is to be creative enough to fulfill the constraint that it seek intensity of feeling for itself and its successors Because Creativity, through its multiple instances, is therefore a vector toward the best of the outcomes possible for it, I have called this feature of the nature of things a "Leibnizian transcendental."[52]

If value is to be enhanced, or even sustained, in a cosmos where mere reenactment entails decay, more novelty is needed that can be achieved by appreciating or depreciating inherited values Hence Whitehead postulates another categoreal obligation, that of Conceptual Reversion: "There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole The diversity is a relevant diversity determined by the subjective aim,"[53] which, as Whitehead later clarifies, is an "aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast "[54]

Diverse physical feelings yield diverse conceptual feelings, but when the diversity is extreme enough, when incompatibilities become incommensurable, a concept of their reconciliation needs to be more inventive than the adjustments conceptual valuations provide A new kind of possible unity needs to be introduced, by interpreting the divergent conceptual feelings as versions of a more general or more fundamental possibility The "conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives," of "proximate novelties," invites an "enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast."[55] A novel possibility does not ever come out of nowhere, as some sort

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[50] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 27
[51] Ibid , 249
[52] Allan, "Whiteheadian Recollection," 218–9
[53] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 26
[54] Ibid , 249
[55] Ibid

of bewildering surd It comes as a variation on the familiar, a shift in emphasis or point of view, as a refreshing alternative to the usual way of characterizing the established order So a new concept is derived from the initial conceptual feelings, responding to the difficulty in how they might collaborate in actualizing the nascent subject's aim It interprets the clashing values as neighbors rather than strangers, as proximate rather than distant alternatives—and therefore as reconcilable They are children of the same parents, branches from the same trunk, the same melody played in different keys, complements rather than opposites, contraries rather than contradictories.

Whitehead says that Conceptual Reversion is "the category by which novelty enters the world, so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance "[56] As we have seen, however, conceptual valuations also introduce novelty The difference between reversion and valuation is that the former kind of novelty, unlike the latter, challenges the extant system of enduring objects rather than reaffirming it A conceptual reversion destabilizes established forms by opening the possibility of improving them Instead of smoothing over minor differences, it affirms the value of the differences by encompassing them within a wider or deeper unity. The new is taken as an improved version of the old, completing it rather than repudiating it

Whitehead stipulates a further mode of conceptual modification of physical feelings, one governed by the categoreal obligation of Transmutation Where the concrescent process has derived the same conceptual feeling from a multiplicity of physical feelings, "the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a characteristic of some nexus containing those prehended actual entities among its members, or of some part of that nexus "[57] Conceptual valuation is a sufficient method for discounting the multiplicity of analogous physical feelings, taking them as a single datum organized by the single conceptual feeling they in fact all exemplify In conceptual reversion an alternative is derived from that single conceptual feeling Transmutation permits the organizing concept to have a looser relationship to the nexus it is interpreted as characterizing It is derived not from all the members of a set of physical feelings but from

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[56] Ibid

[57] Ibid , 27

only some of them, or from physical feelings that lie outside the set "In such a case the objectification may introduce new elements into the world."[58]

For example, we see a the pattern of blue and red dots as a uniform splash of purple According to the theory of transmutation, their sharply contrasting differences are organized by an eternal object that none of them exhibit, by a purple quality that is neither blue nor red but neighbors them both in the color spectrum The citizens in a state of the United States who year after year cast a clear majority of their votes for Republican candidates may be said to be a "red state" even though millions of its citizens vote Democratic "blue," and even though those in any election who vote one way are only in part those who vote that way in the next election Red is a statistical generalization that justifies using a feature of a portion of the whole to characterize the whole Purple is a transmutation of generalizations of this sort, a concept imported from outside the universe of red and blue in order to describe a statistical distribution that justifies using neither a red portion nor a blue to characterize the whole

The importance of transmutation is that it makes complexities intelligible "We can only understand by discarding "[59] We need to overlook detail in order to see important patterns, to find the statistical slope—the tendency—in the seeming cacophony of particulars, to avoid missing the forest because of the trees To understand is to identify an organizing principle, to formulate a law the events exemplify. Apples fall from trees and planets trace errant pathways across the sky, but Newton's gravitational laws allow us to explain both these very different events as exemplifying the same dynamic pattern, from which therefore the subsequent behaviors of both can be predicted Of course, this strategy is open to abuse. We often fashion a rule exhibiting a pattern that although inadequate to the particulars is nonetheless a near enough approximation that, when it suits our purposes, we can claim it is in fact adequate, as when spin doctors take a minor change in voting pattern as a significant shift and therefore as a mandate for their candidate.

One kind of existent in Whitehead's cosmology is "propositions, or matters of fact in potential determination, or impure potentials for

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[58] Ibid , 251
[59] Ibid

the specific determination of matters of fact, or theories "[60] These are relevant possibilities, an "objective lure" resulting from a

> discrimination among eternal objects introduced into the universe by the real internal constitutions of the actual occasions forming the datum of the concrescence under review This discrimination also involves eternal objects excluded from value in the temporal occasions of that datum, in addition to involving the eternal objects included for such occasions [61]

What is excluded for the sake of understanding is not eliminated, the cosmos is always far more than our interpretive worlds The rule by which we order experience into a stable meaningful world involves transmutation vast multiplicities of detail are characterized by means of a single idea, often one exemplified by only a portion of the detail or by none of it So our understanding focuses on some eternal objects while neglecting others, excluding them from value, hiding them in an endless expanse of unimportance And yet they are there, neglected but not gone The discrimination of a neglected or hidden possibility, its entertainment as a proposition for enactment, has transformative potential. This radically new possibility, this surprising alternative to the familiar ones, is not a subjective but rather an objective lure because the possibility it discloses is derived from physical feelings even if obscured by reversions and transmutations.

Creativity is a vector not only toward a determinate outcome and toward an optimal intensity of outcome but also toward optimal endurance Vast ranges of various particulars need to function as though they were one thing, comprising a stable background able to support the salient transformations occurring in the foreground. Actual occasions need to be organized into hierarchies of enduring objects, the more enduring of which provide a predictable foundation upon which the less enduring ones can strut and fret their hour upon the stage The birth of a solar system or the burst of a supernova depend on the stability of a background continuum of space and time permanent enough to be taken as everlasting The historical odyssey by which the idea of human freedom has come to be embedded, tenuously but genuinely, in the practices of some human communities requires a structure of civilized order that has persisted long enough to be

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[60] Ibid , 22, deleting capitalizations
[61] Ibid , 185

presupposed by generation after generation of its constituent members as obviously the way things should be

In a cosmos of actual occasions constantly adding their novel uniqueness to the creative advance, such systemic stabilities require constant adaptive readjustments in which limited subordinate features can rapidly be added, subtracted, or altered without harming the more general features The function of a government in human societies is to undertake initiatives that serve the general good even if doing so means transmuting particular goods, devaluing the members of the group and their individual achievements for the sake of the whole group, treating them as components with finite utility rather than as unique individuals with a worth beyond price.

Transmutation is what I have called a "Hobbesian transcendental"[62] because it stipulates how the achievements of current actual occasions must be used in order to fashion and enhance the continuities that are the foundation for the achievements of their successors The effective transmission of the conditions for actualizing significant value intensities means that actual occasions must subordinate their immediate individual goods to the enduring environment of hierarchically ordered systems necessary for the subsequent emergence of similar or greater individual goods.

Rare the actual occasions or persons who would suffer this deferred or denied gratification gladly Without the offices of Leviathan, the viable possibilities for creative achievement would all be meager, brutish, and short Groups need leaders who are adept at framing their actions in terms of communal rather than individual needs Despite Hobbes, however, this skill is best exercised when it includes reversions as well as transmutations, when it includes the ability to see not only possibilities to which narrow individual perspectives are blind but also ones that disclose courses of action that can reconcile conflicting individual interests and parochial factions rather than intensifying their incompatible aims, that can serve the whole without sacrificing too much of the particular

Whitehead offers the Battle of Waterloo as an example of the transformation potential of the possibilities lurking in the shadows of the world as we know it This complex event resulted in the defeat of Napoleon, "but the abstract notions, expressing the possibilities of

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[62] Allan, "Whiteheadian Recollection," 219–20

another course of history which would have followed upon his victory, are relevant to the facts which actually happened "[63] What happened entails what could have happened but did not "hypothetical alternatives," comprising "a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance to the Battle of Waterloo "[64] Perhaps these alternatives are entertained by "imaginative historians" and explicitly examined for the insights they provide into the actual course of things Perhaps they are dismissed out of hand, although even then they are thereby recognized as relevant enough to have been noticed and as needing to be dismissed. More typically, these might-have-beens are felt more than thought, admitted by some into "effective feeling" but

> for others the ideas float into their minds as daydreams without consciousness of deliberate decision, for others, their emotional tone, of gratification or regret, of friendliness or hatred, is obscurely influenced by this penumbra of alternatives, without any conscious analysis of its content [65]

This penumbra of hypothetical alternatives, more typically sensed than analyzed, is the resource for the transformative ideals harbored by actual fact, haunting both the best laid and the worst laid plans of mice and men

Transformative possibilities are akin to errors they are at odds with what is accepted as truth, with what conforms to the established structures and the normative rules governing them They are wrong, but not useless, for they are ideas about how we might be able to change the world—by means of which we change it

> The conceptual feelings entertained in any nexus modify the future role of that nexus as a physical objective datum What is conceptual earlier is felt physically later in an extended role Thus, for instance, a new "form" has its emergent ingression conceptually by reversion, and receives delayed exemplification physically when the other categoreal conditions permit [66]

The ideal is parent of the actual Unless a different order of things is first conceivable, it cannot be taken as a goal to be made actual

We often act blindly or impulsively, the relevant possibilities for actualization not recognized or only felt at levels below consciousness Insofar, however, as we dream of something better or entertain a working hypothesis or develop a plan of action, we take one

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[63] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 185
[64] Ibid
[65] Ibid
[66] Ibid , 253

of the penumbra of alternative possibilities surrounding the actual world as an objective lure drawing us toward a world never before actualized, a world until then barely conceivable, one that can arise often only at great cost, at the sacrifice of present values and their proximate supports Often, of course, it is not we who take the transmuted alternative possibility as an objective lure; it takes us. We are grasped by the opportunities a transformative ideal promises, finding ourselves enamored by its beauty or its goodness, resonating to the new truth with which it rings, ready to stand athwart the barricades or to ride into the valley of death that it might be actualized—if not for us, at least for the generations after us And in its service, behold all things become new Or so we hope, and strive, and the new world that emerges is indeed a transformed world, although not necessarily a better one.

III

I have been suggesting the way in which novel possibilities can be interpreted within Whitehead's cosmology. They are inherent in determinate actualities. available to actual occasions by conceptual prehensions, reversions, and transmutations derived from their physical prehensions of the past. The past that determines the fundamental conditions, the shape and content, of the world we inhabit, is also a source of possibilities that allow us to alter these conditions in novel and incrementally fundamental ways

For possibilities so understood, there is no ontological need for God as an entity serving as their eternal repository. There is likewise no need for such an entity as the determiner of the relevance of those possibilities and hence as the initiating cause of the creative advance. Since the notion of God wreaks havoc with the coherence of Whitehead's metaphysics, a viable alternative such as I have sketched means Whiteheadians have ample justification for abandoning the notion Creativity instantiated in actual occasions internally related to their predecessors and successors is sufficient for articulating a coherent and adequate philosophy of organism We ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity

This reinterpretation of his metaphysics is not a repudiation of Whitehead, for like any renovation it transforms the old content by

organizing it in a new way, giving salience to features that had been overlooked or rejected. A functionalist approach continues the adventure of Whitehead's metaphysical ideas, recovering their empirical heart and thereby redeeming their temporalist soul

Indeed, this line of thinking is the direction Whitehead's work seems to take subsequent to *Process and Reality*. In *Adventures of Ideas*, for instance, apart from a number of historical references there is only one mention of God When discussing the "intrinsic incompatibility" among ideals, and the "evil" therefore intrinsic to their "attempted conjunction," Whitehead notes as an aside that this issue has "an important bearing upon our conception of the nature of God" There are ideals it is impossible for God to realize in one synthesizing totality

> We must conceive the Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season Thus a process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity is acquiring realization [67]

Whitehead then drops this line of thought—"it is unnecessary to pursue theology further"—and returns to his general discussion of how incompatible ideals can be conceptually entertained as a phase in the process by which some ideals are realized in physical fact

This brief theological reflection is at odds, however, with the rest of the book In a chapter on philosophic method, Whitehead makes a point about the inadequacy of the specific words we use when engaged in philosophical generalization. As an example, he takes as a "working hypothesis"[68] the notion that "the ultimate realities are the events in their process of origination," in their passage from "ideal disjunctive diversity" into "concrete togetherness "[69] This is more or less a restatement of *Process and Reality*'s Category of the Ultimate Whitehead then rejects the doctrine of an "external Creator, eliciting this final togetherness out of nothing" Instead, he opts for the doctrine "that it is a metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things, that there is nothing in the Universe other than instances of this passage and components of these instances "[70] Whitehead

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[67] Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 1933 (New York Free Press, 1967), 277

[68] Ibid , 235

[69] Ibid , 235–6

[70] Ibid , 236

wonders what terms might best be used to explicate this latter doctrine "Creativity" nicely captures the notion that "every event is a process issuing in novelty,"[71] but it also suggests an immanent Creator, which unfortunately has about it "an air of paradox, or of pantheism "[72] The word "concrescence" is a better way to underscore the idea of concrete togetherness as the result of a process of growing together, but it "fails to suggest the creative novelty involved "[73] So in his typical way, Whitehead ends up with a set of ten different terms, which mutually "correct each other" "together, creativity, concrescence, prehension, feeling, subjective form, data, actuality, becoming, process "[74] Notably missing is the word "God" or any of its synonyms

More interestingly, let us consider Part 4 of *Adventures of Ideas*, where Whitehead is discussing the five qualities of mind that he says define a civilized mode of existence Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, and Peace Having discussed the first two of these, he turns in the book's penultimate chapter to Adventure and Art, initiating his discussion by stating that the claim that "no static maintenance of perfection is possible" is an axiom "rooted in the nature of things Advance or Decadence are the only choices offered to mankind "[75] This axiom rests on three "metaphysical principles " First, "that the very essence of real actuality—that is, of the completely real—is process "[76] Second, "that every occasion of actuality is in its own nature finite" and hence that "there is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections "[77] Whitehead's theological digression occurs as an illustration of this second principle

The third metaphysical principle grounding the claim that stasis is not an ontological option is "the principle of Individuality,"[78] which affirms the importance of "enduring things, each experienced as a unity of many occasions bound together by the force of inheritance "[79] "The great Harmony," says Whitehead, "is the harmony of enduring individualities, connected in the unity of a background "[80] Concerned to

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[71] Ibid
[72] Ibid
[73] Ibid
[74] Ibid , 236–7 Whitehead places each of these terms in single quotes
[75] Ibid , 274
[76] Ibid
[77] Ibid , 276
[78] Ibid , 279
[79] Ibid , 280
[80] Ibid , 281

explicate why the "principle of Individuality" is so crucial, Whitehead argues as follows.

> In considering the process which constitutes the existence of an occasion of experience, the perception of the enduring individuals must belong to the final Appearance wherein the occasion terminates For in the primary phase, the past is initiating the process in virtue of the energizing of its diverse individual occasions This is the Reality from which the new occasion springs The process is urged onward by operation of the mental pole providing conceptual subject matter for synthesis with the Reality There finally emerges the Appearance, which is the transformed Reality after synthesis with the conceptual valuations [81]

Whitehead is talking about civilized experience, so the "occasion of experience" under consideration is that of a human being, a moment in a person's ongoing conscious, self-aware, reflective, imaginative life, a moment that will have the character of an "Appearance " The structure of this experience, however, is always generalizable, it describes the character of any concrescence, the pattern of the process which constitutes any actual occasion The "Reality" from which this new occasion emerges is "the past," which is composed of "diverse individual occasions " This Reality is an "initiating" power, an "energizing" force—the originating impetus of the process of concrescence The past is described not merely as an inheritance, a passive lump of brute fact that must be taken into account It is a vector force calling forth the new concrescence This process is then "urged onward" by the operation of the occasion's mental pole, which provides "conceptual subject-matter for synthesis with the Reality." The past energizes the process but is unable to carry it through to an effective outcome without the addition of realizable possibilities for synthesis generated through valuations, reversions, and transmutations, originating in the occasion's mental pole What emerges when the resources provided by the occasion's physical and mental poles are creatively merged is a "transformed" Reality, the initial inherited Reality "after synthesis with the conceptual valuations "

After this brief account of "the process which constitutes the existence of an occasion of experience," a process in which our perception of enduring individuals "must belong to the final Appearance wherein the occasion terminates," Whitehead continues (beginning this quote with the last sentence from the prior one)

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[81] Ibid

> There finally emerges the Appearance, which is the transformed Reality after synthesis with the conceptual valuations The Appearance is a simplification by a process of emphasis and combination Thus the enduring individuals, with their wealth of emotional significance, appear in the foreground In the background there lie a mass of undistinguished occasions providing the environment with its vague emotional tone In a general sense, the Appearance is a work of Art, elicited from the primary Reality [82]

The focus here is on transmutation, because the Appearance that Whitehead is explicating is one that makes enduring objects salient, that interprets experience in terms of temporally extended individuals. We humans take the Reality of our experience and fashion it into something we can manage, into an Appearance We do this by simplifying the complexity of the Reality, emphasizing, subordinating, and combining its details, lifting a few enduring individuals into the foreground and endowing them with a "wealth of emotional significance," while consigning the "mass of undistinguished occasions" to a background "providing the environment with its vague emotional tone." We thereby make a work of Art, an Appearance that has been "elicited" from the primary Reality.

This making by humans of a transformed Reality, of a work of Art, has the same structure as any other process of concrescence It differs from the processes that issue in the events comprising empty space or stars or bacteria or chimpanzees by the quality of the transformation. The causal route along which the Reality of an artful Appearance is sustained is taken as a sign or symbol of other parallel routes of Reality. Its simplicity is the product of occasions with highly sophisticated mental poles able to fashion by complex transmutations intensely harmonized, sharply foregrounded, concretely significant individuals, against a vague but supporting background harmony

In "a general sense," any Appearance is a work of Art, for the novelty that all actual occasions require involves by categoreal necessity, as we have seen, conceptual valuations, reversions, or transmutations. Whitehead clarifies and deepens these notions by calling the results of the synthesis of physical and mental prehensions a work of Art For what is actualized is not just a mental image, which is private, but also a public image Works of Art are physical—intensely

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[82] Ibid

harmonized, sharply foregrounded, richly backgrounded physical objects They can be seen and heard, tasted and sniffed, touched and undergone Works of Art are Appearances that occupy space-time, propositions made flesh, actual presences we encounter The satisfaction that is the determinate outcome of any process of concrescence is in this sense a work of Art

Yet in the specific sense of the aesthetic objects created by human artists, works of Art—images crafted by a creative combination of imaginative insight, manual dexterity, and astute judgment—are the Appearances which Whitehead is emphasizing as crucial to civilized experience

> Thus civilization in its aim at fineness of feeling should so arrange its social relations, and the relations of its members to their natural environment, as to evoke into the experiences of its members Appearances dominated by the harmonies of forceful enduring things It must create, so that in the experience of the beholder there appear Individuals as it were immortal by their appeal to the deep recesses of feeling [83]

These artful Appearances can be evocative even when largely fanciful, even when they depart significantly from the Reality of which they are simplified expressions. After all, as Whitehead famously put it "It is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true "[84] Yet he immediately adds

> But of course a true proposition is more apt to be interesting than a false one Also action in accordance with the emotional lure of a proposition is more apt to be successful if the proposition be true [85]

Whitehead later explains why.

> A grave defect in falsehood limits the extent to which any force of feeling can be summoned from the recesses of Reality The falsehood thus lacks the magic by which a beauty beyond the power of speech to express can be called into being, as if by the wand of an enchanter.[86]

A great work of Art is a novel creation. Its evocative power lies not in a mere replication of the Reality to which it refers but in a transformation of that Reality, and thus means bringing fresh possibilities into play, creating what is literally false in order to disclose truths about

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[83] Ibid , 282
[84] Ibid , 244
[85] Ibid
[86] Ibid , 283, correcting the text which has "truth" instead of "falsehood" as the fifth word

the objective world to which we have been blind or which we have overlooked in our standard ways of perceiving it and thinking about it It is false to the explicit system of things, to the Reality delimited by the careful prose of scientific and legal discourse, in order to reveal the truths that discourse obscures The greatest works of Art fashion an Appearance that refers us to a Reality beyond "the dictionary meaning of words,"[87] sending us "a message from the Unseen," disclosing something of the mystery of things, unloosing "depths of feeling from behind the frontier where precision of consciousness fails "[88]

Whitehead is arguing that reality is complex beyond our ability fully to prehend, much less to articulate what we have prehended We order its complex order into Appearances, fashioning simplified representations of reality, creating the worlds in which we seek to live practically effective and culturally meaningful lives These prosaic worlds are true or false depending on their adequacy to the greater fullness of the reality they claim to represent Art is the creation of an Appearance, an aesthetic world, that not only represents reality but also opens for us its unrepresented deeper poetic structures with their elusive transformative possibilities

The power of the past lies in the way it vastly transcends all of our limited attempts to order it Our power as human agents is our ability to fashion these limited worlds and to live within them effectively This power of ours finds its highest expression, its civilized apotheosis, in the ability to create those Appearances we call works of Art In opening ourselves to these aesthetic worlds, we find in them transformative alternatives to the possibilities available within the inherited systems of order by which our predecessors lived "Philosophy is akin to poetry," for both at their best create works of Art that energize our lives by introducing into experience a sense of "form beyond the direct meanings of words," of possibilities by which we are able, always inadequately but perhaps transformatively, "to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization "[89]

The universal Creativity actualized in the finite creativity of temporal occasions fashions the creative advance These finite acts of invention are always focused on the problems of their own finite

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[87] Ibid , 267

[88] Ibid , 271

[89] Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought,* 1938 (New York Free Press, 1968), 174

present and their own finitely anticipated future, constrained by their own inherited finite past However, these limited creatures have the capacity to access through Art aspects of their inheritance that have been excluded from its explicitly ordered systems of meaning, aspects that are nonetheless there in its implied background.

This inchoate inheritance can be glimpsed at best intuitively, vaguely, brokenly, but it can indeed be felt, and its efficacy lies in the hint of previously unimagined opportunities it releases Whitehead's intuition of an intrinsic suitability in the nature of things is, I propose, an intuition of shadowy but accessible possibilities lying at depths of experience beyond prosaic articulation These obscure possibilities are made by Art into propositions, becoming resources for the transformation of the actual into something better, releasing our energizing power to fashion new realities in which what was once poetic and inchoate is made prosaic and pragmatically effective The ground of this intrinsic suitability is not a primordial agent but the nature of things, and the agency by which it is made relevant to present exigencies is not a primordial divinity but simply we humans Or, to generalize, the agents of creative innovation are we finite creatures, great or small, enduring or momentary, who in our various ways comprise Creativity, who all have as our essence the capacity to grasp the intrinsic suitability the past harbors and graduate its intensive relevance with respect to our preferential adaptations

IV

Dewey admonished Whitehead to be more appreciative of "the infinite fertility of actual occasions in their full actuality,"[90] and to celebrate their latent capacity for experimental intelligence I have tried in this essay to reinterpret Whitehead along these lines The deeper reality that our works of Art disclose is a freshening breeze stirring in the leaves, hinting at an impending change By drawing on these depths, to which by our very nature we have access, we finite creatures are able to transcend our finite limits and to venture tentatively toward a new land, lying always over there just beyond the horizon

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[90] Dewey, "Whitehead's Philosophy," 177, 154

Whitehead in *Adventures of Ideas* offers no vision of an ultimate end There is no eschatological goal eventually to be realized, no Kingdom of God in history, no enduring totalization of created value in that region beyond time Whitehead elsewhere identified with God's consequent nature We creatures are left with the journey, with the endless struggle to achieve finite goods that fall far short of the possibilities for good that could have been achieved. Yet these finite goods always also hold out those unrealized possibilities, and possibilities beyond our imagining, as reasons for renewing the struggle, for continuing the journey toward other finite achievements and other finite struggles.

As Whitehead puts it in the closing words of *Adventures of Ideas*·

> At the heart of the nature of things, there are always the dream of youth and the harvest of tragedy . The immediate experience of this Final Fact, with its union of Youth and Tragedy, is the sense of Peace In this way the World receives its persuasion toward such perfections as are possible for its diverse individual occasions [91]

We are left with the journeying, the endless temporal Adventure that unites us And that is enough.[92]

Dickinson College

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[91] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 296

[92] An earlier version of portions of this essay was given at the Sixth International Whitehead Conference in Salzburg, July 2006 My thanks to Randy Auxier, Harley Chapman, Don Crosby, Bill Hamrick, Stefan Schindler, and Jan van der Veken for their criticisms of a more recent version

KANTIAN AUTONOMY AND THE MORAL SELF

ERIC ENTRICAN WILSON

KANT'S ACCOUNT OF AUTONOMY is not designed to solve the traditional problem of free will It is a response to the problem of heteronomy rather than the problem of determinism And the former pertains to concerns about the structure of practical reason rather than the scope of nature's causal laws So his theory of practical reason, rather than his metaphysics, provides the proper context for understanding his account of autonomy

Unfortunately Kant did not always appreciate this feature of his own views. He says conflicting things about the relation between the practical concept of autonomy and the theoretical concept of "transcendental freedom." He sometimes claims that the former depends on the latter, which he characterizes as "the faculty of beginning a state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature "[1] In other words, he sometimes says that our autonomy depends upon our ability to exempt ourselves from the workings of nature in order to initiate a chain of events that does not itself function as a link to earlier causal states Yet on other occasions he claims that autonomy and transcendental freedom are two separate issues "The question about transcendental freedom concerns merely speculative knowledge, which we can set aside as quite indifferent if we are concerned with what is practical, and about which there is already sufficient discussion in the Antinomy of Pure Reason "[2]

Correspondence to Loyola College in Maryland, 4501 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21210-2699

[1]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (New York Cambridge University Press, 1998), A533/B561, hereafter *KrV* Except for the *KrV*, which is cited according to the standard "A/B" pagination, all references to Kant are to the volume and page of *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, ed Koniglichpreusßischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig Walter de Gruyter, 1902–)

[2]Ibid A803/B831–A804/B832

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Kant himself did not always follow through on this claim, but I propose that we take him at his word here Further remarks recommend this interpretive approach Consider, for example, his review of Johann Heinrich Schulz's work, *Attempt at An Introduction to a Doctrine of Morals for all Human Beings*, which Kant wrote and published in 1783, just before the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* After summarizing Schulz's views in a friendly and not unsympathetic manner, Kant draws the reader's attention to "the general fatalism which is the most prominent principle in this work and the most powerful one, affecting all morality, [since it] turns all human conduct into a mere puppet show and thereby does away altogether with the concept of obligation "[3] What is interesting is that Kant criticizes Schulz's position not by insisting on the reality of freedom, but, rather, by arguing that the viability and legitimacy of our moral practices do not depend on fatalism or determinism being false [4] Despite having claimed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that autonomy depends on transcendental freedom, and thus a solution to the free will problem, he says here that "the practical concept of freedom has nothing to do with the speculative concept, which is abandoned entirely to metaphysicians."[5] Bearing in mind that Kant regards autonomy as a species of practical freedom, this claim is worth repeating in a way that makes its relevance to his moral theory crystal clear the concept of autonomy, he tells us, has nothing to do with the concept of transcendental freedom

This line of thought will surely not impress those who are committed to the importance of the traditional problem of free will They will insist that the will is either free or not—no matter the perspective or standpoint from which one chooses to examine the issue. And whether the will is free or not depends either on the truth or falsity of determinism or on whether freedom can be made compatible with determinism In the same review of Schulz Kant indicates a line of

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[3] Immanuel Kant, "Review of Schulz's Attempt at An Introduction to a Doctrine of Morals for all Human Beings regardless of different religions," in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (New York Cambridge University, 1996), 8 13, hereafter *Schulz*

[4] Kant does not, to my knowledge, distinguish between *fatalism* and *determinism* He seems to take the threats to freedom posed by the one as equivalent to those posed by the other

[5] *Schultz*, 8 13

response to this objection that he will pursue throughout his practical philosophy

> The most confirmed fatalist, who is a fatalist as long as he gives himself up to mere speculation, must still, as soon as he has to do with wisdom and duty, always act *as if he were free*, and this idea also actually produces the deed that accords with it and can alone produce it It is hard to cease altogether to be human [6]

The idea here seems to be as follows It is a reality of human life that we weigh our options, reflect on our impulses and desires, evaluate reasons, and make judgments about how we should conduct ourselves In other words, it is a fact about human life that we face head on, as agents, the world as much as we observe our transactions with it, from a sideways perspective, as prospective knowers (or makers of theoretical judgments). Of course we do not always do this, but the point is that we *can* and this ability is important to us and central to our lives When we deliberate about how to act, we cannot help but take ourselves to be capable of exerting influence on the world We cannot help but regard ourselves as capable of acting according to how we decide and deciding according to how we will Moreover, we cannot help but think that, when we do this, our options are somewhat open and that the outcomes of our volitions and actions are at least somewhat up to us This is why Kant claims that "*for practical purposes* the footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is possible to make use of our reason in our conduct "[7] The fatalist or determinist fails to own up to this The rejection of freedom is a mark of false consciousness regarding the reality of the practical stance we must all take, as agents, vis-à-vis the world To deny one's freedom is not to face courageously the hard truths of science or theology It is to renounce one's agency—and, with that, both one's ability to take responsibility for one's actions and one's "higher vocation" as a person

If we take this line of thought seriously, then the best way to understand and appreciate Kant's account of autonomy is to isolate it within the practical context to which it rightfully belongs In that context, the pressing problem is not *freedom versus determinism*

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[6] Ibid Unless otherwise noted, all emphases belong to the quoted author

[7] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (New York Cambridge University, 1997), 4 455–6, hereafter *GMS*

Instead, the real issue is *autonomy versus heteronomy* What Kant is most concerned about is the prospect that practical reason (or the will) is exclusively heteronomous in nature In this essay, I intend to show how he appeals to the notion of self-respect in order to argue against this prospect In Kant's view, our capacity for autonomy depends on our capacity to identify with and feel respect for an ideal, moral version of ourselves Genuine self-determination, in other words, rests on a form of self-respect

Allow me to begin with a sketch of Kant's theory of practical reason Like most philosophers, Kant takes practical reason to be about means and ends Because his moral theory is normally categorized as "nonteleological" or "deontological" by contemporary taxonomies of ethical thought, this is often overlooked. In fact, it is widely believed that Kant's view of moral reasoning has nothing to do with ends at all But it is easy to show that this is wrong. In the *Groundwork* Kant characterizes means, ends, and the relation between them as follows

> Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an *end* [*der Zweck*], and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings What, on the other hand contains merely the ground of the possibility of an action the effect of which is an end is called a *means* [*das Mittel*] [8]

In the *Metaphysics of Morals* he offers a more straightforward characterization of what he means by "end " There he says that, "an *end* is an object of the choice (of a rational being), through the representation of which choice is determined to an action to bring this object about."[9] Or more simply. "an end is an *object* of free choice, the representation of which determines it to action "[10] The word "object" should not mislead here It is being used in as broad a sense as possible to indicate that at which the will is directed All Kant means is that the end of a decision or choice is that for the sake of which it is undertaken. It is in this sense that the end of a choice "serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination "

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[8] Ibid 4 427

[9] Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (New York Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6 381, hereafter *MdS*

[10] Ibid 6 384–5

Contrary to the tendency to describe his views as nonteleological, Kant explicitly claims that, "every action has an end."[11] In the second *Critique* he puts the point like this: "it is indeed undeniable that every volition must also have an object and hence a matter."[12] This is in fact a central pillar of Kant's entire practical philosophy, for it is in these terms that Kant characterizes practical reason as such. "Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end."[13] In the *Metaphysics of Morals* he goes so far as to say that,

> pure practical reason is a faculty of ends generally, and for it to be indifferent to ends, that is, to take no interest in them, would therefore be a contradiction, since then it would not determine maxims for action either (because every maxim of action contains an end) and would not be practical reason.[14]

Because of its centrality to rationality, end-setting is the essential mark of our humanity: "The capacity to set oneself an end—any end whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)."[15]

In our actual practical reasoning the relationship between means and ends is mediated by incentives (*Triebfeder*).[16] We select what we

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[11] Ibid. 6: 385.

[12] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5: 34, hereafter *KpV*.

[13] *GMS* 4: 437.

[14] *MdS* 6: 395.

[15] Ibid. 6: 392. It is a mistake to think that the focus on ends drops out in Kant's moral theory. He, in fact, defines ethics as "the system of the *ends* of pure practical reason" (Ibid. 6: 381). For important criticisms of the deontological reading of Kant's moral theory, see Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) and Allen Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For an insightful discussion of the importance of ends to the Categorical Imperative, see Jens Timmerman, "Value Without Regress: Kant's 'Formula of Humanity' Revisited," *European Journal of Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (2006): 69–93.

[16] At one point in the *Groundwork* Kant distinguishes between incentives and motives: "The subjective ground of desire is an *incentive* [*die Triebfeder*], the objective ground of volition is a *motive* [*der Bewegungsgrund*], hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ends, which depend on motives, which hold for every rational being" (*GMS* 4: 427). Roughly, it seems that a motive is an incentive that has been endorsed in some sense. Nothing in my interpretation turns on this distinction, so it can be safely ignored for the purposes of the present essay.

take to be the best means toward prescribed ends, but we must also in some sense be "moved" to adopt those ends as our goals This is the job of an incentive, which Kant characterizes as the "subjective determining ground of the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law "[17] Incentives figure into the explanation of intentional actions in that they help account for why we adopt the ends that we do To cite an agent's incentive is to cite what moves her to treat something as her end But it is essential to Kant's theory of agency that we are not merely pushed and pulled by our incentives They move us in a particular sort of way This theoretical commitment is expressed most clearly in what Henry Allison calls the "Incorporation Thesis," which Kant presents in the first part of *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* [18]

> Freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive *except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim* (has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself [19]

There are more and less plausible ways of reading this claim The least plausible version has Kant committed to the idea that human beings cannot be "determined to act" by incentives unless they incorporate them into their maxims This is obviously false Say I hear a scary noise in the woods and am moved by my desire (or "instinct") for self-preservation to run as fast as I can back to camp This desire can obviously function as an incentive without me having to first incorporate it into a maxim It is a good thing we do not have to incorporate our incentives into maxims in order to act We would not survive for long if we did Surely it must be the case that the vast majority of our actions do not require the incorporation of incentives

But this leaves room for a more modest and plausible version of Kant's claim While it must be true that we do not have to incorporate

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[17] *KpV* 5 72

[18] Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (New York Cambridge University Press, 1990) Allison convincingly argues that the view captured in this Thesis is not unique to the *Religion* book or to Kant's later moral theory On the contrary, it expresses a line of thought about agency already present in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*

[19] Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, trans and ed by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (New York Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6 23–4, hereafter *Religion*

our incentives into our maxims, it also seems true that we *can* do this An important range of our behaviors is based on deliberation. That is, many of our actions are the outcome of the process of considering reasons and drawing practical (and sometimes moral) conclusions about how we should conduct ourselves If we accept this much about human agency, I think we can see that Kant's point is simply that our desires and other sensible impulses do not come prepackaged as reasons They enjoy this status only by being treated as reasons, that is, only by being taken up and considered to count in favor of or against doing one thing rather than another As rational beings capable of reflection, we are capable of asking whether a given incentive should move us to pursue a particular end This is not to deny that sensible impulses of various kinds can also overwhelm us, sometimes to the point where the distance required for reflection is impossible The point is only that it is in principle always possible for us to respond to a given incentive by asking whether we ought to or should act on it—what Christine Korsgaard calls "the normative question "[20] And it is not until we pose this question that we confer the status of "reason for action" on these incentives In other words, an incentive becomes for an individual agent a reason for action only when she poses and then answers the normative question An incentive can certainly force its way in and overwhelm us, this happens frequently, but in such a case it is moving us to act without functioning as a reason Kant does not have to deny this for his Incorporation Thesis to make sense In fact, any plausible reading of the Thesis accommodates the point quite easily

It is important to bear in mind that the Incorporation Thesis belongs to Kant's attempt to work out a general framework for understanding the nature of deliberating about what one should or ought to do and what makes such deliberation possible It does not express any commitment to an ontological distinction between things that can count as reasons for action and things that cannot It belongs to his theory of practical reason And a major concern of that theory is to provide an account of the difference between being moved to action by what one takes, upon reflection, to count in favor of that action and being moved to action "without thought" or simply "by instinct " I

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[20] Christine Korsgaard, *Sources of Normativity* (New York Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7–21

think Kant's point here is deceptively simple. Moreover, it seems to conform to some common intuitions about what is involved in considering how to act Under normal circumstances we take it for granted that there is a genuine difference between deciding what to do and wondering what will befall us The Incorporation Thesis is designed to account for this difference by articulating a necessary condition for genuine deliberation According to Kant, we are deliberating only if reflecting on whether a given incentive provides us with a consideration that counts for or against performing some action. And, in his terminology, we do this by incorporating the incentive into one of our maxims [21]

It is in this context that the problem of heteronomy arises for Kant Most theorists of practical reason would be willing to grant some version of the Incorporation Thesis The idea that we are able to achieve some measure of distance from our incentives and ask how they stand with respect to our more general practical principles (our maxims) is not terribly controversial. Our capacity to ask the normative question and weigh reasons for action is not under much suspicion. But how far down does this capacity for reflection and distance go? Do the incentives provided by inclinations and desires function as a limit beyond which practical reason is unable to venture? This is precisely the line of thought that Kant wants to resist. Our incentives explain, in part, why we adopt the ends that we do. If you hold that all incentives come from things such as inclinations and desires, then you must also maintain that the capacity to set ends is limited to operating on these more or less passively experienced incentives On this widely accepted view, practical reason is essentially a matter of reasoning about means to ends that are themselves simply given [22] The

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[21] On Allison's reading, the Incorporation Thesis assumes that we are transcendentally free Though it is not without textual support, I do not think this interpretation is necessary The Thesis assumes the reality of "negative" practical freedom, that is, the idea that our volition is "affected" but not "determined" by sensibility But this by itself does not require the "total independence" from nature allegedly provided by transcendental freedom All it requires is that we have the capacity to distance ourselves from our inclinations in order to consider how we should respond to them On such a view we are certainly connected to nature, just not in a merely mechanical way

[22] As Gilbert Harman presents the view, "practical reasoning is always means-ends reasoning , you can come to want something as a means to something else you already want But you cannot reason yourself into having something new as an ultimate end, since you always reason from your ends to things that are means to those ends " *The Nature of Morality* (New York Oxford University Press, 1977), 31

inclinations and desires that account for the ends, which move us to adopt them as our ends, are not "up to us." If this were true, then I could select from among a range of options afforded me by a range of inclinations and desires.[23] But I could not distance myself from my desires and inclinations as a whole and ask whether some other kind of incentive should move me to set a particular end as that for the sake of which I am considering undertaking some action. Kant thinks that on this view genuine autonomy would be impossible. There is no genuine self-legislation if the self is limited to responding to incentives over which it has no control. To be sure, the capacity to incorporate incentives into maxims and then select appropriate means to desired ends manifests some degree of self-control or freedom, but this is not sufficient for Kantian autonomy. According to Kant it would be sufficient merely for prudential reasoning, which traffics only in hypothetical imperatives.

Kant calls this view the "empiricism of practical reason."[24] His dislike of empiricism is palpable in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he says that empiricism is "dangerous" in that it threatens to "degrade humanity."[25] Why is the view so troubling, and even "dangerous"? Kant worries that it entails what Christine Korsgaard calls "skepticism about practical reason." He is worried in particular about "motivational skepticism."[26] The concern is that theories of practical reason which hold that all incentives spring from inclinations and

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[23] Actually, pushed to extremes, views that limit practical reason to instrumental reasoning about means seem to rule out even this. Consider David Hume's famous remark: "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an *Indian* or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowleg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter." *A Treatise of Human Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press), 267, hereafter *Treatise*. The claim seems to be that if there is no stronger passion to counteract the preference for world destruction, then practical reason, being limited to the selection of means, cannot offer any considerations that would count against adopting such an end.

[24] *KpV* 5: 70.

[25] Ibid., 5: 71.

[26] Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reason," in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 311–34. My discussion of this issue draws directly from Korsgaard's influential essay.

other sensible forms of desire automatically exclude the possibility of genuinely moral motivation. For Kant, of course, we have a case of moral motivation when, and only when, someone is moved to undertake a particular course of action for the sake of the moral law It is not enough to act in accordance with the law, one has to take as one's reason for action the fact that the law prescribes the action When this happens we do what is morally right because it is morally right. We adopt the demand of the law as our end

The motivational skeptic doubts that, in the absence of some inclination-based incentive, there could ever be such a reason to fulfill the demands of the moral law. He or she doubts, in other words, that purely rational considerations could provide genuine reasons for action This follows from a combination of the assumption that all incentives stem from common motivational sources such as inclination and what Korsgaard calls the "internalism requirement" on practical reason.[27] According to this requirement, R is a reason for performing some action only if R implies that a rational individual would be actually motivated, at least to some extent, to perform the action in question. It is easy to see how practical reasons springing from sources such as inclinations and desires meet this requirement But it is more difficult to see how purely rational considerations, which find their source in deliberation rather than in antecedently given inclinations, could as well The empiricist exploits this difficulty by arguing that purely rational requirements cannot provide reasons for action precisely because they cannot meet the internalism requirement And they cannot do this because they cannot provide incentives, that is, "subjective grounds" for the determination of the will Purely rational considerations cannot be reasons, in other words, because they cannot ever motivate anyone to act Although Hutcheson's moral sense theory is most directly in Kant's sights at this point, an extreme version of this view is crystallized in Hume's famous claim that, "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[28]

This is the context in which the problem of autonomy emerges for Kant. He is less worried about determinism than he is about a

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[27] Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reasoning," 317
[28] Hume, *Treatise*, 266

view of practical reason that would deny the possibility of being motivated to act by purely rational considerations Such a view would deny that pure practical reason could, of itself, determine the will by denying that incentives could spring from a source other than inclination or other sensible forms of desire. According to Kant, such a view of practical reason would condemn us to heteronomy If we were entirely dependent upon incentives given prior to rational deliberation by our inclinations, then the will would be able to determine itself "only by means of an incentive that the anticipated effect of the action has upon the will," that is, an incentive based on a momentary desire or inclination [29] If this were the case, then autonomy would be impossible Instead, we would have "*always only heteronomy* of the will "[30] And by condemning us to heteronomy, motivational skepticism would undermine the basis of morality altogether, since "*autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties in keeping with them "[31]

Kant's account of autonomy is his response to this problem To appreciate further his understanding of the difference between autonomy and heteronomy in this context, we can take our cue from the words themselves If I can be forgiven for pointing out the obvious, the prefix of the word "heteronomy" comes from the Greek word for "other" (*hetero*), and the prefix of the word "autonomy" comes from the Greek for "self" (*auto*) Bearing this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the language Kant uses to characterize heteronomous volition and action reflect the etymology of the word itself If the will were restricted to heteronomy, he argues, then "the will would not give itself the law but a foreign impulse [*ein fremder Antrieb*] would give the law to it by means of the subject's nature, which is attuned to be receptive to it "[32] This notion of a "*foreign* impulse" is indeed quite

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[29] *GMS* 4 444

[30] Ibid 4 444

[31] *KpV* 5 33 I do not mean to suggest that Kant views motivational skepticism, or the empiricism of practical reason, as the only threat to autonomy On the contrary, he argues that traditional rationalist concepts of morality and practical reason also endanger the autonomy of the person Empiricism is only one version of the problem For a concise and illuminating discussion of this issue, see Allen Wood's "The Supreme Principle of Morality," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, edited by Paul Guyer (New York Cambridge University Press, 2006), 342–80

[32] *GMS* 4 444

common to the terms in which he discusses inclinations and other sources of sensuous incentives He repeatedly and consistently distinguishes between volition that is determined by respect for the moral law and volition that stems from "alien influences" or "alien causes "[33] Thus the obvious contrast· autonomy is *self*-determination, while heteronomy is *other*-determination.

The point is familiar to any reader of Kant. There is a deeper and less obvious conceptual point here, however. Namely, it is impossible to clarify the difference between autonomy and heteronomy without clarifying the distinction between self and other We cannot make sense of the concept of autonomy, in other words, without establishing what it is that properly belongs to the self. As with so many other pivotal issues in modern philosophy, the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy thus rests on a conceptual distinction between what is *internal* and what is *external* to the self. This explains why Kant sometimes characterizes autonomy as "inner freedom," in which the will is determined by something that springs from within, as opposed to heteronomy, in which the will owes its end to something that comes from without, something "alien "[34]

This is by no means a simple issue There are of course many different ways to characterize the difference between what is internal and what is external to the self, or what properly belongs to it and what does not, since these concepts have many different senses, depending on context and usage There is, for example, a literal sense in which each and every one of my sneezes and itches belongs to me If you notice me sneeze and then say, "bless you," I understand that you are addressing me and that you are ascribing the sneeze to me I acknowledge and endorse that ascription when I say "thanks" in response. But it is just as obvious that if a historian were to someday write my biography, he or she would not include such episodes Nor would anyone think that my story would be incomplete if they were missing. Yet one should resist the temptation to infer from this sort of thing that physical episodes never belong to the person in the sense that they are not "internal" to her self Changes in personality structure wrought by brain injuries, for example, make this perfectly clear Similarly, objects and events located outside one's epidermis are

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[33] *GMS* 4 446, 448
[34] *MdS* 6 418–420

external or foreign in an obvious literal sense Yet in other respects this is not always the case. There is a perfectly meaningful and uncontroversial sense in which some things that happen to my wife or my best friend also happen to me, even partially constitute who I am Analogously, the rules, standards, and ideals that characterize the various institutions and practices in which we participate are outside each of us in one sense, yet we sometimes meaningfully describe them as "ours" in another respect. In cases where we do not, we sometimes say that we are "alienated" or "estranged" from them, and such language indicates that something is amiss It often indicates the recognition that one can expand the boundaries of one's self by belonging to something that exists outside of it Properly belonging to something external can alter the criteria of what is to count as internal [35]

Of course, this barely scratches the surface. The point is that it is difficult to demarcate the self Perhaps it is impossible to do so in a fixed way The self expands and contracts, as it internalizes and disavows, accepts and rejects—sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously As a result we draw the line between inside and outside in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes.[36] What we need to know

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[35] For an interesting account of how demarcation relates to social practices, see Meir Dan-Cohen, "Socializing Harry," in Harry Frankfurt, *Taking Ourselves Seriously, Getting it Right* (Stanford Stanford University Press, 2006)

[36] Commentators often fail to appreciate the prevalence of this issue in Kant's work as a whole His discussion of the self, and the problem of how to determine its structure, is by no means limited to his theoretical treatment of cognition in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Throughout his corpus, Kant seems concerned to explore the ways in which the structure of the self is determined by a complex interplay of the active and the passive, the internal and external, the individual and the social One important place where this can be seen is his treatment of the *sensus communis* in the *Critique of Judgment* Rudolf Makkreel argues convincingly that the idea of a *sensus communis* has implications not just for aesthetic judgment, but also for reflective judgment as a whole According to Makkreel, this idea, which underwrites the capacity for reflective judgment, allows us to "abstract from the private empirical aspects of our subjective representations in order to generate what might be called a communal or intersubjective perspective" Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1990), 158 Also see Stanley Cavell, "The Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy," in his *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York Cambridge University Press, 2002) Kant also treats this issue in his discussion of conscience in the *Metaphysics of Morals* See *MdS* 6 437–40, where he seems to argue that the force of conscience is explained by our having internalized some sort of external authority figure, such as God

now, however, is how Kant draws this line What version of the distinction between self and other underwrites his conception of the difference between autonomy and heteronomy? Kant does not offer a direct answer to this question I am not sure that he always looked at the issue this way. But, assuming I am right about the need to clarify the distinction between self and other in order to clarify the difference between autonomy and heteronomy, any attempt to understand his conception of autonomy calls for a reconstruction of the demarcation project that underlies it

Historically, philosophers have often distinguished between what is internal and what is external to the self on the basis of substance dualism. This doctrine provides a quick and easy criterion for demarcating the boundaries of the self in a fixed and a priori manner Simply put, according to this *cartesian* strategy, that which belongs to the body is outside the self, while that which belongs to the mind belongs inside it [37] Whatever one thinks of the cartesian strategy, it is clear that Kant would not accept it As we know from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in particular the Refutation of Idealism and the Paralogisms, he regards substance dualism as untenable He does not quite reject it as false; instead, he undermines the philosophical enterprise from which it springs In its place he puts a healthy agnosticism regarding the issue. We can find this view expressed in his practical philosophy as well In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, for example, he argues that, "neither experience nor inferences of reason give us adequate grounds for deciding whether the human being has a soul (in the sense of a substance dwelling in him, distinct from the body and capable of thinking independently of it, that is a spiritual substance), or whether life may not well be, instead, a property of matter "[38]

How, then, does Kant circumscribe the boundaries of the self for the purposes of developing the concept of autonomy? Many passages in his work suggest that the self/other or inner/outer distinction lines up evenly with the noumenal/phenomenal distinction For example, when he describes the human being as a being endowed with "*inner* freedom" he characterizes each of us as a "*homo noumenon.*"[39] Much

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[37] I write "cartesian" instead of "Cartesian" in order to avoid attributing this view to Descartes himself, who held a more complex view of the self than he is often given credit for.

[38] *MdS* 6 419

[39] Ibid 6 418

of what he says suggests that the Kantian strategy of demarcation is of a piece with the "two-worlds" metaphysics that sometimes seems to underwrite his moral theory as a whole In the second *Critique*, for example, he says that, "causality through freedom must always be sought *outside* the sensible world in the intelligible world "[40] This points to an "intelligible substratum *in* us "[41] The spatial imagery here is quite complex that which is "outside" the sensible world is actually "in" us, qua intelligible characters or noumenal selves Because we are rational beings (*vernunftige Wesen*), the internal contents of the sphere of our inner selves are outside the empirical world within which we live as empirical or animal beings

The interpretation I want to propose rests on reading such language figuratively and taking Kant at his word when he says that "the concept of a world of understanding is *only a standpoint* "[42] I must admit that the texts by themselves do not decide unequivocally in favor of this interpretation There are undeniably good textual reasons for taking the talk of "worlds" literally But I think the exegetical virtues of this interpretation are cancelled out by its philosophical vices For this reason, I ask the reader to indulge what is generally called the "two-standpoints" interpretation as he or she examines the remarks I shall marshal in support of my proposal [43]

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[40] *KpV* 5 105, my emphasis

[41] Ibid 5 99, my emphasis

[42] *GMS* 4 458

[43] Thanks to the work of commentators such as Lewis White Beck, Henry Allison, Christine Korsgaard, and Thomas E Hill, Jr , it has become quite common, particularly in English-speaking circles, to interpret Kant's talk of two "worlds" in terms of the concept of a standpoint or practical perspective My reading owes a significant debt to this tradition of commentary To my knowledge, Allison's *Kant's Theory of Freedom* represents the most carefully and thoroughly worked-out version of the approach I cannot do justice to his influential work here, but I should note that my version of the two-standpoints interpretation differs from his in at least one very important respect Allison proposes this reading in order to offer a nonmetaphysical interpretation of the notion of transcendental freedom He thinks autonomy rests on the capacity for such freedom, but that making sense of latter does not require taking literally the notions of "intelligible world" and "noumenal self " In contrast to Allison, I adopt the two-standpoints reading in order to *detach* the question of autonomy from that of transcendental freedom The reason why is that I do not see the point in retaining the latter notion once we turn away from the metaphysics that seems to require it My thinking on Allison's account owes much to Karl Ameriks's critique in "Kant and Hegel on Freedom Two New Interpretations," reprinted in his *Interpreting Kant's Critiques* (New York Oxford University Press, 2003) I should add, however, that Ameriks and I draw very different conclusions about the limitations of Allison's approach

First consider the following passage from the *Groundwork*:

> So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing be put to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations, and on the contrary thinks as possible by means of it—indeed as necessary—actions that can be done only by disregarding all desires and sensible incitements [*sinnliche Anreizungen*] The causality of such actions lies in him as intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions in accordance with principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing more than that in it reason alone gives the law, and it is there, as intelligence only, that he is his *proper self*[44]

An implicit demarcation strategy is clearly at work here Kant draws the line between self and other sharply and decisively On the side of the "proper self" (*das eigentlich Selbst*)[45] we have intelligence, reason, and will. And on other side we have desires, inclinations, and all "sensible incitements " This could reasonably be read as just another version of the cartesian strategy, one might perfectly well expect an eighteenth-century philosopher to group inclinations, desires, and other impulses under "body" or "extension" and then group will, intelligence, and reason under "mind" or "thought " But we should resist this interpretation. We know that Kant rejects substance dualism Moreover, this passage should be read in the context of others that make clear this is not what he has in mind

Further down the same page, Kant continues by claiming that

> What inclinations and impulses incite him to cannot infringe upon the laws of his volition as intelligence, indeed, *he does not hold himself accountable for the former or ascribe them to his proper self, that is, to his will*, though he does ascribe to it [his will] the indulgence he would show them if he allowed them to influence his maxims to the detriment of the rational laws of his will[46]

Here we can see that the distinction between what is internal and external to the proper self is not made metaphysically. That is, it is not the result of classifying inclinations and desires, on the one hand, and

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[44] *GMS* 4 457, my emphasis

[45] It is tempting to translate "*das eigentliche Selbst*" as "the *authentic* self," but this would import issues into the discussion that are best left aside for now There is no doubt, however, that the concepts of autonomy and authenticity have much in common, and that Kant's work provides a fruitful opportunity to explore the ways in which they overlap The road from Rousseau to Nietzsche certainly passes through this juncture in Kant's moral philosophy

[46] *GMS* 4 457–8, my emphasis

will and reason, on the other, in terms of their respective essential attributes (for example, "extension" and "thought") Instead, the line is drawn from the first-person perspective by means of acts of identification and disavowal [47] It is we as deliberating, judging, acting individuals—as agents—who draw the line We draw the boundaries around our proper selves by disavowing the incentives provided by our inclinations and desires, by refusing to endorse them as sufficient reasons for action or guides to conduct—that is, by not "ascribing them" to our "proper selves " To be sure, my desires and inclinations provide me with incentives, they have motivational force and they can provide me with reasons (assuming I "incorporate" them into my maxims) But I am capable of questioning their directives, and I am capable of denying that they belong to my proper self. When I disavow them this way, by denying that they are part of me, I constitute, at least partially, my proper self by identifying instead with the directives supplied by my intelligence, my reason, and my will

This act of identification is normative in the sense that it is at bottom *evaluative* In identifying with the reasons supplied by my intelligence and will and disavowing those supplied by my inclinations I express my commitment to what I take to be the greater value of the former I thereby show that I place greater stock in what my intelligence provides reason for than I do in my desires and inclinations That Kant subscribes to such a normative demarcation strategy is evident in passages such as the following, which couches the issues in explicitly evaluative terms Reflecting on what happens when an agent deliberates about action from the moral perspective, Kant writes

> With a will free from impulses of sensibility he transfers himself in thought into an order of things altogether different from that of his desires in the field of sensibility , [from this] he can expect only a greater inner worth of his person *This better person [Diese bessere Person], however, he believes himself to be when he transfers himself to the standpoint of a member of the world of understanding*, as the idea of freedom, that is, of independence from determining causes of the world of sense, constrains him involuntarily to do, and from this

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[47] My thinking on the issues at stake here owes a good deal to Harry Frankfurt's work on the concept of "identification," developed in a number of essays reprinted in *The Importance of What We Care About* (New York: Cambridge University, 1988) and *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

> standpoint he is conscious of a good will that, by his own acknowledgements, constitutes the law for his evil will as a member of the world of sense—a law whose authority he is cognizant even while he transgresses it *The moral ought is then his own necessary will as a member of an intelligible world*, and is thought by him as ought only insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense [48]

This long dense remark raises many questions that cannot be answered here For our purposes, what is most interesting is the way in which it makes what I am calling the normative strategy seem so central to so many fundamental issues in Kant's moral theory, particularly to the question of autonomy The *Verstandeswelt* ("intelligible world") is "only a standpoint" and I, as a deliberating and judging agent, adopt that standpoint when I take myself for this "better person" that I find articulated in the idea of a will that is motivated by the demands of the moral law rather than by incentives that stem from desires and inclinations In doing this, I identify myself with the demands of morality; I take them to be expressions of my own volition. More precisely, I take them to be expressions of the ideal to which I aspire and about which I care deeply [49] That is why the imperative of morality (*das moralische Sollen*) is not foreign to my will, something imposed upon me from outside.

According to this view, the distinction between what is internal and what is external to the self is not metaphysical It is normative in that it reflects a set of commitments concerning the respective values of the various sources of practical reasons Reasons that stem from the pure will (or pure practical reason) are considered more valuable or important than those that stem from the incentives provided by desire and inclination They express our better selves. Kant's term for this ideal self is "moral personality "[50] To be a person in a moral sense

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[48] *GMS* 4 454–5, my emphasis

[49] I take myself here to be developing a point made by Korsgaard See *The Sources of Normativity*, 238

[50] The *moral* concept of personality should not be confused with the *psychological* concept Kant defines the latter as "the ability to be conscious of one's identity in different conditions of one's existence" (*MdS* 6 223) As he puts in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "what is conscious of the numerical identity of its self in different times, is to that extent a person" (A361) This pertains to the sense of personhood that is so central to traditional questions regarding the substantiality of the soul, personal identity, and so on—questions pursued by Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Leibniz, among others

is to possess several characteristics and capacities a person is a "law-giving being"[51] In fact, as a "subject of pure practical reason," a person is "the supreme lawgiver"[52] A person, unlike a mere thing, is also an "end in itself."[53] And a moral person is a being that is accountable or responsible (*zurechnungsfahig*) for its actions[54] According to Kant, when we think of an individual human being in terms of his moral personality, we think of his "invisible self,"[55] his "freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature,"[56] and his "freedom [as] a rational being under moral laws"[57]

While Kant defines "humanity" as "the capacity to set oneself an end—any end whatsoever,"[58] he thinks of moral personality as "the idea of humanity considered wholly intellectually"[59] So we can say that the idea of a moral person is the idea of an individual who sets ends and reasons about how to achieve them on the basis of "formal" rather than "material" principles, someone who decides and acts on the basis of what practical reason recognizes as right, rather than on the basis of sensuous inclinations and idiosyncratic interests This is the idea of who each of us would be if we had the strength and goodness of will (virtue) to regard the demands of morality as a sufficient and overriding guide to conduct In short, this better person we believe ourselves to be when we "transfer ourselves in thought" to the standpoint of the intelligible world is a conception of ourselves *as autonomous*

This concept of moral personality works together with Kant's notion of "respect" to solve the problem of heteronomy Recall our earlier discussion of the internalism requirement on reasons for action According to this idea, R can play the role of a practical reason for a

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[51] *GMS* 4 438
[52] *KpV* 5 75 and *GMS* 4 434–5
[53] *GMS* 4 428
[54] *MdS* 6 223
[55] *KpV* 5 162
[56] Ibid 5 87
[57] *MdS* 6 223 and *KpV* 5 87
[58] *MdS* 6 392 and *GMS* 4 437 For further discussion of the concept of "humanity," see Thomas E Hill, Jr , "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his *Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory* (Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1992), 38–57 Also see chapter four of Allen Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*
[59] *Religion* 6 27–8

rational agent, only if R could, to some degree at least, motivate that agent to act in light of it Reasons for action, in other words, can count as genuine reasons only if they include some motivational component. Without this, R cannot function as a reason for the agent Typically, the reasons that characterize heteronomous volition easily meet this requirement They concern ends that are set by incentives that stem from familiar motivational sources such as desire and inclination. It is no mystery, for example, how my wanting a drink can furnish me with a reason to order a beer. Nor is it hard to see how my hoping for a comfortable retirement gives me a reason to invest wisely now. This picture does not assume that desires or inclinations *cause* the decision or action in question On the contrary, it assumes that the Incorporation Thesis is true. We are "affected" but not "determined" by our sensible impulses,[60] we can step back from them and ask whether they provide considerations in favor of or against some course of action. But if we are only heteronomous then this is all we can do I doubt that would make us slaves to our passions, but it certainly would limit practical reason to a narrower scope than we might like. According to Kant it would rule out the possibility of categorical imperatives and prevent us from fulfilling our "highest vocation." This is the sense in which empiricism threatens to "degrade" our humanity.

The difficult question for Kant's view is whether the reasons that characterize autonomous volition can also meet the internalism requirement. The question, in other words, is whether there really can be reasons of this sort. Can a consideration of pure practical reason really be a reason for someone like you or me? If not, then Kantian autonomy is impossible. Recall that, according to Kant's official definition, the autonomy of the will is "the will's property of being a law to itself."[61] Less technically, an individual is autonomous insofar as he or she is capable of self-legislation or self-determination A person exercises this capacity by acting or deciding on the basis of reasons that stem from purely rational considerations—"formal" rather than "material" principles—regarding how one ought to behave The motivational skeptic doubts that such considerations could possibly have

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[60] *MdS* 6.213 and *KrV* A534/B562
[61] *GMS* 4 446

a motivational component The only thing that could motivate anyone, even a rational agent, is a feeling of some sort Our cognitive grasp of a general principle, in other words, will not actually move us in any particular direction unless it is contains or is accompanied by some sort of affective component. What is doubted here is the idea that we could ever actually be moved to do anything once we have subtracted from our deliberations all inclination and desire. If the motivational skeptic is right about this, and the internalism requirement is true, then, even if we have the capacity to grasp the implications of the moral law for our behavior, that grasp could not actually provide us with genuine reasons for action.

This is where the notion of respect comes in Kant agrees with the empiricist of practical reason—the motivational skeptic—that motivation requires an incentive And he thinks this requires a feeling of some sort We must feel something in order to be moved to act But he rejects the claim that reason cannot play this role. According to Kant, a "feeling" (*Gefuhl*) is a modification of "sensibility" (*Sinnlichkeit*) It is "the effect of a representation [*Vorstellung*] . . upon a subject "[62] So when one has a representation of something—say, a sensation of red—that representation may produce in the perceiver a subjectively felt response The sensation of red may, for example, trigger some degree of irritation or anger. Kant also says that the representation that produces the feeling may be either "sensible or intellectual "[63] Thus, his claim is that it is not just our traffic with empirical objects and our sensuous representations that produce feelings in us On the contrary, even intellectual episodes can do this Respect is an example of this sort of feeling, in that it is produced by a purely intellectual or rational grasp of the demands of morality It is difficult to characterize this feeling precisely. Kant says that feeling in general is "the capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation,"[64] but respect is not a clear case of either It seems to straddle the border between the two, rather, it seems to begin as a feeling of displeasure and then give way to a sort of pleasure, one that we "can't get enough of "[65]

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[62] *MdS* 6 212n
[63] Ibid
[64] Ibid 6 211
[65] *KpV* 5 78

For our purposes, the key claim is that it is the feeling of respect "which connects a ground for determining choice to this action *subjectively* with the representation of the law "[66] Respect thus functions as an incentive (*Triebfeder*) to adopt the moral law as one's maxim.[67] Respect, in fact, is *the* moral incentive Kant's thought here is that as incentive the feeling of respect is capable of motivating an individual "subjectively" to subordinate the principle upon which she acts (her maxim) to the demands of the moral law Respect, in other words, is the affective component that is capable of making the moral law a reason for me to act in a particular way.[68] This is not the place to defend the doctrine of respect in full, but if Kant is right about this, then this explains how purely rational considerations—namely, those that result from drawing conclusions about the implications of the moral law for one's conduct—can meet the internalism requirement and thus function as genuine reasons for action For, if the doctrine of respect is plausible as a piece of moral anthropology, then it explains how "formal" considerations can include a motivational component

The concepts of respect and moral personality go hand in hand The ideal self is the object of respect This is obscured by Kant's talk of "respect for the moral law," an expression which has settled into one of the stock phrases of Kantian moral philosophy The problem is not that this is wrong, but that it is potentially misleading. Talk of "respect for the law" tends to encourage the impression that respect has to do with something abstract, impersonal, and transcendent And this cannot be right. While the moral law is certainly not subjective in the sense of being private or idiosyncratic, it comes from within Let us not forget one of the most oft-quoted and moving passages in all of Kant's work. "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law*

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[66] *MdS* 6 218

[67] *KpV* 5 76

[68] Kant, it must be admitted, would not be comfortable with the appearance of the word "affective" in this context He defines "affects" (*Affekte*) as feelings that *precede* rather than follow deliberation (*Überlegung*) Far from motivating moral action, affects impede it See *MdS* 6 408–409 and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans and ed by Robert B Lowden (New York Cambridge University Press, 2006), §75

within me"[69] The rhetorical symmetry of "*über mir*" and "*in mir*" makes it clear where the law resides This is why Kant explicitly says in the *Groundwork* that "our own will is the proper object of respect"[70] Yet, it is not simply the will as it is found—characterized by volition on the basis of prudential or instrumental reasons, and adopted in response to ends set by inclination-based incentives Rather, it is "our own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of a possible giving of universal law through its maxims"[71] In other words, it is the will considered as moral personality, our better self, which Kant describes as "this respect-inspiring idea of personality" (*diese Achtung erweckende Idee der Persönlichkeit*)[72] This idea of an ideal version of the self is capable of "setting before our eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the lack of accord of our conduct with respect to it and thus striking down self-conceit"[73] There is an important sense, then, in which respect for the law is really *self*-respect, and self-respect has both a negative and a positive component, it motivates by providing both a sense of shame (a feeling that "humbles" or "humiliates")[74] and an object of aspiration

This account of the relation between moral personality and the moral feeling of self-respect constitutes Kant's solution to the problem of heteronomy. When you think of yourself in terms of your moral personality you think of yourself as actively autonomous or self-determining Kant's claim is that thinking of yourself in this way can motivate you to *be* autonomous Self-respect provides the incentive to adopt the moral law as the basis of one's volition. It thus provides the incentive to act on the basis of purely "formal" or rational considerations, to abstract from sensibility in order to treat the demands of morality as sufficient reasons for action In this manner, self-respect makes possible the exercise of autonomy, wherein the will or pure practical reason is a law unto itself This means that our capacity to exercise autonomy rests on our ability to think of ourselves as autonomous—to imagine ourselves in terms of our moral personality, and

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[69] *KpV* 5 161
[70] *GMS* 4 440
[71] Ibid 4.440
[72] *KpV* 5 87
[73] Ibid 5 87
[74] Ibid 5 74

then identify with and be moved by the idea of that better version of ourselves You cannot actually be autonomous unless you can first think of yourself that way For only by doing this can you awaken the feeling of respect for the moral law that can provide you with the motivation to obey that law

On this view, the capacity for autonomy does not rest on transcendental freedom or freedom in the "cosmological sense "[75] It does not require the ability to exempt oneself from the natural order and then function as an uncaused cause Instead, it rests on the capacity to identify with one's "better person" and distance oneself from or even disavow the dictates of one's desires and inclinations One might reasonably object that this view rests on an a priori and unjustified disparagement of feeling and sentiment Kant thinks that "all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling,"[76] and his attitude toward feeling has earned him a bad reputation among philosophers who believe that he has drastically underestimated the moral importance of sentiment, passions, desires, and "affect" in general It is tempting to think that the normative strategy sketched above reflects an unwarranted disparagement of a valuable and necessary part of moral and practical life It is easy to find passages that seem to encourage this reading In the *Groundwork*, for instance, Kant claims that, "the inclinations themselves are so far from having an absolute worth . that it must instead be the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free of them "[77] In a similar vein, he describes them in the *Critique of Practical Reason* as "blind and servile," arguing, in a passage that seems to confirm his critics' worst suspicions, that the feeling of compassion and tender sympathy "is itself burdensome to right-thinking persons" who "wish to be freed from them [that is, inclinations altogether] and subject to lawgiving reason alone "[78]

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[75] *KrV* A533/B61

[76] *KpV* 5 72

[77] *GMS* 4 428

[78] *KpV* 5 118 This well known remark makes it tempting to read Kant as a modern Stoic Compare Seneca, when he writes of "affection" that "the enemy, I say, must be stopped at the very frontier, when he has invaded and rushed on the city gates, there is no 'limit' which his captives can make him accept " See "On Anger," p 26 in *Seneca Moral and Political Essays*, translated and edited John M Cooper and J F Procopé (New York Cambridge University Press, 1995) But as we shall presently see, this comparison is, while apt in important respects, misleading in others

But Kant's view is not so straightforward He does not, in fact, simply label inclination in general as "bad"—in contrast with pure practical reason, which is "good "[79] His concern is not with inclination as such It is with our attitude towards our inclinations and desires That is, he is interested in how we treat the latter in our practical reasoning, the roles we assign them during the course of deliberating about how we ought to behave "*Considered in themselves*," he argues, "natural inclinations are *good*, that is, not reprehensible, and to want to extirpate them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well "[80] Indeed, inclinations would seem to belong to "the predisposition to animality in the human being" which Kant regards as essential to the "original predisposition to good in human nature."[81] The question is how we, as deliberating and judging individuals, incorporate them into our maxims. The question, in other words, is what we do with them. In fact, for Kant, the difference between good and evil turns precisely on this question [82]

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[79] For a careful and thorough treatment of this issue, see Marcia Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology* (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1995), 194–226 She draws extensively on the *Religion* book and the *Anthropology*, in addition to his mainstream works in moral theory, in order to present a picture of Kantian moral psychology nuanced enough to do justice to the role of feeling in our practical lives For a discussion of how moral feelings relate to aesthetic feelings, see Rudolf Makkreel, "Sublimity, Genius, and the Explication of Aesthetic Ideas," in *Kants Asthetik/Kant's Aesthetics/ L'esthetique de Kant*, edited by Herman Parret (Berlin Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 615–29 In *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, Makkreel argues convincingly that feeling, for example, the notion of *Lebensgefuhl*, is much more central to the entire critical project than is normally thought An important lesson of Makkreel's work is that Kant's attitude both toward respect and toward the inclinations should not be surprising at all Once we put his remarks about inclinations in their proper context, which includes the *Critique of Judgment* and the essays on history and orientation, we can appreciate the fact that Kant rarely disparages feeling as such On the contrary, it is essential to his project as a whole It is true that he refuses to base morality on feeling, but that does not mean that he ever intends to eliminate it The centrality of respect makes that quite clear, as does his discussion of the "original predisposition to good" in the *Religion* 6 26–8 For an interesting discussion of Kant's attitude toward sentiment and the "Age of Sensibility," see Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, trans James Haden (New Haven Yale University Press, 1981), 268–70

[80] *Religion* 6 58

[81] Ibid 6 26–7

[82] This marks an important difference between the Kantian and the Stoic views Compare, again, to Seneca "The affections are no less evil as subordinates than they are as commanders " See "On Anger," 27 This is not, of course, to deny affinities between Kant and the Stoics

I realize that this response goes only so far It is undeniably true that Kant values the will (practical reason) more than inclination and desire, or sensibility in general He also argues that all rational agents do as well We cannot help but care more about our reason than our inclinations as sources of practical reasons Only the former connects us to our "highest vocation" as human beings, and only it can function as the source of moral obligation, and, therefore, of duty These issues go right to the heart of his entire practical philosophy. His devaluation of sensibility in favor of reason stems from his conviction that moral requirements can only be expressed in the form of categorical imperatives and from the idea that the autonomy of the will is the basis of morality in general This is certainly not the place to defend either of these deeply Kantian commitments I can only hope that what I have said in response to the above objection may give some critics pause

According to Thomas Nagel, we want to know whether or not we have the capacity for autonomy because "we want to be able to will the sources of our actions down to the very bottom "[83] My account of Kantian autonomy does not scratch this particular itch I have argued that Kant does not rest the capacity for autonomy on transcendental freedom Instead, it rests on the capacity for identification—more specifically, on the ability to identify with and be motivated by the thought of one's self as a moral person However, this does not address the question of how we come to have this idea of moral personality in the first place and why we might find ourselves disposed to identify with and be motivated by it—to feel *respect* for it In response I can only admit that I do not have the answer to this question. Despite his sense that self-love usually wins out in the end, Kant seems confident that the presence of this idea of ourselves as autonomous moral agents and the capacity to be moved by it are universal. I find it impossible to share that confidence Yet I also think they are more common than a widespread cynicism regarding practical reason would have us believe And I think that any theory of practical reason that cannot accommodate these concepts is hopelessly impoverished At any rate, their origins must be at least in part psychological and sociological What is needed is a story about how the idea of moral

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[83] Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York Oxford University Press, 1986), 135

personality and the disposition to feel respect for it can result from the internalization of standards provided early on by parents and other sources of authority [84] It is true that this sort of answer still would not give us what Nagel says we want But I doubt any account of autonomy could do that Kant himself seemed to regard the ultimate ground of freedom as inscrutable, and I tend to think he is right [85] But that should not prevent us from digging as deep as we can [86]

Loyola College in Maryland

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[84] For a fascinating attempt at this, see J David Velleman, *Self to Self Selected Essays* (New York Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially chapters 4, 5, and 6

[85] Nagel himself shares this pessimism as well He differs from Kant, though, in that Kant seems, at least sometimes, confident in his conviction that the theoretical issue really does not matter for the purposes of practical philosophy Nagel thinks the practical and theoretical perspectives are more continuous with each other than Kant does Our tendency to slide from the former into the latter is natural and unavoidable

[86] I would like to thank Paul Abela, Rudolf Makkreel, and Andrew Norris for their insightful comments on this essay

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

BRANDON ZIMMERMAN AND STAFF

AVICENNA Latinus *Liber Primus Naturalium Tractatus Secundus De motu et de consimilibus* Critical edition by S Van Riet, J Janssens, A Allard, with an introduction by G Verbeke, Académie Royale de Belgique, 2006 v + 89*–373 pp $80 00—This publication forms the tenth volume of the Avicenna Latinus series, whose aim is to edit the medieval Latin translations of Avicenna's (Arabic Ibn Sīnā, d 1037) works, in particular his *magnum opus*, *al-Shifā'*—translated into English as *The Healing* or *The Cure*, and known in medieval Latin as *Sufficientia*—which comprises the sum of the philosopher's treatises on the fundamental disciplines of the Aristotelian curriculum, Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. Previous edited works in the series include the *Metaphysics* of *al-Shifā'* (*Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*) in three volumes (including the lexica), several parts of the Physics/natural philosophy, including the one corresponding to Aristotle's *Physics* proper and to his *De anima* (*On the Soul*), all of which were of primary significance for the development of medieval Christian philosophy

The present volume of the Avicenna Latinus series constitutes the second treatise of the first book on natural phenomena (*Naturalia*), and examines motion, place and time Although Simone Van Riet passed away before the completion of this work, as the prime mover of the series and the inspiration behind this edition (since her editorial principles are followed here), she is deservedly credited as editor alongside Jules Janssens and André Allard

The note on the Latin translation (pp 68–71) remarks that the present work is based on the collation of three main manuscripts, Venice (Bibl S Marc Lat 2665), Dubrovnik (Bibl Dom 20) and Paris (Bibl Nat Lat 16604), but takes account of other manuscripts There are numerous references to the editorial principles established by Simone Van Riet and detailed information on the translation, but unfortunately no explicit mention of the period in which the translation from Arabic into Latin was completed or the name of the translator The editors, undoubtedly based on Jules Janssens's expertise in this field, provide ample information in the footnotes on Avicenna's philosophy and his sources, namely Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators, as well as

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers

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on the reception of the translation by Albert the Great In the footnotes the Latin translation is also checked against the Arabic original text, of which the Cairo edition, albeit not a critical edition, remains the reference

The thematic introduction by Gerard Verbeke, who had also provided an introduction to each of the previous volumes of the series, is an important study on Avicenna's views on motion, place, and time Verbeke highlights the aspects in which Avicenna is faithful to the Stagirite, and in what fashion he expands on the Philosopher's thought, making an original contribution to the field He mentions the translation of Aristotle's *Physics* into Latin, from the original Greek (by James of Venice) in the 12th century and from the Arabic translation into Latin, by Gerard of Cremona in the second half of the 12th century, and by Michael Scot in the 13th century Verbeke further places Avicenna's thought on the subject of motion, place and time in its historical and hermeneutical context by examining his Aristotelian and Neoplatonic predecessors, such as Damascius and his pupil, Simplicius, and Christian Neoplatonist philosopher Philoponus, the views of Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, together with those of Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus and Proclus are also considered In particular Verbeke highlights Avicenna's conception of motion and its relation to causality and nature, matter and potentiality, and to Aristotle's ten categories, as well as his account of the subjective perception of place and time Verbeke notes Avicenna's rejection of the void, and his contribution, over and above Aristotle's conception, to the understanding of place and time The introduction is therefore an important guide for a profitable reading of the Latin edition A bibliography of the works used in the introduction and in the edition would have been useful for the reader

This work is to be hailed as an important breakthrough in the field of medieval philosophy studies, resuming as it does the editions of the Avicenna Latinus Series, the last volume of which had been published in 1994 upon the demise of its founder, Simone Van Riet This is a careful edition of the Latin translation, and includes an ample apparatus and detailed footnotes on the similarities and differences between the Arabic original and the medieval Latin translation, in addition to an exposition of Avicenna's thought in G Verbeke's introduction As such it constitutes an indispensable tool for those interested in Avicenna, in particular his natural philosophy and its reception in medieval Christian Europe —Catarina Belo, *The American University in Cairo*

BAKER, Lynne Rudder *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life An Essay in Practical Realism* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2007 xv + 253 pp Cloth, $85 00—When Al-Quaeda attacked the Twin Towers, aside from human lives lost, was anything actually existing destroyed? In many quarters of contemporary analytic metaphysics, the counterintuitive answer is a negative one From those viewpoints, either what

was there was only "simples arranged towerwise," or "the matter that occupied spacetime points arranged towerwise" (p 26) Baker regards such accounts as impoverished and erroneous, and provides an ontological account not only including space for, but placing primary importance on the objects of everyday life Her account, the "Constitution View," develops from her earlier works, notably *Explaining Attitude* and *Persons and Bodies* In this book, Baker consolidates and systematically presents her Constitution View and responds to arguments and objections of critics both actual and hypothetical

Baker's account makes scant contact with thinkers, accounts, and approaches outside of analytic philosophy Much of her project and claims could be (and in large part have already been) worked out in different language by phenomenologists, semioticians, Hegelians, and Thomists That does not, however, deprive the work of value Analytic and non-analytic philosophers alike will discover cogent and thought-provoking arguments and discussions in the book, which, though jargon-rich and framed in relation to contemporary analytic literature, nevertheless remains accessible to non-analytic readers

Chapter 1 argues the need for an account like Baker's Lacking such an account, our "everyday attitudes and practices" (p 6) become incoherent and unintelligible A "metaphysics of ordinary things," holding them to be "irreducibly real," can alone adequately account for our "experience and its probative value" (p 7) Additionally, such a metaphysics is presupposed by "rational debate about moral, political, social, and legal issues" (p 7) And, everyday objects "figure ineliminably in successful common, causal explanations of everyday phenomena" (p 8) Everyday objects for the most part are "intention-dependent object[s]," which is to say, "object[s] that could not exist in a world lacking beings with beliefs, desires, and intentions," (p 11) and these in turn have and are generally defined by their "[intention-dependent] properties" (p 11)

In chapter 2, using the Twin Towers as an example, Baker argues for non-reductionism about everyday objects, which can come into and go out of existence, even though particles comprising them do not, because the relation between them is one of "constitution," characterized thus "when a thing of one primary kind is in certain circumstances, a thing of another primary kind—a new thing with new causal powers—comes into existence" (p 32) This is "a relation of unity without identity," and of very wide scope, since "[a]ll concrete objects found in the world that we encounter are constituted objects" (p 32) Constituted objects may "borrow" properties, or have them "derivatively" (p 37) from objects by which they are constituted Artifacts such as statues constituted from marble through the sculptor's work provide one example Another example is the relation between oneself and one's body "*Person* is your primary kind *Human animal* is your body's primary kind You are a person nonderivatively and a human animal derivatively, and your body is a human animal nonderivatively and a person derivatively" (p 38)

Chapter 3 examines in more detail implications of this view for artifacts, and chapter 4 does likewise for human beings An artifact is an intentionally produced object, constituted often from other constituted

object(s), ultimately from a material aggregate Baker spells out conditions for being an artifact, argues their ontological significance, and discusses malfunctions Chapter 4 reviews her previously articulated theory of human beings, persons, and bodies First person perspective is of the essence of person, so "[w]hen a human organism develops [it], a new thing—a person—comes into existence" (p 68) The chapter makes several contestable assertions and arguments bearing on whether first person perspectives can be duplicated, whether embryos, infants, and higher nonhuman animals are persons, life and death issues, and the materiality of persons

The next three chapters address metaphysical issues upon which Baker's Constitution View takes definite stands Against reductive materialism, chapter 5 argues in favor of "commonsense causation," providing "an account of properties of ordinary things that have two features they are irreducible to lower-level properties and they are causally efficacious" (p 98) Chapter 6 addresses the inevitable metaphysical vagueness of ordinary objects in spatial and temporal modes, in the constitution relation, and in "higher-order vagueness" (p 138) Baker argues the need for both of McTaggert's A and B temporal series in chapter 7, and contrasts her view of time with Presentism and Eternalism

Chapter 8 provides technically rigorous definitions and arguments for the concepts of constitution, of having properties derivatively or nonderivatively, and of non-identity, and then addresses criticisms of the Constitution View Differences and connections between the constitution relation and mereological relations are discussed in chapter 9 Chapter 10 defends our ordinary experience of a three-dimensional world against four-dimensionalism The final chapter raises and examines five metaphysical issues connected with Baker's Constitution View, giving most space to the first two "Ontological Significance, Time and Existence, Ontological Novelty, Ontological Levels, and Emergence" (p 218) —Gregory B Sadler, *Fayetteville State University*

BLIGNIÈRES, Louis-Marie de *Le mystère de l'être L'itinéraire thomiste de Guérard des Lauriers* [*The Mystery of Being The Thomistic Itinerary of Guérard des Lauriers*] Bibliothèque Thomiste Paris Vrin, 2007 454 pp Paper, $48 00—This book should be a landmark for 21st century Thomism A synthesis of several Thomistic schools, Louis-Marie de Blignières' first published monograph in philosophy, with preface by the editor of *Revue Thomiste*, hands on the metaphysics of that most penetrating, but also impenetrable Thomist of the last century, M Louis-Bertrand Guérard des Lauriers (d 1988) The focus is the *how* of the mind's access to being (*ens primum cognitum*) and *esse*, from the first "impact of existence" (*"choc existentiel"*) of beings with the infant mind, to the clarified universal concept through which metaphysics considers what is as such (*ratio entis*, *natura entis*) Simple apprehension and judgment are not philosophically intelligible as acts of human intellect, and being is not accessible, without a primordial dimension which

Guérard called "pneumatic knowledge." Pneumatic knowledge suggests itself to the philosopher in scientific, mathematical, and artistic discovery (beauty as the "antenna of being") as that anticipatory, negative knowledge of real being found in the question and in knowing the right question to ask, spontaneously excluding data irrelevant to the searched for essence of something. Guérard and de Blignières, formed in mathematics and the physical sciences, come close to those who thematize being as object of the question or of judgment, although for the French thinkers the question is always a veiled contact with the beings which actually are and what they are, not with a "horizon" or God, first cause of beings. De Blignières shows the Thomistic character of considering the mind as *capax entis*, potential openness not fundamentally to a concept, but to the things which are qua actually being and being what they are. Analogy appears as the way in which the diverse beings present themselves as being to human intellect (in Maritain's metaphor as further developed here: the staff of the symphony of being whose key signature is the initial "impact of existence"). De Blignières expounds the various kinds of analogy and the traditional interpretations, proposing a way of understanding it in a unified way as both proportionality and attribution.

Guérard's idea of pneumatic knowledge is indebted to Maritain's intuition of being, but not without modification as he probes a play of negations and relations in the apprehension and judgment by which "being" (*ens*) first "falls" into human intellect and is then refined as the subject of metaphysics. Synthesizing Guérard and Pierre-Ceslas Courtès, de Blignières shows how we know "*non-ens*" as the "acolyte" of "*ens*," thus providing the first reflexive and quasi-quidditative, primitive knowledge of being—being is not non-being!—which in turn founds knowledge of the first principle, division, *res*, *aliquid*, and multitude. This development is not an idealist deduction, since de Blignières correlates it with the first "impact" of a sensible being on the intellect through the phantasm, the cogitative sense, and the impressed *species*. One critical observation here: while the treatment of the cogitative sense is adequate, this section could have provided a more complete treatment of active and possible intellect, *species impressa*, and the concept.

The central chapters of the book show how analogy (the "rational approach" to being), simple apprehension (the "noetic approach"), and the recognition of God as subsistent being (the "sapiential approach") are necessary for the initial knowledge and full scientific explication of the *ratio entis*. The first two of these chapters are the most stimulating and complete, discussing a number of classic issues (analogy, degrees of abstraction, judgment of separation) in an original way, showing the strengths and limitations of such Thomists as Cajetan, Santiago Ramirez, Maritain, Leo Elders, John Wippel, Marie-Dominique Philippe, and others. De Blignières retracts the position he once defended in the pages of *Revue Thomiste*, namely that the judgment of the existence of a non-material being is a prerequisite for the metaphysical concept of being as being: he now holds, thanks to John Wippel, that metaphysics can begin prior to this judgment. (The book was finished in 2004, so we can forgive de Blignières for not taking Ralph McInerny's dissenting

Praeambula Fidei into account) Deploying "pneumatic knowledge," de Blignières develops the position the real distinction of *esse* and essence is first recognized only in a *negative* way—"something" in the being which accounts for the fact that it is, is not what-it-is Then, from the prior demonstration of the First Cause as Pure Act and therefore subsistent being, St Thomas can go on to *prove* of creatures that they are not their be-ing, since subsistent being can only be one

Finally, the possibilities inherent in the idea of a negative "pneumatic knowledge" are deployed to ground the principle of causality which points to the First Cause of beings the mind recognizes that in various ways things are not through themselves and therefore only are through another In this chapter, de Blignières introduces Guérard's extensive work on *non per se, per aliud,* and *per se* as the key to, and the underlying unity of, the Five Ways The book includes illuminating sections on the categories and on subsistence, necessary for full understanding of *ens* in the real distinction of *esse* and essence (Guérard spoke of *"la ternarité de l'étant"*)

The bibliography is in six languages, and there are a hundred pages of translated texts of St Thomas related to *"ratio entis "* De Blignières' prose is serene, flowing, and clear Ansgar Santogrossi, O S B —*Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary*

CAMPBELL, James *A Thoughtful Profession The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association* Chicago and La Salle Open Court, 2006 xi + 339 pp Paper, $49 95—Campbell commences by examining what it meant to teach philosophy in America in the nineteenth century His focus here is upon the shift that took place in going from the model of the old time college, religious in nature, to that of the new, German-influenced university, one engaged in more "open-ended inquiry into the meaning of existence" (p 35) He then analyzes the interaction between the emerging disciplines of psychology and philosophy as these developed around the turn of the twentieth century He examines four academic associations—the American Psychological Association, the Western Philosophical Association, the (regional) American Philosophical Association, and the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology All of these organizations came into existence around that time He looks at many of the different efforts undertaken by these groups to further the understanding of the history of American philosophy and to improve teaching

Next, Campbell turns his attention away from matters of organization and toward an analysis of the overall contours of American philosophical life, via a detailed examination of the relationships and transactions among idealism, pragmatism, and realism He then addresses the seemingly endless efforts to achieve more cooperation among the groups via the so-called "discussion sessions," such as the selection of topics in advance for debate at annual meetings so as hopefully to foster philosophical progress He then examines the influence of World War I on

American philosophers Campbell moves on to look at the long-time desire to create a unified national organization, one which finally did come about with the adoption of a constitution by all three divisions—eastern, western, and pacific—in 1926–7 Two final chapters examine other post-war efforts, including those of the Committee on International Cooperation, and some evaluations, pro and con, of the newly established "profession" of philosophy

For Campbell, the APA and philosophy in America have "made great progress in recent years" (p 290), though much remains to be done However, he points out that the quest for professionalization in the APA is by no means a recent, post-World War II phenomenon "[B]y the time of the unification of the APA into a national organization in 1927 [the] costs [of professionalization] were already being paid by American society and its philosophers Any potential for broad social contributions by American philosophers had been lost as they had increasingly withdrawn from the search for social wisdom to concentrate on their own specialized and infinitely fascinating work, and as this work had itself increasingly narrowed into attempts to examine the internal workings of knowledge" (p 284)

Campbell does an excellent job of delineating this quest for respectability vs the need for philosophy to maintain contact with the larger context of everyday human needs and interests The heart of the debate lies in the attempt to defend "progress," and hence respectability, as movement toward an agreed-upon goal—vis-à-vis a more pragmatic effort to maintain pluralism, such as a position wherein "progress" can be defined in several ways The latter approach would be the more democratic one, but can be preserved only at the cost of giving up certainty It enjoyed only limited success, when compared to the approach of realism

By his own admission, Campbell's history of the APA is "incomplete" (p 278), that is, it doesn't uncover all available material It is also "distorted" (p 278), that is, it has to interpret, to a contemporary audience, events that occurred a century ago It is, in short, both partial and perspectival It is also, however, both balanced and informative At a metatheoretical or self-reflexive level, it can perhaps serve as a model of what we need to do in dealing with the past The quest for professionalization is, in many ways, like "the quest for certainty" alluded to by Dewey, very tempting, but to be resisted as much as possible Campbell's warning at the end of his volume should be taken to heart "it is necessary to return from the wonder of philosophical inquiry to the problems of daily existence We can never transcend the problem of professional isolation, but we must always work to minimize it [P]rofessional success is hollow if society does not benefit" (p 291)

This is a rich text, one that is informing and enlightening, broad based and deeply researched It places the APA in a context One should read it keeping in mind Dewey's warning that the most pervasive philosophical fallacies come down to neglect of context An excellent volume, clear and well written Highly recommended —William J Gavin, *University of Southern Maine*

CARANTI, Luigi *Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy The Kantian Critique of Cartesian Scepticism* Toronto University of Toronto Press, 2007 218 pp Cloth, $60 00—The purpose of the present book is to evaluate the different responses to external world skepticism that Kant set forth in his writings ranging from *Nova Dilucidatio* to "Vom Inneren Sinne " He viewed it as a "scandal" that philosophy had been unable to provide an irrefutable proof of the existence of the external world

The book is divided into six chapters, which are supplemented with an introduction, a short conclusion, a bibliography, and a general index Strangely enough, it does not contain a preface This could have let the reader know, for example, that the supervisor of Caranti's PhD dissertation on Kant's Refutation of Idealism was the renowned Kantian specialist Henry E Allison, and that chapters one and six are based on papers published in *Kant-Studien* in 2004 and 2006, respectively

In the first chapter, Caranti offers what he takes to be the first thorough and systematic account of Kant's various anti-skeptical arguments from the pre-critical period He argues that these arguments' inability to meet the skeptical challenge forced Kant to modify the distinction between *phainomena* and things in themselves, which were conceived of as mental entities and the mind-independent objects that cause them, respectively

The second chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of the nature of transcendental idealism and to an evaluation and defense of the arguments in its favor advanced in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Caranti argues that the crucial change which determined the progressive passage from the pre-critical to the critical periods consisted in a modification of the notion of phainomena These were no longer deemed to be mental entities but genuine, mind-independent objects—the existence of these objects being that which must be proven to refute the skeptic Hence, transcendental idealism is the result of Kant's new attempt to meet the skeptical challenge and it cannot be construed as a form of phenomenalism, not even in the first edition of the *Critique* Caranti contends that this rejection of the phenomenalistic reading is the most original and controversial of the theses he defends

For its part, the third chapter deals with the anti-skeptical argument contained in the first edition of the *Critique*, namely, the Fourth Paralogism, whose formulation was made possible by the introduction of the aforementioned modification According to Caranti, failure to recognize such a modification of the notion of phainomena has led to a serious misunderstanding of this new anti-skeptical argument Interpreters generally view it as resting on a phenomenalistic position, even though it is actually based on the empirical form of realism characteristic of Kant's critical philosophy Although the Fourth Paralogism is not, as it stands, an effective anti-skeptical argument, it does contain the two elements necessary to construct such an argument, namely, the thesis of the immediacy of outer perception and the view that the Evil Genius hypothesis implies an illegitimate inquiry into the nature of the thing in itself.

The fourth chapter addresses Kant's treatment of idealism between 1781 and 1787, that is, between the first and second editions of the *Critique* The analysis is focused on the anti-skeptical arguments found in the *Prolegomena* and in the Metaphysics Mrongovius lectures Caranti proposes to show that, despite appearances, in these writings Kant does not go back to the phenomenalistic position of the pre-critical period

The fifth chapter analyzes the Refutation of Idealism—namely, the anti-skeptical argument of the second edition of the *Critique*—while the sixth chapter examines the various anti-skeptical arguments found in "Reflexionen zum Idealismus" and in "Vom inneren Sinne " Contrary to the view of most interpreters, Caranti argues that the Fourth Paralogism is much superior to these later arguments

Caranti's style is clear and readable, and his hermeneutical analyses are by and large rigorous and plausible However, I sometimes have the impression that he has to struggle a lot to explain away some texts or facts that run counter to his interpretation It would perhaps be preferable to accept the possibility that, at times, Kant may be confused or inconsistent or hesitant regarding what strategy is the best to refute so-called Cartesian skepticism

As Caranti makes clear in the introduction, his interest is not exclusively, or even primarily, historical Indeed, the reason for offering a critical examination of Kant's responses to Cartesian skepticism is that this provides the necessary framework for his project of showing that transcendental idealism is the *only* philosophical perspective which makes it possible to respond to that type of skepticism, thus being a serious alternative for contemporary epistemologists Although I strongly sympathize with this approach which is both historical and systematic, I think that Caranti makes an overstatement First, he himself sometimes recognizes that his is not a full-scale defense of transcendental idealism and that he has only shown that this position is less flawed and outdated than usually thought Second, he does not offer a detailed discussion of present-day epistemological debates about external world skepticism, but rather a brief examination of the anti-skeptical strategies found in Guyer, Carnap, Dummett, and Putnam and concludes that they are inferior to Kant's Of course, such defense and discussion would require a book of its own, but this is precisely why I find Caranti's avowed aim too ambitious

All in all, this is a most interesting book in which specialists in Kantian philosophy will find much to ponder and discuss —Diego E Machuca, *Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina*

CHAKRAVARTTY, Anjan *A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism Knowing the Unobservable* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2007 xvi + 251 pp Cloth, $85 00—Anjan Chakravartty describes and to some extent argues for a version of scientific realism according to which our

best scientific theories approximately correspond to the causal properties and kinds that are in the world He describes this position as "semirealism" since it is more sophisticated than earlier realisms His book differs from much of the literature in the philosophy of science by focusing more on the metaphysical rather than epistemological implications of realism

The book has three parts The first part begins with the role of unobservables in science Some unobservables are detectable through instruments at least in principle, such as distant bodies and neutrinos, whereas others cannot be detected, such as universals and causal necessity Although Chakravartty is concerned with the way in which scientific theories are about both observables and unobservables, the thrust of his metaphysical concern is with undetectable unobservables

He provides a good account of debates over the reality of such unobservables in the past thirty years He primarily argues against Bas van Frassen's "constructive empiricism," according to which empiricism is a kind of voluntary stance which rejects speculation about unobservables Chakravartty argues that van Frassen's stance is itself a metaphysical position But since van Frassen regards his own constructive empiricism as a voluntary stance, he cannot defend it with arguments Chakravartty's method here recalls the familiar dictum that one must practice metaphysics even to argue against it

In the remainder of the first part, Chakravartty develops "semirealism," which is meant to incorporate the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of two major contemporary realisms, namely entity realism and structural realism One realist worry here is that scientific theories change over time and consequently do not seem to describe the world Entity realists point out that even though scientific theories change, causal interaction with entities requires that there be mind-independent entities But what are these entities and how do we know them? Structural realists argue that scientific theories tell us not about the entities in the world but rather a mind-independent structure But what is being structured? Chakravartty combines aspects of the theories by holding that entities are known through their causal interactions Consequently, entities and structures cannot be separated When scientific theories change, the detection properties, such as causal processes, remain, even though auxiliary properties, such as phlogiston, may vanish This continuity makes semirealism possible

The second part of the book begins with a defense of causal realism, which Chakravartty understands as the view that causal necessity is real even though it is unobserved He holds that the traditional understanding of causation as a relation between events is entirely misplaced But he does not turn to agent causality Instead, he emphasizes causal processes, which are about entities and their dispositions Even though dispositions to behave cannot be observed, the dispositions themselves are real Objects, events, and causal properties can be truly described by laws because they fall under kinds Chakravartty rejects what he understands as the traditional notion of essences and replaces it with the "sociability" of properties There are no traditional essences because such an essence would require the possession of at least some properties which are exactly the same by each member of the kind But biology

and other sciences do not allow for such essences For instance, not every pig has four legs Nevertheless, causal laws and other description are about mind-independent kinds, which are grouped together not by chance but by what Chakravartty describes as "sociability "

The third part of the book shows how Chakravartty's semirealism understands the relationship between theories, models, and the world He argues that the truth of scientific theories and models cannot be merely syntactic, but must be semantic, that is, the theories must correspond to the world This commitment to the correspondence of approximately true theories to the world is not the same as a commitment to the correspondence theory of truth, but is compatible with different approaches to truth

Chakravartty states that scientific theories can be approximately true in different ways For instance, some theories and models abstract from the world, whereas others stipulate ideal conditions Abstraction and idealization are both necessary for science, but the second does not describe the world as it is Abstractions are true insofar as they describe the world, but idealizations are true in part because of their utility

Most of Chakravartty's arguments are clear and seem at least plausible, although I wish that certain discussions were carried on with greater depth, such as his rejection of essences and his description of idealization The book shares common but questionable prejudices about the centrality of causal necessity and the priority of scientific theories over pre-theoretical knowledge Nevertheless, it is an excellent introduction to many central issues in the philosophy of science and provides some novel arguments for a version of scientific realism — Thomas M Osborne Jr , *University of St Thomas at Houston*

DASTON, Lorraine, and GALISON, Peter *Objectivity* Brooklyn, N Y Zone Books, 2007 542 pp Cloth, $38 95—It is rare in a treatise that runs 500 pages to conclude that not a single page could be deleted except at the reader's expense The concept of objectivity is so foundational in contemporary thought as to go unnoticed as a concept As now widely understood it grounds what aspires to be a thoroughly depersonalized epistemology To be objective is to record nature in the raw, unfiltered, uninterpreted, accepted for what it is How surprising, then, that the concept thus understood is largely a creation of the 19th century

The earlier standard was truth-to-nature, requiring investigator to go beyond the mere physical attributes of the object of inquiry and to locate that object correctly in its natural setting The botanists who first benefited from the development of the microscope were then able to present specimens at an extraordinary level of detail This, however, was not the conclusion of the undertaking Rather, the specimen now had to be presented in the settings in which it is found The truth of the thing includes its context With instructive extracts from Linnaeus and Goethe, the authors provide an insight into Enlightenment

understandings of how one is to be thus true to nature It is the naturalist's mind that must exclude what is merely accidental The skilled botanist is one who is able to concentrate on what is constant in the subject of study Irrelevant details are to be filtered out Finding what is true to nature requires a kind of genius, scarcely depersonalized

The movement toward objectivity was uneven and protracted The authors illustrate this both with medieval treatises and with dictionary definitions common in the Enlightenment In the age of Ockham and Duns Scotus *subiectivus* is the thing as it actually exists, whereas *obiectivus* is its representation in consciousness It is objective in the sense that it is known It is subjective in the sense of its reality as a potential subject of experience, but a reality independent of that experience

Times have changed The twentieth century would revisit the concept of objectivity and support any number of investigators wary of methods that would exclude the expert witness, the trained observer Illustrative of the tendency is the expertise required in basing a diagnosis on features of the electroencephalogram Daston and Galison pause to consider the 1941 *Atlas of Electroencephalography* which sets down the *subjective* criteria by which correct diagnosis becomes possible The section in which this account is given has as its heading, "Accuracy should not be sacrificed to objectivity "

Objectivity is organized in eight chapters It is an added virtue of the book that it includes nearly fifty pages of exquisitely reproduced color plates illustrating various aspects of the authors' main points Each chapter could stand alone as a worthy exposition of significant developments in the history of ideas Throughout, the reader is forced to track the different roles assigned to objectivity Is it to be understood primarily in epistemological terms, ontological terms, methodological terms, even moral terms? The part played by leading philosophers is carefully and authoritatively traced Proper space is allotted to Kant and the "seismic intensity" with which his arguments influenced scientific thinking throughout the first half of the 19th century Daston and Galison accurately summarize the understanding of Kant espoused by leading figures of the period, including Helmholtz The reader might have been assisted at this point had some attention been given to the rather gross misunderstandings that even the best and brightest reached as they thumbed the *Critique of Pure Reason* That work was never intended as a systematic metaphysics, but as the delineation of the method necessary if such a systematic metaphysics were to be attained A question that impelled the work throughout was how nature itself is possible The task that Kant took upon himself was that of rescuing science from skepticism This is less a criticism of Daston and Galison than a reminder of how important it is to read Kant more closely than one reads Kantians

On this very point the authors identify as one of the central aims of their book the identification of a veritable plurality of epistemic virtues They have succeeded in this preeminently Indeed, read in a certain light, objectivity is something of a detailed appendix to Kant's first critique In asking how nature is possible, Kant understood the distinction between the chaotic buzz of raw physicality and that ordered realm of knowledge within which we are able to predict and explain the objects

of experience Knowledge itself, however, requires that experience be subsumed under general categories The categories themselves are pure—they are neither given in experience nor deducible from it In establishing the categorical framework of all knowledge to which science might aspire, Kant guaranteed that the shifting standards, the valiant but always questionable conclusions, and, yes, even the exhilarating success achieved within the framework of science are implicit in the enterprise itself Daston and Galison offer the historical record of the enterprise There is to be sure a plurality of epistemic virtues though, if Kant is right, not every epistemic virtue is generative of knowledge as such What such virtues might well claim for themselves is a sobering recognition of the contextual factors on which our conjectures rest If the virtues achieved nothing greater they would at least keep before us the distinction between knowledge and conjecture and the limits of sense and reason In just this respect, *Objectivity* is a profound contribution to the category of epistemic virtues The authors richly deserve the praise that has been heaped on this exceptional work —Daniel N Robinson, *Oxford University*

DESMOND, William *God and the Between* Malden, Mass Blackwell, 2008 xiv + 368 pp Cloth, $89 95, paper, $44 95—This is a very difficult book on very important, indeed pressing, topics in the philosophy of religion The book completes Desmond's trilogy beginning with *Being and the Between* (Albany State University of New York Press, 1995) and *Ethics and the Between* (Albany State University of New York Press, 2001) A brief résumé of the book here cannot do justice to the density and scope of the argumentation Certain overall features of the book, however, can be gleaned Desmond relies upon arguments sketched out already in the first two volumes in his trilogy, his main interlocutors are Kant and Hegel, he is dismissive of the putative charge of onto-theology, the challenge he poses is to philosophy to be more "porous" to religion, there are different and quite suggestive senses of "the between" at play in the work, and the God who emerges in the between is in part constituted by reaction to Enlightenment-inspired Gnosticism and pan(en)theism I shall distinguish here between the existential or anthropological motifs on the one hand and the systematic philosophy of religion he proposes on the other

There are several recurring anthropological motifs running throughout the work, and a knowledge of these is essential to understanding the train of the systematic arguments First and foremost, Desmond claims that to be human is to be porous to the divine, ecstatically self-transcending and open to the existential dimensions of finding oneself in the between between religion and philosophy, between immanence and transcendence, between the presence and absence of God, between *poros* and *penia*, between the Pascalian heart and Hegelian speculative reason Various cultural and philosophical trends have "clogged" the

primal porosity of being, for example, in closing it into an immanent self-completing whole. It is Desmond's task to diagnose such Kantian and Hegelian forms of clogging and provide ways to unclog porosity Desmond refers repeatedly to man's "urgency to ultimacy," a reaching beyond determinate finitude and erotic self-transcending In a passage that brings to mind Augustine, Desmond says "a certain infinitude springs up in the overdeterminate restlessness of our finitude While this is the passion of our being, it is also the urgency of ultimacy" (p 102)

Now to the systematics At the outset of the book Desmond distinguishes three senses of the concept of transcendence There is first the transcendence of beings whose otherness resists complete reduction to our conceptual grip (T^1) Next, there is self-transcendence (T^2) Finally, there is transcendence itself in its hyperbolic sense, "bringing to mind the question of God beyond the immanence of transcendence in nature and human being . It would seem that second transcendence in its ineradicable recalcitrance to complete objectification, is pointed beyond both objectness and subjectness to transobjective and transsubjective transcendence (T^3)" (pp 22–3) Kantian modernity has made the possibility of obtaining the third transcendence nearly impossible because of its overemphasis on the second kind of ethical transcendence It is in these terms that Desmond tells a story that leads from Kantian autonomy through Hegelian speculative reason up until Nietzschean will to power The moral of the story is that transcendence in the third sense has become unthinkable for a modernity that has lost its sense of the anthropological determinations of man as sketched above

The backbone of the book turns on four ways of approaching the question of God 1) the univocal way, which targets fixed identity and determination, and is characteristic of Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, 2) the equivocal way, which focuses upon the indefinite and the "unfixing of difference", 3) the dialectical way, which mediates between sameness and difference in its relief of self-mediating wholeness, and 4) the metaxological way, a mindfulness more patient to transcendence, a logos of the *metaxu*, the middle or the between This fourfold sense of being is complemented by what Desmond calls the four hyperboles of being 1) the idiocy of being, the "that it is" of God's resistance to any determinate claims, 2) the aesthetic rapture of being, 3) the erotics of selving, and 4) the agapeics of transcendence, of the radical letting be of the other as other and call to community

It is a shame that Desmond does not engage with what he recognizes as the phenomenological approaches to God beginning in the 1990s, with which there would be significant overlap, at least on the anthropological level But Desmond is not shy to name the metaxological God, the *being* of the God of the between, as irreducible to what in his mind is a dubious critique of ontotheology One last comment one is struck immediately by the extremely small font of the book—had the font been loosened a bit the work could have been well over 600 pages, but a most pleasant read overall —Daniel Dwyer, *Xavier University*

FOSTER, Roger *Adorno The Recovery of Experience* SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy Albany State University of New York Press, 2007 x + 236 pp Cloth, $70 00—Theodor W Adorno's writings resist interpretation Their challenges stem in part from the unusual range he covers and the innovations he introduces into various fields aesthetics, cultural studies, epistemology, ethics, literature, musicology, psychology, and sociology Difficulties also arise from Adorno's idiosyncratic appropriations of complex works by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger The most crucial source of resistance, one that unifies the ones just mentioned, comes from the radical character of Adorno's critique of modernity

Roger Foster argues that Adorno's critique of modernity seeks "a recovery of spiritual experience" This aim is "the unifying core to Adorno's strikingly multidisciplinary oeuvre" (p 2) Foster unfolds his interpretation in three stages The first three chapters introduce Adorno's project and compare it with central ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin The next three chapters contrast Adorno's project with Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson's unsuccessful attempts to do justice to spiritual experience Foster sets this contrast in sharp relief by tracing affinities between Adorno and Marcel Proust Then Chapter 7 and the Conclusion argue that Adorno's approach has significant advantages over those of John McDowell and Jurgen Habermas, both of whom remain trapped, like Husserl and Bergson, in a "failed outbreak" from epistemology

The English translation of Adorno's book on Husserl uses the title *Against Epistemology* to translate *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie* ("On the Metacritique of Epistemology"), thereby turning Adorno's dialectical "metacritique" into an oppositional "against" This single mistranslation encapsulates many of the ways in which Adorno has been misunderstood The most egregious misunderstanding regards him as an opponent of modernity But, Adorno does not straightforwardly oppose modernity, any more than he simply stands against epistemology He undertakes a dialectical metacritique of both A metacritique, as he conceives it, starts from within that which is criticized To pretend that one could oppose modernity and epistemology from the outside would lead to one of the failed outbreaks that Foster describes

To an unwary reader, however, the term "spiritual experience" might suggest an external position in English "spiritual" has come to connote something otherworldly or mystical or vaguely religious That, however, is not what Adorno wishes to recover Foster uses "spiritual experience" to translate Adorno's Hegelian "*geistiger Erfahrung*" The alternative translation—"intellectual experience"—would be worse "Intellectual" suggests something disembodied and disengaged, which is precisely what Adorno questions So one must read past the translation to Adorno's conception of what needs recovering

As Foster explains, Adorno develops a mode of philosophical writing in which particular objects of interpretation come to express an "immanent universal" To engage in such interpretation is to have spiritual experience Modernity makes spiritual experience increasingly difficult to attain This is because the modern world is marked "by a

transformation in the structure of experience," a transformation aided and amplified by "the theoretical self-understandings of that world produced by philosophy" (p 3) Hence the path to spiritual experience goes through a critique of both modernity's "disenchantment" of the world and philosophy's epistemological support of disenchantment Only through such a critique—through what Adorno calls a "negative dialectic"—can philosophical writing help an immanent universal come to expression

Foster demonstrates with admirable clarity that, unlike Husserl's critique of natural-scientific reductionism, Adorno thoroughly problematizes the epistemic subject, showing it to be the product of a complex sociohistorical process. Unlike Bergson, Adorno explains why the conditions of modernity do not support immediate qualitative experience Husserl and Bergson inadvertently ratify the disenchantment they resist Similarly, McDowell's "attempt to reconcile mind and world fails because it does not truly get beyond constituting subjectivity" (p 8) Even Habermas loses sight of "the disclosive potential of language" (p 202) that Adorno deploys in his search for spiritual experience

Foster's book stands out as an exposition and defense of Adorno's project It is weaker, however, as a critical examination Two concepts in particular deserve additional scrutiny One is the notion of an immanent universal Although the notion makes sense as a crystallization of historical tendencies illuminated by constellations of concepts, one wonders how it can perform the normative role both traditionally accorded to universals and required by Adorno's own critique The concept of suffering is also problematic At times Foster seems to suggest that suffering is simply the disruption of experience brought about by a societally induced alienation between subject and object Yet the strong motivating force that "suffering" has in Adorno's writings points to something stronger, namely, the suffering of those who are dominated and oppressed

In other words, Foster puts the sociopolitical import of a negative dialectic in very soft focus Yet it does show up In that sense he achieves the combination of communication and expression that an Adornian recovery of spiritual experience requires His ambitious interpretation succeeds in its own terms Shedding new light on Adorno's project, Foster shows why it deserves ongoing attention —Lambert Zuidervaart, *Institute for Christian Studies and University of Toronto*

GROSHOLZ, Emily R *Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and the Sciences* New York Oxford University Press, 2007 xviii + 313 pp Cloth, $63 00—This book provides a series of case studies supporting the author's claim that ambiguous representation can be central to advances in both mathematics and science.

Chapter 1 briefly treats two exemplary cases and shows then to be imbued with ambiguity the study of projectile motion by Galileo in the early seventeenth century and the chemical formulas proposed by Jacob

Berzelius in the early nineteenth century Here and throughout Grosholz makes abundant use of C S Peirce's distinction between iconic and symbolic representations (that is, those linked to their objects by similarity and those linked by convention), while emphasizing that these two modes will often blend and interchange Grosholz also here lays out an intellectual genealogy, beginning with the logical positivists, especially Carnap, whose reductionist program she evaluates as "essentially syntactical" (p 20) The following generation of semantic philosophers (Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking, and others) were in turn succeeded by Grosholz's own cohort, who augmented the philosophy of science toolkit with pragmatic considerations, bringing historical context to the forefront Grosholz claims some credit for including philosophy of mathematics within this pragmatic turn, an extension she sees some otherwise likeminded colleagues (Ursula Klein, Robin Hendry) as having been hesitant to make

Further groundwork is laid in Chapter 2, "Analysis and Experience" Analysis, for Grosholz, is "the search for conditions of intelligibility" (p 33) She acknowledges numerous intellectual debts (she is commendably explicit and generous in this regard throughout), from Leibniz, Locke, and Hume to Jean Cavaillès, Herbert Breger, and Carlo Cellucci Leibniz looms especially large, Grosholz is firmly in the camp of those committed to rescuing him from the stunted interpretations of Louis Couturat and Bertrand Russell Leibniz for Grosholz is not a logicist but rather a pragmatic user of multiple modes of representation, helping to demonstrate "why the philosophical project of finding the sole correct representation of mathematics is misguided" (p 48)

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present close readings of cases involving the interfaces among biology, chemistry, physics, and geometry constructing and testing an antibody mimic, understanding the transposition of genes, and investigating benzene via molecular orbital theory Although Grosholz is engaged by the scientific cases in their own right, especially as they illustrate the subtleties of theory reduction, she makes clear that a major motivation for including them is to emphasize commonalities with mathematical practice, and to insist that mathematics should not be considered a unique outlier when compared to the physical and biological sciences

Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz are treated in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, respectively Grosholz views Descartes as a genius who persuasively promoted the false hope of ultimate clarity in mathematics and science His mathematical practice, often inconsistent with his methodological pronouncements, is found to be rich in productive ambiguity Newton's *Principia* is likewise rich. A tour of some key propositions from that book reveals the crucial ambiguity of the diagrams found therein, as Newton shifts back and forth between geometry and mechanics, and between the finite and the infinitesimal Grosholz defends the importance of diagrams against Kantian snobbery In the Leibniz chapter she emphasizes that "what a diagram means depends on its context of use" (p 219) Appropriately, the book is abundantly illustrated with figures taken from primary sources being considered

Chapter 9 begins with a survey of Jules Vuillemin's approach to the philosophy of mathematics and then proceeds to examine De Rham's theorem, which, by employing multiple modes of representation, demonstrates an isomorphism between two sets of algebraic invariants associated with a smoothly triangulated manifold Nancy Cartwright's views on the abstract and concrete are used to interpret the philosophical significance of this episode

In the last chapter Grosholz argues that "there cannot be complete speech about mathematical things," (p 259) and criticizes the foundational proposals of both Bertrand Russell and Penelope Maddy She looks at mathematical results connecting logic, topology, and algebra, such as the theorem of M H Stone, (not W H , as the book would have it), which asserts that any Boolean algebra can be represented by an algebra of sets associated with an appropriately constructed topological space

Grosholz's overall position is clear, and each case provides her opportunity for cogent remarks, but probably few readers will find all the case studies equally illuminating or understandable At times the work resembles a scrapbook of Grosholz's intellectual interests more than a connected argument Many intriguing questions are left unasked There is never a hint that investigators at different times or places (all cases are from standard Western science and mathematics) have been better or worse at utilizing ambiguous representation, and no indication that investigators have, or have not, learned to master ambiguity from acquaintance with their predecessors If scientists and mathematicians are conscious or unconscious of ambiguity does this have any practical consequences?—David Lindsay Roberts, *Prince George's Community College*

GSCHWANDTNER, Christina M *Reading Jean-Luc Marion Exceeding Metaphysics* Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion Bloomington, Ind Indiana University Press, 2007 xxiii + 320 pp Cloth, $65.00, Paper, $24 95—The fundamental aim of this handsomely printed volume is to explain that, through a careful and proper reading of all of Jean-Luc Marion's key writings, one can come to understand how and, more importantly, why the need to exceed metaphysics, one of the themes central to his life's work, leads Marion to "articulate a theology of excess and a phenomenology of saturation" (p xi) in his attempt to elucidate the relationship between philosophy and theology and, ultimately, God and creatures. But, rather than producing yet another more-or-less standard commentary on his thought, the author takes a fresh and bold approach by arguing that a coherent and synthetic understanding Marion's theological and phenomenological thought can only be achieved by grounding it in his often overlooked work on Descartes "Marion's desire to 'exceed metaphysics' is guided by his outline and criticism of the metaphysical system evident in Descartes its concern with

epistemology and its doubled grounding in the thinking ego and divine causality" (p 243)

The structure of the book, divided into three parts consisting of three chapters each, mimics profitably Marion's own tripartite lifelong project devoted to Descartes (metaphysics), theology (God), and phenomenology (the self and the other) Each part begins with a helpful review of pertinent critical secondary literature and is then followed by a careful discussion of the relevant subject matter

In the first part ("The Constraints of Metaphysics") the author strives to demonstrate the extent to which Marion's attempt to go beyond ("overcome") the limitations of metaphysics is rooted in his study of Descartes and the late medieval context The second part ("A God of Excess") is devoted to Marion's treatment of God, a topic which, according to the author, may be most profitably considered only in light of his consideration of Descartes' white/blank theology In particular, the author argues that it is only when Marion's thought is seen within the Cartesian and late medieval context that one can come to appreciate how subtly he is able to find a balance between the absolute transcendence and total immanence of God

In the third part of the book ("A Self Open to the Other"), the author examines Marion's account of the human self and argues that, for Marion, the "saturated phenomenon reformulates not only one's reflection about God but also thought about the human self" and that his "phenomenology of excess requires and makes possible such a different and new account of subjectivity" (p 181) Perhaps the most interesting insight on this topic is the contention that Marion's "analysis of the Cartesian ego provides significant pointers both for the shortcomings of the traditional subject and for a more successful account of the self that might come 'after' it" (p xvi)

This volume successfully presents a persuasive and lucid argument for the employment of a heretofore under-utilized dimension of Marion's thought as a means of understanding and articulating a coherent vision of his position The author makes the case that it is only through careful analysis and consideration of Marion's exegesis of Descartes (and at several opportune junctures, of Pascal's response to Descartes) that one properly can understand his need (and, indeed, ability) to go beyond metaphysics (for example, the necessity of "exceeding metaphysics," as the book's subtitle insists) in order to "articulate a theology of excess and a phenomenology of saturation" (p xi) In other words, one must advance to a different kind of knowing, if one is to navigate successfully the murky channels that lead to God It is Pascal, then, who provides the crucial insight that this other kind of knowing involves going beyond traditional metaphysics, because it relies on the rationality of the heart rather than of the mind The author notes that, according to Marion, "Pascal's account of love is what overcomes Cartesian metaphysics most successfully" (p 246) And it is through reflection on this insight that one is led to a deeper understanding of what Marion considers to be the proper relationship between theology and philosophy, the will and the intellect, the heart and the mind

The author argues that Marion, throughout his writings, "identifies theology with a rationality of the 'will' while philosophy is a rationality of the 'mind' In order to have any sense of God, then, one must move into a different regime of rationality One must approach God with the heart and not with the mind God is known in love, not in certainty" (pp 249–50) Marion's analysis of Descartes, aided by the critical insights of Pascal, thus permits (indeed, urges) him to "exceed" the Cartesian metaphysics "through and because of the givenness of charity" (p 250) In the final analysis, the abiding theme and project in Marion's writings is "the generous givenness that pours itself out in abandon for the other" (p 250)

Those already familiar with Marion's work will find this volume both a provocative and congenial addition to the literature on his thought And for those who are relatively new to this fascinating thinker this volume may reliably be utilized as a lucid and comprehensive, while at the same time serious and challenging, introduction to his ideas

The book contains extensive and detailed endnotes (forty-nine pages in all), a helpful, thorough, and up-to-date bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and a brief index —Roman T Ciapalo, *Loras College*

HARDIN, Russell *David Hume Moral and Political Theorist* Oxford Oxford University Press, 2007 xi + 260 pp Cloth, $49 50—The aim of this book is, in the author's words, "to explicate Hume's political theory" (p 23) Hume's moral theory is included in the title and the work, because, in Hardin's view, Hume's moral theory differs from his political theory only in scale, not principle Both levels of theory, large and small scale, are tied together by the principle of utility, the "chief actuating principle of the mind" as Hume has it in the *Treatise*

Central to Hardin's explication of Hume's moral and political theory is the conviction that Hume was the first among modern philosophers to give consistent expression to the standpoint of naturalism Hume's naturalism governs the determination of the objects of his theory the morality and politics of the human world are to be construed as natural phenomena. And it indicates the appropriate method by which these phenomena are to be studied descriptive and explanatory, not normative or evaluative For this reason, "Hume's account does not tell us what is right or wrong, good or bad It explains moral views, it does not justify them or argue for them beyond fitting them to the actual psychology of people" (p 28) If Hume appears to be making evaluative judgments, these are to be dismissed as occasional panegyrics, expressive of Hume's psychology, not his theory, if he appears to be making normative claims, these should be understood as prudential recommendations Hume's focus, Hardin claims, "is on explaining our commitments and views, not on justifying, correcting, or asserting them" (p 200) This makes of Hume a nascent social scientist, bent on the explanation of

moral beliefs and behavior, rather than a philosopher who aims at the evaluation of such It should come as no surprise that Hardin himself is a social scientist

Hardin's contribution to Hume studies comes chiefly in the use of game theory as a basis for the explication of Hume's account of moral and political phenomena He employs three modal categories (conflict, cooperation, and coordination) crossed by two levels of scale (small and large levels of interaction) yielding six loci of analysis Apparently normative moral and political phenomena are then explained as outputs of strategic decisions by which utility is maximized A promise of exchange between two parties is a small-scale coordination problem, benevolence, a small-scale conflict problem Justice, as order, is cast as a large-scale coordination problem, distributive justice as a problem in large-scale conflict All moral and political phenomena are thus construed as strategic artifacts aimed at producing either personally or mutually advantageous outcomes Among Hume's contributions to political theory, the most significant, in Hardin's view, is his account of the rise and role of convention On this account, convention is the result of the repetition of large-scale coordination decisions, a repetition that acquires strategic weight in future decision-making The social order generated by convention, insofar as it works to our perceived mutual advantage, naturally garners our support This is the real source of the power of government Hume's theory of convention explains why people will lend obedience to the government without the help of an absolute monarch, mythical contracts, or even shared values Social institutions that secure our mutual advantage please us by virtue of their utility, on that basis they gain our allegiance

If one takes up Hardin's book on Hume, one will have to be prepared for a fair amount of boosterism In the preface Hardin admits that he finds Hume's social science "very congenial" (p vii) Elsewhere he claims that Hume was not only ahead of his time, but ahead of ours Hume's great innovation was to explain the social order by way of strategic analysis, but only with the development of game theory in the twentieth century have we begun to understand and appreciate what he was up to In addition to some hefty Hume promotion, one will also have to put up with Hardin's frequent editorial asides In the course of this book on Hume's political theory, readers will also learn much about the author's political opinions regarding the American religious right, the Republican Party, and the political liabilities of philosophy

For all his interest in philosophers, Hardin has remarkably little use for philosophy Philosophical views other than Hume's are often dismissed by way of ridicule and invective The summary comparisons of the political philosophies of Locke, Hobbes, and Hume at the end of the book are something less than rewarding—a series of abrupt, impatient paragraphs that sometimes border on incoherence Clearly the chief value of this book resides in Hardin's exploitation of the resources of game theory in his explication of Hume's political theory On that basis the book is worthy of hearty recommendation —Lee Hardy, *Calvin College*

HINTIKKA, Jaakko *Socratic Epistemology Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning* New York Cambridge University Press, 2007 viii + 239 pp Cloth, $80 00, paper, $24 99—This is a rich and ambitious collection of ten papers drawn from Hintikka's work in various fields, ranging from epistemic logic and game-theoretic semantics, to exegetical work on historical figures With great erudition and acute insight, he pursues what he calls the interrogative model of inquiry—which models information-seeking inquiry on a sequence of questions and answers—and its applicability to traditional epistemological problems, such as the nature of abduction, the role of the a priori in experimental science, logical explanation, and so on Hintikka claims that the ramifications of the interrogative model for traditional epistemology are not merely novel but also implement a paradigm shift His new epistemology emerging from the interrogative model is sharply opposed to the main thrusts of traditional epistemology in at least two respects (a) the contexts of discovery and justification are amenable to unified treatment, and (b) the concept of knowledge is to be replaced by the concept of information Due to space constraint, I concentrate on the important chapters related to this paradigm shift

Although the interrogative model of inquiry in rudimentary form dates back to philosophers of antiquity such as Socrates and Aristotle, they lacked the necessary linguistic resources for its full-blooded development According to Hintikka, they are found in IF (independence friendly) logic, which is first-order epistemic logic augmented with the independence operator (/) indicating independence between variables Chapters 3 and 4 are mainly dedicated to developing epistemic logic so as to enlarge its expressive power to deal with all forms of questions, their answers, and their presuppositions

The IF logic is thus essential for revealing the logical structure of inquiry, but Hintikka also emphasizes in Chapters 1 through 3 that logic alone does not do justice to a key aspect of inquiry, its strategic aspect An inquiry seeking new information is a goal-directed activity like games in general, and therefore two types of rules for conducting it are to be distinguished, definitory rules and strategic rules The former define what moves are permissible in playing a game, whereas the latter reveal how to play it successfully The rules of inference that formal logic is concerned with fall under the former category because of their permissive character, only specifying what inferential steps are allowed at a given stage of inquiry Such rules, however, cannot answer strategic questions concerning how an inquirer should perform the inquiry, whether it is deductive or interrogative Hintikka argues that in the context of pure discovery, deductive and interrogative processes are subject to the same strategic considerations, and game theory paves a way to treating them in a unified manner

Hintikka points out that the tendency of traditional epistemology to sharply distinguish the context of discovery from that of justification and ignore that the former is rooted in the assumption that the context of discovery is in essence beyond rational evaluation He now argues against this assumption by claiming that the interrogative model, because it incorporates IF logic, makes it possible to treat the two contexts in the same logical and game-theoretic manner His claims for (a),

the methodological unity of the two contexts, consist in his ingenious efforts to establish the interrogative model as a logic of inquiry He makes a case for (b), the dispensability of the concept of knowledge, mainly on two grounds first, to construct a logic suitable for the interrogative model only requires an epistemic operator corresponding to a wide notion of information (this notion is elucidated in Chapter 8) rather than an operator that captures the sense of 'knowledge' philosophers have struggled to define, second, "the question as to whether a conclusion of inquiry has been justified strongly enough for it to qualify as knowledge" (p 27) is a strategic one, being tantamount to the question as to whether an inquirer should presuppose it in further inquiry To answer such a strategic question requires considering contextual factors such as the subject matter of the inquiry and its seriousness It is because definitory rules are permissive and context-free in character that any definition of knowledge is not able to offer an answer to the strategic question

While Hintikka dedicates most of his time to establishing (a), it seems that he needs to say more about the two grounds for (b) The first raises the old debate on how epistemic logic is related to our ordinary notion of knowledge The second, as Hintikka is aware, commits him to a version of epistemological contextualism But of course, it is a hot but open question whether contextualism can refute the rival invariantist position Hintikka attacks His paradigm shift is in its early stage, and thus awaits further development —Masashi Kasaki, *University of Calgary*

KAPLAN, Benjamin J *Divided by Faith Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* Cambridge, Mass and London Harvard University Press, 2007 xiv + 415 pp Cloth, $29 95—In *Divided by Faith,* author Benjamin Kaplan (Professor of Dutch History, University College London and the University of Amsterdam) explores one large theme in order to defend an even larger thesis His theme is Europeans who lived in religiously mixed communities between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries Here the focus is on concrete strategies for avoiding physical violence and maintaining peaceful coexistence, and religious toleration is treated not as a positive virtue but as "a pragmatic move, a grudging acceptance of unpleasant realities" (p 8, see also p 336) Kaplan's thesis is that the Enlightenment story of the rise of tolerance "is a myth, in more than one sense of the term" (p 5) Insofar as the story rests on the assumption that tolerance necessarily increases as human societies become more modernized, it is false And insofar as it blames intolerance on "primitive irrationality," it obscures the "true causes" of intolerance (p 6) In short, the Enlightenment story of religious toleration was wrong about both the past and the future

Divided by Faith consists of twelve chapters, divided into four parts In Part I ("Obstacles"), Kaplan examines why it was so difficult for people of different faiths to live together in early modern Europe What were the religious, political, and social forces that fueled intolerance? In Part II ("Arrangements"), he looks at different strategies for containing the threat of religious conflict Some communities (for instance, the small German town of Goldenstedt) actually allowed Catholics and Lutherans to worship together in the same parish church But most required members of religious minorities to worship elsewhere—either in other towns or inside newly defined private spheres such as the *schuilkerken* (clandestine churches) in Amsterdam In Part III ("Interactions"), Kaplan focuses on how people of different faiths got along in daily life What threats did conversions and intermarriage pose to minority faiths? In what respects did the segregation of Jews into ghettos signify "a liberalization of policy toward Jews" (p 294), a way of making "a Jewish presence acceptable to the Christian community" (p 295)? Why were similar arrangements not extended to Muslims living in early modern Europe? Finally, in Part IV ("Changes"), the author examines the question of how much actually changed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century with regard to religious toleration Here Kaplan offers "an alternative history of religious conflict and toleration" (336), one intended to serve as a corrective to the Enlightenment's "evolutionary schema of progressive development" (p 335)

Like much recent historical writing, *Divided by Faith* adopts a "bottom up" perspective Its primary focus is not on philosophers and kings, intellectuals and ruling elites, but peasants and craftsmen, women and minorities In describing the mundane dimensions of religious tolerance for ordinary people who lived in religiously mixed communities in early modern Europe, Kaplan performs a valuable service for all scholars concerned with toleration and modernity In *Divided by Faith* readers are treated to a level of concrete detail that is absent in other works on toleration But his attempt to shoot down the Enlightenment story of the rise of tolerance is less successful, in large part because he is often attacking a straw man Enlightenment advocates of toleration such as Bayle, Locke, and Voltaire were not Whig historians who viewed their subject through the distorted lens of inevitable progress They knew that human progress is never guaranteed And in advocating toleration, they were articulating an ideal that they hoped would influence practice Showing readers the discomforting details of the practice in no way refutes the ideal —Robert B Louden, *University of Southern Maine*

KAVANAUGH, Leslie Jaye. *The Architectonic of Philosophy Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz* Amsterdam Amsterdam University Press, 2007 vii + 340 pp Paper, $45 00—The guiding idea of this work is that the analysis of the systemic ('architectural') implications of selected concepts from Plato's, Aristotle's, and Leibniz's thought helps make explicit the ontology underlying their respective philosophic systems, or even the many

ontological structures underlying the whole of Western metaphysics (p 2) The goal of the analysis is to provide a new "architectonic" of being called "the reticulum" (p 265) According to the author, understanding the world in terms of a "system of reticulance" (*sic*, p 275) may help overcome the various ontological problems left open by Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant, mainly the "hierarchical," "transcendent," "monocentric," and apparently altogether "static" aspects of their system's metaphysical foundations

The unearthing of ancient and early modern metaphysical presuppositions is to be achieved via a reconstruction of particular aspects of these philosophies, aspects deemed central to their respective, explicit or implicit, theories of Being Borrowing a Derridian term which translates Heidegger's notion of *Seinstopologie* (from "The Thinker as Poet," 1954), the author calls the method pursued "onto-topology " This is defined as an inquiry into "the location of Being" as opposed to the classical inquiry into the "whatness" or the meaning of Being By "location" or "place" of Being the author sometimes intends Being's logical relations to other metaphysical categories, and at other times the situatedness of "Being" in the Heideggerian sense of *Dasein*, namely, regarding the human being (see p 265)

According to the author, the fundamental principle at work in Plato's metaphysics is *arché* (or its specification in the *Timaeus* as *chora*), in Aristotle, it is the concept of the *continuum* from the *Physics*, in Leibniz, it is the "*labyrinth*" (an expression Leibniz uses in the Preface to the *Theodicy*) Relying heavily (but not always explicitly) on post-modern, post-structuralist perspectives, the author attempts a broad explication of the three philosophies in question based on the understanding of the three fundamental concepts just mentioned

Much of the introduction is taken up by the author's interpretation of Kant's "architectonic of pure reason" (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 860) The author criticizes both Kant's early, Newtonian conception of "absolute space" (from the *Inaugural Dissertation*, 1770) and his later, properly critical notion of space and time as *a priori* sensible intuitions Although borrowing from Kant the very notion of an "architectonic" of philosophy, a criticism of the First Critique is used as springboard for the author's own philosophic construction

Following the introduction, the three main sections of *The Architectonic* consist of essays of various length containing reflections on the respective theory's main structuring principle as well as on topics verging on it The section on Plato ("The Architectonic as *Arché*") contains meditations on the general notion of "beginning," of *genesis* in pre-Socratic thought, of *arché* in the *Timaeus*, and finally on *chora* in its various acceptations as receptacle, medium, and space The section centered on Aristotle's *Physics* ("The Architectonic as *Continuum*") contemplates various logical relations among classical metaphysical notions like continuity, divisibility, change, motion, and infinity The third and last main section ("The Architectonic as Labyrinth") is an exposition of and reflection on Leibniz' notions of monad, universal harmony, correspondence, flux, unity and multiplicity, space and time The last thirteen pages of the book ("The Architectonic as Reticulum") contain

an epilogue that proposes in a "suggestive and provisional" way (p 275) the alternative ontology of the "reticulum" (and provides the reader with visual sketches of the same)

The book's footnotes are prodigiously rich in bibliographic citations and sometimes lengthy commentaries, some of which do shed light on the theses and problems discussed in the main text The very extended and essential bibliography is a remarkable contribution by the author, providing the most important critical editions and secondary sources available for such a vast enterprise Owen, Cherniss, Guthrie, Cornford, Dana Miller, Taylor, and countless others for the *Timaeus*, Freeman, Gill, Randall, and Lang among others, for Aristotle, Robinet, Mason, Parkinson, Mondadori, and Mercer, to name a few, for Leibniz

The structural plan of *The Architectonic* (pun not intended) is obviously very ambitious The actual execution of an elaborate undertaking such as this is bound to disappoint in some measure, in part because of the excessive breath of the overall conception Since the author's aim is to make explicit systemic principles and methodological features common to the three philosophers, a more in-depth analysis of the subject-matter (that is, of the actual philosophic texts) and sharper definitions of the author's own claims would have been helpful A case in point is the author's working assumption that 'labyrinth' must be a pivotal notion of Leibniz's metaphysics (and thus, by extension, of his philosophy), instead of a common French expression for *conundrum* in seventeenth-century literate circles The thesis is of course based on Deleuze's reading of Leibniz (*The Fold Leibniz and the Baroque*, 2003), but given the creative and eccentric nature of this reading, an appropriation of it would seem to call for textual corroboration or philosophical justification

The interpretive keys suggested by the author are often intriguing, the connections intimated are interesting and the alternative meanings alluded to are thought provoking—and yet some of the important theses defended remain quite impenetrable Perplexed readers will find however in the rich footnotes and bibliography an abundance of leads by which to pursue the intriguing suggestions of the text

Amsterdam University Press cannot, in this case, be praised for their editorial work An average of three to four grammatical, lexical or typographical errors per page, random punctuation, and *verbatim* repetitions are not helpful to readers willing to navigate such a multifaceted text Rather, the press has provided one more proof of the fact that a digital system will not catch problems that a human reader would the characterization of God as a "tenable underpinning" (p 10), the statement that "architectonic enables intersubstantiality to communicate" (p 15), the claims that "Greek civilization was repeatedly decimated" (p 23) or that "Leibniz did not want to acquiesce that a rock, for example, had substantial form" (p 177) would not have escaped the knowledgeable, patient, *and* salaried manuscript reader of the past —Allegra de Laurentiis, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*

ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques *Rousseau on Philosophy, Morality, and Religion* Translated and edited by Christopher Kelly Hanover, N H Dartmouth College Press, 2007 xxx + 277 pp Paper, $24 95—Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in the voice of the Savoyard Vicar that "I am not a great philosopher, and I care little to be one" (*Emile*, trans Allan Bloom [New York Basic Books, 1979], p 266) Yet the impressive new volume edited by Christopher Kelly suggests that despite these protestations, Rousseau's works endure as a vital and timeless nexus of philosophical doctrines The selections are drawn from Kelly's invaluable *Collected Writings of Rousseau* and for the first time offer an affordable English translation of some of his most important essays, including his *Letter to Beaumont, Fiction, or Allegorical Fragment on Revelation*, and the *Moral Letters*

In discussing Rousseau as a philosopher, one is inevitably drawn to the question of what kind of philosopher Rousseau actually was This question is notoriously tricky, as acknowledged in the extensive secondary literature Is he a Platonist or a Hobbesian? A neo-Stoic or a proto-Kantian? A modern materialist or an ancient dualist? The essays included in Kelly's edition shed some important light on these central questions. It seems that Rousseau was very much at the intersection of most all such dualities Most important as an early modern philosopher perhaps is the metaphysical question of materialism versus dualism Rousseau's Parisian intellectual milieu was increasingly drawn by the gravity of the new science to materialism, as expressed in La Mettrie, Baron d'Holbach, and Denis Diderot But the volume's essays make it perfectly clear that Rousseau had serious misgivings about this doctrine and its moral implications He laments in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* that "every effort is made to materialize all the operations of the soul and to deprive human feelings of all morality" (p 138) In his *Letter to Franquières*, he writes that "the supposition of matter thinking is a genuine absurdity" (p 229) Such reflections lead him to embrace the dualism of the ancients, as well as of Descartes, as declared in his *Letter to Beaumont* Man "is composed of two substances," namely a material body and immaterial soul (p 170)

This conclusion leads Rousseau to resolve the question of freedom versus determinism in a decided assertion of the former, as articulated in the *Letter to Franquières* In an attempt to reclaim good sense in a young man recently seduced by materialism and determinism, Rousseau pleads, "The sentiment of freedom, the charm of virtue, make themselves felt by you in spite of yourself" (p 237) This assertion of freedom is crucial to Rousseau, since it is his foundation of morality Virtue (as distinguished from mere goodness) rests upon the successful struggle of the will against the physical inclinations "There is no virtue without struggle, there is none without victory Virtue does not consist only in being just, but in being so by triumphing over one's [materially-generated] passions" (p 235)

For Rousseau, the knowledge of virtue resides in the conscience, which is articulated for the first time in his *Moral Letters* He describes as that "divine instinct, immortal and celestial voice, assured guide of being that is ignorant and limited but intelligent and free, infallible judge

of good and evil, sublime emanation of the eternal substance" (p 95) It is here that the careful reader can appreciate Rousseau's philosophic system His arguments are deeply coherent, if not uncontroversial Rousseau's morality depends on a free will, which itself relies on substance dualism To be sure, Rousseau himself arrives at this coherence only gradually with occasional indications of his own doubts (see the third *Moral Letter*) But once the system fully emerges in the letters to Beaumont and Franquières, Rousseau's choice offers a powerful alternative to the materialism, determinism, and utilitarianism of his contemporaries He did not necessarily win over the successive ages of Western intellectuals, but the essays in this volume at a minimum call the reader's attention back to the stakes of these questions

There is much to appreciate in this collection The only obvious omission would have been the inclusion of Rousseau's "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar," a text that stands at the center of the issues raised in the included essays The *Moral Letters* were an important first draft of much of the Vicar, while the *Letter to Beaumont* represents a defense of the doctrine that Rousseau believed could have saved Europe from its future calamities (p 209) Indeed, by considering the Vicar here, readers could decide once and for all whether or not Rousseau's personal views are identical with the Vicar's, a matter of great dispute in the literature But on the whole, this volume constitutes essential reading for anyone seriously interested in Rousseau as a philosopher, and for compiling this volume, Professor Kelly is again to be commended — David Lay Williams, *University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point*

LADYMAN, James, and ROSS, Don, with SPURRETT, David and COLLIER, John *Everything Must Go Metaphysics Naturalized* Oxford Oxford University Press 2007 346 pp n p —This is a "truly naturalistic metaphysics," with reality closed by scientific verifiability, (see "naturalistic closure" on p 29), aimed exclusively at "elucidating consilience networks across the sciences" (p 28), with fundamental physics (p 38), nowadays quantum mechanics and general relativity, as its base—the physics whose measurements can be taken or disconfirmed at any place in the universe (p 55, 283)

Although the universe is "nothing but processes in structural patterns all the way down" (p 228), and "individuals are resolved out of patterns rather than vice versa" (p 229), the authors maintain a generous "rainforest realism" (ch 3) about the scale-relative ontology of the objects of the special sciences whose measurements are from restricted areas of the universe or at restricted scales (p 195), bound by "notional-world concepts" involving temporally asymmetric causation that is not to be found in fundamental physics (pp 260–80)

Distinguishing their "ontic structural realism" from competitors like van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (ch 2), there is a "commitment to objective modality" supporting counterfactuals (p 306), without

which there would be "no connection between unobservable entities and the phenomena we observe" (p 123) "From the metaphysical point of view, what exist are just real patterns" (p 121)

"Objective modalities in the material mode are represented by logical and mathematical modalities in the formal mode" (p 119), with "real patterns" "understood in the material mode" and "structures" "understood as mathematical models " "Our realism consists in our claim that successful scientific practice warrants networks of mappings as identified above between the formal and the material" (p 121)

The authors, James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David Spurrett co-writing chapters 1 and 5 and John Collier co-writing chapter 4, call their stance "scientism" (title of ch 1) with information based verifiability (p 307), distinguishing "useful from useless metaphysics" (p 27) They regard the work of analytic metaphysicians, naming D Davidson, J Fodor, T Merricks, P Van Inwagen, C Elder, J Kim, D Armstrong, and others, as naive (p 22–6), "neo-scholastic" (their opprobrium in ch 1, sec 1 2 and pp 193–6 and 292), and out of touch with the "best science," "still talking as if the world is individual items in causal relations, rather than processes in structural patterns all the way down " They urge a "key general grievance against traditional analytic metaphysicians" for "continuously constructing simplistic caricatures of science" (p 22)

Chapter 3 develops their ontic structural realism amid controversies in the philosophy of physics, with discussions of identity and individuality in quantum mechanics, individuality and space-time objects, objectivity and invariance, the metaphysics of relations, mathematical structure and physical structure, the metaphysics of relations, replies to objections to their account (sec 3 50), the distinction of mathematical from physical structure, and accounts of quantum gravity and quantum information theory

Though the authors endorse "scale relative ontology," distinguishing that from common notions of emergence (p 193), and say "special sciences track real patterns" (p 242) but with "institutionally evolved and negotiated scope boundaries" (p 251), and with notional-world conceptions (p 242, 252) that suppose time asymmetric thermodynamics, unlike fundamental physics whose structural properties "are not causal relations" (p 286), they say, "We do not know what the general positive relationship between the real patterns of fundamental physics, and the real patterns of the special sciences is" (p 299), but they do think the "special sciences study real patterns located bY notional-world concepts of cohesion and causation," yet their "kinds do not exist in the way that folk metaphysics takes them to do" (p 298)

The real interest of the book is its discussion of philosophy of physics and the relations among the sciences, its exploration of broad literature and options in philosophy of physics, and its development of the authors' own structural realism, not in the tiring, repetitious polemics and naturalistic faith decreeing a narrow scope for metaphysics (though verification is interestingly defined it in terms of information transfer, [p 307–10] and Salmon's idea of causal processes is interestingly developed as "information carrying")

For overall, what they call "weak metaphysics" is in traditional philosophy general "philosophy of nature" and many, perhaps most, of their claims would be quite plausible, or at least adaptable and suggestive extensions of, say, Aristotelian approaches to the physical world They exclude the rest of metaphysics by a false dichotomy of the a priori and the verifiable, "we have no good reason for thinking that a priori metaphysical knowledge is possible" (p 7)—as if that were the only option (ch 1) with nothing beyond the sciences known through experience (including their own theories), not even inquiries about why the order of nature obtains at all, or as it does, and why basic natural reality is intrinsically, even if weakly, modal (ch 2, pp 123, 128, 303), and it distracts from the book's genuine interest —James Ross, *University of Pennsylvania*

MALPAS, Jeff *Heidegger's Topology Being, Place, World* Cambridge, Mass M I T Press, 2007 413 pp Cloth, $38 00—Jeff Malpas' latest book is an ambitious and sweeping study of the concept of place in Heidegger's thinking, a topic that has received relatively little attention from Heidegger scholars Against those readings which understand the question of being to be Heidegger's primary concern, Malpas "[takes] Heidegger to have attempted a thinking of being that is centrally oriented to the concept of place as such" (p 3) Therefore, "what guides that thinking, if only implicitly, almost from the start, is a conception of philosophy as having its origin in a particular idea, problem, and, we may also say, experience our finding ourselves already 'there,' in the world, in 'place'" (p 6) *Heidegger's Topology* aims to defend this claim by means of a systematic investigation of Heidegger's thinking and the way in which concepts of spatiality, topology, and place figure centrally in all of its stages from the very early writings, through to *Being and Time*, the 1930's and 1940's, and even Heidegger's later texts and final seminars

Malpas begins his investigation with some general considerations about the notion of place and the constantly shifting series of terms that Heidegger employs in his invocations of topological or spatial themes, he also addresses political concerns about whether concepts such as dwelling and place, when viewed alongside Heidegger's involvement in the National Socialist party, are intrinsically reactionary or exclusionary (p 20) Chapter 2 examines the origins of Heidegger's thinking of place in the early 1920's, particularly the focus on the question of the "situatedness" of philosophy Malpas views this focus as the ground of Heidegger's early critiques of the philosophical tradition, and also views it as a nascent form of his later, more explicit topological discussions (p 39) The analysis here focuses on Dasein and on the notions of facticity, how we "find ourselves" [*Befindlichkeit*], the initial formulations of being-in-the-world, and the concept of ground While Malpas attempts to locate an emergent thinking of place in Heidegger's earliest works, I wonder why he doesn't connect these terms, which express "the way our being

is already given over to a situatedness in the world from which we cannot stand aside" (p 42), to the concept of thrownness that Heidegger begins to articulate during these years and which represents an undeniably temporal *and* spatial notion of inescapable predetermination In other words, I wonder whether Malpas' argument about the implicit thinking of place in Heidegger's earliest work is convincing given Heidegger's own emphasis on the *temporal* dimension of situatedness that is captured by the "already given" character of our thrownness

This question is put into sharp focus in Chapter 3, where Malpas treats *Being and Time* and Heidegger's increasing tendency to interpret topological concepts such as ground and being-in-the-world temporally Malpas is critical of how Heidegger's apparent distinction between at least three senses of spatiality in *Being and Time*—the "objective" spatiality of extension and containment, the "equipmental" spatiality associated with the ordering of the ready-to-hand within a referential totality, and the "existential" spatiality of Dasein's involvement in the world—is itself grounded upon something non-spatial temporality (p 89, 96) For Malpas, this prioritization, wherein "only temporality can provide the necessary unity and directionality that allows things, persons, places, and spaces to appear as significant" (p 96), raises doubts about the coherence of the complex relationships of derivation, foundation, and dependency that structure Heidegger's analysis In particular, Malpas claims that prioritizing temporality institutes a series of hierarchical dependencies that seem to be incompatible with Heidegger's descriptions of the often equiprimordial relationships between the various elements of the phenomenological analysis of Dasein's being While this critique illuminates the problematic status of spatiality in *Being and Time*, it does not entirely resolve that text's own problematic status within a systematic narrative about the centrality of place in Heidegger's thinking

That central claim is evinced most strongly in Chapters 4 and 5, which examine Heidegger's later work during the period of the so-called "turning" in the 1930s and 1940s, and the texts from approximately 1945 on, respectively Here, Malpas deftly and methodically shows that as Heidegger's work evolves in the period after *Being and Time*, its overt focus also shifts from the meaning of being to the truth of being—understood in terms of the happening of the event [*Ereignis*]—and then subsequently, from truth explicitly to place Malpas characterizes this development as a kind of return to or retrieval of the place within which, for Heidegger, the questionability of being always arises (p 150), as the sixth and concluding chapter notes, this return is also a "homecoming," a "turning back toward our own dwelling place" and toward the wondrous and familiar-but-uncanny questionability of our own being (p 310-11)

Overall, Malpas' examination of the topological themes in Heidegger's thinking is careful, thorough, and attentive to many of the nuances and shifts that occur during its evolution This book should be of interest both to Heidegger scholars and those who are interested in place and related concepts —Maureen Melnyk, *DePaul University*

MORAN, Dermot *Husserl Founder of Phenomenology* Malden, Mass Polity Press, 2005 xiii + 297 pp Cloth, $62 95, Paper, $24 95—Moran has written a fine introduction to Husserl's thought that complements two recent works in this genre, Robert Sokolowski's *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Dan Zahavi's *Husserl's Phenomenology* (Stanford Stanford University Press, 2003) The distinguishing characteristics of Moran's book are its authoritative command of primary texts, the helpful German translations of key terms, and the historical scope that frees Husserl's works from their *Wirkungsgeschichte*, that is, "from the accumulated layers of post-Heideggerian interpretation " (p 10) At the outset of the book, Moran does not simply give a chronological account of Husserl's writing and strengths and weaknesses He rather presents the best case for Husserl in three distinct but overlapping stages First, the brief Introduction traces the main Husserlian concepts with which the reader is probably already familiar intentionality, the phenomenological reduction, the life-world, et cetera Then, in the first chapter, there follows a discussion of Husserl's various turns of thought in terms of his autobiographical and historical circumstances Finally, chapter two, entitled "Husserl's Conception of Philosophy," overlaps significantly with the introduction and chapter 1, with only limited development of concepts not treated there

Thus, the non-novice reader should be referred immediately to the third chapter, entirely devoted to Husserl's first published work, *Philosophy of Arithetic* (1891) This 35-page chapter is much more than an overview, it is the clearest and most concise account in English that I know of concerning the problems Husserl faced and later had to account for in leading up to the *Logical Investigations* Moran wants to distinguish those principles which Husserl never abandoned and those which he was forced to abandon Among the former is the basic assumption, following Brentano, that "no concept can be thought without a foundation (*Fundierung*) in a concrete intuition", (*Philosophie der Arithmetik*, ed L Eley, [The Hague Nijhoff, 1973,] 79) We find that whereas Husserl, having later reproached this text for its psychologism, never entirely repudiated it, "and later even reinterpreted it as an exercise in *constitutive phenomenology* " Moreover, Moran asserts, "Husserl is already attempting a kind of eidetic phenomenology *avant la lettre* " (p 61) Most impressively, Moran plumbs the depths of the contemporary history of mathematics as Husserl would have encountered it to show his many influences

Moran's chapter and sub-chapters on each of the *Logical Investigations* are as clear as his editor's introduction to the new English edition of this work It is primarily due to the clarity of the latter that nothing essentially new is to be gleaned from the former But a truly puzzling chapter in terms of organization is ch 5, "The Eidetic Phenomenology of Consciousness," which treats such a bewildering array of phenomena that one might question whether or not this chapter would be better divided into two or three separate chapters A cursory glance at the subheadings reveals a dizzying number of topics somehow all unified under the title of the chapter Noetic-Noematic Constitution, the Temporal Character of Constitution, the Unconscious, Drives, and Instincts,

Anonymous Living, Active Consciousness Position-Taking, Founding, Modifying, Modalizing, Synthesizing, the Role of Sensation and Interpretation, and others Moran so much as admits this ambitious undertaking His goal—admirable in itself—is to circumvent "the hastily written, poorly structured, and in many places, the quite sketchy" *Ideas I* (p 130) He attempts to bring forth a systematic approach to essential features of consciousness based on late manuscripts and texts from the 1920s and 1930s In other words, Moran is in a sense writing the book on essential features of consciousness that Husserl never wrote, and all within one chapter

Perhaps Moran's most helpful chapter for the beginner is entitled "Transcendental Phenomenology An Infinite Project" He covers the variety of ways in which idealism can and should be understood In particular, he claims that the supposition, according to which the transcendental ego would necessarily survive the annihilation of the world, can be found in both the idealistic *Ideas I* and the non-idealistic *Ideas II* Moran notes perceptively that although Husserl admitted that this topic was developed only incompletely and "suffered from imperfections," he never withdrew it (p. 181) Moran lays out in detail the Kantian transcendental way to the reduction, showing the originality of his thesis that it may well be through Kant among others that Husserl was originally motivated to the reduction

Moran ends his book by discussing issues that are only now getting their proper treatment in Husserlian circles Embodiment, the Other, and Intersubjectivity Unfortunately, there is only one paragraph on the key distinction between static and genetic phenomenology and almost nothing on Husserl's ethics In summary, one cannot fail to be impressed by the scope and clarity of this book It is perhaps the case that Moran's ambition to cover so much in so little accounts for the very few critical comments we have laid out here —Daniel J Dwyer, *Xavier University*

MORRISON, Jeffry H *John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic* Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 2005 xv + 220 pp Cloth, $22 50—Every U S citizen should remember and honor the important American founding fathers, their ideas, and their achievements Why then, wonders Jeffry Morrison, is John Witherspoon (1723–1794) the "forgotten founder," as the title of the first chapter calls this college president who happens to be the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence? After all, suggests Morrison, "Perhaps more than any other single founder, Witherspoon embodied all of the major intellectual and social elements behind the American founding" (p 127) This book seeks to set the record straight by situating Witherspoon prominently among the leaders of the founding generation and thereby proving that his slide from prominence is nothing but unjustified cultural amnesia.

Benjamin Rush predicted that Witherspoon's "works will probably preserve his name to the end of time" (p 1) He had good reason to think so Witherspoon immigrated to the American colonies from Scotland on the eve of the revolution in 1768 and worked tirelessly at his three American careers pastor, college president, and politician He had come to America to assume the presidency of the College of New Jersey, later Princeton, where Witherspoon set an unmatched "record of making politicians and patriots" (p 48) Those who remember Witherspoon today usually recall him as James Madison's most important teacher, a fact of which Morrison makes much as he claims to find Witherspoon's influence via Madison in both the constitution and *The Federalist* But Witherspoon's students also included twelve members of the Continental Congress, a handful of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, forty-nine congressmen, twenty-eight senators, three Supreme Court justices, eight U S district judges, a secretary of state, as well as a couple foreign ministers, and dozens of political leaders at the state level In addition to teaching, Witherspoon was the eighteenth-century's "most eminent American Presbyterian" and "one of the most eminent clergymen in all America" (p 6) He also wrote on political economy, dabbled in natural philosophy, composed a systematic treatise on moral philosophy, and developed a thoughtful, if derivative and synthetic, political theory that reflected each of the period's principal intellectual disciplines Accordingly, there is good reason, Morrison thinks, to focus greater attention upon this clerical founding father He does so in a half-dozen tidy chapters that together use Witherspoon's public careers in religion, education, and politics as lenses through which to focus upon the chief themes of the American founding era By the end, there is little reason to question the soundness of Morrison's contention that Witherspoon is "an eminently representative founder" who deserves greater attention, even if only because his career is so useful for understanding his age

The book's second chapter, "The Public Interest of Religion," details features of Witherspoon's political theology, the heart of which rested upon his conviction that orthodox Christianity was a necessary prerequisite to civic happiness Morrison reveals Witherspoon to be "swimming in the mainstream of eighteenth-century American political thought" as the Princeton president insisted that a republic could only thrive when the self-governing citizenry was animated by genuine virtue (p 30) Further, Witherspoon maintained that "true religion" fostered such virtue better than anything else By "true religion" Witherspoon did not mean confession of particular sectarian dogmas, but the life of a soul tempered by genuine Christian faith issuing in virtuous conduct When the Continental Congress deemed it wise "humbly to approach the throne of Almighty God" and ask "that he would establish the independence of these United States upon the basis of religion and virtue," it was giving voice to Witherspoon's widely shared conviction that rehgion fostered virtue which, in turn, sustained republican liberty (p 31) Morrison also devotes a section of this chapter to demonstrating the ways in which Witherspoon's church-state teaching influenced Madison He argues that Madison's stout conception of religious liberty, his Augustinian political realism, and his notion of limited and sinful human

nature all can be traced to Witherspoon's tutelage Thus Witherspoon the teacher-cleric nursed a commonly held vision of religion's rightfully prominent place in public life

Just as Witherspoon gave voice to the eighteenth-century's hegemonic American political theology, so was he more than anyone else responsible for the importation of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy Morrison's exegesis found in his chapter on "Plain Common Sense" divides Scottish philosophy into "the moral sense school of Francis Hutcheson" and the "common sense school" associated with Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart According to the former, Witherspoon maintained that humans have all been endowed by Providence with the capacity to render sound moral and political judgments According to the latter, Witherspoon echoed the general Scottish empirical bent and its fundamental distrust of abstract theorizing that he and fellow Scots pejoratively labeled "metaphysics" (p 57)

Chapters four and five take up Witherspoon's practical actions and utterances as a statesman and church leader during his first decades in America Morrison looks at Witherspoon's roles in the Continental and Confederation congresses Although a prominent spokesman for independence—Witherspoon was the first from New Jersey publically to advocate American separation from Britain—he was absent from the Constitutional convention, but only because of his prior commitment to forge a national constitution for the Presbyterian Church Morrison's discussion of Witherspoon's revolutionary theory reveals a man deeply influenced by what Wilson Carey McWilliams has called the two "voices" of the American political tradition, those of liberal Whigs and those of Protestant Reformers (p 78)

The book's final chapter, "John Witherspoon and Early American Political Thought" ends the volume on a note of high quality in which Morrison persuasively demonstrates how Witherspoon's political thought became a fabric woven from each of the major intellectual threads of late eighteenth-century If founding historiography reveals at least four sources of founding political thought—Lockean or British liberalism, Scottish enlightenment philosophy, Reformed Protestant Christianity, and Classical Republicanism—each of which arguably constituted a principal source for the new American regime, Morrison shows the degree to which Witherspoon embodied them all

This welcome monograph goes a long way toward reestablishing John Witherspoon to his rightful place among the prominent founding fathers Of course, as Morrison is aware, the 2001 study by L Gordon Tait, *The Piety of John Witherspoon Pew, Pulpit, and Public Forum*, and the 1999 monograph by Matthew F Rose, *John Witherspoon An American Leader*, show that Witherspoon has not really been "forgotten " Indeed, he also earns deserved attention in recent works by such scholars as James Hutson, John G West, Michael Novak, and others Perhaps this very good book could have been even better had such recent secondary literature informed, more than it does, the author's robust apology for this important clergyman founder —Mark A Kalthoff, *Hillsdale College*

O'BRIEN, Lucy *Self-Knowing Agents* New York Oxford University Press, 2007 x + 231 pp Cloth, $63 00—The thesis of *Self-Knowing Agents* is that one can solve various problems facing standard theories of self-reference and self-knowledge by appealing to "agent's awareness"—that is, the primitive, non-representational awareness that a subject has of her actions in virtue of their being "the product of the subject's consideration of possibilities, grasped as possibilities" (p 120)

O'Brien holds that self-reference (1) is context-dependent, (2) doesn't require that the subject be able to distinguish herself from others, (3) has cognitive significance, and (4) is guaranteed Attempts to account for (1)–(4) tend to fall into one of two categories *perceptual*, on which the referent of 'I' is determined by information gathered from some perceptual faculty, and *rule-based*, such that if one uses 'I' according to "the self-reference rule" (SSR), then one refers to oneself first-personally O'Brien rejects perceptual theories because they all allow that one could lack the requisite reference-determining information, meaning that one might fail to refer at all, or that one might refer successfully, but without knowing that one has done so

O'Brien argues that SSR ought to feature in a theory of self-reference, but she denies that it can do the work on its own She cites two difficulties for such a view "the individuation problem," that successful self-reference doesn't entail *self-conscious* self-reference, and "the explanation problem," which is that unless one assumes that one uses SSR self-consciously, merely using a term in accord with SSR doesn't help us to understand why that term is expressive of self-consciousness (p 57) These problems lead O'Brien to "the two-tier strategy," which pairs SSR with some more basic cognitive ability to avoid these objections (p 65) She eventually argues that we ought to invoke some kind of non-conceptual awareness to ground a subject's self-conscious use of first-personal terms, preparing the way for her defense of agent's awareness

O'Brien claims that having the sort of control over one's mental life that is constitutive of acting "provides a primitive, representationally independent kind of awareness of what one is doing, and that this awareness is agent's awareness The core suggestion is that the very idea of an action produced by an active assessment by an agent, carries with it the idea of an assessment by an agent of actions *for her* [Any] action produced directly on the basis of an active assessment by an agent will be an action of which the agent is aware of as hers" (p 117) Her account of self-reference, then, can "explain why use of a term or concept governed by SSR will result in a subject thinking of herself in a self-conscious way It does so by suggesting that that way of thinking is *generated* by the joint operation of the application of SSR and agent's awareness" (p 82)

The second half of the book is on action and self-knowledge O'Brien argues against the view that actions are metaphysically complex entities, partly mental and partly physical, instead, she takes them to be primitive psychological phenomena with physical success conditions She then identifies basic actions as those actions that (a) can be done on their own and (b) are required to do anything else These moves allow her to say that, when someone performs a basic action and is "agent aware" of doing so, she has authoritative knowledge as to what she

does Her knowledge is due to the fact that being agent aware involves understanding the possible actions available as possibilities *for her*, and her acting involves selecting one of those possibilities

The book concludes with arguments for the view that while bodily awareness is a perceptual faculty that "enables us to perceive properties of our bodies" (p. 200), it is not fit to ground self-reference or self-knowledge generally She rejects the idea that bodily awareness can play these roles for reasons akin to those that led her to reject perceptual accounts of self-reference in earlier chapters without appealing to agent's awareness, bodily awareness on its own permits "error through misidentification," in other words, failure to know who is acting when one acts But, although we can be mistaken about many things, we can not fail to know that we are acting when we are

O'Brien moves briskly, but her pace is one of the book's virtues She doesn't pretend to be offering definitive arguments for her views (although she offers many good ones) Instead, she is sensitive to the fact that the appeal of her approach is its explanatory power, and she makes a compelling case for the utility of agent's awareness by showing how it navigates waters that are managed far less well by competitors I highly recommend her work—R W Fischer, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

OWENS, Joseph *Aristotle's Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z* South Bend, Ind St Augustine's Press, 2007 xlvii + 186 pp Cloth, $40 00—These reflections on Aristotle, completed shortly before the author's death, were finalized for publication by Lloyd Gerson Included are Gerson's insightful, unobtrusive preface and a comprehensive bibliography of Owens' half-century of scholarly works and reviews, as well as critical evaluations of these by others, all in an attractive book with fewer than five minor printing errors

The work is divided into two principal sections that examine Aristotle's Books *Epsilon* as a "macroscopic" focus and *Zeta* as a "microscopic investigation " Four chapters comprise the first *Epsilon's* role in the *Metaphysics*, Pure actuality and primacy of being, Starting points of Aristotelian sciences, Universality of being qua being The second contains the final six chapters Meaning of *ousia*, Essential being, Essential being and singular thing, Essential being and form, Form and universal, Form and cause of being A brief epilogue synopsizes the main conclusions

Those familiar with Owens' studies will recall his previous emphases concerning Aristotle's understanding of the nature of metaphysics, particularly the primacy of direct cognition of things as point of departure in developing first philosophy that is theology Direct cognition of individual things grants immediate, indirect, concomitant awareness of cognitional activity and attainment of universality "in things themselves" that is reflectively refined within science(s) and philosophy, and which

intimates the human desire for essential being and eudaimonia (pp 4–5, 21, 5–6 , 88–96 , 104–8, 110–12 , 120–4, 165) Moreover, Aristotle's original portrayal of the "universal" is one with his insistence that things serve as enduring, implicate reference for causal explicitation within diverse epistemic knowledges conditioned by distinct focal references or starting points (pp 4, 15, 58, 69, 127–8, 133, 149, 151–2) Yet "epistemology is not made the entrance into metaphysics, nor is metaphysics left without justification," if one properly appreciates the complementary findings in *Metaphysics Zeta* and *On the Soul*, for neither is deduced from the other (p 168) Finally, within "direct and immediate cognition a gradation in being is at once apparent to the knower," for cognitional identity with things grants awareness of what is prior in notion, knowledge, and time concerning the necessary and contingent within substantiality and accidentality, and through such "the multisignificant notion of being appears to the knower" (pp 88–9, 65–7)

Agreeing with F Trendelenburg's recommendation that to comprehend Aristotle's "Metaphysics" one must use the latter's own reflections as norms of interpretation, Owens insists that although "entity" approximates Aristotle's use of *ousia* in simultaneously signifying the notions of "beingness and the subject that has the beingness," it is preferable to utilize the latter term to manifest Aristotle's consistency in "seeing the singular thing as the primary *ousia* in a logical context, the form of the sensible thing in a physical context, and the supersensible forms as the primary *ousiai*" (pp 92–3) For Aristotle, "beingness" is not shared as through a universal, but rather "each instance is related to separate substance through focal meaning," and although this reference to a primary separate instance that is finite and that may be plural ultimately fails to account for unity, "through that relation all are beings and being is predicated of each in turn even though none is identical with the nature of being," which is a correlate of the fact that each tends toward its perfection by imitating "in its proper degree the permanence and stability of the immaterial forms" (p 61)

Yet, for Aristotle "being appears as intrinsically the same characteristic throughout primary and secondary instances" constituting an order that integrates proportional equality and intrinsic difference and inequality, and in which "existence [though] not at all eliminated [plays] no significant role in the understanding of being" (pp 49, 176–7) Thus "what a thing is and that it is are known by the same type of intellection," for form as the "greatest *aporia*" finds its ultimate resolution within "pure actuality [that] is finite , open to plurality, closed in itself in its cognition, [and] incapable of creation or providence or interest in anything outside itself" (pp 27, 32–3, 78, 80, 95, 122) For these reasons and more Owens acknowledged the validity of Pierre Aubenque's conclusion that Aristotle's metaphysics is incapable of being fully systematized, even though he sharply disagreed with central aspects of the latter's depiction of Aristotle's science of the supersensible Rather, Aristotle's procedure presents itself as "distinctively Aristotelian," in contrast to developments of his doctrines by different Neoplatonists and subsequent thinkers (p 80) To fully appreciate this one must approach Aristotle's philosophizing as one would that performed within other philosophies, "in the light of their respective starting point" (p

121) Failure to do so, particularly in regard to Aristotle, will blind one to his consistency within different contexts in which he often presents considerations in "the staccato manner" of school *logoi* that require painstaking examination to draw out their background meanings (pp 120, 127–8)

Twenty years before his death, Owens prefaced a collection of his studies on Aquinas with the remark that "focus has been sharpened with the years but the direction has remained the same " While applicable to this work as well, the tone of these final reflections on Aristotle may poignantly remind one of Gilson's observation in his last years that polemic and refutation are absolutely sterile Nonetheless, this work will likely provoke criticism from some quarters that is lacunose and tendentious, as G E R Lloyd once described Galen's occasionally undisciplined interpretations of his predecessors' texts More important, however, is the possibility that these richly textured reflections may lead others to meditate further not only on what Aristotle achieved, but on Owens' many other insightful studies —Michael Ewbank, *Logos Philosophical Institute*

REATH, Andrews *Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy* Oxford Oxford University Press, 2006 286 pp Cloth, $143 00, Paper, $45 00—Andrews Reath is one of the most important post-Rawlsian Kantian moral philosophers and particularly important for his focus on close readings of specific passages in key Kantian texts This collection of his best published (and two previously unpublished) articles gives an excellent sense for Reath's overall reading of Kant The book is not worth buying solely for the unpublished chapters, but it does successfully collect together a set of very important articles

The book begins with three chapters on Kant's moral psychology In the first ("Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility"), Reath defends what Richard McCarty has called an "intellectualist" reading of respect for the moral law, according to which the moral law motivates through one's recognition of its authority rather than through feeling (p 12) Reath also clarifies *nonmoral* motivation through this account If respect for morality can override nonmoral inclinations, such inclinations must operate using a similar motivational structure (p 18) In the second chapter ("Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kant's Principle of Happiness"), Reath continues his interest in nonmoral motivation, arguing against naively hedonist readings of Kant on nonmoral motivation In his third chapter ("The Categorical Imperative and Kant's Conception of Practical Rationality"), Reath argues from his sophisticated account of nonmoral practical rationality to the Categorical Imperative as practical rationality's fullest expression (p 81) Those familiar with his published articles will find important appendices to chapters one and two In the first, Reath responds to Henry Allison's alternative account of self-love and self-conceit (cf *Kant's Theory of Freedom*) In the second, Reath

rethinks the relationship between pleasure and non-moral motivation to allow pleasure to play a greater role in non-moral motivation, such that "by taking pleasure in the representation of an object we become conscious of an interest in it" (p 58)

Chapters 4–6 elucidate the book's central claim, that the nature of practical reason involves a kind of autonomy governed by a regulative principle In all three chapters, Reath aims to resolve the apparent "problem of how Kant can combine the universal validity of moral requirements with the autonomy of moral agents" (p 173) Using Kant's language of legislation and sovereignty, Reath shows how, in the context of practical reason, the distinction between subject and legislator collapses without generating a free-for-all voluntarism Chapters four and five, which rehearse similar arguments for similar positions, defend what Reath calls, in chapter four, a "Legislation Thesis," "that rational agents are bound only to laws which they have given, or laws of which they can regard themselves as legislators" (p 92) (The very similar "Sovereignty Thesis" in chapter five reads "An agent who is subject to an unconditionally valid principle [i e , a practical law] must be [regarded as] the legislator from whom it receives its authority" [p 122]) In chapter six, Reath adds and argues for an important "social dimension of autonomy" (p 173), connecting *Groundwork*'s Formula of Autonomy and Formula of the Realm of Ends

Chapter 7–9 take this overall account of Kant's moral theory and apply it to some specific hard cases Chapter 7 is primarily a defense of Reath's distinctive form of Kantian constructivism in the context of accounts by Korsgaard and especially Allen Wood's critique of the Formula of Universal Law as overly abstract Reath defends the Formula of Universal Law, but only by largely granting Wood's claim that, on its own, it is insufficient as a basis for moral theory Reath incorporates "a conception of autonomous agency" into the Formula of Universal Law (p 205), thus doing much of the work that Wood does by reading the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy as being the better and fuller expressions of the Categorical Imperative This chapter closes with a discussion of how the Formula of Universal Law, combined with a conception of autonomous agency, can deal with the particular issues of false promising, deception, coercion, violence, and mutual aid This sets the stage for the next two chapters, which use discussions of specific issues of applying Kant's ethics—duties to oneself in chapter 8 and the imputation of consequences in chapter 9—to make more general points about the nature of autonomy and moral responsibility

This book should be read by all serious Kant scholars and anyone interested in neoKantian ethics Even for those who object to Reath's readings of Kant, the book shows how his views fit together as a whole Only on reading his work as a whole, for example, did I recognize Reath's consistent reading of normativity as *essentially* intersubjective, such that a good reason to do something must be defensible to actually existent others (see pp 31, 70, 73, 76–8, 115, 245, and all of chapter six) And only on reading this book did the deeply realist strains of Reath's account of the norms of practical rationality, as something "which agents do not choose" (p 174), such that "there is no thought that these

rules are self-imposed" (p 176) emerge clearly for me (These strains seem in tension with Rawlsian-Kantian constructivism, although Reath makes progress toward a reconciliation on pp 150–2 and 198–201) This book also confirmed my suspicion that Reath (like other students of Rawls) attends too much to Kant's *Groundwork* and *Critique of Practical Reason* at the expense of the *Metaphysics of Morals* and especially *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* But even—or perhaps especially—in the context of these differences with Reath's reading, I found this a helpful collection of the best work of one of today's leading scholars of Kant's moral philosophy —Patrick Frierson, *Whitman College*

ROSENBERG, Alex *Darwinian Reductionism Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology* Chicago University of Chicago Press x + 263 pp Cloth, $40 00—Three major concerns inform this work The foremost is the dualism held to exist between the physical realm and the biological, which Rosenberg tells us is predominant amongst those who think about philosophical issues in biology Another concern is the logical status of the Darwinian principle of natural selection, often referred to as "survival of the fittest " If it is asked who are the "fittest," the only properly Darwinian answer is "those who survive " But then this principle would seem to be a mere tautology without empirical content, and so unfalsifiable A further concern is the doctrine of genetic determinism, which says that human characteristics such as intelligence and morality are inexorably determined by specific genes

Rosenberg argues that the dualism (held even by most Darwinians) is untenable and lends credence to such "spooky" notions as intelligent design and vitalism He hopes to correct this by broadening Darwin's principle to include the physical, macromolecular realm This "Darwinian reductionism" would not only vindicate the principle of natural selection but also, in doing so, refute the genetic determinism advocated by such as Richard Dawkins and James Watson Any morally sensitive and politically informed thinker, Rosenberg says, should find this kind of determinism simply inadmissible It can be seen that Rosenberg's book tackles very difficult issues in the philosophy of biology in subtle and innovative ways

The dualism Rosenberg speaks of is not a full fledged one, in that it does allow that biological phenomena are metaphysically reducible to physical ones this is the "physicalist" thesis that there is only one kind of stuff out of which everything in the universe is built, that described by physics and chemistry It is still a dualism, however, because it holds that properly biological explanations are not reducible to macromolecular ones Ever since the scientific revolution physics and chemistry have eschewed any semblance of final causality in their nomological explanations But biology generally does not seek to find laws of nature as physics and chemistry do, rather it employs end-directed or functional

explanations The performance of a single function can be realized by multiple physical systems, hence, there is no single structure realizing a given function that that function is reducible to In terms of identity theory, there is a token-type correspondence between the physiochemical and the biological, but no type-type one

Rosenberg, indeed, admits the force of this dualistic position, and relies on a concept in computational theory to illustrate and legitimate it This is the well known principle that for any computable function, there exist distinct multiple programs that will compute it Although Rosenberg does not mention it, this principle is formalized by the theorem that it is impossible to decide, based on examination of internal structure alone, whether two given (distinct) algorithms will compute a given function Hence, no necessary structural similarity exists between distinct algorithms that do in fact compute the same function

Rosenberg argues that recent advances in molecular biology strongly indicate that the genetic material inside cells instantiates a program for embryo development DNA sequences are literally program codes It still may not be very well known to the educated public, but a great many biologists and philosophers maintain DNA is not a code containing all the information needed for embryogenesis Rather, they say, embryogenesis is crucially influenced by the cytoplasmic and the multicellular environment, so that there is a kind of downward causation where the whole affects DNA expression as much or more than the reverse Moreover, DNA might simply be a set of triggers which themselves contain no information, just as the buttons on a jukebox are not codes for the recording but rather simply trigger the sequence leading to playing the recording The cytoplamic and multicellular environment contains the "information," not the trigger

Given that DNA does literally embody a program, says Rosenberg, it must be the case that, just as many programs can compute a single function, many different DNA sequences can 'compute' the same developmental outcome Because there is no one to one correspondence between DNA structure and development, knowledge of a particular DNA sequence gives us no knowledge of invariable laws of nature Indeed, the genetic material itself could have had a very different chemical composition, and still would have performed the same function This contrasts with the laws of chemical interaction (say, how oxygen combines with hydrogen), which are invariable

Rosenberg theorizes that the actual DNA sequences responsible for particular developmental outcomes are "frozen accidents" of random variation and natural selection Some macromolecules were able to replicate themselves and have some measure of stability (but not *too* much stability, else they could not have the complexity necessary to self-replicate) such that were able to survive and continue to replicate in the primordial chemical stew This happens to have given rise to the first primitive genetic material Thus, the principle of natural selection holds not only for organisms but also for macromolecules Rosenberg, in fact, argues that the principle of natural selection is not only a principle operating in our particular biosphere, but also more generally, a physical *law* operating throughout the universe In this way, it appears, he wants to deal with the tautology problem adverted to earlier The principle of

natural selection only seems tautological, because it is so broad and pervasive Yet Rosenberg wants to say that it is still a *law*, and thus presumably falsifiable

In arguing for the notion that a given DNA program for a function is a frozen accident of evolution, Rosenberg performs a kind of judo move on those Darwinians who insist that organismic biology cannot be reduced to molecular The very lack of a type-type correspondence between structure and function, which is held to be the basis of such antireductionism, turns out to be the clue to how reductionism is valid For the lack of such correspondence shows that macromolecular structures are themselves accidental results of natural selection Reductionism is accomplished by showing that natural selection is a unifying natural law

Rosenberg also uses this lack of one to one correspondence to argue against what he calls genetic determinism While there might be a single "gene for" sickle cell anemia, he says, there could never be a single gene for something as complex as, say, intelligence Undeniably, intelligence, like everything else, is genetically determined (although Rosenberg does seem to admit some influence of the environment), but we will never be able to predict, based on an examination of genetic material alone, the level of intelligence a fertilized egg will attain For Rosenberg "scary" determinism is thus refuted

This might offer cold comfort for those who wish to maintain a stronger version of antideterminism Moreover, Rosenberg's elevation of Darwinism to an invariable law might strike one as an extreme case of anthropomorphism, in that it takes a doctrine of human economic interaction (Adam Smith) to be universally applicable Rosenberg's insistence on random variation as the sole factor of variability might fit in well with the now discredited central dogma of molecular biology, which says that interaction between the genetic material in the nucleus and the outer cellular environment is strictly one way One can point to Barbara McIntock's (at first largely ignored) work in the 1940's—for which she finally won the Noble Prize in 1983—showing that stress on a cell leads to DNA transpositions The discovery of retroviruses and reverse transcription, where RNA affects the DNA in the nucleus, also opens up the possibility that organisms can affect their own genetic makeup — Edward M Engelmann, *Merrimack College*

SARKAR, Husain *Group Rationality in Scientific Research* New York Cambridge University Press, 2007 xv + 284 pp Cloth, $88 00—In the wake of the epistemological turn of early modern philosophy, the question of what it means to be rational has remained central What began as an "individual" focus upon rationality in the writings of such philosophers as Descartes and Kant, soon became redirected towards a "group" orientation as evidenced by the writings of Peirce and the later Royce This has given rise to two seemingly disparate problems—the problem

of individual *and* the problem of group rationality But are they separate problems?

Husain Sarkar's book is an attempt to answer the question "Under what conditions is a group of scientists rational?" (p ix) The book operates from two major premises 1) "[T]he notion of individual rationality [is] utterly indispensable to solving the problem of group rationality" (p xi), and 2) "[I]n order to determine the solution to the problem of group rationality, we ought to make method or methodology [instead of theories] the cornerstone of our inquiry" (p 5)

The book proceeds in the following way After presenting a cohesive overview of the multiple contours characterizing the landscape of the problem of group rationality, successive chapters are devoted to demonstrating the various fault lines of the respective solutions offered by the "classical orthodoxy " Such orthodox "solutions" include evolutionary accounts, game theory and welfare economic explanations, skeptical challenges, as well as both subjectivist and objectivist approaches These chapters include many revealing insights obtained from the application of the work of such notable figures as Sen, Rawls, Feyerabend, Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Williams, and Putnam—not to mention others—to the problem of group rationality Throughout these chapters the reader is given a clear sense of the vital connection between group rationality and political process A democratic community of truth seekers provides a "necessary" condition for the establishment of a condition of group rationality, it does not provide a "sufficient" condition A sufficient condition can be arrived at only by answering the question "How should a group of scientists rationally organize itself?" (p 222)

It is not until one arrives at Chapter 8 entitled "Putnam, Individual Rationality, and Peirce's Puzzle" that we begin to "reach bedrock " Due to limitations of space, the review will focus upon this important section

Sarkar closely examines Putnam's treatment of "Peirce's puzzle " This puzzle, simply stated, concerns the question of why, given competing alternatives, should a person act rationally? Peirce's answer emphasizes the fact that "one can be rational only provided one psychologically identifies with one's community" (p 226) Putnam, on the other hand, looks at the issue more individualistically "[W]e have an *underived*, a *primitive* obligation of some kind to be reasonable, which—contrary to Peirce—is *not* reducible to my expectations about the long run and my interest in the welfare of others [H]ere I have to say with Wittgenstein, 'This is where my spade is turned This is what I do, this is what I say'" (p 227)

Sarkar identifies both positive and negative consequences from Putnam's insight Positively speaking, this "Putnamian idea," albeit thin, could be robustly thickened when combined with a Rawlsian treatment of the original position, "add[ing] a great deal—a masterstroke, if there ever was one, in the history of philosophy—to make it deep, powerful, distinctive" (p 241) Negatively speaking, "Putnam, without argument, presupposes what it is to be reasonable and then takes it as an argument to be reasonable" (p 228) In other words, Sarkar would agree that we have an original obligation of some kind to be reasonable However, this alone does not answer the question as to *how* one should proceed in

order to act in a reasonable fashion If each individual's "spade is turned" in accordance with their own individual stand, "[t]he specter of relativism would loom large on the horizon" (p 234)

This book succeeds admirably in bringing together in one place various attempts to address the problem of group rationality However, despite some mere hints of a solution to the problem of group rationality that are offered in Chapter 8, the author is never able to advance much beyond the *via negativa* In the final chapter, Sarkar claims that when it comes to accepting one of the theories of group rationality, "there is no such theory and there are no such reasons" (p 243) Therefore, the closing chapter is used "to present the cardinal problems of group rationality if only as a view to argue against (p 243) " Perhaps this is because Sarkar's "vision that for now is buried in the footnotes, or tracked only in the implications, several of them far flung will have to wait its turn for full expression in the second half of this project" (p xii) Despite the many insights gained from traveling along the *via negativa*, it would have been nice to have seen a bit more light awaiting at the end of the tunnel —David W Rodick, *Boston College*

SCMITZ, Kenneth L *The Texture of Being Essays in First Philosophy* Edited by Paul O'Herron *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, vol 46 Washington, D C The Catholic University of America Press, 2007 xvii + 327 pp Cloth, $59 95—It is always difficult to capture in a few words the theme or themes of a collection of essays covering a wide range of topics It is particularly difficult in the case of such a philosopher as Kenneth Schmitz who unites an almost encyclopedic knowledge of the history of philosophy, a commitment to traditional metaphysics, and a creative mind that both challenges and profits from advances made in modern and post-modern philosophy If there is one theme that holds the essays together it is Schmitz's search for a more fully developed metaphysics of the person In addition to his knowledge of the metaphysics of Aristotle and Thomas, Schmitz is widely known as a leading interpreter of Hegel and he draws deeply upon his work as well as the personalism of such thinkers as Marcel and Wojtyla His own critical reflections on these and other major figures in the history of philosophy result in an approach to metaphysics as a search for first principles that is more open and exploratory than much traditional metaphysics His is a metaphysics that seeks to be comprehensive and determinate while taking seriously the realms of nature, history, and society

The book is divided into three parts, Being, Man, and God Part I provides something of a prolegomenon to what follows In these chapters Schmitz develops his approach to metaphysics as first principles taking into account contemporary efforts to deconstruct traditional metaphysics His aim, he says, is not one of offering an apologetic for metaphysics against all criticisms It is to make us aware of tendencies and

confusions within the metaphysical tradition itself According to deconstructionist critics the first principles of metaphysics, whether *ousia*, God, or human subjectivity, assume a position of privilege and domination, reduce multiplicity to a uniform entity and close off the true disclosure of being The result is said to be a dehumanizing suppression of individuality and freedom in favor of fixed values and practices Schmitz takes these criticisms seriously and responds from the perspective of a Christian philosophy that seeks to appropriate by rational and philosophical means certain lines of inquiry suggested in Christian experience while avoiding appeals to authority Christian philosophy understood in this sense Schmitz says, in summary of his argument, offers to what critics perceive to be the domineering power of metaphysics "caring presence, to sheer unity it expands into the primordial harmony of plurality within unity, and to the darkness of reductive closure it opens out onto the inexhaustible light of mystery" (p 52)

The final chapters of Part I may be understood to lay the groundwork for the recovery and advancement of a more metaphysical understanding of persons which he develops in Part II Schmitz challenges the modern turn towards the primacy of self-reference and subjectivity and the tendency to separate person and nature, while acknowledging the importance of the recognition of a more historical mode of being and meaning, the modern shift to the concrete and the increased appreciation of the distinctiveness of human being Drawing upon the Christian doctrine of creation, Schmitz focuses upon the gift of being with its emphasis upon the primacy of relation that parallels the emphasis upon relationality that one finds in much twentieth century thought This notion of receptivity is understood to open into a metaphysics that situates all human persons and all created beings within the community as a gift For many years Schmitz has indicated his indebtedness to the personalism of Gabriel Marcel and for this reader at least, this connection seems to shed light on what Schmitz is trying to accomplish Marcel joined the Roman Catholic Church in 1929, but stood much closer to the existentialists than he did the Thomists and traditional metaphysics, having been convinced by the tragedy of World War I of the failure of more abstract kinds of philosophy to come to grips with the human condition Schmitz is not without his criticisms of Marcel For example, he does not find in Marcel an adequate notion of non-personal creatures He also argues that while the truth of contemporary personalism cannot be simply integrated into the classical and medieval understanding of being without recognizing an advance in our understanding of being, the personalism of Marcel and others stands in need of traditional metaphysics of being with its universal comprehension and radical depth He develops further his conception of the personal while applying it to ethics and politics In contrast to classical liberal theories that place emphasis upon the individual, Schmitz emphasizes the conception of persons-in-relation Intimacy itself, he argues, is rooted in the unique being present of a person, in the self disclosure of a personal presence, a personal other Schmitz does not ignore the individual or the ego Rather, he retains both a sense of self and a sense of other and hence a place for

privacy in the relation of person to person It is through being with an other that we discover that reality is not indifferent to persons and here we are at the heart not only of another person but of being itself

The final part of the book includes two essays reflecting on the theme of persons and God in the work of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II, an essay on Thomas' argument for the existence of God, and an evaluation of the so-called death of God, which provides further evidence of Schmitz's ability and one might add desire to look critically at Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment developments while learning from them Schmitz is critical of the death of God traditions that have developed during the past four hundred years, arguing that they lead to the death of man and a denial of stables structures and purposes in the self understanding of persons as rational human beings He also argues, however, that this may be understood as part of the history of the unfolding of being that prepares the way for a more adequate ontological understanding of being and beings than was available before the modern experience

In these essays of which only hints can be provided in a brief review, Schmitz provides his readers with a deep and rich understanding of the personal and a convincing case for developing a metaphysics of the personal that takes into account both the being of traditional metaphysics and the modern concern for the historical and the concrete Whether traditional metaphysics can be stretched adequately to accomplish this purpose remains a question for this reader, but Schmitz makes a good case that it might be —Eugene Thomas Long, *The University of South Carolina*

SCHOFIELD, Malcolm *Plato Political Philosophy* Oxford Oxford University Press, 2006 x + 384 pp Paper, $45 00—Taking the *Republic* as its central text, but with comparisons and contrasts to other dialogues throughout, this thoroughly engaging book takes a thematic, rather than developmental, approach, with seven chapters ranging over topics of current as well as historical interest 'alienation from politics, education, democracy, knowledge, utopia and the idea of community, the power of money, and ideological uses of religion' (p 2) Schofield's stand on a number of perennial questions of Plato interpretation is made clear in chapter 1 ("The *Republic* Contexts and Projects") "Plato believes he is Socrates' voice" (p 19), and whether the *Seventh Letter* is by Plato or not, Plato's thinking and "rethinking of Socrates" relationship to Athens' (p 29), rather than his own biography, is what really informs his political philosophy and accounts for the differences in his presentation of political points across the dialogues Plato's mode of presentation can be "engaged" or "immanent", thus the Socrates of the *Apology* is an "engaged" critic, goading citizens into self-examination about their individual and civic priorities, but the Socrates of the *Gorgias* forwards the "rejectionist" view that one cannot hope to persuade the citizens because they have the outlook of children, who will always vote for the pastry-

cook rather than the doctor (or as the *Republic*, also "rejectionist," puts it, because they are deaf and dumb, or like animals, on whom moral standards must be imposed by intensive education) According to Schofield, Plato's political thought remains stable throughout these differences in his opposition to democracy as in his constructive political philosophy, the overarching concerns are always that wisdom should rule, that a city should form a true community, and that citizens should be committed to their city by means of an effective ideology (p 62)

In chapter 2 ("Athens, Democracy, Freedom"), Schofield argues that the often-remarked differences in the *Laws'* and the *Republic's* treatment of democracy are effects of mode of presentation rather than substantive disagreement· unlike the *Republic*, the *Laws* constructs a constitution without challenging Plato's contemporaries' existing conceptual framework (p 81). Schofield identifies a deeper commonality between the works on the key democratic values of equality and freedom But there is a tension between assimilating the *Laws'* outlook to the 'rejectionist' *Republic's* and maintaining that the *Laws* recognizes the democratic values of freedom and equality

Schofield argues that the *Laws'* idea that the citizens should be 'voluntary slaves to the laws' has a counterpart in the *Republic's* idea that the citizens "agree as to who should rule and be ruled," and that in the *Laws* the persuasive preludes to legislation provide a rational justification for the laws, an idea with some affinities to hypothetical consent in modern liberal political thought (pp 83–7) This attractive possibility is, I think, mistaken. As Schofield admits, the *Republic's* agreement as to who should rule and be ruled cannot play the justificatory role that consent does in liberal political thought because the agreement is produced by the ideal city's educational program Agreement follows from and is evidence of good government, it contributes to the goodness of government, but it is not the legitimacy-maker for government The same goes for willing subjection to the law in the *Laws* The consent of the ruled is not one of the *Laws'* seven claims to rule, and democracy's contribution to the list is the authority of the lot rather than the decision of the people (690a–c)

Yet Schofield maintains that the institution of persuasive preludes in the *Laws* shows that citizens are entitled to justification in virtue of their potential for "rational freedom " His case for this depends in part on a tendentious reading of the *Laws'* analogy between the persuasive preludes and the speech a doctor makes to his patient when that patient is a free person (he persuades the patient to adhere to the regime prescribed), which is to be contrasted with the orders a doctor gives a slave patient According to Schofield, the preludes cannot be aimed at those who have already done wrong, for they are to be punished So they must be summaries of voluntary outcomes that *would* result from "innumerable exercises in Socratic dialogue" (85), justifications to which citizens are entitled *qua* potentially rational

However, the categories of wrongdoer and non-wrongdoer are not appropriate for understanding the doctor analogy Being sick is a disposition, as is being capable of breaking the law even if one has not done so It is this condition that calls for persuasive preludes in addition to the threat of sanctions—as on the straightforward reading of the doctor

analogy Even if there is something here of the thought that persuasion is "fitting" for a free person, that is still far both from the view that the laws' legitimacy depends on persuading anybody, even hypothetically, and from the view that citizens are entitled to justification There is no evidence that the citizens are able to demand justification, instead, the persuasive preambles to the laws (like the doctor's persuasion) presumably improve compliance, and (unlike the doctor's persuasion) contribute to citizens' political virtue To say that citizens should receive certain treatment in virtue of their status or potential is not yet to accord them an entitlement If the *Laws* values democratic freedom and equality, it is not by embracing anything remotely like citizens' (hypothetical) consent

I have used up my reviewer's space with Schofield's treatment of Plato on the value of democratic freedom and equality, but I found myself equally engaged with his argument that Plato experiments with two very different conceptions of the knowledge that equips one to rule (chapter 4, "The Rule of Knowledge"), his defense of utopianism as necessary to political philosophy (chapter 5, "Utopia"), his surprising conclusion that on Plato's psychology, valuing money merely instrumentally is worse than valuing it for its own sake (chapter 6, "Money and the Soul"), and his claim that it is patriotism, inculcated by such non-rational means as the Noble Lie that motivate philosophers to do their job in ruling ("Ideology") Students of Plato who pick up this book are in for a treat —Rachana Kamtekar, *University of Arizona*

SOKOLOWSKI, Robert *Phenomenology of the Human Person* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2008 345 pp Cloth, $68 00, Paper, $24.29—Readers familiar with Robert Sokolowski's earlier books have come to expect the blend of philosophical depth and elegant style that make him one of the most perceptive and eminently readable of contemporary philosophers This book meets and surpasses our expectations The theme of the book is the human person considered as the agent of truth Its principal philosophical antecedents are Aristotle and Husserl, although the author also frequently refers to Aquinas and Henry James He also comments extensively on contemporary linguistic theory, and develops a coherent non-reductive account of the neurological basis of thinking

The author contends that the introduction of syntax is the key to human rationality Syntactic composition is at work not only in language, but also in pictures and in human action In all of its forms, whether verbal, pictorial, or practical, reason manifests itself primarily in the public domain Following Derek Bickerton, he distinguishes an intermediate stage, protolanguage, between animal cries or signals and specifically human language Protolanguage, exemplified in baby talk and the trained responses of primates, is speech that has not yet achieved the level of syntax The grammatical grid generated by syntactic speech

permits the subtle articulation of the relationships of belonging and exclusion that are grasped in an inarticulate manner in our perceptions Moreover, whereas protolanguage works only in the presence of its objects, syntax permits us to refer to things that are absent in various ways things beyond our ken, things past, future, or fictional, and even things that cannot in fact exist Syntax also permits the use of what he calls "declaratives," words that express personal agency and responsibility Consider also the crucial syntactic features of conversation quotation, questioning, and especially the exercise of what the author calls "propositional reflection," the shift in focus that converts statements about things in the world into mere suppositions As Husserl puts it, "propositions are states of affairs taken as supposed " This intellectual achievement enables us to evaluate and take a stand on various positions We assume responsibility for truth claims, and thus become agents and guardians of truth

This emphasis on the role of syntax permits the author to address several traditional philosophical issues in a remarkably fresh and instructive manner Instead of speaking about concepts and meanings, and wondering about their location (in minds, in things, in some "third realm", in the play of linguistic signs), he speaks about the interplay between things and their intelligibility, and considers concrete examples of how intelligibility typically comes to light He contends that intelligibility occurs most effectively in and through the syntactic exchanges of human conversation When, for example, we read the biography of Dwight Eisenhower by the historian, Max Hastings, we enter into a kind of dialogue with the author and with friends to whom we might recommend his book Hastings has a broader and deeper understanding of Eisenhower than the average reader Hence, the intelligibility embodied in Eisenhower is present in quite different degrees in the authoritative understanding of Hastings, and in the less informed understanding of his readers Shall we say, Sokolowski asks, that the words of Max Hastings express concepts or meanings in the mind of Hastings? The intelligibility is surely present, in some sense, in Hastings and in his readers, but this way of talking "makes concepts or meanings too much like mental images, and its traps us into the 'way of ideas' of the British Empiricists" (p 173) Following Husserl, he prefers to say simply that words express the intelligible content of the things we talk about Intelligibility is located in the human conversation about things

Another example of a fresh approach to a traditional philosophical issue is Sokolowski's discussion of essences He points out that when an object or situation is presented by way of linguistic syntax, it immediately becomes evident that alternative articulations are possible The presentation of the essence emerges out of a process in which such alternatives are ruled out and distinctions are made Even the failure to discern essentials from accidentals, the failure sometimes exhibited by persons who do not realize that they do not know what they are talking about, can only take place when syntax has come in to play

Philosophy does not teach an esoteric doctrine It reminds us of what we already know as agents of truth "Philosophy comes into play after we have already entered into the game of truth, and it looks at, marvels at, contemplates, and reflects on that game itself" (p 316) Using the

role of the narrator in the novels of Henry James as a foil, Sokolowski brings out the uniqueness of philosophical discourse Like the "omniscient" narrator of a work of fiction, the philosopher enjoys a certain detachment, a comprehensive view looking down upon unfolding events Indeed, the philosopher is called upon to address things as a whole, to consider not a particular story as its details are disclosed, but the universal story of every dimension of disclosure and action The philosophical task is humbling, however, because philosophy is by nature a dialogue of interlocutors who, like Socrates, know that they do not know The reader of a novel must wait to find out what the writer reveals By contrast, the philosopher necessarily treats readers as interlocutors "In this respect, a novel is a monologue while a philosophical text is a conversation The philosophical reader does not simply listen and follow, but continuously evaluates and responds as he thinks on his own" (p 322)

The final sections of the book discuss passages in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas that make use of ambiguous terms such as likenesses within the soul, phantasms, intelligible species, and inner words The author does not reject these classical formulations While acknowledging and indeed justifying the philosophical merit of describing aspects of the work of intelligence in this language of interiority, he nevertheless contends that our intellectual achievements "are made more tangible if we see them in their natural setting, which is in the human conversation" (p 302) It is true that the poet, the scientist, and the philosopher need sometimes to think in solitude if they are to have something to say, but we cannot carry out this "darkroom thinking" without the syntactical forms and vocabulary that public discourse provides (p 303)

The concluding sentences of this original and evocative book provide the best summary of its themes and a typical example of Sokolowski's distinct philosophical voice "Through words we enjoy an articulated world in common and engage in reciprocal exchanges, whether moral, commercial, or political, in both friendship and alas enmity By using them we take a stand among others, across space and time, and exercise and declare our own agency Words allow us to live involved in light" (p 324) —Richard Cobb-Stevens, *Boston College*

SORABJI, Richard *Self Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* Chicago University of Chicago Press, co-published with Oxford Oxford University Press, 2006 xi + 400 pp Cloth, $35 00—Richard Sorabji's *Self Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* begins and ends with mortality In the introduction Sorabji tells us that his interest in the topic of the self "stemmed from my discovery at the age of six that mortality applied to me and not just to insects" (p 1) The final chapter addresses the question of whether the fact of mortality should fill us with dismay, and concludes that while evolution may have programmed us to feel horror at

the thought of annihilation, the "ideal attitude is to think that what matters is not the location of our life in the flowing series of past, present, and future, but the quality of our life" (p 341) Between these very personal observations is a treasure trove of reflection on a range of questions concerning the nature and duration of self

These reflections proceed via a combination of meticulous scholarship, rigorous philosophical analysis, and astute observation They feature rich, detailed readings of texts often neglected in present-day discussion, concentrating primarily on the Ancients, but including also writings from Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic thinkers Throughout, Sorabji gives the reader access to subtle and ingenious insights largely lost in current debates He demonstrates the ways in which these insights can be applied to existing problems, and offers his own account of the self as "an embodied individual whose existence is plain to see something that *has* or *owns* psychological states as well as *having* or *owning* a body and bodily states" (p 4)

Virtually every aspect of selfhood is addressed in the book, which is divided into seven main topics Part I sets the stage by discussing the question of what a self is, and explaining why, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should operate on the assumption that selves exist. Here Sorabji argues that there is a discernable philosophy of the self in antiquity, surveying the way in which different accounts of and puzzles about the self arise at different times Part II deals with questions of personal identity over time, showing how many of the puzzles about diachronic identity found in Locke and the Moderns, and in present-day literature, echo issues that were discussed (often in richer detail) by the Ancients Part III looks at how questions about the differentiation of selves have been addressed throughout history, highlighting the tension between the demand for a unified and transcendent soul on the one hand, and the desire for individual immortality on the other The problem of individuating embodied selves is also discussed

Part IV shifts gears and considers various topics related to the role of the self in practical reasoning Here Sorabji contrasts the Stoic view that what is right for someone to do depends upon her nature with Kantian universalism, discusses narrative conceptions of the self and the emphasis they place on life as a whole, and looks at early understandings of self as will Part V looks at the many puzzles that arise with respect to the notion of self-awareness Sorabji considers differing views on how difficult it is to achieve self-knowledge (contrasting, for example, the Platonists with Augustine and Descartes on this matter) and discusses the idea (found both in Aristotle and in current developmental psychology) that awareness of self requires having a conception of others He also describes Ancient views on the unity of self-consciousness, relating them to ongoing debates in the philosophy of psychology Part VI supplies the most direct and sustained argument for Sorabji's repeated claim that we are not ownerless bundles of experiences but rather the owners of such bundles This discussion includes extended focus on Buddhist and Hindu accounts of self Part VII addresses the question of whether there is a coherent way of thinking about surviving the death and destruction of our bodies Reincarnation and disembodied existence are considered, and there is a fascinating consideration of

the possibility that we might survive through time's being circular Finally, Sorabji returns to the question that originally got him thinking about the self, whether it is rational to feel horror at the possibility of one's own annihilation

Each of these seven sections is overflowing with detailed exegesis of entrancing yet difficult passages from texts both familiar and obscure Especially effective is Sorabji's strategy of offering insightful and incisive philosophical analysis first and ending with extended quotations of the relevant passages Personal and broadly humanistic concerns—like the question of mortality that frames the book—are never far from the discussion, no matter how esoteric or abstract the topic at hand In this way Soabji brings to life and makes compelling complex philosophical debates that have been pursued for millennia. There is truly something for everyone in this magnificent study, and it represents a precious resource for those interested not only in questions of self, but more generally in the evolution of human thought —Marya Schechtman, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

STEINBOCK, Anthony J *Phenomenology and Mysticism The Verticality of Religious Experience* Bloomington Indiana University Press, 2007 x + 309 pp Cloth, $44.95 —As the title suggests, this work provides a phenomenological account of mysticism and the "verticality of religious experience " In the introduction, the author tells us that "though there are several forms of verticality, this work concentrates on just one kind of vertical givenness, what I term *epiphany*, and the countervailing movements of idolatry" (p 2) The introduction makes the large claim that "ultimately, if our society and ecosystems are in disarray and in turmoil, it is because our relations to the vertical dimensions of experience are in disarray and in turmoil" (p 1) This larger claim is not developed but the discussion of idolatry culminates in the claim that capitalism is evil in the sense that it loses the vertical orientation toward persons and culture such that everything becomes a mere object As such, it is a form of idolatry A critical theme of the work is a rejection of the "Modern prejudice that the Self is the primordial point of departure" and the assumption that the Self is "self-grounding" (p 163)

The book has eight chapters and a brief conclusion (epilogue) The first chapter discusses "The Religious and Mystical Shape of Experience " This is followed by three chapters, each of which discusses the mystical experience as it is described by a mystic in the Abrahamic tradition a Christian (Teresa of Avila), a Jew (Rabbi Dov Baer), and a Muslim (Rūzbihān Baqli) Subsequent to the account of these three mystics are chapters on evidence in religious experience, epiphany (the central theme of the book), individuation, and idolatry The work makes good use of the writings of these three mystics and a wide-ranging bibliography of the writings of other mystics and of scholarly work on mysticism, both historical and contemporary The works of Zaehner, Otto, Buber,

and Weil are often cited Phenomenologically the work is informed most importantly by Husserl (particularly for his account of evidence and the experience of time) and Scheler (especially for his phenomenology of loving) Steinbock finds Heidegger's contribution to the phenomenology of religion "compelling" but "misleading" (p 166) Though Heidegger is "working at the core of experience" (p 166), according to Steinbock, what Heidegger finds ultimate is "an impersonal enigmatic regioning for which there is nothing to be responsible" (p 165) For Steinbock, the vertical epiphanic experience of mysticism is profoundly personal This distinguishes Abrahamic mysticism from Eastern Though occasionally Steinbock refers to Eastern mysticism, especially Zen Buddhism, he is concerned only with the Abrahamic mystical tradition What most importantly distinguishes the Eastern mystical traditions from the Abrahamic is the status of the individual The Eastern traditions attenuate the individual, while the Abrahamic is "trained on individuation" (p 177) The chapter on individuation attempts to give phenomenological substance to the proposition that in losing the self, one finds oneself He is critical of Dan Zahavi's recent book, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, for not taking into account mystical experience

He acknowledges important differences between the three mystics and their respective religious traditions, but he claims that these mystics "often share more with each other than they do with others of their own religious tradition" (p 233) Themes he finds in common among these mystics include the mystical union, the loss of self, verticality, and epiphany Epiphany names a certain kind of givenness in contrast with "disclosure," "display," and "manifestation " He asserts that "epiphany *qua* religious experience is the foundation of religion" (p 230) Idolatry is the reversal of the verticality of the religious Modes of idolatry are pride, attachment to the 'world' (secularism and fundamentalism), and delimitation

Sometimes Steinbock seems to recognize the difference between religious experience in general and mystical experience "Mystical experiences are not to be equated with all religious experiences" (p 19) Yet, he often seems to be claiming that in its root (epiphany) religious experience is mystical experience "I operate with a specific sense of religious experience described and clarified by the mystics of the Abrahamic tradition" (p 21) This suggests that the task is to illuminate religious experience through the experience of mystics In so doing, this account fails to show the specific distinctiveness of mysticism within religious experience The reader is left uncertain as to whether this book represents a phenomenology of religious experience or mystical experience or both (inasmuch as they are the same) Similarly, the book does not sufficiently discuss the other types of verticality A more extensive discussion would provide better context and illuminate better the sort of experience with which Steinbock is concerned Too often his account relies on a rather simple and binary contrast of vertical experience with the perceptual experience of objects (horizontal) So much of human experience is neither mere perception nor is it vertical and epiphanic in Steinbock's sense, for example, our practical involvement in the world with other people, animals, and the environment (natural and built) Steinbock acknowledges this but takes it too little into account —Robert J Dostal, *Bryn Mawr College*

TAYLOR, Mark C *After God* Chicago University of Chicago Press, 2007 xviii + 464 pp Cloth, $35 00—Like many scholars of the twentieth century, Mark Taylor is impressed by the revival of religion despite what was supposed to be the inexorable secularization of modernity Taylor presents a provocative interpretation of this phenomenon, and an impassioned plea to transcend our "culture wars" by embracing a "religion without God and an ethics without absolutes" Taylor is particularly alarmed at the revival of "neofoundational religion," which, in an "unholy alliance" with "neoconservative politics and neoliberal economics" (p 255) now threatens us with planetary extinction "If disaster is to be avoided," he says, "there must be a radical transvaluation of values" (p 344)

He begins with a transvaluation of the usual interpretation of the historical development of modernity Secularism itself is a religious phenomenon, rooted in the individualism and scientistic empiricism of Luther and Ockham Calvin turned Luther's theological radicalism into a social and economic radicalism that culminated in the enlightened Scots Calvinists of modern capitalism In the nineteenth century, Hegel turned Luther's theology into a philosophy of history

On the other hand, and contrary to the claim of contemporary conservatives, secular modernism has not produced a dangerous relativism and nihilism "I am a committed relativist," Taylor notes (p 254) Rather, neofoundational religion is the real source of nihilism and the greatest threat to human existence Saint Paul turned the originally life-affirming religion of Christ into a dangerously other-worldly creed that now threatens annihilation "For the apocalyptic imagination, the best way to hasten the arrival of the next world is by working for the destruction of this world" (p 355) Thus the neo-orthodox who are most apt to call their secular opponents nihilists are the ones who actually embrace a "culture of death," as we saw in the extenuation of the death of Terry Schiavo and, above all, in the looming planetary extinction of global warming Due to the neofoundationalists' death-wish, "the fate of the harlequin frog might well prefigure the fate of all life on earth" (p 376)

Taylor applies a Hegelian philosophy of history to the problem Of particular interest is his description of how early Christological controversies laid the foundation for modern philosophy Taylor claims that Hegel was the first to understand fully the implications of what Luther had taken from them, in dialectical fashion Theologians understood God, and modern man understands himself, in the progression of self-as-subject (Father), self-as-object (Son), and finally their interrelation (Holy Ghost) Hegel offers an "after God" theology that Taylor seeks to recover and build upon

His solution appears to be to reject all of the "either/or" alternatives that history has presented—such as transcendence/immanence, nominalism/realism, monism/dualism, and essentialism/existentialism We must recognize, with the help of recent linguistic, network and communication theory, that all existence is relational, that seeming opposites are "co-dependent and co-evolving" Recent work confirms Ralph Waldo Emerson's image of the "transparent eyeball," which teaches us that "to be is to be related" (p 313) The most important call is for reli-

gious liberals to regain their voice and to help us see that secular modernism is ultimately a religious phenomenon, and to restore the nineteenth century movements of religion without God and ethics without absolutes In the final analysis, life has no meaning or purpose other than life itself Life is "autotelic," a process whose purpose is nothing more than the process itself (p 317)

After God sounds much like James Davison Hunter's depiction of contemporary American life in *Culture Wars*, though it rarely cites Hunter Though containing many valuable accounts and ideas, particularly in the history of philosophy, *After God* is notably uneven At times it is overly technical and sophisticated, arguing fine points of specialized doctrine with too much jargon At other times it is ham-handedly partisan and polemical. He attributes the 2004 election of George W Bush to the intervention of Cardinal Ratzinger, his source for this claim being Sidney Blumenthal by way of Jack Miles Many of the book's strengths will fall into the crack between specialists and general readers —Paul Moreno, *Hillsdale College*

VERENE, Donald Philip. *Hegel's Absolute—An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit* Albany State University of New York Press, 2007 xv + 131 pp Cloth, $59 50; Paper, $19 95—*The Phenomenology of Spirit* represents a watershed in the history of philosophy At the same time, particularly for philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, my sense is that few are very familiar with Hegel Thus, the philosophical community should welcome Professor Verene's volume *Hegel's Absolute*

In the first half of *Hegel's Absolute* the essentials of Hegel's system are presented, in spite of Verene's claim that his aim is not Hegel "made simple " Made simple or not, he provides the initial guidance one needs to begin a study of the *Phenomenology* He begins by stressing the importance of understanding basics of the Preface, Introduction, Part A (Consciousness) and Part B (Self-Consciousness) in order to understand the final section, Part C (Reason), including Absolute Knowing In explaining Part A and Part B he focuses on two central principles of Hegel's philosophy 1) recollection (*Erinnerung*) and 2) speculation or reason (*Vernunft*) Recollection is the self's growing awareness of where spirit or human consciousness has been, which Hegel refers to as the "highway of despair " Each prior stage contains internal contradictions and fails to unify itself, continually collapsing into an ever new, expanding stage of consciousness But the failure in all prior stages, leading up to the final section on Absolute Knowing, represents the growth of philosophical insight for Hegel It is the "seeing into the object" which only speculative reason can provide Speculation for Hegel is contrasted with reflection or understanding Most philosophy since the modern times have thrived on later Admittedly, reflection can provide clarity into our thinking but is limited from Hegel's point of view Speculation is necessary if we wish to see the whole picture of reality—the "true "

Verene's commentary casts modern thinkers as Locke and Kant as overly fearful thinkers Their thinking achieved certainty and clarity at the price of not seeking the truth Hegel, like Socrates, is the ultimate philosophical risk-taker, willing to grapple with illusions of consciousness, always in a state in internal duality or opposition Speculative philosophy is the story of the double *Ansich*, the "double itself", at each stage in the pursuit of oneness which consciousness is never able to attain Experience is the movement of dual moments—the collapse of one and the ascendancy of the other—only for a new oppositional moment, or stage of consciousness, to emerge The speculative philosopher is the one who has taken the entire journey, which constitutes self-understanding of the whole For Hegel, "the true is the whole." Yet truth cannot be taught, as Verene points out, but must be self-taught—by genuinely immersing oneself on the dialectical journey and appreciating the inherent irony of human experience Seeking truth is a life of using irony, saying other than what one means Only through irony can the subject of experience capture the "doubleness" of experience and the canceling and preserving—the *Aufhebung*—that allows consciousness to expand into into Absolute Knowing

Verene provides a summary of each stage of consciousness up to emergence of self-consciousness of the self Beginning with "sense-certainty" consciousness assumes the certainty of the immediate object of consciousness But as consciousness affirms its object, the object becomes a negative and dissolves into multiplicity of "heres" and "nows " The immediate knowing of particulars is shown to be impossible and knowledge requires the universal Perception thus, involves a deception Through sensation, perception, and now, understanding, the universal, or the "concrete universal" has emerged Naive consciousness through understanding is beginning to think conceptually But the object is still a thing with properties, all of which are universals, which consciousness views as a "play of forces " The inner nature of the object cannot be penetrated at this level—since there is always the possibility of deception We are left with the realization that all of this uncertainty is within the self, which results in self-consciousness

In the final two chapters, Professor Verene provides an overview of the last half, Part C, of the *Phenomenology* The self has become educated and aware of itself, and will gain inner knowledge by understanding that the external forms of social and cultural life, including religion, are its own We are advised to just keep reading and not get stuck on the obscure details of Hegel's dialectic In the final two chapters, the reader is provided with summaries of the final dialectical transitions, including "Reason," "Spirit," and "Religion," up to "Absolute Knowing " At the conclusion, Verene includes a helpful glossary of key terms in the *Phenomenology*, which provide rich nuances of meaning for those, like myself, unable to translate the original

Overall, *Hegel's Absolute* is geared to professional philosophers but also would be useful for all advanced students of humanities But this would be only a warm-up for the would-be philosopher, who must become immersed into the *Phenomenology* itself —Wayne Shelton, *Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical College*

WIMSATT, William C *Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings Piecewise Approximations to Reality* Cambridge, Mass , and London Harvard University Press, 2007 xvi + 450 pp Cloth, $ 49 95—The book contains essays written by William C Wimsatt since 1971 The essays discuss how scientific method must be constructed to account for complex systems such as they are found in biology, engineering, society, and culture Wimsatt builds his theories on the work of Herbert Simon, Donald Campbell, Richard Lewontin, and Richard Levins He argues that we are "limited beings in a rich, messy world" (p 5) and that we must build our knowledge on heuristics This does not entail relativism Rather, it leads to acknowledging the biases of scientific approaches Through this awareness, an explanation of complexity becomes possible Wimsatt exemplifies this by concepts that are used in biology namely, "robustness, heuristic strategies, near-decomposability, levels of organization, mechanistic explanation and generative entrenchment" (p ix)

Part I of the book explains the need for heuristics as scientific method Part II provides for heuristic principles, and Part III shows how the application of those principles on complex issues provides for more suitable results than simple reductionism Part IV discusses an engineering example that led Wimsatt to explore heuristics as a more appropriate way for problem solving The appendixes A, B, and D are particularly useful because they summarize scientific methods and how they should be used to generate workable results In the appendixes, Wimsatt also points out the pitfalls of particular scientific approaches that are helpful to avoid fallacious conclusions The definition of terms in Appendix C and the references are most helpful to acknowledge that in order to understand complexity we need to employ sophisticated tools

After a very thorough introduction in Part I, Part II deals with approaches to understand complex systems One approach, based on the work of Levins and Campbell, is robustness defined as different methods to verify conclusions It assumes bounded rationality Similarly, "bootstrapping," (the term stems from Clark Glymour), advocates for using different empirical tests to check one's hypothesis For robustness, the use of levels of organization allow for research parameter This method also allows for detecting one's own judgment biases, (Wimsatt refers here to the work of Tversky and Kahneman as well as of psychologist Gigerenzer)

Chapter 5 gives a compelling case for heuristics as scientific methodology, and it also describes a number of heuristic approaches In chapter 6, Wimsatt explains the usefulness of false models to detect theories False models are also a safeguard to detect biases that tend to exist even in correct models Wimsatt points out generative entrenchment (Wimsatt exemplifies this through genetics) that can easily lead to bias

He argues that complex systems tend to be robust, rely on numerous adaptations (so called *Kluges*), show generative entrenchment and are composed of levels of organization He sees this also as a feature of cultures and of historical processes (p 135) In addition, it gives credence to evolutionary epistemology (p 136 and chapter 13) Still, Wimsatt

opposes post-modern relativism as a common reaction to complexity For Wimsatt, understanding just has become more sophisticated in light of acknowledging reality as being highly complex

Part III explores the ontology of complex systems and pragmatist tools to understand those In order to conceptualize complex systems, Wimsatt employs an ontology of systems (organizational *Bauplane)* that is based on levels of organization, perspectives, and causal thickets Levels of organization are systems that are connected to other systems to form a whole. Often, levels of organization work in a manner that changes at one level will be compensated by other features of the whole thus making a system stable Perspectives acknowledge the subjective side without sacrificing objectivity Causal thickets describe the interrelatedness of levels of organization and perspectives Thus calls for "an embodied socialized theory of consciousness" (p 234)

In chapter 12, Wimsatt demonstrates that context-sensitivity (emergence) is not contradictory to reductionism if the biases of reductionism are considered Thus can be demonstrated by an amplifier where aggregativity needs to meet specific conditions (the four conditions are listed on pp 280–1) to have the same results if the parts are ordered differently Theories on decomposition also must be mindful of the robustness of a system, of generative entrenchment, the effects of approximations and tolerances, decompositions based on functions, and on disciplinary specializations The concluding epilogue summarizes the findings in the book that is exemplified by an engineering problem that Wimsatt resolved early on in his trans-disciplinary and distinguished career

For me, this book is a reminder that humility is indeed a virtue because we are "limited, fallible, and error prone scientists" (p 308) However, keeping this in mind allows us to make claims about objectivity that become workable for us as universal knowledge —Erich P Schellhammer, *Royal Roads University*

WOOD, Allen W *Kantian Ethics* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2008 xviii + 342 pp Cloth, $80 00, Paper $25 99—Wood's *Kantian Ethics* is a systematic reconstruction of Kant's moral philosophy that never leaves Kant's text far behind, in fact, Wood mobilizes Kant's entire corpus to great effect By contrast, there is relatively little discussion of contemporary Kantian ethicists or other contemporary moral theorists Instead, the work is primarily concerned with setting the record straight about Kant's views on ethics and secondarily with situating those views within the general setting of contemporary moral philosophy

The preoccupation with what Kant said might seem odd in a book that claims to be about Kantian ethics rather than about Kant's own ethics Yet Wood recognizes this oddity and addresses it For an ethics to be properly Kantian, Wood suggests, it would have to adopt a methodology that departs from the methodology most widely pursued in

contemporary ethics That contemporary methodology is derived from Henry Sidgwick's rational intuitionism, and is found in its most well-known form in Rawls's conception of reflective equilibrium The familiar idea is to work out a refined, precise moral conception by working toward moral judgments that are grounded on principles that have themselves been rigorously tested against our strongly held intuitive judgments Many contemporary philosophers who have attempted to understand Kant have made a serious mistake in assimilating him to this methodology, Wood contends, for it is entirely foreign to Kant Yet, these philosophers are not simply making an exegetical mistake, according to Wood, they are leaving behind genuine insights of Kant that should be definitive of a Kantian approach to ethics Kant rightly disavowed, according to Wood, the aspiration to scientific standards of precision in morality

A related mistake many readers of Kant make, according to Wood, is to read him as a "constructivist" about morality Wood's Kant is a realist who grounds his approach to morality on an appeal to the 'nature of things' specifically, on an appeal to the intrinsic value of the rational will The two mistaken views—taking Kant to be seeking scientifically precise moral judgments together with taking him to be a constructivist—have been welded into a very popular and, to many philosophers, attractive view, with Rawls among its chief exponents Yet for Wood this view has led us to see Kant as by turns a rigid, dogmatic absolutist and as an advocate of an entirely subjectivist, self-made morality By rejecting the scientific aspirations of contemporary readers of Kant, Wood believes we can avoid the view that Kant is a rigid, dogmatic absolutist Kant's moral philosophy happily leaves room for divergent interpretations of what morality demands While there are many substantive moral positions that follow from adopting a Kantian stance, according to Wood there is also considerable room for reflection and adopting different positions For example, Wood shows that it is fully comprehensible that one could end up advocating vegetarianism from a Kantian standpoint Yet this view does not end up in subjectivism because Kant is a realist about morality and any Kantian must begin with thinking about the real value of the rational will, we can do that best, Wood advocates, by reflecting on whether we are acting only on maxims that can be universal laws for all rational beings, as Kant direct us to do in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* This version of the categorical imperative does not give us a procedure for constructing a scientifically precise morality, but rather provides a framework within which we fallibly reasoning, historical beings, can continue to work toward realizing a rational moral society

Wood's book moves from this theoretical territory into a discussion of issues including punishment, social justice, sex, and lies In each case he attempts to reconstruct Kant's best views, at times, he goes to great lengths, appealing in the case of sexual morality to Kant's *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* to find seeds for a sexual morality more enlightened than the notorious views for which Kant is known in this area Wood thereby shows himself to be a masterful scholar Yet, the book is much more successful as a work of scholarship than as a work of contemporary moral philosophy While Wood's Kant is a compelling corrective to the Kant many of us take for granted, the arguments

correcting our vision of Kant are much better developed and more convincing than the brief passages that bring this Kant into contact with other threads of contemporary moral philosophy such as virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and feminist ethics The book therefore reads less like a fresh approach to Kantian ethics and more like a rehashing of Wood's *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1999) —John Hacker-Wright, *University of Guelph*

ZIOLKOWSKI, Theodore *Modes of Faith, Secular Surrogates for Lost Religious Belief* Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 2007 296 pp Cloth, $35 00—This book presents what it promises in the title It analyses different kinds of secular faith in European literature and sees this from the perspective of lost religious belief The erosion of Christian faith accelerated in the course of the nineteenth century as the Creation narrative was undermined by spectacular findings in geology and by Darwin's biological reordering of the descent of man, as the Higher Criticism of the Bible and its startling historical and anthropological discoveries qualified the understanding of Jesus and early Christianity, and as the social criticism of such radically different thinkers as Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche tore at the ideological roots of Christianity This historical change resulted in changes in philosophy and literature The tensions that these changes raised, produced a conspicuous surge of autobiographies and autobiographical novels revolving around the crisis of faith as experienced and expressed by thoughtful individuals in Europe Successive waves of literary works in the years at the beginning of the 20th century recorded the modes of secular faith, that individuals sought to replace the religious faith that had been challenged and often destroyed by the 19th century

The author starts with an analysis of the contest of faith and reason, making this clear by means of the work of Darwin, Frazer, James, and Weber, and shows subsequently how this is present in 19th century literature He sees in this period theologians of the profane that are characterized by the following quotation "He had lost his faith in Christianity, but his faith in something—he knew not what, but that there was a something as yet but darkly known, which made right right and wrong wrong—his faith in this grew stronger and stronger daily" (p 31) This means that the classic frame work of Christian faith has disappeared and in stead of that a lot of different forms appear on the scene For this the author uses a quotation from Karl Jaspers "The absurd faiths of the modern era, ranging from astrology to theosophy, and from National Socialism to Bolshevism, suggest that superstition has no less power over the human mind today than it had formerly" (p 49)

So the notion of the death of God plays an important role at the background of this book It looks as it were for the presented alternatives for the death of God This is found in art, by Stefan George in art as ritual, by Paul Valéry in art as order and by James Joyce by art as escape

According to the author's analysis more than any other novel of the 20th century, Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* represents the turn to art as a clear surrogate for the loss of religious faith There was not only the alternative of art, there was also the pilgrimage to India European thinkers, writers, and artists were crisscrossing India on cultural pilgrimages in search of the paradise they regarded as lost in Western civilization But it was questionable whether they found their salvation there A return was necessary to a social and philosophical resolution "Following the inevitable disappointment in their pilgrimages to India, it was therefore to politics and myth that the writers turned after the failure of the retreat into art for art's sake and the flight from Europe" (p 118) The result was a free-floating faith longing for an object expressed by Thomas Mann "One must believe And in what? In faith itself! Would be the correct answer For it is actually a kind of l'art pour l'art, a kind of faith as gesture and aestheticism It is faith in politics, in progress, in mankind and its perfectibility" (p 119) Because the Christian God failed, the God of socialism, progress, and perfectibility replaces him

Next to this there was the alternative of the myth There was a hunger for myth Man embraces myth because he must His mind seeks order everywhere in the universe, and if it cannot find order ready-made, it will impose order and believe in the order it has imposed All myths do the same thing they attempt to relate man in some meaningful way to the goings-on of the universe They reflect a world that is meaningful and orderly and, when they are outgrown because man's ideas about order have changed, the have to be discarded or altered and new myths must replace them (p 173) Not only the myth is seen as a surrogate, but also the longing for utopia If the inward turn to art had failed along with the outward turn to political solutions, whether in community or in myth, the obvious solution was Nowhere But where is Nowhere? Based on this question the author analyses the utopia as a response to social disorder, and the utopia in relation to time and space According to this analysis most of the literature in this field such as Huxley's *Brave New World* or George Orwell's *1984* turn out to be antiutopian They offer no better surrogate for religious despair

The author wants to show that the analysis of the situation at the beginning of the 20th century is worth our attention precisely because today's secularized society, especially in Europe but also among many rootless Americans, finds itself in a situation remarkably similar to that of almost a century ago This makes this book not only an analysis of the beginning of the 20th century but also of the 21st century, but in itself it offers a brilliant insight into the literature of the beginning of the 20th century —Ben Vedder, *Nijmegen, Holland*

ZUCKERT, Rachel *Kant on Beauty and Biology An Interpretation of the 'Critique of Judgment'* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2007 xiii + 409 pp Cloth, $99 00—It is not easy to say what Kant's third

Critique is about Its two main parts deal with aesthetics and teleology, but these subjects may seem at best only loosely connected In his introduction, however, Kant suggests that aesthetic and teleological judgment rest on the same principle of "purposiveness," which also specifies the ideal of a completed empirical science Moreover, Kant claims that this principle is a priori although it does not ground objective knowledge claims, it structures a distinctive form of "reflecting" judgment whose claims are both (inter-)subjectively valid and necessary That is, we must employ the ideal of a completed science in order to obtain an interconnected understanding of nature, we must explain organisms teleologically in order to understand them, and we are justified in requiring others to agree with our aesthetic judgments

Yet scholars have not generally focused or smiled upon Kant's attempt to present the *Critique of Judgment* as a single, sustained argument unified by the principle of purposiveness Most interpreters approach the work as a collection of separate discussions about aesthetics, various topics in the philosophy of science, and their relations to other topics in Kant's system Many regard Kant's principle of purposiveness as too vague to impart any substantive unity to his treatment of these topics, and some argue that what coherence the work has derives from elsewhere Rachel Zuckert, however, opposes such piecemeal approaches Like Hannah Ginsborg and Cristel Fricke, Zuckert argues that the principle of purposiveness does provide a substantive basis for a unified interpretation, but Zuckert has written the only book that treats the entire *Critique of Judgment* as a unified work She develops an original interpretation both of the principle of purposiveness and of how it unifies Kant's overall argument It is a rich, often ingenious book that makes an important contribution to Kant studies

Zuckert argues that reflective, aesthetic, and teleological judging all have the common structure of purposiveness without a purpose, which involves representing unity in contingent, empirically diverse characteristics of objects, and which is made possible by nonconceptually-guided anticipation of the future (pp 62, 86) In teleological judging we attribute this structure to an object we judge the individually contingent parts of organisms to stand in reciprocal *causal* relations to one another that are necessary means to the end of anticipating future needs in the organism as a whole (pp 117, 125) By contrast, in reflective and aesthetic judging, the subject's judgmental activity itself exhibits the structure of purposiveness without a purpose, which makes possible *cognitive* and formal (rather than causal and objective) relations among properties of objects (p 86) Zuckert calls reflective judging "proto-disjunctive" because it involves projecting (anticipating) a disjunctive, indeed, systematic whole of empirical concepts that guides us to correct and refine our empirical judgments by comparing the features of objects that fall under our current concepts with those of other objects (pp 76, 355) Finally, aesthetic judging likewise projectively unifies distinct properties of objects by interpreting them as parts of a whole without being guided by any determinate concept of this whole (pp 303, 308), and aesthetic pleasure too has a future-directed, intentional structure it is a state in which we aim only to maintain that state (p 266) Zuckert

also argues that applying her view of the principle of purposiveness to Kant's aesthetic formalism yields an "objectivist" reading that renders it more plausible than overly subjectivist readings we judge objects to be beautiful in virtue of relations of contrast and complement among their sensible properties, among their contents in the case of representational artworks, or among both form and content (pp. 181, 194, 211–12)

Why is it important that these forms of judging have a common structure deriving from the principle of purposiveness? According to Zuckert, showing that teleological and especially aesthetic judgments apply the principle of purposiveness is essential to Kant's argument that such judgments are justified She takes Kant to argue roughly as follows: (1) it is a condition of experience that we use the principle of purposiveness to form empirical concepts, (2) aesthetic (and teleological) judgments apply this principle, so (3) they justifiably claim (inter-)subjective validity (pp 321–2, 337, 366–7) I can only mention two objections here First, I am not convinced by Zuckert's argument that Kant holds (1), but I also don't see what work it does that is not accomplished by her weaker claim that we *ought* to approach nature purposively in order to perfect our empirical knowledge Second, it's not clear that (3) follows without a further premise that everyone must (be able to) apply the principle of purposiveness specifically in aesthetic judgments (see pp 335–6) Zuckert appears close to identifying the need to perfect our cognition by studying nature purposively with the need or ability to judge aesthetically, which seems more rationalist than Kantian —Michael Rohlf, *The Catholic University of America*

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

American Philosophical Quarterly
Vol 45, No 3, July 2008

The Problem of the Essential Icon, CATHERINE LEGG

The article provides information on the philosophical meanings of icon, index, and symbol It discusses the distinction among these three which are considered as kinds of signification or the three kinds of relationship between a sign and its object It is stated that icons signify objects by resembling them, indices signify objects paradigmatically by being in contact with them physically via causation or through copresence, and symbols are the triadic signification of objects using some kinds of conventions or rules

Phenomenal Intentionalities, WILLIAM G LYCAN

The article discusses on the philosophical meaning of the term "phenomenal intentionality" It provides information regarding the issues surrounding the term as instigated by the philosopher Alvin Goldman Other arguments and philosophical positions about surrounding attitudes and functionalism are also given The article also defines the subjects with introspect differences in the strength of desire, firmness of intention, happiness, and confidence in judgment

Ethical Intuitions. What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify, MATTHEW S. BEDKE

The article discusses the philosophy of ethical intuitions It defines ethical intuitions and shows what they are not and how they justify scenarios It provides information on moral epistemology, theories, and beliefs The article also philosophically analyses the term "initial intellectual seemings" Self-evidence, intellectual seeming theory, and sensory experience are further discussed in the article to support arguments regarding the meaning of ethical intuitions

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review* We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed

The Review of Metaphysics 62 (December 2008) 451–477 *Copyright © 2008 by The Review of Metaphysics*

Semantic Compositionality, Predicates, and Properties, ANTONIO RAUTI

The article presents a discussion of semantic compositionality, predicates, and properties, including information on the philosophical background and an analysis of these three terms It shows their relationship to language, ontology, natural science, and realism The article also offers some arguments on compositionality and semantics The main point of the article is to investigate these terms in order to shed light on the confusion and difficulty in understanding their definitions

Can Expressivists Tell the Difference Between Beauty and Moral Goodness? JAMES HAROLD

The article presents a discussion of the distinction between beauty and moral goodness, specifically on the capacity of expressivists to identify the difference between moral goodness and beauty The article focuses on the differentiation of the types of normative attitudes toward goodness and beauty as a key to identifying the distinction This emotion type solution is discussed in detail to expound on the topic being tackled in the article

"My Body" "My X" and "I", JONATHAN WESTPHAL

The article presents a discussion of the terms "I," "my body," and "my " It provides information on their philosophical background and gives an analysis of the three within the context of language, speech, and linguistics The article details the Cartesian hypothesis and predicates, the two factors which might solve the problem of how to differentiate the three terms Examples are given to illustrate these factors

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The Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol 86, Issue 3, September 2008

The Error in the Error Theory, STEPHEN FINLAY

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J L Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims (1) that moral judgments essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1) It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth conditions of moral claims These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute An analogy is drawn between moral judgments and motion judgments

The Vanishing Argument from Queerness, LEE SHEPSKI

The "argument from queerness", made famous by J L Mackie, remains one of the most influential arguments in metaethics However, many philosophers focus on just one or two of its strands, while others assume a particular but by no means universal reading of it This essay attempts to disentangle and evaluate all strands of the argument Surprisingly, when this is done, not much is left as a distinct argument from queerness Much of the argument collapses into other types of argument, and what is left, though intuitively appealing, is not viable as philosophical argument

The Reliability of Moral Intuitions A Challenge from Neuroscience, FOLKE TERSMAN

In a recent study at Princeton, Joshua Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas, some involving the use of violence It has been argued that the results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight The author distinguishes between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a skeptical attitude towards intuitions The author argues against the first version of the challenge, that the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings, and against the second, that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general

What Is at Issue between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth? JOHN FOX

This paper argues that epistemic accounts of truth claiming that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe are mistaken The defense of these accounts on the grounds that they can solve skeptical problems that traditional accounts cannot, the claim that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional accounts cannot, and, conversely, the attacks leveled against these accounts claiming that they collapse into idealism are rebutted It is argued that similarities in the systems of statements accepted by adherents to certain forms of epistemic and traditional accounts make singling out one claim as defining "true" important only in order to explain the value of truth Though some epistemic theorists have deemed the ability to explain the value of truth a merit of their account, minimal accounts of "true" fit a sound account of our valuing of truth in a way that epistemic accounts do not

Moore's Paradox, KRISTA LAWLOR and JOHN PERRY

G E Moore famously noted that saying "I went to the movies, but I don't believe it" is absurd, while saying "I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it" is not in the least absurd The problem is to explain this fact without

supposing that the semantic contribution of "believes" changes across first person and third person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic The authors offer a new solution to the paradox This solution is that the truth conditions of any Moorean utterance contradict its accuracy conditions Thus, they diagnose a contradiction in how the Moorean utterance represents things as being, so that they can do justice to the intuition that a Moore paradoxical utterance is in some way senseless, even if they know what proposition it expresses

Knowledge by Indifference, GILLIAN K RUSSELL and JOHN M. DORIS

Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley (2005) argues that whether or not the relational predicate "knows that" holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p The evidence for Stanley's thesis includes a number of intuitive judgments about examples In this paper the authors provide parallel examples for which Stanley's thesis requires unwelcome knowledge attributions, and argue that this is possible because his thesis conflicts with familiar and plausible principles about knowledge

In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics for "Know", BERIT BROGAARD

Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about "know" the truth value of sentences containing "know" is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment This sort of double indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving "know" than does standard contextualism However, relativism has come under recent attack it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of "know", and it entails, counter-intuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator This paper replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. It then argues that a version of contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment This version of contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds

Evidence, Experience, and Externalism, JACK C LYONS

The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), this paper intends to show that the Sellarsian

dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories This reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism Instead, it is used to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology

Kitcher, Mathematics, and Naturalism, JEFFREY W ROLAND

This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments

Can Vagueness Cut Out at any Order? ANNA MAHTANI

Could a sentence be, say, 3rd order vague, but 4th order precise? In Williamson [1999] we find an argument that seems to show that this is impossible every sentence is either 1st order precise, 2nd order precise, or infinitely vague The argument for this claim is unpersuasive, however, and this paper explains why

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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 16, No 2, August 2008

Compassion and the Solidarity of Sufferers The Metaphysics of Mitleid, DAVID CARTWRIGHT

On the centenary of Arthur Schopenhauer's death, Max Horkheimer spoke of his relevance (Aktualitat), praising the philosopher for confronting the horrors of existence without delusion and for providing an ethics in which the solidarity of those who are suffering can become decisive in human life While others have stigmatized Schopenhauer for his pessimism and irrationalism, Horkheimer reminded us that he was also the philosopher of compassion, of identification, and of solidarity After sketching Schopenhauer's conception of compassion, and after examining two of his attempts to explain compassion metaphysically—neither of which the author believes succeed—the author argues that a naturalized version of Schopenhauer's morality of compassion yields a new basis for understanding the solidarity of sufferers, one that supports Schopenhauer's description of the worldview of good persons

Back to Truth Knowledge and Pleasure in the Aesthetics of Schopenhauer, PAUL GUYER

Although he retained much of the outward trappings of Kant's aesthetics, Schopenhauer in fact rejected Kant's central theoretical conception of the free play of the cognitive powers with ideas in favor of a more traditional conception of heightened cognition of ideas as the basis of aesthetic experience Reading Kant through Schopenhauer's eyes, Nietzsche criticized Kant as well as Schopenhauer for offering an aesthetics for the spectator rather than the artist, but failed to see that Kant's theory of genius, grounded on his theory of free play, undercut this distinction

Life Is Merely a Mirror The Way to Ethical Metaphysics in Schopenhauer's Early Writings, MATTHIAS KOßLER

Arthur Schopenhauer claims that in his philosophy ethics and metaphysics are one and the same Usually the literature relates this assertion to the fact that his philosophical system laid down in *The World as Will and Representation* leads to a theory of redemption The author tries to prove by a thorough study of the early handwritten manuscripts and Schopenhauer's dissertation that the doctrine of character is his prior systematic conception from which the doctrine of will as thing in itself and its denial springs owing to some inconsistency in the first draft Since in Schopenhauer's theory of character the life of an individual human being is the mirror in which the essence becomes visible, there is a way to interpret also Schopenhauer's mature philosophy including the denial of will as "experience of character " The second part of the essay offers a short outline of such an interpretation which throws a new light on ethics

Schopenhauer's Metonymic Aesthetic, SANDRA SHAPSHAY

There is a notorious problem with Schopenhauer's identification of the Kantian thing-in-itself with Will How can one truly predicate something of the *Ding an sich* given adherence to Kantian strictures on knowledge? The author argues that Schopenhauer transforms the Kantian symbolic relationship (between beauty and the morally good) into one she terms "metonymic " Whereas Kant profoundly felt structural analogies afford some sensible confirmation of the good will, for Schopenhauer it is the experience of felt contiguities which constitutes the means by which human beings may have indirect access to the world as it is in itself

Schopenhauer on Aesthetic Understanding and the Values of Art, BART VANDENABEELE

While the young Schopenhauer was obsessed with the issue of the "better consciousness"—a supersensuous and extratemporal consciousness, which is aroused by aesthetic objects—he came to realize that the value of a work of art cannot be wholly captured in terms of the pleasurable experiences it offers Crucial in his view is the idea that works of art offer understanding of the world in and through the (Platonic) Ideas they communicate

This kind of understanding may offer aesthetic pleasure, but the value of a work of art cannot be fully estimated in terms of the aesthetic pleasure it yields, for at least part of the reason we value it arises from the understanding the work offers Some crucial (and often neglected) aspects of Schopenhauer's insightful discussion of tragedy show, or so the author argues, that the thesis that the value of all art is reducible to the value of the aesthetic pleasure it generates is flawed

Natural Beauty and Optimism in Schopenhauer's Aesthetics, ROBERT WICKS

Schopenhauer regards aesthetic experience as a means to salvation, but some of his remarks about natural beauty ascribe to it a negative value It is also a well known scriptural matter that Buddha became enlightened upon observing the morning star, and held up a single flower to transmit his state of enlightenment to others Among the subjects of this essay is how, within a Schopenhauerian perspective, such instances of natural beauty can consistently stimulate an enlightened state of mind, when Schopenhauer claims that their inspiring charm should not be taken seriously This problem is addressed within the broader context of describing how Schopenhauer's negative valuation of natural beauty reveals an inner teleology within his aesthetics that ultimately displays three different types of wisdom in an ascending order These are aesthetically acquired wisdom, morally acquired wisdom, and ascetically acquired wisdom, the latter two of which are tempered by the suffering that natural beauty leads us to ignore

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death, and Salvation, JULIAN YOUNG

Under the influence of Friedrich Lange's *History of Materialism*, the youthful Nietzsche embarked on a fundamental critique of *The World as Will and Representation* Surprisingly, however, this critique only made him more of a Schopenhauerian The reason for this, the article shows, is that the critique enabled him to resolve a fundamental contradiction in Schopenhauer's philosophy

The Ethical Significance of Selflessness, BERNARD REGINSTER

Schopenhauer describes the most desirable condition possible for human beings—"will-lessness," or freedom from desires and affects—as selflessness, or the absence of a sense of self, and argues that this condition is achieved through the distinctive cognitive stance characteristic of aesthetic contemplation The author examines the relation between the will and the sense of self, by virtue of which emancipation from the one is also a loss of the other He then considers various mechanisms through which knowledge can "quiet" the will He finally asks whether the reflective cognitive stance characteristic of aesthetic contemplation can produce, as Schopenhauer claims, the kind of will-lessness he calls "complete resignation" He argues that this reflective contemplation is unsuited to produce resignation because

it is unable to affect the will The article concludes with some tentative suggestions to resolve this paradox of reflection

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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 16, No 3, December 2008

Respecting Value, MARK ELI KALDERON

Joseph Raz motivates his own account of respect by criticizing Kant's Many (though not all) of Raz's criticisms are found deficient—Kant's account, properly interpreted and sympathetically extended, has the means to evade these criticisms In the end, Raz's account is not as strikingly different from Kant's as he may have supposed Indeed, Raz's account provides the material for a nonconstructivist interpretation of the derivation of the Formula of Humanity

The Myth of Practical Consistency, NIKO KOLODNY

Joseph Raz suggests that instrumental rationality—the idea that there is a special faculty or set of norms devoted to taking the apparent means to our ends—is a myth There is only the structure of reasons and our responsiveness, insofar as we are rational, to that structure This paper applies Raz's approach to practical consistency to the idea that there is a special faculty or set of norms devoted to avoiding intentions that we believe that we cannot jointly fulfill Here too, the paper suggests, there is only the structure of reasons and our responsiveness, insofar as we are rational, to that structure.—Correspondence to kolodny@berkeley edu

Rationalism about Obligation, DAVID OWENS

There is a difference between the way a reason for doing something recommends that action to us and the way in which an obligation demands that action of us This paper considers the obligations imposed by promises and commands It rejects Scanlon's recent account of obligation as inferior to that offered by Joseph Raz Raz analyses obligation in terms of the notion of an exclusionary reason The article agrees with Raz that the idea of exclusion is crucial to the analysis of obligation but rejects the idea that exclusion works by giving us exclusionary reasons Obligation is not a special reason for action

Rules, Regression and the "Background" Dreyfus, Heidegger and McDowell, DENIS MCMANUS

This paper explores the role played by two arguments—each of which turns on the idea of a "regress of rules"—in motivating Dreyfus's proposal

that we must recognize what he calls the "background" if we are to (in some sense) "make sense" of intentionality The paper evaluates how our recognizing the "background" might be thought to help us to deal with the problems that those arguments reveal If we expect that recognition to provide solutions to those problems, then the supposed solutions appear flawed Drawing on ideas set out by John McDowell (some of which Heidegger anticipated), the paper goes on to explore an alternative interpretation of Dreyfus's proposals as instead being part of an attempt to "dissolve" those problems Assessing such an interpretation may ultimately require, the paper argues, a broader reassessment of what we take "doing ontology", "doing phenomenology" and "doing therapy" to be — Correspondence to mcmanus@soton ac uk

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The Journal of Philosophy
Vol 105, Issue 2, February 2008

The Situation-Dependency of Perception, SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG

Is Realism Really Bad for You? A Realistic Response, NEERA K BADHWAR

Realism about oneself and others has long been regarded as a hallmark of mental health and happiness, conceived of as subjective fulfillment in an objectively worthy life Common sense says that sometimes ignorance is bliss, and social psychologists Taylor and Brown claim that empirical research shows that people who are mildly deluded about their abilities, achievements, and future prospects are mentally healthier and happier than highly realistic people This paper argues that, properly understood, realism really is good for us Realism requires being informed about the important facts of one's own life and human life in general, and being reality oriented in one's perceptions, evaluations, and responses Common sense is right to hold that being reality oriented and informed can sometimes be disastrous for us However, not being thus is usually worse Taylor and Brown's interpretations of the empirical data are often unjustified, and their arguments riddled with problems

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The Journal of Philosophy
Vol 105, Issue 3, March 2008

Nobody Needs a Theory of Art, DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES

What Colors Could Not Be An Argument for Color Primitivism, JOSHUA GERT

Risky Business: Evolutionary Theory and Human Attitudes toward Risk—A Reply to Okasha, ARMIN W. SCHULZ

The Journal of Philosophy
Vol 105, Issue 4, April 2008

Indeterminacy and Incomplete Definitions, DAVID BARNETT

A question is indeterminate just in case it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically Initially, many questions appear to be indeterminate For example, it appears to be indeterminate how many mountains there are Timothy Williamson has given a simple and powerful argument that indeterminacy is impossible Those who are persuaded by this argument need to explain away appearances of indeterminacy. Williamson and others have tried to do this for cases of vagueness In this paper, an attempt is made to do this for cases of explicitly incomplete definitions, such as the following definition of "nice*" (1) a number is nice* if it is greater than 15, (2) a number is not nice* if it is less than 15 Initially, it appears to be indeterminate whether 15 is nice* This appearance is argued against and explained away

Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism, J R G. WILLIAMS

Understand the Dimensions of Realization, THOMAS W POLGER and LAWRENCE A. SHAPIRO

The Journal of Philosophy
Vol 105, Issue 5, May 2008

Counterfactual Intervention and Agent's Capacities, NEIL LEVY

On Having a Point of View Belief, Action, and Egocentric States, CHERYL K CHEN

Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty, A Reply to Jackson and Smith, RON ABOODI, ADI BORER, and DAVID ENOCH

Moral Absolutism Defended, PATRICK HAWLEY

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"Technē" and the Good in Plato's "Statesman" and "Philebus", GEORGE HARVEY

This paper addresses a number of questions raised in the *Statesman* by the Eleatic Visitor's identification of certain ontological conditions for the existence of art of due measure, and therefore of all the *technai* My view is that evidence relevant to these questions can be found in the *Philebus*, and specifically, in an ontological doctrine presented at 23c–27c What emerges from an examination of the *Statesman* and *Philebus* is a highly developed conception of *technē*, one that affords a place for such ordinary human activities within the broader framework of Plato's philosophy

Spinoza on Civil Liberation, JUSTIN STEINBURG

In the final chapter of the *Tractactus Theologico-Politicus*, Spinoza declares that "the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom " While this remark obviously purports to tell us something important about Spinoza's conception of the civitas, it is not clear exactly what is revealed Recently, a number

of scholars have interpreted this passage in a way that supports the view that Spinoza was a liberal for whom civic norms are rather more modest than the freedom of the *Ethics* Against this view, this paper provides an interpretation of Spinoza's account of civil liberation that enables us to view the political writings as an extension of his larger ethical enterprise Specifically, it shows that, according to Spinoza, the state can promote robust liberty in a variety of ways, not least by influencing the behavioral patterns and affective dispositions of its citizens

Kant's Defense of Human Moral Status, PATRICK KAIN

The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant's biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views about moral status Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant's practical-metaphysical analysis of the origins of freedom, reveals Kant's principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral status

Hegel's Concept of Desire, SCOTT JENKINS

Hegel's assertion that self-consciousness is desire in general stands at a critical point in the *Phenomenology*, but the concept of desire employed in this identification is obscure This paper examines three ways in which Hegel's concept of desire might be understood and concludes that this concept is closely related to Fichte's notions of drive and longing So understood, the concept plays an essential role in Hegel's nonfoundational, nongenetic account of the awareness that individual rational subjects have of themselves This account, it is argued, is part of a larger concern with demonstrating the relation between theoretical and practical capacities of the subject The article also argues that this reading explains Hegel's emphasis on the figure of the bondsman in "Lordship and Bondage " The bondsman's experience of itself and its world instantiates Hegel's views on the integration of subjective capacities and the reality of objects of experience.

Mind
Vol 117, no 467, July 2008

Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action, SARA RACHEL CHANT and ZACHARY ERNST

Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group

must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members In spite of the fact that this so-called "interactive knowledge" is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge In this paper, we argue that such an account is necessary for any adequate analysis of collective intention Furthermore, we argue that an application of Robert Aumann's theory of interactive knowledge may be used to address several puzzling features of collective intention

Spinoza and Consciousness, STEVEN NADLER

Of the few discussions of Spinoza and consciousness, most conclude either that he has no account of consciousness, or that he has one but that it is at best confused, at worst hopeless This paper argues that people have been looking in the wrong place for Spinoza's account of consciousness, namely, at his doctrine of "ideas of ideas" Spinoza offers the possibility of a fairly sophisticated, naturalistic account of consciousness, grounded in the nature and capacities of the body Consciousness for Spinoza is a certain complexity in thinking that is the correlate of the complexity of a body, while human consciousness is nothing but the correlate in Thought of the extraordinarily high complexity of the body in Extension Spinoza anticipates the conception of mind that is emerging from studies in the so-called "embodied mind" research program This research program may hold out hope for a clearer understanding of some of Spinoza's more difficult claims

Character and Consistency Still More Errors, GOPEL SREENIVASAN

This paper continues a debate among philosophers concerning the implications of situationist experiments in social psychology for the theory of virtue In a previous paper (2002), the author argued among other things that the sort of character trait problematized by Hartshorne and May's (1928) famous study of honesty is not the right sort to trouble the theory of virtue Webber (2006) criticizes the author's argument, alleging that it founders on an ambiguity in "cross-situational consistency" and that Milgram's (1974) obedience experiment is immune to the objections leveled against Hartshorne and May Here the author responds to his criticisms The most important error in Webber's argument is that it overlooks a distinction between "one time performance" experiments and "iterated trial" experiments The paper explains why the former cannot begin to trouble the theory of virtue

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The Philosophical Quarterly
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A New Defense of Anselmian Theism, YUJIN NAGASAWA

Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical This paper seeks to establish a new defense which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once In developing this defense, the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being is considered

Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge, TIM BLACK

Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge they allow us to know far too easily that certain skeptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are This problem is a result of the theory's interaction with an epistemic closure principle Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified This paper argues that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead, a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge The author's solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge

Forbidden Ways of Life, BEN COLBURN

This paper examines an objection against autonomy minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston—that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life Hence autonomy minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life A modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy promoting education, is suggested The article concludes by suggesting some reasons why autonomy minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this

Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry, FRANK HINDRIKS

Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgments about intentional action and moral responsibility First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has a normative component This paper proposes a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action The praise blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not

Perceptual Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience, MICHAEL PACE

There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to skepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a nonskeptical epistemology This paper investigates these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense perception and argues that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a nonskeptical epistemology Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining how perceptual experiences serve as justifying reasons for empirical beliefs Alston and others have argued that a successful defense of a contemporary version of naive realism would secure further epistemological advantages The author argues that this is not the case A complete explanation of experience's reason giving power involves factors beyond the metaphysical nature of experience

A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics, REBECCA STRANGL

There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgment in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes This paper argues that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues

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Philosophical Review
Vol 117, Issue 2, April 2008

Utilitarianism without Consequentialism The Case of John Stuart Mill, DANIEL JACOBSON

This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism, second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres morality, prudence, and aesthetics This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations

Aquinas on Mental Representation Concept and Intentionality, JEFFREY E BROWER and SUSAN BROWER-TOLAND

This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species) It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind

The Unreliability of Naive Introspection, ERIC SCHWITZGEBEL

We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept Examples highlighted in this essay include emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily, does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology of thought (does it have a

distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?) Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward

Critical Notice of Kit Fine's "Modality and Tense Philosophical Papers", GRAEME FORBES

This critical review discusses the main themes of the papers in Kit Fine's *Modality and Tense Philosophical Papers* These themes are that modal operators are intelligible in their own right and that actualist quantifiers are to be taken as basic with respect to possibilist quantifiers The author also discusses a previously unpublished paper of Fine's on modality and existence

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Philosophical Review
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The Egg and I Conception, Identity, and Abortion, EUGENE MILLS

Suppose you and I are "human beings" in the sense of human "animals," members of the genus "Homo " Given this supposition, this article argues first and foremost that (it's at least very plausible that) we originated not at the moment of our biological conception but either before or after Biological conception is most plausibly seen as a momentous event in the continuing life of a preexisting organism—the egg—rather than a cataclysmic event ending one life and creating another This article considers and rebuts the most likely challenges to this claim This metaphysical point carries moral freight concerning abortion This article surveys familiar "pro-life" principles and argues that if any of them raises moral qualms about the permissibility of aborting zygotic pregnancies, then these qualms apply equally (or at least almost equally) to the permissibility of contraception and abstinence Hence no such principle provides a justification for condemning zygotic abortion while condoning abstinence or contraception

Saying Good-bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way, MICHAEL MCKENNA

Peter van Inwagen contends that if the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics This article considers two notable efforts, one by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza and another by David Widerker It shows

that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument, and offers a novel challenge to the argument Van Inwagen has not given good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in light of the dialectical context with the compatibilist Hence, it is not the compatibilist's burden to produce counterexamples to it Rather, it is van Inwagen's burden to produce relevant confirming instances of it

On Specifying Truth-Conditions, AGUSTIN RAYO

This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other This allows one to set forth an assignment of truth conditions to arithmetical sentences whereby nothing is required of the world in order for the truth conditions of a truth of pure arithmetic to be satisfied The essay then argues that such an assignment can be used to account for the a priori knowability of certain arithmetical truths

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Philosophy
Vol 83, Issue 4, October 2008

Moral Perception, TIMOTHY CHAPPELL

This paper develops an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic nonrealist complaints about ontological extravagance and "queerness" It shows how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J L Mackie (about motivation) The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains

Locke and the Mind-Body Problem An Interpretation of His Agnosticism, HAN-KYUL KIM

From the Lockean point of view, the mind/body problem is conceived as a problem created by us It is an error to think there is a problem with mind and body, an error of confusing nominality with reality This paper argues that Locke's agnosticism should be understood as a warning not to confuse our human point of view with what really is From this perspective, the mind/body problem is a nominal problem, not a real one It appears to us as a problem, but is not really so What makes it appear to us as a problem? This is Locke's starting point for solving the mind/body problem

Not Actually Hume's Problem On Induction and Knowing-How, STEPHEN HETHERINGTON

Philosophers talk routinely of "Hume's problem of induction." The usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of "Hume's problem" in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, the author will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge how and knowledge that. It will also be seen why Hume's "skeptical solution" was a perfectly appropriate response to his "skeptical argument"—rather than (as is often thought by analytic epistemologists) a merely descriptive response patently missing the normative skeptical point so strikingly formulated by Hume.

The Conflict of the Faculties *and the Knowledge Industry Kant's Diagnosis, in His Time and Ours*, DAVID EVANS

Kant's short essay is a reflection on the contemporary structure of academic studies, he examines this structure in terms of the functions of the State and of the Universities which form part of it. His analysis links the empirical facts with conceptual distinctions, in ways that are familiar from his more general and abstract philosophy. His main aim is to ground a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ways in which different Faculties of the University may approach intellectual issues that are of common interest to them. The author considers to what extent and how a Kantian analysis might be applied to our contemporary University situation. Despite the societal and intellectual differences between Kant's environment and ours, he argues that significant parallels exist between the two cases and that Kant's proposals and strictures for his own time have application for us today.

Primitive Modality and Possible Worlds, JAVIER KALHAT

This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when construed nonreductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. It first considers a nonreductive version of Lewis's modal realism, and then moves on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. The author's main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give us an adequate answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims mean, nor do they give us an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of what makes such claims true.

Infinitely Long Afterlives and the Doomsday Argument, JOHN LESLIE

A recent book of mine defends three distinct varieties of immortality. One of them is an infinitely lengthy afterlife, however, any hopes of it might

seem destroyed by something like Brandon Carter's "doomsday argument" against viewing ourselves as extremely early humans The apparent difficulty might be overcome in two ways First, if the world is nondeterministic then anything on the lines of the doomsday argument may prove unable to deliver a strongly pessimistic conclusion Secondly, anything on those lines may break down when an infinite sequence of experiences is in question

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol 76, Issue 3, May 2008

Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism, ERIK J. OLSSON

"Whatever Begins to Be Must Have a Cause for Its Existence" Hume's Analysis and Kant's Response, HENRY E ALLISON

How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified, DAVID ENOCH and JOSHUA SCHECHTER

In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief forming methods The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem, PETER BAUMANN

Epistemological contextualism—the claim that the truth value of knowledge attributions can vary with the context of the attributor—has recently faced a whole series of objections The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far the factivity objection This paper explains what the objection is and presents three different versions of the objection It then shows that there is a good way out for the contextualist However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism

Three Grades of Immediate Perception Thomas Reid's Distinctions, TODD BURAS

A New Argument for Non-conceptual Content, ADINA L ROSKIES

This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy The author presents an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning all perceptual concepts must be innate The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for, if the nonconceptual content of experience is admitted

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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The Virtue of Practical Rationality, SIGRÚM SVAVARSDÓTTIR

Practical rationality is best regarded as a virtue an excellence in the exercise of one's cognitive capacities in one's practical endeavors The author develops this idea so as to yield a Humean conception of practical rationality Nevertheless, one of the crucial features of the approach is not distinctively Humean and sets it apart from the most familiar neo-Humean approaches an agent's practical rationality has to do with the presence and form of his cognitive activity, as well as with how it engages his emotional and motivational states, rather than with the impact that his actions have on his utility or with how his actions relate to his expected utility The approach also contrasts with full information accounts of rationality The paper ends with a discussion of our interest in operating with the conception of practical rationality that emerges from this approach, even if it is so demanding that it would be humanly impossible to be perfectly practically rational

Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of Epistemic Regress, JOSÉ L ZALABARDO

This paper provides a construal of the epistemic regress problem and takes issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant It sketches a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism It ends with the suggestion that the strategy that has been presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe

foundational status to experiential beliefs It can also be used to generate a version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles

A Functionalist Theory of Properties, ANN WHITTLE

This paper considers a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties It argues that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties.

Is Locke's Theory of Knowledge Inconsistent? SAMUEL C RICKLESS

Why Be an Anti-individualist? LAURA SCHROETER

Antiindividualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that antiindividualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology Our commitment to antiindividualism, it is argued, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment Since antiindividualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency The story the author tells about the regulation of one's own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for antiindividualistic concepts

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol 77, Issue 2, September 2008

Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge, EDWARD HARCOURT

Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate, MATTHEW CHRISMAN

"True" as Ambiguous, MAX KOLBEL

This paper argues (a) that the predicate "true" is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of

deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate The overall position is not new and it has previously been defended by supervaluationists about vagueness However, the position is here motivated in a new, independent way, and an explanation is offered why some uses of "true" do not seem to require disambiguation

Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity, J ROBERT G WILLIAMS

John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy This paper responds to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and concludes that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong The author develops a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds, and argues that the revised version avoids Hawthorne's challenges It is argued that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis's first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis's own suggested modification

The Metaphysics of Harm, MATTHEW HANSER

Respect for Just Revenge, BRIAN ROSEBURY

This paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extralegal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgment we may make of such acts While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to obey other compelling motives This thesis is tested against various objections, notably those which doubt the intelligibility or application of such nonmoral "respect", or would assimilate it to moral approval, and it is distinguished from various positions with which it might be confused, such as the "admirable immorality" of Slote, or the Nietzschean critique of morality

The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection, MATTHEW SOTERIOU

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? This paper presents an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions According to this account, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgments about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting While the account concedes that when one recollects one's attitude to what is recollected

cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time travel—a case of revisiting, or reacquaintance with, some past episode

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Phronesis
Vol 53, no 4/5, November 2008

Doctrinalia Heraclitia I et II Âme du Monde et Embrasement Universal (Notes de Lecture), SERGE MOURAVIEV

In this paper dealing with Heraclitus's doctrine, the author examines two recent controversial articles with the content of which he sympathizes—one by Gábor Betegh (2007) on the cosmological (physical) status of Heraclitus's *psychē*, and the other by Aryeh Finkelberg (1998) on Heraclitus's cosmogony and the reality of a Heraclitean world conflagration This examination is aimed, first, at fostering "marginal" opinions which the author believes to be fundamentally correct—and the rejection of which since times immemorial (by Schleiermacher and others) he considers to have greatly harmed and hampered our understanding of the Ephesian philosopher, second, at introducing some personal corrections and additions to these opinions, and third, at illustrating the advantages of a deliberately unprejudiced approach towards our sources, an approach based on the presumption of innocence, knowledgeability, and intelligence for all our informers and on the rejection of any rejection (this is not a dittography!) of any source on ground of mere suspicion

Another Note on Zeno's Arrow, OFRA MAGIDOR

In *Physics* VI 9 Aristotle addresses Zeno's four paradoxes of motion and amongst them the arrow paradox In his brief remarks on the paradox, Aristotle suggests what he takes to be a solution to the paradox In two famous papers, both called "A Note on Zeno's Arrow", Gregory Vlastos and Jonathan Lear each suggest an interpretation of Aristotle's proposed solution to the arrow paradox This paper argues that these two interpretations are unsatisfactory, and suggests an alternative interpretation In particular, it claims that what seems on the face of it to be Aristotle's solution to the paradox raises two puzzles to which the author's interpretation, as opposed to Lear's and Vlastos's, provides an adequate response

Private Parts of Animals Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual Difference, KAREN M NIELSEN

This paper examines Aristotle's account of sexual difference in *Generation of Animals*, arguing that Aristotle conceives of the production of males as the result of a successful teleological process, while he sees the

production of females as due to material forces that defeat the norms of nature It challenges Devin Henry's argument that Aristotle explains sex determination exclusively with reference to material necessity (in particular, levels of "vital heat" in the male semen), for Aristotle's notion of "sufficient" or "deficient" vital heat is itself teleological If, as Aristotle is aware, male and female embryos appear with approximately equal frequency in most species, how, in light of *Physics* II, can he conceive of the two as in accordance and contrary to nature respectively? My proposal is that Aristotle's notion of what happens usually (ως επὶ τὸ πολυ) is bifurcated the usual need not be more frequent

Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed, JAMES WILBERDING

This paper argues that Porphyry's account of the nature of seeds can shed light on some less appreciated details of Neoplatonic psychology, in particular on the interaction between individual souls The process of producing the seed and the conception of the seed offer a physical instantiation of procession and reversion, activities that are central to Neoplatonic metaphysics In the course of developing his theory, Porphyry makes significant revisions to his philosophical predecessors' views in both embryology and botany He revises Aristotle's verdict on the relative importance of the female in generation as well as Theophrastus's explanation of the biological mechanics of grafting Although Plotinus nowhere addresses embryology in the same detail as Porphyry does, we can conclude from his remarks on seeds and plants that his own views were similar to those of his student

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Ratio
Vol. 21, Issue 3, September 2008

The Harm of Immorality, PAUL BLOOMFIELD

A central problem in moral theory is how it is to be defended against those who think that there is no harm in being immoral, and that immorality can be in one's self-interest, assuming the perpetrator is not caught and punished The argument presented here defends the idea that being immoral prevents one from having self-respect If it makes sense to think that one cannot be happy without self-respect, then the conclusion follows that one cannot be both immoral and happy Immorality is harmful because its self-disrespecting nature keeps immoralists from being happy This is the harm of immorality

Should a B-Theoretic Atheist Fear Death? MIKEL BURLEY

This article discusses Robin Le Poidevin's proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear

of death According to the most prevalent B-theoretic conception of our emotional attitudes, A-theoretic (and not B-theoretic) beliefs are sufficient to ground these attitudes The B-theoretic account of emotions and its relation to the fear of death is discussed It is argued that, according to this model, the fear of death is warranted, and hence that, if Le Poidevin's proposal is to stand, then we must be given either a new B-theoretic account of the connection between beliefs and emotions, or an account of why the fear of death is unlike other emotional attitudes

The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness Beyond Objectivity and Back Again, ISKRA FILEVA

This papers purpose is twofold to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue, and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual's decision making Decisions to do what is right or virtuous differ not only in motivation, but in point of view The "objectively right" course of action must be right, "neutrally" speaking if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A, as for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so The paper maintains that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken An account of objectivity's constraining power is offered

The Vagaries of Vegetarianism, JONATHAN HARRISON

The following was meant to be a "fun paper," which the author's honesty and natural seriousness of mind prevented from coming off well Its main theme is that it is not wrong to eat meat provided the animals eaten are painlessly killed or already dead In the course of his remarks the author touches on the bearing of affluence on vegetarianism, animal rights, child eating, treating animals as ends and with due Kantian respect, the inadequacy of the word "duty", aesthetics and morals, the distinction between private behavior and public duty, our duties to vegetables, snakes, flying ants, and Martians, and the desirability of irrationality in matters of duty, stealing and eating as much meat as possible as a way of bringing the meat industry to its knees, the contribution that animals should make to animal welfare, namely, allowing themselves to be eaten He ends by emphasizing the likeness of nonhuman animals to human animals

In Defense of Metaphysical Analyticity, FRANK HOFFMAN and JOACHIM HORVATH

According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads

into a highly implausible view about the truth makers of analytic truths We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of "independence of (extralinguistic) facts" If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truth makers of analytic truths no longer follows Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open

How to Reconcile Essence with Contingent Existence, STEPHEN K MCLEOD

To reconcile true claims of *de re* necessity with the supposedly contingent existence of the concrete objects those claims are typically about, Kripkean essentialists invoke weak necessity The claim that a is necessarily F is held to be equivalent to the claim that necessarily, if a exists then a is F This strategy faces a barrage of serious objections a proper subset of which shows that the strategy fails to achieve its intended purpose Relief can be provided via recourse to a markedly non-Kripkean version of essentialism

Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism, DANIEL STAR

This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favor of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might benefit from paying attention to this fact At the same time, the terrain of moral epistemology (approached as a subfield of metaethics) needs to be reshaped by the realization that externalists can steal the thunder of intuitionists when it comes to knowledge constituted by seemingly self-evident beliefs

Samples as Symbols, MARK TEXTOR

Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called "exemplification" (Goodman, Elgin) or "exemplarisation" (Lehrer) Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, Goodman's account of exemplification has several flaws This paper will offer an alternative account of exemplification that is inspired by Grice's idea that one can communicate something by providing one's audience with intention independent evidence and letting them draw the obvious conclusion for themselves This explication of exemplification will solve the problems that arose for Goodman's theory in the spirit of his approach

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Metaphysical Society Annual Meeting

The *Review of Metaphysics* is pleased to announce that the 60th Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America will take place on March 13 and 14, 2008 at Emory University in Atlanta The topic will be "Imagination, Reason, and the Real" Please visit the Society's website for more information http //web02 gonzaga.edu/faculty/henning//metaphysical_society/2009/2009_meeting htm

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Please remember that the deadline for the 2008 Essay Contest is January 15, 2009 All individuals who have been awarded the Ph D in philosophy in the year 2008 are invited to compete Please visit the *contents* page on the *Review's* website for more information and see the announcement this issue for more details

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The *Review of Metaphysics* is pleased to note that Jean-Luc Marion has recently been elected to the Académie Française He succeeds Jean-Maire Lustiger Jean-Luc Marion is the John Nuveen Professor of Religion and Theology at the University of Chicago and is a member of the Philosophy faculty and the Committee on Social Thought He has done important and original work on phenomenology, Cartesianism, Neoplatonism, patristics, and the philosophy of God

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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